Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Cleven worked as a City of Madison stagehand, classified as an independent contractor and not enrolled in the Wisconsin Retirement System. In 2006, a union sought to represent the stagehands. The Employment Relations Commission found that they were not independent contractors and ordered an election. The city agreed to review the stagehands’ hours to determine whether they qualified for enrollment in the System, determined that Cleven qualified as of December 2009, and agreed to pay the stagehands’ share of the required contribution starting in 2010. There was no agreement concerning the period before the labor agreement. The state Employee Trust Funds Board concluded that Cleven was eligible to enroll in 1983, but declined to decide who was responsible for paying the past‐due employee contribution. State courts declined his efforts to seek judicial review. In the meantime, the city did not report his hours and earnings. Cleven sought mandamus relief. In 2016, the state court ordered the city to “immediately” report his enrollment as a participating employee as of 1983. The city complied; the System invoiced the city for the employer and employee contributions. After the city paid, it joined parallel litigation about whether the stagehands owed the past‐due employee contribution; its appeal is pending. Cleven sued the city and city employees under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging that they violated his due process rights because he wanted to retire in 2011, but the delay in reporting his hours forced him to wait until 2016, holding his benefits "hostage” without a pre-deprivation hearing. The Seventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment for the city. If there was a deprivation of property, Cleven’s ability to seek a writ of mandamus was adequate post-deprivation process. View "Cleven v. Soglin" on Justia Law

In 2008 Indiana University hired Haynes, who is black, as an assistant professor, funding most of his salary through the Strategic Recruitment Fund, which facilitates "recruitment of underrepresented minorities and women into the professoriate.” Haynes had a six-year probationary contract. Tenure candidates are evaluated on research, teaching, and service and must be “excellent” in one area and “satisfactory” in the others. In 2013, Haynes submitted his tenure dossier, selecting research as his "excellence" performance area. The committee voted 6–3 against tenure. The dean wrote that “the committee questioned the extent of Dr. Haynes’[s] impact based on low citation numbers and low numbers of publications in high-quality journals” and that Haynes’s “evaluations ha[d] been mixed[] and particularly low in the online courses” and failed to show “significant improvement.” The university-wide Tenure Advisory Committee voted unanimously against tenure; 18 of 27 faculty members found his teaching unsatisfactory and 19 found his research not excellent. Haynes sued under the Civil Rights Act of 1866, 42 U.S.C. 1981, and the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 2000e.The Seventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of the University, upholding the exclusion of Haynes’s proffered expert reports for lack of “specialized knowledge.” A plaintiff needs compelling evidence that “clear discrimination” pervasively infected the tenure decision; this case was “not a close one.” Regardless of the finer points of academic tenure and its intersection with anti-discrimination law. Haynes lacks any evidence that the University denied tenure because he is black. View "Haynes v. Indiana University" on Justia Law

Allied offered Robertson a job, but ran a background check before she reported to work. Under the Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA) 15 U.S.C. 1681a(d)(1), Robertson claims that Allied violated a requirement to notify her “clear[ly] and conspicuous[ly],” in writing, unadorned by additional information, of its intent to obtain the report and to secure her consent (notice claim). Non‐conviction information appeared in Robertson’s background check. Allied revoked its offer. An employer that relies on a background check for an adverse employment decision must provide the applicant with a copy of the report and a written description of her rights under FCRA before acting. Allied provided neither (adverse action claim). After mediation, the parties reached a tentative settlement. Months later, the Supreme Court held that federal jurisdiction exists only if the plaintiff has alleged an injury that is concrete and particular. Months later, Robertson moved under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(e) for preliminary approval of the settlement and for certification of two settlement classes. The court rejected, as “simply wrong,” Robertson’s assertion that it could approve the settlement without jurisdiction over the underlying case and dismissed the case for lack of standing. The Seventh Circuit reversed as to the adverse action claim. Allied’s alleged violations of the Act caused Robertson concrete injury. Dismissal of the notice claim was proper because authority to adjudicate must exist before a court can resolve the case, even if that resolution is only a Rule 23(e) fairness hearing, followed by approval of a settlement. View "Robertson v. Allied Solutions, LLC" on Justia Law

