Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Khowaja was an Immigration Enforcement Agent, 2008-2012. He then began employment as an FBI Special Agent on a two-year probationary term. Khowaja’s lack of judgment was frequently cited as a concern by his immediate supervisor, SSA Green. In June 2013, Green and Assistant Special Agent in Charge Jones approved a recommendation for removal report, listing several examples; Khowaja did not dispute the examples. The report concluded Khowaja’s arrogance, avoidance of senior agents, and defensiveness had hindered his judgment. Jones and Green informed Khowaja that his removal was being sought. Days later, Khowaja contacted the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. In July 2013, the Assistant Administrative Director of the FBI’s Human Resources Division terminated Khowaja's employment. Khowaja alleged that Green, a white Christian, asked Khowaja during their first meeting if he was Muslim, questioned him about his faith, used Arabic holy phrases in a derogatory manner; mocked Middle Eastern accents, and pointed out that Khowaja is Muslim during a presentation to other agents. Khowaja noted a remark by Jones to a police chief that Khowaja was “not our typical agent.” Khowaja asserted that he was held to a different standard than his peers. Khowaja alleged that he was unlawfully discriminated against because he is Muslim, (Title VII, Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. 2000e-16(a)), and that he was intentionally, unlawfully terminated in retaliation for beginning the EEOC process (42 U.S.C. 2000e-3(a)). The Seventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of the government. View "Khowaja v. Sessions" on Justia Law

Sutula‐Johnson sold office furniture. In 2010, OfficeMax adopted a compensation plan that paid a commission rate depending on the sale’s profit. Commissions were earned either when a customer paid or 90 days after the customer was invoiced, whichever came first. Sutula‐Johnson negotiated better terms and earned commissions upon invoicing. OfficeMax and Office Depot merged in 2013. Office Depot continued paid Sutula‐Johnson and her colleagues under the terms of the old OfficeMax plan. In July 2014, Office Depot announced a new compensation plan for furniture sales, effective immediately. Sutula‐Johnson claims she did not receive a copy of the new plan for several weeks. The new plan significantly changed how Sutula‐Johnson was paid and reduced her total pay. She initially refused to sign it, complaining about its application to sales already in the works but not yet invoiced. Sutula‐Johnson continued working for Office Depot for more than a year. In 2015 Sutula‐Johnson resigned and sued for breach of contract and violations of the Illinois Wage Payment and Collection Act, 820 ILCS. 115/1. The Seventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment for Office Depot on the breach of contract claims but reversed as to the statutory claims. Sutula‐Johnson accepted the new terms by continuing to work but offered evidence that Office Depot violated the Wage Act by failing to pay her commissions monthly and by failing to pay her commissions earned before she resigned. View "Sutula-Johnson v. Office Depot, Inc." on Justia Law

When Goplin began working at WeConnect, he signed the “AEI Alternative Entertainment Inc. Open Door Policy and Arbitration Program,” which referred to AEI throughout; it never mentioned WeConnect. Goplin brought a collective action under the Fair Labor Standards Act. WeConnect moved to compel arbitration, Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(3), attaching an affidavit from its Director of Human Resources stating, “I am employed by WeConnect, Inc.—formerly known as Alternative Entertainment, Inc. or AEI.” Goplin claimed that WeConnect was not a party to the agreement and could not enforce it. He cited language on WeConnect’s website: WeConnect formed when two privately held companies, Alternative Entertainment, Inc. (AEI) and WeConnect Enterprise Solutions, combined in September 2016… we officially became one company. WeConnect asserted that WeConnect and AEI were two names for the same legal entity, stating: This was a name change, not a merger. The court held that WeConnect did not establish that it was a party to the agreement or otherwise entitled to enforce it. The court rejected subsequently-submitted corporate-form documents and affidavits, stating that new evidence cannot be introduced in a motion for reconsideration unless the movant shows “not only that [the] evidence was newly discovered or unknown to it until after the hearing, but also that it could not with reasonable diligence have discovered and produced such evidence.” The Seventh Circuit affirmed. View "Goplin v. WeConnect, Inc." on Justia Law

