Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

In 2011, Plaintiffs, former arbitrators for the Illinois Workers’ Compensation Commission, brought a due process action challenging the implementation of a workers’ compensation reform statute that terminated their six‐year appointments under prior law. The district court granted summary judgment for defendants. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, concluding that plaintiffs failed to demonstrate a clearly established right that was violated. While that suit was pending, the Illinois governor declined to reappoint Plaintiffs, which ended their employment. Two years later, Plaintiffs filed suit against the governor and his advisors, alleging retaliation for filing the prior suit and that the retaliation violated the First Amendment. The district court dismissed plaintiffs’ First Amendment claims, holding that the Due Process Suit was not protected speech. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, declining decide whether the Due Process Suit was speech on a matter of public concern as is required for a government employee to show retaliation in violation of the First Amendment. Plaintiffs’ claims fail because Plaintiffs were policymakers who could be not reappointed for engaging in “speech on a matter of public concern in a manner that is critical of superiors or their stated policies.” View "Hagan v. Quinn" on Justia Law

In 2013 the Sheriff of Whitley County, Indiana hired the county’s first black police officer, McKinney. Nine months later, McKinney was fired. He sued for race discrimination under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 2000e–2. The district court granted summary judgment for the Sheriff. The Seventh Circuit reversed. Viewed in the light most favorable to plaintiff, his extensive evidence adds up to a strong case of race discrimination. The Sheriff “has offered an ever-growing list of rationales for firing McKinney that fall apart in the face of his evidence.” The Sheriff’s termination letter provided three reasons for his discharge. Four days later, the Board of Commissioners sent McKinney another letter that added two more reasons. After McKinney brought suit, the defense added three more reasons. McKinney presented evidence that he was treated differently than his similarly situated colleagues who are not black. He also presented substantial evidence that the many rationales offered for firing him were baseless and pretextual. The district court erred by disregarding most of McKinney’s evidence, improperly discounting his testimony as “self-serving,” and misreading the circuit’s precedent on the “common actor” inference that is sometimes argued in discrimination cases. View "McKinney v. Sheriff's Office of Whitley County" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, current and former members of the Chicago Police Department’s Bureau of Organized Crime, claim that the Bureau did not compensate them for work they did off-duty on their mobile electronic devices (Blackerrys). The judge concluded that the Bureau did not prevent plaintiffs from requesting payment for non-scheduled overtime work and did not know that plaintiffs were not being paid for it. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. 201, requires employers to pay covered employees at one-and-a-half times their usual pay rate if they are employed for longer than a certain hourly threshold. Employers must pay for all work they know about, even if they did not ask for the work, even if they did not want the work done, and even if they had a rule against doing the work. That strict rule “stops short of requiring the employer to pay for work it did not know about and had no reason to know about.” The plaintiffs did not establish the existence of an unwritten policy not to compensate them for off-duty work performed on their BlackBerrys. No one ever told plaintiffs not to submit slips for that work, and no one was ever reprimanded or disciplined for submitting such slips. View "Allen v. City of Chicago" on Justia Law

Nischan had a history of performance problems and had made mistakes that had resulted in her demotion. One of her mistakes was serious, implicated safety concerns, and occurred in front of Sabbah, who was the employee of her employer’s (Stratosphere) client and who had then requested that Nischan be removed from the client’s account. Nischan then alleged that she was sexually harassed by Sabbah. Although Stratosphere requested that she report for reassignment, Nischan sought unemployment benefits. Nischan alleged that she was fired from her job for filing the sexual‐harassment complaint, citing Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 2000e, and the Illinois Human Rights Act. The district court dismissed her claims. The Seventh Circuit reversed in part. Nischan offered sufficient evidence supporting that claim to avert Stratosphere’s motion for summary judgment. Stratosphere had constructive notice of the harassment because supervisors were present when it occurred and were required, by the employee handbook, to report it. View "Nischan v. Stratosphere Quality, LLC" on Justia Law

Stragapede worked in Evanston’s water services department for 14 years. In 2009 he suffered a traumatic brain injury at home. The city placed him on a temporary leave of absence during his recovery and rehabilitation. When he was medically cleared to return to work, Stragapede resumed full-time employment, but had some minor mishaps: he drove through an intersection while looking down and he went to the wrong address. After just a few weeks, the city again placed him on administrative leave and later terminated his employment. Stragapede sued for violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. 12101. A jury found the city liable and awarded $225,000 in damages. The judge concluded that Stragapede was entitled to back pay plus interest from the date he was fired until the time of judgment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting arguments that Stragapede was not a qualified person under the ADA because he was unable to perform the essential functions of his job; that even if Stragapede was qualified, he posed a direct threat to himself and to others, which is a statutory defense to liability; and that the judge incorrectly calculated the back pay award. View "Stragapede v. City of Evanston" on Justia Law

