Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Kennedy had decades of experience working for Schneider Electric and taught classes, part-time, in electrical and industrial safety at Prairie State community college. Schneider requires its employees to obtain advance approval before they teach classes or submit articles for publication. Without obtaining permission, Kennedy published articles about power-distribution equipment, identifying himself as a Prairie State instructor. When Schneider learned of these articles a manager contacted Prairie State to ask about Kennedy’s course materials, which she worried might contain proprietary information. Weeks later, while reviewing instructors' credentials, Prairie State realized that Kennedy did not possess the qualifications to teach and did not rehire Kennedy as an adjunct instructor. A year later, Kennedy sued Schneider, alleging defamation and malicious interference with an advantageous relationship. The court granted Schneider summary judgment, finding that Prairie State acted solely because Kennedy did not meet its credentialing requirements and not because of Schneider’s telephone call. More than a year later, Kennedy moved to set aside the judgment (Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(d)(3)), asserting that Schneider’s lawyers knowingly submitted perjured evidence. The court denied the motion, stating that the cited evidentiary discrepancies were known at the time of summary judgment, and granted Rule 11 sanctions against Kennedy’s lawyer for having to defend against the motion ($10,627.16). The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Kennedy could have challenged the same evidence on summary judgment. If the court made a mistake, Kennedy could have asked for reconsideration or appealed. View "Kennedy v. Schneider Electric" on Justia Law

Milliman, then a McHenry County Sheriff’s Department (MCSD) deputy, gave a deposition in which he accused Sheriff Nygren of corruption, bribery, securing fraudulent loans, trafficking illegal aliens, and soliciting two murders. Nygren and his subordinates referred Milliman to a psychologist to evaluate whether he was fit for duty. The psychologist determined that Milliman suffered from cognitive and psychological problems from a previous brain tumor that rendered him unfit to perform his duties. MCSD terminated Milliman based upon the results of that examination, the false allegations against Nygren, and violations of MCSD General Orders. Milliman sued Nygren, Nygren’s subordinates, and the county under 42 U.S.C. 1983, claiming that defendants violated his First Amendment rights by retaliating against him for protected speech. The district court granted summary judgment to defendants and the Seventh Circuit affirmed, on the ground that the fitness‐for‐ duty examination provided an independent, non‐retaliatory, non‐pretextual basis for Milliman’s termination. The court rejected Milliman’s argument that a jury could question whether Milliman’s fitness examination was ordered in good faith because he received a “standard” rating in his last annual performance review, citing the importance of such precautionary measures in the law enforcement context due to “the risks posed by an officer who is not well enough to work.” View "Milliman v. Prim" on Justia Law

Joint Logistics (JL) hired Oliver, an African-American, as a truck driver in 2012, subject to a Collective Bargaining Agreement, which outlined two seniority units: the Motor Vehicle Repair Employees and the Motor Vehicle Operation Employees (transportation unit). When JL conducted layoffs, the most junior employees within a “seniority unit” were let go first. When JL filled a position more senior employees within the unit had hiring priority. At various points during 2013–2015, Oliver was laid off from and subsequently recalled to his position in the transportation unit. Each time he was laid off, Oliver was the least senior member of that unit. In 2014, Oliver applied for an open mechanic position in the repair unit. Vance, a white male, also applied. Neither had seniority over the other. While JL considered his application, Oliver filed a charge with the EEOC alleging discrimination and retaliation. Weeks later, JL hired Vance to fill the position. During the following months, JL filled other mechanic positions, for which Oliver did not apply. Oliver brought discrimination and retaliation claims under 42 U.S.C. 1981. The Seventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of JL. Oliver cannot establish a prima facie case that he was laid off because of his race; he presented no adequate comparators. Oliver cannot demonstrate that JL hid a discriminatory motive when it failed to hire him for the mechanic position. View "Oliver v. Joint Logistics Managers, Inc." on Justia Law

