Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Ramos, filed a charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) regarding her severance agreement's broad release of claims and covenant not to sue, with exceptions for “rights that Employee cannot lawfully waive” and for participation “in a proceeding with any appropriate federal, state or local government agency enforcing discrimination laws.” The EEOC abandoned Ramos’s charge by issuing her a right-to-sue letter and, eight months later, filed suit under section 707(a), which it believed granted independent litigation authority for suits against “any person or group of persons … engaged in a pattern or practice ....” 42 U.S.C. 2000e-6(a). While section 707(e)’s incorporation of section 706’s procedural requirements generally requires the EEOC to follow the same pre-suit procedures whether the suit is an individual one or a pattern-or-practice action, the EEOC believed that a distinction between section 707’s subsections excused it from doing so. Section 707(a), unlike section 707(e), gives the EEOC a right to litigate without an underlying charge or unlawful employment practice, and (EEOC thought) by extension, without first conciliating. The EEOC distinguished between section 707(a)’s reach to “any person or group of persons” and section 707(e)’s limitation to employers. In 2015, the Seventh Circuit held that conciliation is necessary under both sections. The district court subsequently awarded $307,902.30 in attorneys’ fees, finding that EEOC had taken a position contrary to its own regulations. The Seventh Circuit reversed, holding that the Sevdecision impermissibly rested on hindsight. View "Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. CVS Pharmacy, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs claim that they faced racial discrimination while working as Environmental Service Technicians (EVS techs) at Advocate, in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. 2000e; 42 U.S.C. 1981. In 2012, Advocate contracted with Aramark and reorganized the supervision of the EVS department; Aramark was responsible for managing the department while abiding by Advocate's policies, including Advocate’s non-discrimination policy. Plaintiffs claim that Aramark supervisors engaged in discriminatory acts, in that: two plaintiffs were paid less than white EVS techs; two were denied promotions and raises; plaintiffs were managed and disciplined more scrupulously than their non-African-American co-workers, and terminated in a discriminatory fashion; African-American plaintiffs were given less desirable and more strenuous assignments; Aramark supervisors subjected plaintiffs to offensive and derogatory racial comments, creating a hostile work environment. The district court granted Advocate summary judgment, concluding that the plaintiffs did not experience severe or pervasive race-based harassment, that there was no basis for employer liability, and that the plaintiffs failed to demonstrate that racial animus motivated the decisions to terminate three plaintiffs. As for the hostile work environment claim, the lower court held that cited comments, although concerning, were too isolated, indirect, and sporadic, and not so serious as to have affected working conditions. The Seventh Circuit remanded the hostile work environment claim but otherwise affirmed. View "Johnson v. Advocate Health and Hospitals Corp." on Justia Law

Indiana juvenile courts may establish juvenile facilities; the judge must appoint staff and determine budgets. The county must pay the facility's expenses from general funds. The Allen Superior Court established a juvenile center, where Harris began working in 1995. His offer of employment included the seal of the “Allen Superior Court,” and he signed the Court’s Employee Handbook, acknowledging an employment relationship with the Court. His job description bore the seal of the Board of Commissioners; his medical records authorization identified the Commissioners as his employer and the juvenile center as his department. Harris’s discipline was handled by the Court; his evaluations were titled “Allen County Employee Performance Appraisal.” Harris injured his back at work. County Attorney Murphy sent Harris a form listing “Allen County Government” as his employer so that he could collect workers’ compensation benefits. A doctor determined that Harris had reached maximum medical improvement and imposed work restrictions. Murphy stated that his restrictions prevented Harris from “perform[ing] the essential functions” of his position “with or without a reasonable accommodation.” Harris applied to several county jobs but did not obtain employment. Harris sued under the Americans with Disabilities Act. The district court granted the County summary judgment, concluding that the Board was not Harris’s employer. Harris voluntarily dismissed the Court. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Harris did not establish that the Board sufficiently controlled his employment, so a reasonable trier of fact could only conclude that the Board was not Harris’s employer. View "Harris v. Allen County Board of Commissioners" on Justia Law

