Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Guzman was a Brown County 911 dispatcher from 2002-2013. Since 2011, Brown County has had a third-party vendor manage disability, Family Medical Leave Act (FMLA), and unpaid leave requests. Employees do not need approval from a supervisor. Guzman was diagnosed with sleep apnea in 2006 and, in 2008, had gastric bypass surgery. Guzman received five warnings concerning her use of vacation time or casual time in 2004-2013, three warnings for failure to timely complete mandatory proficiency tests, and a warning for failure to report to work on a date that she mistakenly believed that she was not scheduled to work. Guzman was disciplined for being late to work in 2011 and three times in 2012. On February 9, 2013, Guzman failed to report and was given a three-day suspension and warned that if she was late again she could be fired. Guzman attributed her tardiness to sleeping through her alarms and did not mention sleep apnea. There is no evidence that her supervisors were aware of that diagnosis. On March 8, Guzman was again tardy. Guzman’s psychiatrist wrote a note stating that Guzman “most probably” had sleep apnea, and needed to be retested. Her employment was terminated. The Seventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment rejecting Guzman’s suit under the FMLA, 29 U.S.C. 2601, the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. 12112, and the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. 794. There was no evidence that Guzman requested FMLA leave before her termination. View "Guzman v. Brown County" on Justia Law

Guzman was a Brown County 911 dispatcher from 2002-2013. Since 2011, Brown County has had a third-party vendor manage disability, Family Medical Leave Act (FMLA), and unpaid leave requests. Employees do not need approval from a supervisor. Guzman was diagnosed with sleep apnea in 2006 and, in 2008, had gastric bypass surgery. Guzman received five warnings concerning her use of vacation time or casual time in 2004-2013, three warnings for failure to timely complete mandatory proficiency tests, and a warning for failure to report to work on a date that she mistakenly believed that she was not scheduled to work. Guzman was disciplined for being late to work in 2011 and three times in 2012. On February 9, 2013, Guzman failed to report and was given a three-day suspension and warned that if she was late again she could be fired. Guzman attributed her tardiness to sleeping through her alarms and did not mention sleep apnea. There is no evidence that her supervisors were aware of that diagnosis. On March 8, Guzman was again tardy. Guzman’s psychiatrist wrote a note stating that Guzman “most probably” had sleep apnea, and needed to be retested. Her employment was terminated. The Seventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment rejecting Guzman’s suit under the FMLA, 29 U.S.C. 2601, the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. 12112, and the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. 794. There was no evidence that Guzman requested FMLA leave before her termination. View "Guzman v. Brown County" on Justia Law

Martensen was a supervisor in the Chicago Stock Exchange’s unit responsible for examining compliance with trading regulations. He was fired in 2016. He claimed his firing violated 15 U.S.C. 78u–6(h), a part of the Dodd-Frank Act that protects whistleblowers. Martensen’s complaint did not allege that he reported any unlawful activity to the Securities and Exchange Commission. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the dismissal of his suit. Only a person who has reported “a violation of the securities laws to the Commission” is covered by 78u–6(h). The judge was wrong to reject Martensen’s proposal to file an amended complaint alleging that he had reported fraud to the SEC, but remand would be pointless. The report was unrelated to his discharge. A report to the SEC does not prevent employers from responding adversely to later reports that do not concern fraud or any other violation of the securities laws and never reach the SEC. Martensen acknowledged that the Exchange did not retaliate against him for the act that made him a whistleblower and did not argue that an internal complaint, which resulted in his firing, was “required or protected” by any particular rule of the Chicago Stock Exchange. View "Martensen v. Chicago Stock Exchange, Inc." on Justia Law

