Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Cannici was a Melrose Park firefighter for 16 years before being terminated for violation of the Residency Ordinance. Cannici and his family lived in Melrose Park until 2008 when they bought a home in Orland Park while retaining ownership of their Melrose Park home. During the week, Cannici’s wife and children lived in Orland Park, while Cannici lived in Melrose Park, spending weekends together in one of the homes. In 2013, Cannici rented the Melrose Park home out, reserving part of the basement for his exclusive use. He kept belongings in the home, paid utilities and taxes, and received all of his mail at the Melrose Park address, but slept in Orland Park between June 2013 and June 2016. In May 2016, the Village requested an interview to inquire about his residency. The Board of Fire and Police Commissioners issued a written Statement of Charges, seeking to terminate his employment. Before his hearing, Cannici filed an unsuccessful motion challenging purported ex parte communications between the prosecuting attorney and the Board’s attorney. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the dismissal of Cannici’s equal protection and due process claims. The Illinois statute does not provide full protection from termination; the Village afforded Cannici what the statute requires: written charges, a hearing, and the opportunity to present evidence. View "Cannici v. Village of Melrose Park" on Justia Law

Madlock, an African American woman, has worked at WEPCO since 1977. While Madlock was working in the Industrial Billing section, she was not in management, but was a point person for her team of “billers.” In 2011, WEPCO assigned a new management team, to perform a comprehensive review and institute metrics to measure performance. Wrycza, a white woman, became Madlock’s supervisor. The two did not get along. Madlock’s conduct, such as personal phone use, had already drawn the attention of management, and under Wrycza, Madlock’s conduct came under greater scrutiny. Wrycza followed WEPCO’s graduated discipline system to deal with billing errors and Madlock’s use of unprofessional language. Madlock was transferred to a different department, where she worked between two managers. The transfer did not affect Madlock’s title or salary, but co‐workers described it as a demotion and "a total humiliation." Madlock’s new supervisor, Phillips, a black woman, prompted Madlock to file an internal discrimination complaint against Wrycza. Madlock made another billing error. Madlock’s grievances were denied; the Vice President of Customer Service expressed shock at Madlock's errors. Madlock was denied a promotion due to her work record. Madlock sued (42 U.S.C. 1981), alleging racial discrimination and retaliation. The Seventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment for WEPCO, noting that the transfer caused no material change in Madlock’s employment and was not an adverse employment action. Madlock cannot show a sufficient causal link between her internal complaint and the alleged adverse actions. View "Madlock v. WEC Energy Group, Inc." on Justia Law

IC, the subsidiary of a Canadian corporation, hired plaintiff, a U.S. citizen, age 55, as a management trainee. He completed the program and served in multiple management positions. With a 2011 promotion, plaintiff reported to Clermont, a Canadian citizen. In 2012, Clermont was investigated for abusive workplace behavior. Plaintiff alleged that, because of Clermont’s behavior, he experienced physical symptoms and was taken to the hospital. Plaintiff requested reassignment. Clermont contacted Human Resources about “performance issues” with plaintiff and was told of plaintiff’s complaints. No transfer occurred. Plaintiff filed a complaint, referring to a “hostile work environment” and retaliation. Clermont wrote a letter about plaintiff's unsatisfactory performance. In 2013, as part of a company‐wide reorganization, Clermont was reassigned to Canada. Plaintiff’s position was eliminated. He took a clerical job. For the first time, plaintiff referenced the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. 621–34 (ADEA). Efforts to place plaintiff in management were unsuccessful. Plaintiff complained Clermont’s letter was “retaliatory” and claimed that he applied to 82 management positions and that many of those positions were filled by substantially younger candidates. Plaintiff filed suit, under the ADEA and Title VII, 42 U.S.C. 2000e. The Seventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of IC. Nothing in plaintiff’s complaints about Clermont suggested discrimination based on age or national origin. The evidence indicates the same events would have transpired if plaintiff had been younger than 40 and everything else had been the same. View "Skiba v. Illinois Central Railroad Co." on Justia Law