Lake County had cash flow of $51 million in 2007. In 2009, it was operating at a deficit; by 2013 its general fund was more than $1 million in the red. The county’s self-insurance fund had a balance of $10 million in 2007; that balance was wiped out by 2013. The county offered retirement incentives to employees age 65 or older. Under one package, retirees were entitled to five years of supplemental health insurance (secondary to Medicare coverage) through Aetna and could return to work, part-time, as at-will employees. In 2013, Aetna informed the county that if retirees working as part-time employees remained on the plan, the plan would no longer qualify for special exemptions under federal law and the county’s costs would skyrocket. The county notified all rehired retirees who were covered by the Aetna supplement that their employment would end. Some sued under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. 621, and the Equal Protection Clause. The Seventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of the county. The key criterion that distinguished the terminated employees from other county employees was not their age but rather their participation in the Aetna plan. The county’s action was rationally related to a legitimate state interest: preserving supplemental insurance coverage for its retirees while avoiding further financial hardship. View "Carson v. Lake County" on Justia Law

Alamo worked for the Chicago Fire Department. He alleges that in 2009, after a transfer, other firefighters began harassing him, calling him “spic” and “f--king Puerto Rican,” and stealing Alamo’s food. Alamo also alleges that the number of times he was assigned to work at different locations was excessive when compared to assignments given to non-Latino colleagues. His supervisor, Lieutenant Bliss, did not remedy the behavior. At one point, Alamo called 911 about a “chest bump” incident but did not press charges because of pressure from the Chief. The next day, Alamo experienced chest pain, dizziness, and a migraine. A physician diagnosed him with a work-related chest contusion, work-related stress, and possibly post-traumatic stress disorder and ordered medical leave. The Medical Section Chief stated the Department would not pay for treatment. After Alamo had been on medical leave for six months, he obtained written authorization to return to work without restrictions, but the Department required additional documentation. Alamo filed a charge with the EEOC. The Department continued to request additional records. Alamo filed suit under Title VII, 42 U.S.C. 2000e, and against Bliss, under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The Seventh Circuit reversed dismissal of his hostile work environment, disparate treatment, and retaliation claims. The complaint describes an investigation into his fitness to work that was so onerous that it could not be completed in four months and sufficiently alleged retaliation. View "Alamo v. Bliss" on Justia Law

In 2013, Scheurer applied to work at Richelieu which outsourced its staffing needs to Remedy, a temporary staffing agency. The application form she signed with Remedy for placement with Richelieu contained an arbitration agreement. She was assigned to work for Richelieu, but that assignment ended after some months. About a year later, Remedy placed Scheurer with Fromm. Scheurer alleges that while working at Fromm, her supervisor sexually harassed her and that Fromm took no serious action to address the sexual harassment and instead fired her. Fromm tried to arrange a work situation that would have separated Scheurer from the supervisor, but when that proved “impossible,” Fromm asked Remedy to assign Scheurer to another client. Scheurer filed suit against Fromm, but not Remedy, alleging sexual harassment and retaliation, 42 U.S.C. 2000e‐2(a)(1) & 2000e‐3(a). Fromm argued that arbitration should be compelled under the contract law principle of equitable estoppel and because Fromm was a third‐party beneficiary of the Remedy agreement. The district court denied Fromm’s motion. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. There was no basis for finding that Fromm relied on Scheurer’s arbitration agreement since Fromm did not even know about it and Fromm was not a third‐party beneficiary of Remedy’s agreement with Scheurer. View "Scheurer v. Fromm Family Foods, LLC" on Justia Law

Lauth, then 54, began working at Covance in 2006, as a shift supervisor. His performance reviews noted needed improvements in his communication style and that staff members had expressed discontent with Lauth’s supervision and communication style, eventually stating that Lauth “appears unreceptive to take help and/or suggestions from others” and that Lauth “must improve … [his] working relationship with his fellow shift supervisors.” In a 2011 meeting, Lauth’s supervisor asked Lauth when he planned to retire. Lauth submitted a complaint regarding another employee, for what Lauth characterized as “bullying.” Lauth was unhappy with the result and filed a charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, claiming age discrimination and retaliation. The EEOC issued a dismissal. A new supervisor at Covance wanted to dismiss Lauth based on his “argumentative and insubordinate” interactions. Warnings and complaints continued. In 2012, Lauth was terminated. Based on his EEOC charge, Lauth filed suit, alleging age discrimination and retaliation under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. 621. The district court granted Covance summary judgment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Lauth failed to provide evidence, other than his belief that Covance’s assessments of his workplace behavior were mistaken, from which a jury could infer that Covance terminated him because of his age. View "Lauth v. Covance, Inc." on Justia Law

Baines alleged that when her former employer, Walgreens, refused to rehire her in 2014, it intentionally retaliated against her for complaining about race discrimination several years earlier. She sued under 42 U.S.C. 1981 and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The district court granted Walgreens summary judgment. The court said it found no evidence linking Baines’ protected activity (filing EEOC charges) and Walgreens’ adverse employment actions (failing to rehire her). The Seventh Circuit reversed. While Baines did not offer direct evidence of a causal link, she offered sufficient circumstantial evidence to satisfy the summary judgment standard. She offered evidence that the manager who handled her earlier EEOC charges intervened in the 2014 decision not to rehire her, and did so in ways that deviated significantly from Walgreens’ standard hiring procedures. Walgreens offered no explanation for this unusual behavior. Other circumstantial evidence included missing records of Baines’ application and her interview scores, a decision to hire instead someone less qualified, and dishonest answers from Walgreens decision-makers when asked to explain their decisions. If a jury believes Baines’ evidence, it could reasonably find that Walgreens unlawfully retaliated against her. View "Baines v. Walgreen Co." on Justia Law