Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Since 2003, Smith has worked behind the meat counter at Rosebud, a local grocery store. After several years of ongoing sexual and racial harassment from his male coworkers and supervisor, Smith sued, citing Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 1981, and the Illinois Gender Violence Act. Smith had complained about the harassment, to no avail. The jury returned a verdict for Smith. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. To win, Smith had to show more than unwanted sexual touching or taunting; he had to show that the harassment occurred because of his sex. The evidence supports the inference that Smith’s coworkers harassed him because he was male. The shop was a mixed‐sex workplace, and only men were groped and taunted. Because men were treated differently from women at Rosebud, a reasonable jury could conclude that Smith was tormented because of his sex. Rosebud also argued that the district court should have awarded it judgment as a matter of law on Smith’s section 1981 retaliation claim and granted a new trial because of inflammatory statements that Smith’s counsel made during his closing argument. Rosebud did not raise either of these arguments below, so it has forfeited them. View "xSmith v. Rosebud Farm, Inc." on Justia Law

Gianino Plastering operated in St. Louis for over 30 years but abruptly closed in 2012. Gianino’s son, Curt, who had worked at Gianino Plastering for over a decade, founded his own company, CWG, taking on some of Gianino’s customers and employees. CWG completed jobs that Gianino had begun. Curt went into business on the same day that a $196,940.73 judgment was entered against Gianino, arising out of Gianino’s 2009 collective bargaining agreement, which obligated the company to make regular contributions to the Welfare and Pension Funds. The Funds were blocked from collecting on their judgment because Gianino filed for bankruptcy. The Funds then sued CWG, asserting that CWG is Gianino’s successor and alter ego, liable for the judgment and for other ongoing violations of the collective bargaining agreement. After discovery, the district court ruled that the Funds had not produced enough evidence to proceed to trial. The Seventh Circuit reversed. The Funds proffered considerable evidence that a trier of fact could use to support its case against CWG. A reasonable factfinder could find both common ownership and control between the two entities; CWG’s capitalization, common equipment, and shared clients remain disputed matters for trial. The Funds have strong evidence of intent and undisputed evidence of knowledge. View "McCleskey v. CWG Plastering, LLC" on Justia Law

Hamer, a former Intake Specialist for Housing Services and Fannie Mae, sued her former employers, citing the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. 621, and Title VII, 42 U.S.C. 2000e. The court granted the defendants summary judgment. The deadline for her Notice of Appeal was October 14, 2015. On October 8, Hamer’s counsel filed a “Motion to Withdraw and to Extend Deadline.” The court extended the deadline to December 14. Hamer filed her Notice of Appeal on December 11, consistent with the order, but exceeding the extension allowable under Fed.R.App.P. 4(a)(5)(C). The Seventh Circuit dismissed for lack of jurisdiction, reasoning that the statutory requirement for filing a timely notice was jurisdictional and Rule 4(a)(5)(C) limits a district court’s authority to extend the deadline to 30 days. The Supreme Court vacated, holding that statutory time limits are jurisdictional but that those imposed by rules are not—though they remain mandatory if properly invoked. On remand, the Seventh Circuit reached the merits and affirmed. Rights under nonjurisdictional rules can be waived in docketing statements; defendants’ docketing statement included affirmative statements that Hamer’s appeal was “timely”. Hamer did not establish a causal link between her EEOC complaint and an adverse action. To retaliate against a complainant, decision-makers must be aware of the complaint. Hamer has not established a genuine dispute about the decision-makers’ knowledge; all filed affidavits asserting they were never told of Hamer’s plan to file an EEOC complaint. View "Charmaine Hamer v. Neighborhood Housing Services" on Justia Law

After Indianapolis police officers Anders and Carmack divorced, Anders stalked and threatened Carmack. The police department eventually opened a criminal investigation and placed a GPS tracking device on Anders's car with a warning mechanism to alert Carmack if he passed nearby. Carmack spent nights away from home so Anders could not locate her. Anders eventually discovered the device on his car and called Robinett—his friend and fellow police officer—who examined it and confirmed that the device was a GPS. Robinett did not tell investigators that Anders had discovered the device. Days later Anders drove to Carmack’s house and killed her and himself. She was not alerted to his approach. Carmack’s estate sued the city, Robinett, and others. The judge granted the defendants summary judgment, holding that Robinett was not liable under 42 U.S.C. 1983 because he did not act under color of state law. Robinett requested that the city pay his attorney’s fees and costs under the Indiana public-employee indemnification statute. The judge denied the motion, ruling that the statute applies only when the employee acted within the scope of his employment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. A mere allegation that the employee acted within the scope of his employment does not trigger the indemnification obligation. View "Robinett v. City of Indianapolis" on Justia Law

