Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Fitzgerald worked for Roncalli Catholic High School as a guidance counselor and Co-Director of Guidance for 14 years and earned years of stellar performance reviews. In 2018, the school declined to renew her one-year employment agreement, explaining that her same-sex marriage was contrary to the Catholic faith. Fitzgerald was placed on administrative leave. Her Co-director of Guidance, Starkey, informed Roncalli that she too was in a same-sex marriage. The school did not renew Starkey’s employment agreement. Fitzgerald and Starkey brought separate lawsuits, alleging sex discrimination under Title VII.In both cases, the district court entered summary judgment in favor of the defendants and the Seventh Circuit affirmed. The school fired Fitzgerald because of her same-sex marriage and Title VII prohibits this kind of sex discrimination, but the Supreme Court has held that employment discrimination suits are barred “when the employer is a religious group and the employee is one of the group’s ministers.” Fitzgerald played a crucial role on the Administrative Council, which was responsible for at least some of Roncalli’s daily ministry, education, and operations and “helped develop the criteria used to evaluate guidance counselors, which included religious components like assisting students in faith formation and attending church services.” Fitzgerald held herself out as a minister. View "Fitzgerald v. Roncalli High School, Inc." on Justia Law

The Lac Courte Oreilles Band of Lake Superior Chippewa Indians is a federally recognized tribe in northwestern Wisconsin. In 2013 the Tribe’s Community Health Center hired Mestek as the Director of Health Information. In 2017 the Health Center implemented a new electronic health records system. Mestek soon raised questions about how the new system operated, expressing concern to management that the Center was improperly billing Medicare and Medicaid. An eventual external audit of the Center’s billing practices uncovered several problems. After receiving the audit results in 2018, Bae, the head of the Health Center, called Mestek into her office to ask if she was “loyal.” Mestek answered yes, but persisted in her efforts to uncover billing irregularities. A month later, Mestek learned that she was being fired in a meeting with the Medical Director and the HR Director. Mestek sued the Health Center and six individuals (in both their personal and official capacities) under the False Claims Act’s anti-retaliation provision, 31 U.S.C. 3730(h). The district court dismissed.The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The doctrine of tribal sovereign immunity precluded Mestek from proceeding; the Health Center is an arm of the Tribe. The individual employee defendants also properly invoked the Tribe’s immunity because Mestek sued them in their official capacities. View "Mestek v. Lac Courte Oreilles Community Health Center" on Justia Law

Deputy Deeren announced his candidacy for Sheriff of Trempealeau County in 2017. In early 2018, officials within the Sheriff’s Department discovered that Deeren had failed to disclose information about his arrest record when he applied to become a deputy. Deeren had been asked in a 2015 job interview whether he had any prior contact with law enforcement; he failed to disclose that he had been arrested and charged with criminal sexual assault in 2007. After the Department learned of the arrest in 2018, Deeren was again asked about his prior contacts with law enforcement. Deeren again omitted his 2007 arrest and, when confronted, refused to answer questions about it. Then-Sheriff Anderson and Chief Deputy Reinders sought to terminate Deeren for dishonesty and insubordination. Deeren ultimately resigned from the Department and lost the sheriff’s race to Semingson, another deputy in the Department.Deeren filed suit, alleging that Anderson, Reinders, and Semingson engaged in several retaliatory actions against him in response to his candidacy and in violation of the First Amendment. The district court granted the defendants summary judgment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Deeren failed to offer evidence from which a reasonable jury could conclude that any defendant engaged in a single act of unconstitutional retaliation. View "Deeren v. Anderson" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a lieutenant in the Kankakee Fire Department (“KFD”)—was attacked by another firefighter while responding to a fire at a senior living facility. The City suspended the other firefighter for twenty-four hours without pay, ordered him to complete an anger management course, and directed him to avoid working on the same shift as Plaintiff for three months. Plaintiff experienced ongoing physical and mental injuries from the incident, causing her to take leave from work and apply for workers’ compensation. She returned to work six months later but permanently left her position shortly after. She then filed a lawsuit, alleging that Defendants, among other things, retaliated against her for certain protected activities under Title VII and condoned aggressive and inappropriate behaviors as part of a “code of silence” that resulted in her attack. The district court granted summary judgment for Defendants, and this appeal followed.   The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The court explained that on the merits, Plaintiff’s claim fails because none of her evidence, separately or taken together, creates a genuine dispute regarding whether Defendants had a practice of condoning aggressive behavior, resulting in a constitutional injury. Further the court wrote that the record does not support Plaintiff’s contention that there was such a high risk of constitutional injury from the other firefighter that the “single incident” theory of municipal liability applies here. The court held Plaintiff failed to create a genuine dispute of material fact precluding summary judgment regarding her Fourth Amendment Monell claim and her Title VII retaliation claim. The district court, therefore, properly granted summary judgment to Defendants. View "Michelle Giese v. City of Kankakee" on Justia Law