Sloan began working for the Association in 2014. She received multiple merit raises. In 2016 she was promoted, making her an exempt salaried employee under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), 29 U.S.C. 213. Sloan’s relationship with Wilson, the Association’s president-CEO, deteriorated. Wilson became confrontational, unfairly criticized Sloan, and antagonized her in front of colleagues. At a meeting, Wilson asserted that Sloan “bring[s] [her] personal problems to work.” Sloan complained that the Association did not have a human resources department to help resolve the conflict. Wilson sent Sloan home and informed Sloan that she was suspended for six days without pay. Sloan stated, “I don’t even know if you can do this.” Wilson replied: “I’m the President ... I can do whatever I want.” Days later, Sloan emailed the Board of Directors, stating that she believed Wilson’s actions violated federal law and attacking Wilson’s leadership. Sloan's attorney emailed the Board regarding “potential legal claims” and “actionable defamation.” Wilson sent an email to the entire staff stating that "Sloan is no longer employed. Sloan alleged that she was fired in violation of the FLSA’s anti-retaliation provision. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the suit. Sloan attacked the substantive basis for her suspension, criticized Wilson’s leadership, and protested the absence of a human-resources department. These complaints expressed Sloan’s frustrations with Wilson and the Association, but no reasonable employer would recognize them as assertions of FLSA-protected rights concerning wages and hours. View "Sloan v. American Brain Tumor Association" on Justia Law

Rowlands worked at the UPS for 25 years before she was fired in 2012, for changing her time card. Rowlands filed an EEOC Charge and a union grievance. She was reinstated. Rowlands had suffered several injuries, starting in 2005 when she was hit by a semi-truck and needed a hip replacement. Immediately before her firing, Rowlands suffered three knee injuries, one at work, and required surgery. Rowlands returned to work but her employee ID was never reactivated and UPS allegedly established new rules that applied only to Rowlands. Rowlands claims that she requested accommodations for her knee injuries, which were not granted. In January 2013 Rowlands was fired for violating UPS’ “zero tolerance” Violence Prevention Policy by brandishing a taser before she walked to the distant, dimly-lit parking lot. Rowlands’ coworkers corroborated that for 10 years she had carried the taser as personal protection. Rowlands’ car had been broken into twice. According to her co-workers, other employees carried similar devices on a regular basis, believing that the Policy prohibited only firearms. The district court rejected her suit under the Americans with Disabilities Act, 14 U.S.C. 12111 on summary judgment, finding that she did not have a disability, had waived her failure to accommodate claim and failed to establish a prima facie case for retaliation. The Seventh Circuit reversed. There are genuine disputes of material fact on Rowlands’ failure to accommodate and retaliation claims, neither of which were waived. View "Rowlands v. United Parcel Service, Inc." on Justia Law

For more than 50 years, Caterpillar paid unemployment benefits to laid-off employees at its Joliet, Illinois manufacturing plant. Caterpillar and the local union agreed to end the program in their 2012 collective-bargaining agreement. In exchange for the elimination of the benefits, Caterpillar distributed $7.8 million to certain employees who had participated in the plan. Retirement-eligible employees received a pro rata share if they agreed to retire. Those who were ineligible to retire received the same pro rata share of the fund but with no strings attached. O’Brien and 47 other retirement-eligible employees who refused to retire brought suit under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA), 29 U.S.C. 621. The Seventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment for Caterpillar,. Though the liquidation plan has a disparate impact on older workers, it was justified by several “reasonable factors other than age.” The plan achieved one of Caterpillar’s long-standing financial objectives— the elimination of costly unemployment benefits. It also saved money by incentivizing early retirement and reducing administrative expenses, and contributed to labor peace between Caterpillar and the union. View "O'Brien v. Caterpillar Inc." on Justia Law