Quinn applied to become an Indianapolis firefighter. He passed the written examination, oral interview, and Certified Physical Agility Test and was placed on a ranked list for hiring consideration. The Department hired two academy classes from that ranked list, but Quinn was not selected. Quinn’s father (Rodney) filed a qui tam suit under the False Claims Act, 31 U.S.C. 3730(h)(1), alleging that the Department had made false statements of material fact to the federal government in order to receive federal grant funds. Rodney was a backup investigator in the Department’s arson unit. Quinn joined his father’s suit, alleging that the Department retaliated against him for his father’s complaint. The district court granted the Department summary judgment on Quinn’s retaliation claim. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Quinn was ranked, at best, five spots too low to receive an automatic selection and every discretionary pick in both classes had more markers than Quinn, consistent with the Department’s policy for discretionary selections. There is no evidence from which a reasonable jury could conclude that Rodney’s suit was even a motivating factor in the decision not to hire Quinn. Even assuming that the meaning of “employee” under section 3730(h) is could encompass job applicants, there are no facts from which a jury could conclude that Quinn was retaliated against because of his father’s suit. View "Heath v. Indianapolis Fire Department" on Justia Law

Chicago’s Independent Police Review Authority (IPRA) investigated complaints against police, including domestic violence, excessive force, and death in custody, and made disciplinary recommendations: allegations were “sustained,” “not sustained,” “exonerated,” or “unfounded.” Investigators interviewed witnesses and procured evidence to draft reports. IPRA’s Administrator retained final responsibility for making recommendations and establishing “rules, regulations and procedures for the conduct of investigations.” Davis became an IPRA investigator in 2008. Davis alleges that in 2014-2015, his supervisors ordered Davis to change “sustained” findings and make his reports more favorable to the accused officers. Davis refused and was allegedly threatened to with termination. Davis alleges that they requested Word versions of Davis’s reports to alter them to look like Davis had made the changes. The administrator then implemented a policy requiring his approval for all “sustained” findings: if an investigator refused to make a recommended change, he would be disciplined for insubordination. Davis again refused to change “sustained” findings and was fired. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the dismissal of his First Amendment claims. That an employee may have good reasons to refuse an order, does “not necessarily mean the employee has a cause of action under the First Amendment when he contravenes that order.” Because IPRA required Davis to draft and revise reports, his refusal to revise those reports was speech “pursuant to [his] official duties.” He spoke as a public employee, not a private citizen. The First Amendment does not protect this speech. View "Davis v. City of Chicago" on Justia Law

Freelain worked as a police officer for five years before Sergeant Vardal made what Freelain perceived as inappropriate and unwelcome sexual advances toward him. According to Freelain, he was not the only person subjected to Vardal's sexual harassment. After Freelain rebuffed Vardal’s invitations, he claims, she escalated a pattern of harassment and hypercriticism of his performance. After an incident prompted him to report the misconduct, Freelain began experiencing migraine headaches and other medical conditions that he has attributed to stress related to the harassment. As Freelain began taking time off, tensions rose between him and the police department. Freelain claimed that as a result of his medical condition and use of leave time, the village retaliated against him in violation of the Family and Medical Leave Act, 29 U.S.C. 2601, and the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. 12101. The Seventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of the village. The acts that Freelain has identified as retaliation would not discourage a reasonable employee from exercising his rights under the statutes. Freelain was allowed to take all the unpaid leave he wanted or needed. His claims assert that doing exactly what the FMLA allows—placing an employee on unpaid leave—violated the anti-retaliation provisions of the FMLA and ADA. View "Freelain v. Village of Oak Park" on Justia Law