While an Illinois State Police (ISP) lieutenant, Dunn was assigned to the Illinois Gaming Board. According to ISP, federal agents informed the ISP that he was implicated in a federal criminal investigation into mortgage fraud. In 2014, the ISP placed him on restricted duty. ISP records reflected that Dunn was the “subject of a federal criminal felony investigation.” Dunn admits that he participated in a voluntary interview with federal investigators, but denies that he was under investigation. He claims that the ISP was never told that he was a “target.” According to ISP, it “could not obtain any additional documentation” before placing Dunn on restricted duty because of “limitations with federal grand jury regulations.” In 2016, Dunn filed suit, 42 U.S.C. 1983, against three individuals in their personal and official capacities, alleging that they had violated his right to due process without opportunity for a hearing by depriving him of a liberty interest in future occupational opportunities. He asserted that the defendants had notified third parties that ISP had stripped him of his law-enforcement authority. While the lawsuit was pending, Dunn retired while on restricted duty; he was categorized as “not in good standing” at retirement, which affected his eligibility to carry a concealed weapon.The Seventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment for the defendants. Dunn lacked evidence that they publicly disclosed stigmatizing information about him. Public disclosure requires actual disclosure, but Dunn pointed to only the possibility of disclosure by FOIA requests or database searches. View "Dunn v. Schmitz" on Justia Law

In 2018, Chicago Public Schools (CPS) hired Bronson as a treatment center teacher. Bronson was assigned to Lurie Hospital. Bronson and another teacher assigned to Lurie (Cooper), are Black; the third teacher, Lee, is White. Lurie’s family services director, Ruohonen, was the teachers’ “representative supervisor” at Lurie. Ruohonen is White. Bronson alleges that Lurie and Ruohonen treated Bronson and Cooper, the first Black teachers assigned to Lurie, in a discriminatory manner. In a departure from consistent past practice, Lurie denied Bronson and Cooper access to Lurie's electronic medical records system, EPIC, for a year. Identification badges issued to Bronson and Cooper bore a different color than those issued to others: Lee’s badge granted her “regular employee access” to EPIC. In 2019, Ruohonen sent an email to their CPS supervisor, complaining about Bronson and Cooper. Bronson contacted the Chicago Teachers Union, which responded that the complaint was inconsistent with the union contract, Bronson also alleges that she and Cooper were denied adequate office and desk space.In December 2019, Bronson filed a charge of discrimination with the EEOC, then filed suit, asserting violations of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. 2000e, and the Civil Rights Act of 1866, 42 U.S.C. 1981. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the claims. Because the allegations in Bronson’s complaint establish that Lurie is not her de facto employer, she cannot sue Lurie under Title VII. View "Bronson v. Ann & Robert H. Lurie Children's Hospital of Chicago" on Justia Law

In 2013, Kinsella, working for Baker, suffered work-related knee injuries that left him unable to work for three years. He received disability benefits. In 2016, his physician deemed him fit to work in sedentary jobs. Martinez, in human resources, helped him look for appropriate jobs at the company. Kinsella submitted an ADA Reassignment Request. Martinez indicated that Baker had 30 days to look for jobs and that failure to timely find alternative work would result in termination. After that period expired, Martinez suggested Kinsella apply for a dispatcher job. Kinsella failed to apply on time, despite an extension. He applied the next day but did not follow up. A non-disabled employee was hired.Kinsella received a termination letter, citing failure to apply for a position. Kinsella responded, attaching a receipt confirming his application. After investigation, Baker began the process of reinstating Kinsella'a status. Eventually, negotiations broke down.In 2018, Kinsella filed a claim that the EEOC dismissed as untimely. Kinsella sued, alleging failure-to-accommodate, discriminatory discharge, and retaliation under the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. 12101. An arbitrator granted Baker summary judgment. Kinsella asked the district court to vacate the award, arguing that the arbitrator exceeded his powers by requiring illegitimate elements of proof. The court reinstated and dismissed the case. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Kinsella misconstrues the arbitrator’s statements concerning a lack of evidence showing discriminatory intent. They were part of attributing fault on both sides for a breakdown in the interactive process to find a reasonable accommodation. View "Kinsella v. Baker Hughes Oilfield Operations, LLC" on Justia Law