Jaworski provided construction services to Master Hand, an Illinois general contractor, over several years. Some of these services went unpaid. Jaworski alleged violations of the federal Fair Labor Standards Act, the Illinois Minimum Wage Law, the Illinois Wage Payment and Collection Act, and the Employee Classification Act, which makes it unlawful for construction firms to misclassify an employee as an independent contractor. The Classification Act presumes that the complainant is an employee unless the contractor proves otherwise; a misclassified employee is entitled to double “the amount of any wages, salary, employment benefits, or other compensation denied or lost to the person by reason of the violation.” The judge held that Master Hand had misclassified Jaworski and was entitled to the compensation guaranteed by the Minimum Wage Law and Wage Payment and Collection Act without having to prove that he is an employee. Those statutes do not include the presumption that plaintiffs are employees. The judge rejected Master Hand’s insolvency defense and ordered Master Hand to pay $200,000 in damages, plus $150,000 in attorneys’ fees. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, adding attorneys’ fees for the frivolous appeal. The court declined to review the rulings challenged by Master Hand, as a sanction for failure to follow court rules. View "Jaworski v. Master Hand Contractors, Inc." on Justia Law

In 2013, Grussgot was hired by a Milwaukee private school that provides non-Orthodox Jewish education. The school employs a rabbi and has a chapel and Torah scrolls but does not require its teachers to be Jewish. Grussgott claimed that she was solely a Hebrew teacher and had no responsibilities that were religious in nature. The school maintained that Grussgott was employed as a Hebrew and Jewish Studies teacher. Grussgott underwent treatment for a brain tumor and ceased working during her recovery. She has suffered memory and other cognitive issues. During a telephone call from a parent, Grussgott was unable to remember an event, and the parent taunted her. Grussgott’s husband (a rabbi) sent an email, from Grussgott’s work email address, criticizing the parent. The school then terminated Grussgott. Grussgott sued under the Americans with Disabilities Act. The school argued that because of Grussgott’s religious role, the ADA's ministerial exception barred her lawsuit. The district court agreed without considering the merits of her ADA claim. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Even taking Grussgott’s version of the facts as true, she falls under the exception as a matter of law. Her integral role in teaching Judaism and the school’s motivation in hiring her demonstrate that her role furthered the school’s religious mission. The school’s nondiscrimination policy did not waive the exception’s protections. View "Grussgott v. Milwaukee Jewish Day School, Inc." on Justia Law

Mann attacked his coworker, Baylay, a British citizen. The men, members of an Etihad Airways (incorporated in Abu Dhabi) flight crew, were at a Chicago hotel on a layover. Baylay sued Etihad, Mann, and the hotel’s corporate entities. The district court dismissed Baylay’s claims against Etihad, stating that they should be heard by the Illinois Workers’ Compensation Commission, and later dismissed Baylay’s remaining claims, reasoning that it had no original jurisdiction over the claims and declining to exercise its supplemental jurisdiction. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act imposes liability on the foreign state “in the same manner and to the same extent as a private individual under like circumstances,” 28 U.S.C. 1606. If the foreign state is not immune from suit, “plaintiffs may bring state law claims that they could have brought if the defendant were a private individual.” Baylay failed to show that his injuries would not be compensated under Illinois law. After Etihad’s dismissal, Baylay’s remaining claims included state-law claims against Mann and the hotel’s corporate entities. The corporate entities’ third-party contribution claims are entirely dependent on the resolution of the underlying state-law negligence claim against them. Baylay’s state-law claims substantially predominate; the district court’s decision to decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction was not an abuse of discretion in light of 28 U.S.C. 1367(c). View "Baylay v. Etihad Airways P.J.S.C." on Justia Law

In a complaint described as “disjointed and murky at best,” Catinella alleged that he worked for Cook County, 1994-2013, and in 2009, was promoted to a supervisory position. In 2013, Catinella was questioned regarding a bidding process and refused to sign documents relating to the probe. During this interview, investigators asked Catinella if he was carrying a weapon. Catinella admitted that he had a knife, which he gave to his lawyer. Months later, Catinella’s coworkers filed a grievance complaining that Catinella was getting extra work privileges. Catinella was placed on emergency leave with pay pending an investigation. Days later he was placed on emergency suspension for unspecified “major causes.” An investigator produced witnesses to an alleged threat by Catinella to “shoot up the workplace.” The witnesses gave inconsistent accounts. Catinella was charged with disorderly conduct and released on bond. A report concluded that Catinella possessed a weapon while at work. At a pre-disciplinary meeting, Catinella was not allowed to confront witnesses. Cook County fired Catinella for possessing a weapon and making a threat of violence. The disorderly conduct charge was dropped. Catinella sued under 42 U.S.C. 1983 alleging violations of procedural and substantive due process and alleging race-based retaliation under 42 U.S.C 1981 and 1983. The Seventh Circuit affirmed dismissal. The complaint does not show how this “whirlwind of alleged unfairness” violates any federal constitutional or statutory provision. View "Catinella v. Cook County" on Justia Law