The University fired Carmody, an information technology manager, after printed copies of a professor’s privileged emails suspiciously ended up in Carmody’s home newspaper box. The emails allegedly exposed inconsistencies in the professor’s testimony in Carmody's separate lawsuit against a different professor. The University learned about the mysterious delivery because Carmody’s lawyer filed the emails with the court. The University concluded that it was “more probable than not” that Carmody improperly obtained the emails himself. Carmody sued the board of trustees and officials alleging that he was fired without due process of law both and that his firing violated an Illinois whistleblower statute. The district court dismissed the case. In an earlier appeal, the Seventh Circuit held that Carmody had pleaded a plausible claim that he was fired without pre-termination due process, but that his decision to withdraw from the post-termination hearing foreclosed his due process claim based on the post-termination procedures and affirmed the dismissal of the state-law claim. On remand, the district court granted summary judgment for some defendants and Carmody lost at trial on his claim against three remaining defendants. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Carmody did not establish that the individual defendants bore responsibility for his alleged deprivations. The Eleventh Amendment bars the claims against the board and 42 U.S.C. 1983 does not authorize such claims. View "Carmody v. Board of Trustees of the University of Illinois" on Justia Law

Flanagan sued under Title VII, 42 U.S.C. 20003, alleging that two coworkers threatened her life because she previously successfully sued their shared employer, the Cook County Adult Probation Department, for discrimination and retaliation. Flanagan claims that her colleague overheard human-resources director Vaughan, tell deputy chief, Loizon, “to figure out a way to get [Flanagan] alone and away from her partner.” On March 13, 2008, Loizon radioed for Flanagan to join him and another supervisor at an Adult Probation facility to question a probationer regarding a potential tip. After the questioning, Loizon and the probationer left through the back door. The other supervisor then locked the front door and escorted Flanagan toward the back. While near the back door, Flanagan overheard Loizon say, “Do it to her when she gets out the door.” Nothing further happened. After Flanagan filed another EEOC charge, Loizon approached her in the office parking lot, exchanged words with her, and warned, "I could hit you and nobody would give a fuck.” The district court granted the defendants summary judgment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, reasoning that the threat to Flanagan was too oblique for a jury to conclude that she was subjected to severe or pervasive harassment. View "Flanagan v. Office of the Chief Judge of the Circuit Court of Cook County" on Justia Law

The National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) ruled that full-time staff members who also teach part-time (50-75 individuals, “FTST”) were included in the Part-Time Faculty Association at Columbia College Chicago (PFAC) bargaining unit for the purposes of their part-time faculty duties. Under the collective bargaining agreement’s recognition clause FTST are part-time faculty members and arguably fall under the scope of the general inclusion but also qualify as full-time staff members, which are expressly excluded from representation. An arbitrator vacated the ruling. The Seventh Circuit upheld the NLRB decision. Given the primacy of the NLRB’s determination, the countervailing arbitration decision cannot stand. The National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. 159, “confers broad discretion on the Board to determine appropriate bargaining units,” because “the bargaining unit determination is a representational question reserved in the first instance to the Board.” View "Part-time Faculty Association v. Columbia College Chicago" on Justia Law