Lieutenant Perales (Hispanic) asked Officer Robinson (biracial) why he did not shave his facial hair in compliance with Department policy. Robinson’s doctor’s note was deemed inadequate. Robinson has folliculitis, a painful skin condition that most often occurs in black men who shave. Weeks later, Robinson revived the issue. Lieutenant Hersey (African‐American) was present. Perales told Robinson that his inquiry was not racially based and recounted that Chicago police used to say that “We don’t back n‐‐‐‐rs up” and Perales claimed, “That’s not me.” Hersey told Perales that this was inappropriate but did not report the incident. Weeks later, Robinson told Perales that he had scheduled another doctor’s appointment and invited Perales to look at his scars, caused by shaving. Perales responded, “it must be the n‐‐‐‐r in you.” Robinson's partner, Pawlik, overheard. Robinson submitted a grievance. Chief Richardson (African-American) imposed a 20‐day suspension. Robinson, Pawlik, and watch commander Spangler noticed that Perales was subjecting Robinson to particular scrutiny. Perales and Hersey directed Spangler to “go against” Robinson and Pawlik. Spangler refused. Another officer reported that Perales had stated that Robinson and Pawlik needed to “watch [their] asses.” Following Robinson's second grievance. Perales was found not to have engaged in any wrongdoing and was reassigned to Internal Affairs. Robinson was passed over for promotion. Spangler received two unwarranted notices of infraction, then was bumped from his watch commander position. In Robinson and Spangler's suit, the court granted the defendants judgment on all claims except for Robinson’s retaliation claim against Perales and the Board. A jury found against Perales and in favor of the Board, awarding Robinson one dollar. The court declined to award Robinson attorneys’ fees. The Seventh Circuit vacated the defendants' judgment on Robinson’s claim for racial harassment and Spangler’s claim for retaliation and otherwise affirmed. View "Spangler v. Perales" on Justia Law

The Union sought to represent Jam’s employees, part-time stagehands who handle equipment at various venues; their employment is sporadic. On September 30, 2015, Jam and the Union identified the potential bargaining unit as full-time and regular part-time production employees at specific venues, employed during the payroll period ending on October 4, 2015. The petition was held in abeyance pending the investigation of the Union's unfair labor practice charge, based on Jam’s termination of a crew leader and 53 employees.The charge was resolved in April 2016; Jam would reinstate the employees by offering them immediate, full participation in Jam’s “on-call list.” In the May 2016 election, Jam included on its voter eligibility list five stagehands hired during two weeks after October 4, 2015. The Union prevailed 22-10; an additional 21 ballots were challenged. Five were ballots cast by employees hired during the two week period. The Board’s Acting Regional Director concluded that Jam’s challenge fell short of requiring that the election be aside. The Director sustained the Union’s challenges to the ballots of four of the “two week” employees and certified the Union. An NLRB panel affirmed. The Seventh Circuit declined to enforce the order requiring Jam to bargain with the Union, finding enough evidence to warrant an evidentiary hearing on Jam’s argument that, in the period before the election, the Union attempted to influence the election outcome by steering premium union jobs to Jam employees. View "National Labor Relations Board v. Jam Productions, Ltd." on Justia Law

Khowaja was an Immigration Enforcement Agent, 2008-2012. He then began employment as an FBI Special Agent on a two-year probationary term. Khowaja’s lack of judgment was frequently cited as a concern by his immediate supervisor, SSA Green. In June 2013, Green and Assistant Special Agent in Charge Jones approved a recommendation for removal report, listing several examples; Khowaja did not dispute the examples. The report concluded Khowaja’s arrogance, avoidance of senior agents, and defensiveness had hindered his judgment. Jones and Green informed Khowaja that his removal was being sought. Days later, Khowaja contacted the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. In July 2013, the Assistant Administrative Director of the FBI’s Human Resources Division terminated Khowaja's employment. Khowaja alleged that Green, a white Christian, asked Khowaja during their first meeting if he was Muslim, questioned him about his faith, used Arabic holy phrases in a derogatory manner; mocked Middle Eastern accents, and pointed out that Khowaja is Muslim during a presentation to other agents. Khowaja noted a remark by Jones to a police chief that Khowaja was “not our typical agent.” Khowaja asserted that he was held to a different standard than his peers. Khowaja alleged that he was unlawfully discriminated against because he is Muslim, (Title VII, Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. 2000e-16(a)), and that he was intentionally, unlawfully terminated in retaliation for beginning the EEOC process (42 U.S.C. 2000e-3(a)). The Seventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of the government. View "Khowaja v. Sessions" on Justia Law