Simpkins began working for DuPage Housing Authority (DHA) in 2009 under an “Independent Contractor Agreement” for “general labor” to rehabilitate vacant properties to make them suitable for occupants. In 2011, the rehab work slowed and Simpkins began working primarily at Ogden townhome community, for which DHA served as on‐site management. Ogden’s property manager and maintenance supervisor, DHA employees, gave Simpkins instructions and prioritized the order in which he needed to complete tasks. In May 2012, Simpkins and DHA entered into another “Independent Contractor Agreement,” covering “general labor” at Ogden. Simpkins worked full‐time and exclusively for DHA; reported his hours by invoice; and was paid bi‐weekly via check. DHA issued Simpkins 1099‐MISC tax forms, while others received W‐2 forms. Simpkins knew that DHA considered him an independent contractor and repeatedly requested to become an employee. DHA did not provide him with pension, insurance, or other benefits. In 2015, Simpkins was injured in a car accident; his relationship with DHA ended. He filed suit, claiming that DHA had repeatedly failed to pay him overtime and was required to provide him with disability benefits. The district court ruled that Simpkins was not an employee under the Fair Labor Standards Act and rejected all of his federal claims. The Seventh Circuit reversed, finding genuine issues of fact as to the control exercised by DHA, questions concerning the origin of tools and material, and ambiguity as to the termination date of the second contract. View "Simpkins v. DuPage Housing Authority" on Justia Law

Kennedy had decades of experience working for Schneider Electric and taught classes, part-time, in electrical and industrial safety at Prairie State community college. Schneider requires its employees to obtain advance approval before they teach classes or submit articles for publication. Without obtaining permission, Kennedy published articles about power-distribution equipment, identifying himself as a Prairie State instructor. When Schneider learned of these articles a manager contacted Prairie State to ask about Kennedy’s course materials, which she worried might contain proprietary information. Weeks later, while reviewing instructors' credentials, Prairie State realized that Kennedy did not possess the qualifications to teach and did not rehire Kennedy as an adjunct instructor. A year later, Kennedy sued Schneider, alleging defamation and malicious interference with an advantageous relationship. The court granted Schneider summary judgment, finding that Prairie State acted solely because Kennedy did not meet its credentialing requirements and not because of Schneider’s telephone call. More than a year later, Kennedy moved to set aside the judgment (Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(d)(3)), asserting that Schneider’s lawyers knowingly submitted perjured evidence. The court denied the motion, stating that the cited evidentiary discrepancies were known at the time of summary judgment, and granted Rule 11 sanctions against Kennedy’s lawyer for having to defend against the motion ($10,627.16). The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Kennedy could have challenged the same evidence on summary judgment. If the court made a mistake, Kennedy could have asked for reconsideration or appealed. View "Kennedy v. Schneider Electric" on Justia Law

Milliman, then a McHenry County Sheriff’s Department (MCSD) deputy, gave a deposition in which he accused Sheriff Nygren of corruption, bribery, securing fraudulent loans, trafficking illegal aliens, and soliciting two murders. Nygren and his subordinates referred Milliman to a psychologist to evaluate whether he was fit for duty. The psychologist determined that Milliman suffered from cognitive and psychological problems from a previous brain tumor that rendered him unfit to perform his duties. MCSD terminated Milliman based upon the results of that examination, the false allegations against Nygren, and violations of MCSD General Orders. Milliman sued Nygren, Nygren’s subordinates, and the county under 42 U.S.C. 1983, claiming that defendants violated his First Amendment rights by retaliating against him for protected speech. The district court granted summary judgment to defendants and the Seventh Circuit affirmed, on the ground that the fitness‐for‐ duty examination provided an independent, non‐retaliatory, non‐pretextual basis for Milliman’s termination. The court rejected Milliman’s argument that a jury could question whether Milliman’s fitness examination was ordered in good faith because he received a “standard” rating in his last annual performance review, citing the importance of such precautionary measures in the law enforcement context due to “the risks posed by an officer who is not well enough to work.” View "Milliman v. Prim" on Justia Law