Ramos, filed a charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) regarding her severance agreement's broad release of claims and covenant not to sue, with exceptions for “rights that Employee cannot lawfully waive” and for participation “in a proceeding with any appropriate federal, state or local government agency enforcing discrimination laws.” The EEOC abandoned Ramos’s charge by issuing her a right-to-sue letter and, eight months later, filed suit under section 707(a), which it believed granted independent litigation authority for suits against “any person or group of persons … engaged in a pattern or practice ....” 42 U.S.C. 2000e-6(a). While section 707(e)’s incorporation of section 706’s procedural requirements generally requires the EEOC to follow the same pre-suit procedures whether the suit is an individual one or a pattern-or-practice action, the EEOC believed that a distinction between section 707’s subsections excused it from doing so. Section 707(a), unlike section 707(e), gives the EEOC a right to litigate without an underlying charge or unlawful employment practice, and (EEOC thought) by extension, without first conciliating. The EEOC distinguished between section 707(a)’s reach to “any person or group of persons” and section 707(e)’s limitation to employers. In 2015, the Seventh Circuit held that conciliation is necessary under both sections. The district court subsequently awarded $307,902.30 in attorneys’ fees, finding that EEOC had taken a position contrary to its own regulations. The Seventh Circuit reversed, holding that the Sevdecision impermissibly rested on hindsight. View "Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. CVS Pharmacy, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs claim that they faced racial discrimination while working as Environmental Service Technicians (EVS techs) at Advocate, in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. 2000e; 42 U.S.C. 1981. In 2012, Advocate contracted with Aramark and reorganized the supervision of the EVS department; Aramark was responsible for managing the department while abiding by Advocate's policies, including Advocate’s non-discrimination policy. Plaintiffs claim that Aramark supervisors engaged in discriminatory acts, in that: two plaintiffs were paid less than white EVS techs; two were denied promotions and raises; plaintiffs were managed and disciplined more scrupulously than their non-African-American co-workers, and terminated in a discriminatory fashion; African-American plaintiffs were given less desirable and more strenuous assignments; Aramark supervisors subjected plaintiffs to offensive and derogatory racial comments, creating a hostile work environment. The district court granted Advocate summary judgment, concluding that the plaintiffs did not experience severe or pervasive race-based harassment, that there was no basis for employer liability, and that the plaintiffs failed to demonstrate that racial animus motivated the decisions to terminate three plaintiffs. As for the hostile work environment claim, the lower court held that cited comments, although concerning, were too isolated, indirect, and sporadic, and not so serious as to have affected working conditions. The Seventh Circuit remanded the hostile work environment claim but otherwise affirmed. View "Johnson v. Advocate Health and Hospitals Corp." on Justia Law

Indiana juvenile courts may establish juvenile facilities; the judge must appoint staff and determine budgets. The county must pay the facility's expenses from general funds. The Allen Superior Court established a juvenile center, where Harris began working in 1995. His offer of employment included the seal of the “Allen Superior Court,” and he signed the Court’s Employee Handbook, acknowledging an employment relationship with the Court. His job description bore the seal of the Board of Commissioners; his medical records authorization identified the Commissioners as his employer and the juvenile center as his department. Harris’s discipline was handled by the Court; his evaluations were titled “Allen County Employee Performance Appraisal.” Harris injured his back at work. County Attorney Murphy sent Harris a form listing “Allen County Government” as his employer so that he could collect workers’ compensation benefits. A doctor determined that Harris had reached maximum medical improvement and imposed work restrictions. Murphy stated that his restrictions prevented Harris from “perform[ing] the essential functions” of his position “with or without a reasonable accommodation.” Harris applied to several county jobs but did not obtain employment. Harris sued under the Americans with Disabilities Act. The district court granted the County summary judgment, concluding that the Board was not Harris’s employer. Harris voluntarily dismissed the Court. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Harris did not establish that the Board sufficiently controlled his employment, so a reasonable trier of fact could only conclude that the Board was not Harris’s employer. View "Harris v. Allen County Board of Commissioners" on Justia Law

Quinn applied to become an Indianapolis firefighter. He passed the written examination, oral interview, and Certified Physical Agility Test and was placed on a ranked list for hiring consideration. The Department hired two academy classes from that ranked list, but Quinn was not selected. Quinn’s father (Rodney) filed a qui tam suit under the False Claims Act, 31 U.S.C. 3730(h)(1), alleging that the Department had made false statements of material fact to the federal government in order to receive federal grant funds. Rodney was a backup investigator in the Department’s arson unit. Quinn joined his father’s suit, alleging that the Department retaliated against him for his father’s complaint. The district court granted the Department summary judgment on Quinn’s retaliation claim. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Quinn was ranked, at best, five spots too low to receive an automatic selection and every discretionary pick in both classes had more markers than Quinn, consistent with the Department’s policy for discretionary selections. There is no evidence from which a reasonable jury could conclude that Rodney’s suit was even a motivating factor in the decision not to hire Quinn. Even assuming that the meaning of “employee” under section 3730(h) is could encompass job applicants, there are no facts from which a jury could conclude that Quinn was retaliated against because of his father’s suit. View "Heath v. Indianapolis Fire Department" on Justia Law