Sutula‐Johnson sold office furniture. In 2010, OfficeMax adopted a compensation plan that paid a commission rate depending on the sale’s profit. Commissions were earned either when a customer paid or 90 days after the customer was invoiced, whichever came first. Sutula‐Johnson negotiated better terms and earned commissions upon invoicing. OfficeMax and Office Depot merged in 2013. Office Depot continued paid Sutula‐Johnson and her colleagues under the terms of the old OfficeMax plan. In July 2014, Office Depot announced a new compensation plan for furniture sales, effective immediately. Sutula‐Johnson claims she did not receive a copy of the new plan for several weeks. The new plan significantly changed how Sutula‐Johnson was paid and reduced her total pay. She initially refused to sign it, complaining about its application to sales already in the works but not yet invoiced. Sutula‐Johnson continued working for Office Depot for more than a year. In 2015 Sutula‐Johnson resigned and sued for breach of contract and violations of the Illinois Wage Payment and Collection Act, 820 ILCS. 115/1. The Seventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment for Office Depot on the breach of contract claims but reversed as to the statutory claims. Sutula‐Johnson accepted the new terms by continuing to work but offered evidence that Office Depot violated the Wage Act by failing to pay her commissions monthly and by failing to pay her commissions earned before she resigned. View "Sutula-Johnson v. Office Depot, Inc." on Justia Law

When Goplin began working at WeConnect, he signed the “AEI Alternative Entertainment Inc. Open Door Policy and Arbitration Program,” which referred to AEI throughout; it never mentioned WeConnect. Goplin brought a collective action under the Fair Labor Standards Act. WeConnect moved to compel arbitration, Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(3), attaching an affidavit from its Director of Human Resources stating, “I am employed by WeConnect, Inc.—formerly known as Alternative Entertainment, Inc. or AEI.” Goplin claimed that WeConnect was not a party to the agreement and could not enforce it. He cited language on WeConnect’s website: WeConnect formed when two privately held companies, Alternative Entertainment, Inc. (AEI) and WeConnect Enterprise Solutions, combined in September 2016… we officially became one company. WeConnect asserted that WeConnect and AEI were two names for the same legal entity, stating: This was a name change, not a merger. The court held that WeConnect did not establish that it was a party to the agreement or otherwise entitled to enforce it. The court rejected subsequently-submitted corporate-form documents and affidavits, stating that new evidence cannot be introduced in a motion for reconsideration unless the movant shows “not only that [the] evidence was newly discovered or unknown to it until after the hearing, but also that it could not with reasonable diligence have discovered and produced such evidence.” The Seventh Circuit affirmed. View "Goplin v. WeConnect, Inc." on Justia Law

Simpkins began working for DuPage Housing Authority (DHA) in 2009 under an “Independent Contractor Agreement” for “general labor” to rehabilitate vacant properties to make them suitable for occupants. In 2011, the rehab work slowed and Simpkins began working primarily at Ogden townhome community, for which DHA served as on‐site management. Ogden’s property manager and maintenance supervisor, DHA employees, gave Simpkins instructions and prioritized the order in which he needed to complete tasks. In May 2012, Simpkins and DHA entered into another “Independent Contractor Agreement,” covering “general labor” at Ogden. Simpkins worked full‐time and exclusively for DHA; reported his hours by invoice; and was paid bi‐weekly via check. DHA issued Simpkins 1099‐MISC tax forms, while others received W‐2 forms. Simpkins knew that DHA considered him an independent contractor and repeatedly requested to become an employee. DHA did not provide him with pension, insurance, or other benefits. In 2015, Simpkins was injured in a car accident; his relationship with DHA ended. He filed suit, claiming that DHA had repeatedly failed to pay him overtime and was required to provide him with disability benefits. The district court ruled that Simpkins was not an employee under the Fair Labor Standards Act and rejected all of his federal claims. The Seventh Circuit reversed, finding genuine issues of fact as to the control exercised by DHA, questions concerning the origin of tools and material, and ambiguity as to the termination date of the second contract. View "Simpkins v. DuPage Housing Authority" on Justia Law