Joint Logistics (JL) hired Oliver, an African-American, as a truck driver in 2012, subject to a Collective Bargaining Agreement, which outlined two seniority units: the Motor Vehicle Repair Employees and the Motor Vehicle Operation Employees (transportation unit). When JL conducted layoffs, the most junior employees within a “seniority unit” were let go first. When JL filled a position more senior employees within the unit had hiring priority. At various points during 2013–2015, Oliver was laid off from and subsequently recalled to his position in the transportation unit. Each time he was laid off, Oliver was the least senior member of that unit. In 2014, Oliver applied for an open mechanic position in the repair unit. Vance, a white male, also applied. Neither had seniority over the other. While JL considered his application, Oliver filed a charge with the EEOC alleging discrimination and retaliation. Weeks later, JL hired Vance to fill the position. During the following months, JL filled other mechanic positions, for which Oliver did not apply. Oliver brought discrimination and retaliation claims under 42 U.S.C. 1981. The Seventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of JL. Oliver cannot establish a prima facie case that he was laid off because of his race; he presented no adequate comparators. Oliver cannot demonstrate that JL hid a discriminatory motive when it failed to hire him for the mechanic position. View "Oliver v. Joint Logistics Managers, Inc." on Justia Law

The University fired Carmody, an information technology manager, after printed copies of a professor’s privileged emails suspiciously ended up in Carmody’s home newspaper box. The emails allegedly exposed inconsistencies in the professor’s testimony in Carmody's separate lawsuit against a different professor. The University learned about the mysterious delivery because Carmody’s lawyer filed the emails with the court. The University concluded that it was “more probable than not” that Carmody improperly obtained the emails himself. Carmody sued the board of trustees and officials alleging that he was fired without due process of law both and that his firing violated an Illinois whistleblower statute. The district court dismissed the case. In an earlier appeal, the Seventh Circuit held that Carmody had pleaded a plausible claim that he was fired without pre-termination due process, but that his decision to withdraw from the post-termination hearing foreclosed his due process claim based on the post-termination procedures and affirmed the dismissal of the state-law claim. On remand, the district court granted summary judgment for some defendants and Carmody lost at trial on his claim against three remaining defendants. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Carmody did not establish that the individual defendants bore responsibility for his alleged deprivations. The Eleventh Amendment bars the claims against the board and 42 U.S.C. 1983 does not authorize such claims. View "Carmody v. Board of Trustees of the University of Illinois" on Justia Law

Flanagan sued under Title VII, 42 U.S.C. 20003, alleging that two coworkers threatened her life because she previously successfully sued their shared employer, the Cook County Adult Probation Department, for discrimination and retaliation. Flanagan claims that her colleague overheard human-resources director Vaughan, tell deputy chief, Loizon, “to figure out a way to get [Flanagan] alone and away from her partner.” On March 13, 2008, Loizon radioed for Flanagan to join him and another supervisor at an Adult Probation facility to question a probationer regarding a potential tip. After the questioning, Loizon and the probationer left through the back door. The other supervisor then locked the front door and escorted Flanagan toward the back. While near the back door, Flanagan overheard Loizon say, “Do it to her when she gets out the door.” Nothing further happened. After Flanagan filed another EEOC charge, Loizon approached her in the office parking lot, exchanged words with her, and warned, "I could hit you and nobody would give a fuck.” The district court granted the defendants summary judgment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, reasoning that the threat to Flanagan was too oblique for a jury to conclude that she was subjected to severe or pervasive harassment. View "Flanagan v. Office of the Chief Judge of the Circuit Court of Cook County" on Justia Law

The National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) ruled that full-time staff members who also teach part-time (50-75 individuals, “FTST”) were included in the Part-Time Faculty Association at Columbia College Chicago (PFAC) bargaining unit for the purposes of their part-time faculty duties. Under the collective bargaining agreement’s recognition clause FTST are part-time faculty members and arguably fall under the scope of the general inclusion but also qualify as full-time staff members, which are expressly excluded from representation. An arbitrator vacated the ruling. The Seventh Circuit upheld the NLRB decision. Given the primacy of the NLRB’s determination, the countervailing arbitration decision cannot stand. The National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. 159, “confers broad discretion on the Board to determine appropriate bargaining units,” because “the bargaining unit determination is a representational question reserved in the first instance to the Board.” View "Part-time Faculty Association v. Columbia College Chicago" on Justia Law