Koty, a DuPage County Sheriff’s Department deputy, requested a different squad car model. Koty’s physician indicated Koty should be given a car with more legroom to accommodate a hip condition. The Department denied Koty’s requests. Koty submitted EEOC complaints alleging discrimination in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). Shortly thereafter, the Department reassigned Koty to courthouse duty, for which he would not need to drive a squad car. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the rejection of Koty’s claims that the Department violated the ADA when it denied his request for an SUV and then wrongfully retaliated against him for making the EEOC complaint. Koty did not qualify as “disabled” under the ADA and the Department took no adverse employment actions against Koty. All Koty alleged was that he is unable to drive one model of vehicle, which does not affect a major life activity. The transfer did not result in a pay decrease, other than Koty’s diminished opportunity for overtime pay. Koty did offer some evidence that courthouse duty is considered less prestigious but Koty conceded he knew the transfer was a way for the Department to accommodate his hip pain, an accommodation he requested. “It is the employer’s prerogative to choose a reasonable accommodation.” View "Koty v. County of Dupage" on Justia Law

Moreland worked as a FEMA Disaster Assistance Employee. Such employees to respond to events declared disasters by the president. Their work is intermittent. They are paid only for hours worked when they are “deployed.” When they are not deployed, they are “reservists” and are not paid. Moreland, who lives in Texas, filed a discrimination charge and requested a hearing. The ALJ scheduled her hearing in Wisconsin. Moreland, who was on reserve status, asked to be deployed to Wisconsin so that she would receive pay for her time and reimbursement for her travel expenses. After consulting with its Office of Equal Rights, the agency declined to deploy her to the hearing. While on reserve status, Moreland attended and testified. The agency required that two supervisors testify at the hearing, so it deployed them and paid for their time and expenses. At least one of the witnesses was on reserve status; the agency deployed her solely to testify. Moreland claims that the agency’s decision not to deploy her for the hearing was retaliation for her previous discrimination grievance. On remand, the district court granted the government summary judgment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Moreland failed to provide evidence that she suffered an adverse action and did not rebut the government’s legitimate reason for not reimbursing her--a reasonable interpretation of its own regulation. View "Moreland v. Nielsen" on Justia Law

Emerson, a Cook County Department of Corrections corrections officer, alleged that County employees unlawfully discriminated against her during her “tumultuous” tenure at a County detention facility. During that time, she twice filed formal personnel grievances. She claims that she was subsequently the victim of retaliation. She was on paid medical leave from September 2012 until March 2014, and she has remained on unpaid leave ever since. While her claims under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 2000e, were pending, Emerson took to Facebook to threaten potential witnesses with legal action if they testified against her. The district judge sanctioned Emerson ($17,000) for the threat and eventually entered summary judgment for the defendants. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, reasoning that Emerson’s grievance regarding scheduling did not qualify as protected activity under Title VII because it did not allege that Grochowski (who made the schedule) targeted her because of her race, sex, or other protected characteristic. Emerson had no proof that Grochowski ever knew of her earlier grievance, so she cannot establish that they harbored the retaliatory motive necessary for a Title VII retaliation claim. View "Emerson v. Dart" on Justia Law

United Airlines pilot instructors sued their union, ALPA, alleging that ALPA had breached its duty of fair representation in its allocation of a retroactive pay settlement among different groups of pilots. The district court dismissed the case. The Seventh Circuit reversed. A claim of discrimination or bad faith must rest on more than a showing that a union’s actions treat different groups of employees differently and must be based on more than the discriminatory impact of the union’s otherwise rational decision to compromise. The Instructors sufficiently and plausibly pleaded that ALPA acted in bad faith in its allocation of retroactive pay between the line pilots and pilot instructors. A union may not make decisions “solely for the benefit of a stronger, more politically favored group over a minority group.” The plaintiffs have alleged that pilot instructors make up a minority of ALPA’s membership and that ALPA acted with the intent to appease its majority membership, the line pilots, after a lengthy and contentious CBA negotiation. View "Bishop v. Air Line Pilots Association, International" on Justia Law