Northrop laid off workers in 2012 and did not provide them all with severance benefits. Its Severance Plan provides that a laid-off employee regularly scheduled to work at least 20 hours a week will receive severance benefits if that employee “received a cover memo, signed by a Vice President of Human Resources.” The plaintiffs, who did not receive this “HR Memo,” filed suit under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA), 29 U.S.C. 1001– 1461.The parties agreed to have a magistrate resolve the case, 28 U.S.C. 636(c). After the suit was certified as a class action, the district judge resumed control at Northrop's request, finding that the increased stakes constituted “good cause” for withdrawing the reference. The district court granted the defendants summary judgment, ruling that the Plan gives the HR Department discretion to choose who gets severance pay.The Seventh Circuit affirmed, first finding no abuse of discretion in the withdrawal of the reference order. The Plan makes the receipt of severance benefits contingent on the receipt of an HR Memo, which the class members did not get. Welfare-benefit plans under ERISA—unlike retirement plans—need not provide for vesting, and the terms of welfare-benefit plans are entirely in the control of the entities that establish them. When making design decisions, employers may act in their own interests and may include a discretionary component. Rights under ERISA are not subject to estoppel. The plan itself—not past practice—always controls. View "Carlson v. Northrop Grumman Severance Plan" on Justia Law

In 2001, Sylvester Wince, who is Black, began work as a Hospital maintenance mechanic. In 2010 the Hospital contracted with CBRE. Wince kept his job under the title of Stationary Engineer. Wince is a licensed Stationary Engineer, has a bachelor’s degree, and holds certificates in electricity, air quality, and refrigeration. Collective bargaining agreements (CBAs) governed Wince’s employment. Wince alleges that CBRE denied him a promotion because of his race. Wince’s application for the job was outside CBRE’s usual hierarchy for promotions; the job went to a white man with similar credentials who had gone through that hierarchy. Wince claimed he was the subject of racist slurs and a discriminatory nickname, “Sly.” After Wince told his coworkers he disliked the nickname, they stopped using it. Wince claimed CBRE’s management made comments that revealed racial bias. Wince also alleged that he filed grievances accusing CBRE of denying him holidays, overtime, promotions, and paid time off and that CBRE failed to address them. In 2018 Wince filed a charge of discrimination with the EEOC, which was dismissed. In 2019, Wince quit CBRE for a position at another hospital.The Seventh Circuit affirmed the summary judgment rejection of his claims of racial discrimination and retaliation under 42 U.S.C. 1981 and Title VII; breach of the CBA, the Fair Labor Standards Act, and the Illinois Wage Payment and Collections Act; and constructive discharge. View "Wince v. CBRE, Inc." on Justia Law

Jam produces and hosts live events at Chicago-area venues. Over six years ago, Jam’s employees voted to certify the Union as their bargaining representative. Jam filed an objection to the election results, which the National Labor Relations Board overruled. In 2018, the Seventh Circuit instructed the Board to hold an evidentiary hearing on the objection. The Board did so, overruled Jam’s objection again, and again sought enforcement of its order compelling Jam to bargain.The Seventh Circuit granted the application for enforcement, upholding the Board’s approach to analyzing objectionable pre-election benefits. The Board carefully examined the statistical evidence and witness testimony and could reasonably require Jam to show something more than voters receiving a critical period hiring-hall benefit before inferring coercion. The Board properly held that Jam “failed to prove the union provided referrals to the [] voters to which they were not otherwise entitled” and, as a consequence, found it unnecessary to draw an inference of coercion and determined that “even if the increase in job referrals during the critical period were construed as a grant of benefits,” the union’s explanation for the referrals rebutted “any inference of coercive, election-related timing or purpose.” View "National Labor Relations Board v. Jam Productions, Ltd." on Justia Law