IC, the subsidiary of a Canadian corporation, hired plaintiff, a U.S. citizen, age 55, as a management trainee. He completed the program and served in multiple management positions. With a 2011 promotion, plaintiff reported to Clermont, a Canadian citizen. In 2012, Clermont was investigated for abusive workplace behavior. Plaintiff alleged that, because of Clermont’s behavior, he experienced physical symptoms and was taken to the hospital. Plaintiff requested reassignment. Clermont contacted Human Resources about “performance issues” with plaintiff and was told of plaintiff’s complaints. No transfer occurred. Plaintiff filed a complaint, referring to a “hostile work environment” and retaliation. Clermont wrote a letter about plaintiff's unsatisfactory performance. In 2013, as part of a company‐wide reorganization, Clermont was reassigned to Canada. Plaintiff’s position was eliminated. He took a clerical job. For the first time, plaintiff referenced the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. 621–34 (ADEA). Efforts to place plaintiff in management were unsuccessful. Plaintiff complained Clermont’s letter was “retaliatory” and claimed that he applied to 82 management positions and that many of those positions were filled by substantially younger candidates. Plaintiff filed suit, under the ADEA and Title VII, 42 U.S.C. 2000e. The Seventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of IC. Nothing in plaintiff’s complaints about Clermont suggested discrimination based on age or national origin. The evidence indicates the same events would have transpired if plaintiff had been younger than 40 and everything else had been the same. View "Skiba v. Illinois Central Railroad Co." on Justia Law

Guzman was a Brown County 911 dispatcher from 2002-2013. Since 2011, Brown County has had a third-party vendor manage disability, Family Medical Leave Act (FMLA), and unpaid leave requests. Employees do not need approval from a supervisor. Guzman was diagnosed with sleep apnea in 2006 and, in 2008, had gastric bypass surgery. Guzman received five warnings concerning her use of vacation time or casual time in 2004-2013, three warnings for failure to timely complete mandatory proficiency tests, and a warning for failure to report to work on a date that she mistakenly believed that she was not scheduled to work. Guzman was disciplined for being late to work in 2011 and three times in 2012. On February 9, 2013, Guzman failed to report and was given a three-day suspension and warned that if she was late again she could be fired. Guzman attributed her tardiness to sleeping through her alarms and did not mention sleep apnea. There is no evidence that her supervisors were aware of that diagnosis. On March 8, Guzman was again tardy. Guzman’s psychiatrist wrote a note stating that Guzman “most probably” had sleep apnea, and needed to be retested. Her employment was terminated. The Seventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment rejecting Guzman’s suit under the FMLA, 29 U.S.C. 2601, the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. 12112, and the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. 794. There was no evidence that Guzman requested FMLA leave before her termination. View "Guzman v. Brown County" on Justia Law

Guzman was a Brown County 911 dispatcher from 2002-2013. Since 2011, Brown County has had a third-party vendor manage disability, Family Medical Leave Act (FMLA), and unpaid leave requests. Employees do not need approval from a supervisor. Guzman was diagnosed with sleep apnea in 2006 and, in 2008, had gastric bypass surgery. Guzman received five warnings concerning her use of vacation time or casual time in 2004-2013, three warnings for failure to timely complete mandatory proficiency tests, and a warning for failure to report to work on a date that she mistakenly believed that she was not scheduled to work. Guzman was disciplined for being late to work in 2011 and three times in 2012. On February 9, 2013, Guzman failed to report and was given a three-day suspension and warned that if she was late again she could be fired. Guzman attributed her tardiness to sleeping through her alarms and did not mention sleep apnea. There is no evidence that her supervisors were aware of that diagnosis. On March 8, Guzman was again tardy. Guzman’s psychiatrist wrote a note stating that Guzman “most probably” had sleep apnea, and needed to be retested. Her employment was terminated. The Seventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment rejecting Guzman’s suit under the FMLA, 29 U.S.C. 2601, the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. 12112, and the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. 794. There was no evidence that Guzman requested FMLA leave before her termination. View "Guzman v. Brown County" on Justia Law