Delgado, an ATF agent, alleges that his supervisors retaliated against him after he reported his suspicions that another agent improperly shot at a fleeing suspect, provided an inaccurate report, and testified falsely about the incident. Delgado filed a whistleblower complaint with the Office of Special Counsel (OSC), which is charged with investigating allegations under the Whistleblower Protection Act, 5 U.S.C. 1214(a)(1)(A), 2302(b)(8). The OSC declined to investigate, telling Delgado that he had not made a disclosure protected by the Act and had failed to provide sufficient evidence to support his allegations of retaliation. The Merit Systems Protection Board dismissed his appeal, finding that Delgado had not satisfied the requirement that he “seek corrective action before the Special Counsel before seeking corrective action from the Board.” The Seventh Circuit remanded, finding that the OSC and the Board applied unduly stringent and arbitrary requirements. Delgado’s disclosure of suspected wrongdoing either explicitly accused another federal employee of perjury or provided sufficient evidence to justify such a suspicion worthy of consideration by superiors. Either version would be a protected disclosure. The Act requires only that a complainant fairly present his claim with enough specificity to enable the agency to investigate and does not require a whistleblower to prove his allegations before the OSC. View "Delgado v. Merit Systems Protection Board" on Justia Law

Delgado, an ATF agent, alleges that his supervisors retaliated against him after he reported his suspicions that another agent improperly shot at a fleeing suspect, provided an inaccurate report, and testified falsely about the incident. Delgado filed a whistleblower complaint with the Office of Special Counsel (OSC), which is charged with investigating allegations under the Whistleblower Protection Act, 5 U.S.C. 1214(a)(1)(A), 2302(b)(8). The OSC declined to investigate, telling Delgado that he had not made a disclosure protected by the Act and had failed to provide sufficient evidence to support his allegations of retaliation. The Merit Systems Protection Board dismissed his appeal, finding that Delgado had not satisfied the requirement that he “seek corrective action before the Special Counsel before seeking corrective action from the Board.” The Seventh Circuit remanded, finding that the OSC and the Board applied unduly stringent and arbitrary requirements. Delgado’s disclosure of suspected wrongdoing either explicitly accused another federal employee of perjury or provided sufficient evidence to justify such a suspicion worthy of consideration by superiors. Either version would be a protected disclosure. The Act requires only that a complainant fairly present his claim with enough specificity to enable the agency to investigate and does not require a whistleblower to prove his allegations before the OSC. View "Delgado v. Merit Systems Protection Board" on Justia Law

After complaints about his professionalism, Indiana University Hospital required Dr. Hamdan, a U.S. citizen of Palestinian descent, to participate in a peer-review process, which resulted in disciplinary letters. Hamdan successfully appealed. The hospital ultimately voided the letters. Nonetheless, Hamdan resigned and relinquished his hospital privileges. Hamdan sued the hospital for discriminating against him based on race. Hamdan was not a hospital employee and could not sue under Title VII, so he sued under 42 U.S.C. 1981, part of the Civil Rights Act of 1866, intended to protect the ability of newly-freed slaves to enter and enforce contracts. Hamdan alleged discrimination in his contractual relationship with the hospital. The Seventh Circuit affirmed a verdict for the hospital, rejecting an argument that the district court erred in allowing the hospital to ask Hamdan impeachment questions relating to his prior work at other hospitals. The court noted Hamdan’s testimony that his reputation was “untarnished” before he received the disciplinary letters. The Seventh Circuit also rejected an argument that the court erred in permitting the hospital to try to impeach him with questions about matters that were confidential under the peer-review statutes of Indiana, Louisiana, and Michigan. Even if the state laws applied, the judge did not abuse his discretion in allowing impeachment questions about incident reports. View "Hamdan v. Indiana University Health North Hospital, Inc." on Justia Law