Kleber is an attorney with extensive experience, including private law practice in Chicago, work as a general counsel for a major national company, and leadership of a national trade association, a real estate development company, and a medical device company. In 2011, Kleber began applying for jobs, sending more than 150 applications without success, including applications for less senior positions. In 2014, Kleber (58 years old) applied for a position as “Senior Counsel, Procedural Solutions.” The posting stated that applicants must have “3 to 7 years (no more than 7 years) of relevant legal experience.” The company did not interview Kleber and filled the position with a 29‐year‐old applicant. Kleber filed a charge of age discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, then filed suit, alleging disparate treatment and disparate impact. The Seventh Circuit reversed the dismissal of the case. The Age Discrimination in Employment Act prohibits employment practices that discriminate intentionally against older workers and prohibits employment practices that have a disparate impact on older workers, 29 U.S.C. 623(a)(1), (a)(2), and protects both outside job applicants and current employees. The court noted the virtually identical language in Title VII and stated that it could not imagine why Congress might have chosen to allow disparate impact claims by current employees, including internal job applicants while excluding outside job applicants. View "Kleber v. CareFusion Corp." on Justia Law

From 2009-2014, Sampra was an FAA field electrical engineer, initially assigned to Chicago’s Midway Airport. She was eventually assigned to oversee technical support services contract work releases, which required little field work, so Sampra spent most of her time in the office. She retained the same job title; her job description continued to require up to 100% travel and field work. While Sampra was on Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA) childbirth leave, a new supervisor assigned to himself the work releases that Sampra had overseen. After Sampra’s return, she was reassigned to work on an O’Hare Airport runway overnight. Before she would have had to start the overnight assignment, Sampra requested reassignment to the position of drafting coordinator. Her request was granted. The drafting coordinator position is in a lower pay band than an electrical engineer, but Sampra retained her electrical engineer salary. Sampra filed suit under the FMLA more than two years after her assignment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of the defendants without reaching the merits. The suit was barred by a two-year statute of limitations. The more forgiving three‐year statute of limitations does not apply because Sampra failed to provide evidence that the department willfully violated her FMLA rights. View "Sampra v. United States Department of Transportation" on Justia Law

College of DuPage hired Breuder as its president. After extensions, his contract ran through 2019. In 2015 newly-elected members of the Board of Trustees, having campaigned on a pledge to remove Breuder, discharged him without notice or a hearing. Board resolutions stated that Breuder had committed misconduct. The Board did not offer him a hearing and refused to comply with clauses in his contract covering severance pay and retirement benefits. Breuder filed suit, citing Illinois contract and defamation law and 42 U.S.C. 1983. The Board as an entity moved to dismiss the complaint, contending that Breuder never had a valid contract because, under Illinois law, a governmental body whose members serve limited terms may not enter into contracts that extend beyond those terms. Individual Board members moved to dismiss the 1983 claim on qualified immunity grounds. The Seventh Circuit affirmed denial of both motions. The court noted precedent allowing Illinois Community Colleges to grant their presidents tenure beyond the date of the next board election. Rejecting claims of qualified immunity, the court noted that a hearing is required whenever the officeholder has a “legitimate claim of entitlement.” In discharging Breuder, the Board stated that he had committed misconduct. Even a person who has no property interest in a public job has a constitutional entitlement to a hearing before being defamed during a discharge, or at least a name-clearing hearing after the discharge. View "Breuder v. Hamilton" on Justia Law

In 2012 Northern changed its defined-benefit pension plan under which retirement income depended on years worked, times an average of the employee’s five highest-earning consecutive years, times a constant (traditional formula). As amended, the plan multiplies the years worked and the high average compensation, by a formula that depends on the number of years worked after 2012 (PEP formula), reducing the pension-accrual rate. Northern provided people hired before 2002 a transitional benefit, treating them as if they were still under the traditional formula but deeming their salaries as increasing at 1.5% per year, without regard to the actual rate of change. Teufel sued, claiming that the amendment, even with the transitional benefit, violated the anti-cutback rule in the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA), 29 U.S.C. 1001–1461, and, by harming older workers relative to younger ones, violated the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), 29 U.S.C. 621–34. The Seventh Circuit affirmed dismissal of the suit. Nothing in the traditional formula guaranteed that any salary would increase in future years; ERISA protects entitlements that make up the “accrued benefit” but does not protect anyone’s hope that the future will improve on the past. Nor does the PEP formula violate the ADEA. Benefits depend on the number of years of credited service and salary, not on age. View "Teufel v. Northern Trust Co." on Justia Law