Martensen was a supervisor in the Chicago Stock Exchange’s unit responsible for examining compliance with trading regulations. He was fired in 2016. He claimed his firing violated 15 U.S.C. 78u–6(h), a part of the Dodd-Frank Act that protects whistleblowers. Martensen’s complaint did not allege that he reported any unlawful activity to the Securities and Exchange Commission. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the dismissal of his suit. Only a person who has reported “a violation of the securities laws to the Commission” is covered by 78u–6(h). The judge was wrong to reject Martensen’s proposal to file an amended complaint alleging that he had reported fraud to the SEC, but remand would be pointless. The report was unrelated to his discharge. A report to the SEC does not prevent employers from responding adversely to later reports that do not concern fraud or any other violation of the securities laws and never reach the SEC. Martensen acknowledged that the Exchange did not retaliate against him for the act that made him a whistleblower and did not argue that an internal complaint, which resulted in his firing, was “required or protected” by any particular rule of the Chicago Stock Exchange. View "Martensen v. Chicago Stock Exchange, Inc." on Justia Law

Jaworski provided construction services to Master Hand, an Illinois general contractor, over several years. Some of these services went unpaid. Jaworski alleged violations of the federal Fair Labor Standards Act, the Illinois Minimum Wage Law, the Illinois Wage Payment and Collection Act, and the Employee Classification Act, which makes it unlawful for construction firms to misclassify an employee as an independent contractor. The Classification Act presumes that the complainant is an employee unless the contractor proves otherwise; a misclassified employee is entitled to double “the amount of any wages, salary, employment benefits, or other compensation denied or lost to the person by reason of the violation.” The judge held that Master Hand had misclassified Jaworski and was entitled to the compensation guaranteed by the Minimum Wage Law and Wage Payment and Collection Act without having to prove that he is an employee. Those statutes do not include the presumption that plaintiffs are employees. The judge rejected Master Hand’s insolvency defense and ordered Master Hand to pay $200,000 in damages, plus $150,000 in attorneys’ fees. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, adding attorneys’ fees for the frivolous appeal. The court declined to review the rulings challenged by Master Hand, as a sanction for failure to follow court rules. View "Jaworski v. Master Hand Contractors, Inc." on Justia Law

In 2013, Grussgot was hired by a Milwaukee private school that provides non-Orthodox Jewish education. The school employs a rabbi and has a chapel and Torah scrolls but does not require its teachers to be Jewish. Grussgott claimed that she was solely a Hebrew teacher and had no responsibilities that were religious in nature. The school maintained that Grussgott was employed as a Hebrew and Jewish Studies teacher. Grussgott underwent treatment for a brain tumor and ceased working during her recovery. She has suffered memory and other cognitive issues. During a telephone call from a parent, Grussgott was unable to remember an event, and the parent taunted her. Grussgott’s husband (a rabbi) sent an email, from Grussgott’s work email address, criticizing the parent. The school then terminated Grussgott. Grussgott sued under the Americans with Disabilities Act. The school argued that because of Grussgott’s religious role, the ADA's ministerial exception barred her lawsuit. The district court agreed without considering the merits of her ADA claim. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Even taking Grussgott’s version of the facts as true, she falls under the exception as a matter of law. Her integral role in teaching Judaism and the school’s motivation in hiring her demonstrate that her role furthered the school’s religious mission. The school’s nondiscrimination policy did not waive the exception’s protections. View "Grussgott v. Milwaukee Jewish Day School, Inc." on Justia Law

Mann attacked his coworker, Baylay, a British citizen. The men, members of an Etihad Airways (incorporated in Abu Dhabi) flight crew, were at a Chicago hotel on a layover. Baylay sued Etihad, Mann, and the hotel’s corporate entities. The district court dismissed Baylay’s claims against Etihad, stating that they should be heard by the Illinois Workers’ Compensation Commission, and later dismissed Baylay’s remaining claims, reasoning that it had no original jurisdiction over the claims and declining to exercise its supplemental jurisdiction. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act imposes liability on the foreign state “in the same manner and to the same extent as a private individual under like circumstances,” 28 U.S.C. 1606. If the foreign state is not immune from suit, “plaintiffs may bring state law claims that they could have brought if the defendant were a private individual.” Baylay failed to show that his injuries would not be compensated under Illinois law. After Etihad’s dismissal, Baylay’s remaining claims included state-law claims against Mann and the hotel’s corporate entities. The corporate entities’ third-party contribution claims are entirely dependent on the resolution of the underlying state-law negligence claim against them. Baylay’s state-law claims substantially predominate; the district court’s decision to decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction was not an abuse of discretion in light of 28 U.S.C. 1367(c). View "Baylay v. Etihad Airways P.J.S.C." on Justia Law