Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Cervantes began working as an Ardagh pallet loader in 1991. He was promoted to forklift driver, then to electro‐mechanic in 2000. On June 20, 2015, after completing his shift, he remained at the Ardagh facility to assist his father, an Ardagh employee, with fixing a machine. Supervisor Stewart unsuccessfully attempted to call Cervantes on his radio. When Stewart located Cervantes, he explained that he had not responded because he was not working a second shift. Stewart stated that if he was not accepting second shift assignments, he must leave. He eventually complied. Cervantes was written up for insubordination and temporarily suspended. Following an investigation, Ardagh demoted Cervantes to forklift driver. Cervantes filed a charge with the Illinois Department of Human Rights, claiming only “Retaliation.” He did not check boxes for race, national origin, or any other basis of discrimination. The IDHR dismissed the charge. Cervantes sued under Title VII, 42 U.S.C. 20003 and the Illinois Human Rights Act, claiming Ardagh failed to promote him, issued him performance warnings, and demoted him based on his race and national origin and in retaliation for his previous complaints about harassment and discrimination. The district court granted Ardagh summary judgment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Cervantes did not exhaust his administrative remedies for his discrimination claims. His retaliation claim fails because there is no evidence of a causal connection between any protected activity by Cervantes and an adverse employment action by Ardagh. View "Cervantes v. Group" on Justia Law

Scheidler, employed by the Indiana Department of Insurance (IDOI), sought accommodations for disabilities related to her mental health. She asked, among other things, that her coworkers not startle her. She received these accommodations for several years. In May 2013, a frustrated supervisor reached toward Scheidler and said, “I could just strangle you.” An investigation into the incident discovered that several months earlier Scheidler commented in an elevator about a coworker’s apparent promotion prospects: “It’s who you know and who you blow.” IDOI terminated Scheidler. She sued for disability discrimination, retaliation, and other claims. She lost some claims at summary judgment and the rest at trial. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The closest Scheidler comes to advancing a failure-to-accommodate claim is under the theory that she asked her coworkers not to startle her, but the supervisor threatened to strangle her in an episode that was an isolated, “one-off” event. Scheidler claimed that her elevator comment was statutorily protected activity but the court held she failed both the subjective and objective factors because she did not have a sincere, good-faith belief she opposed an unlawful practice and because her comment did not involve discrimination prohibited by Title VII. View "Scheidler v. Indiana" on Justia Law

In March 2014, Kleber, an attorney, applied for a senior inhouse position in CareFusion’s law department. The job description required applicants to have “3 to 7 years (no more than 7 years) of relevant legal experience.” Kleber was 58 and had more than seven years of pertinent experience. CareFusion hired a 29-year-old applicant who met but did not exceed the experience requirement. Kleber filed suit, alleging disparate treatment and disparate impact under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. 623(a)(2). The district court dismissed Kleber’s disparate impact claim, reasoning that the text of section 4(a)(2) did not extend to outside job applicants. Kleber then voluntarily dismissed his separate claim for disparate treatment liability to appeal. Following en banc review, the Seventh Circuit affirmed. The plain language of section 4(a)(2) makes clear that Congress, while protecting employees from disparate impact age discrimination, did not extend that same protection to outside job applicants; that reading is reinforced by the ADEA’s broader structure and history. View "Kleber v. CareFusion Corp." on Justia Law

Calvert was the sole owner of E.L.C., an electrical contracting company. After a labor organization unsuccessfully campaigned to unionize his workforce, Calvert laid off most of E.L.C.’s electricians, effectively preventing future unionization attempts. The NLRB determined that E.L.C. violated the National Labor Relations Act prohibition on discrimination against workers for exercising their statutory rights, 29 U.S.C. 158(a)(3) and ordered E.L.C. to compensate the electricians with backpay. Calvert shifted E.L.C.’s operations to new corporate entities. The NLRB discovered Calvert’s plan and held him personally responsible for the backpay award. Facing more than $400,000 in liability, Calvert filed for Chapter 7 bankruptcy. The Board argued that the debt was not dischargeable because it arose from a willful and malicious injury, 11 U.S.C. 523(a)(6). Calvert denied that he acted maliciously. The bankruptcy judge declined to apply collateral estoppel and found that Calvert had not acted maliciously, so the debt was not exempt from discharge. In the district court, the Board again raised collateral estoppel but failed to analyze the elements of the doctrine or provide citations to the agency record. The district judge and Seventh Circuit affirmed. The Board did not challenge the evidence or the factual findings but based its entire case on collateral estoppel while providing only a generalized discussion of preclusion doctrine that is untethered to specific findings. View "National Labor Relations Board v. Calvert" on Justia Law

In November 2016, two plaintiffs sued Metra and several of its employees, alleging racial discrimination under 42 U.S.C. 1983. An amended complaint named 11 plaintiffs and 10 defendants, with additional claims of racial discrimination and a claim under the Americans with Disabilities Act; it described instances in which African-American employees were treated differently than white employees. Defendants asserted it was impossible to discern the alleged acts attributable to the individual defendants, and that the amended complaint contained incorrect numbering and failed to assert wrongdoing against five defendants. The plaintiffs did not respond. Plaintiffs then submitted the wrong version of a second amended complaint. After a hearing, the plaintiffs filed an amended second amended complaint, with claims by 12 plaintiffs against Metra and 11 employees, alleging racial discrimination; hostile work environment; disparate treatment; negligent and intentional infliction of emotional harm; discrimination under the Fourteenth Amendment; discrimination under Title VII, the Illinois Civil Rights Act, and the ADA; retaliation; and breach of contract. Defendants claimed the breach of contract claim was preempted by the Railway Labor Act, the Illinois Act has no application in employment law, and that Title VII and the ADA only authorize suits against employers, not individuals. The court denied the plaintiffs’ motion to file a third amended complaint. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The plaintiffs had ample opportunity to address the deficiencies and waived their arguments in opposition to the motion to dismiss. View "Lee v. Northeast Illinois Regional Commuter Railroad Corp." on Justia Law

Fare Foods hired Swyear as an outside sales representative in 2015. Swyear claims Porter (an owner) indicated that she would be the first female outside sales representative and expressed concern regarding her ability to perform effectively in a male-dominated field. Porter later testified that he liked hiring a woman because they could get men to do things like unload delivery trucks or make sales and that Fare employed several female outside sales representatives before Swyear. Swyear noticed the work environment was sometimes unprofessional; male employees used offensive nicknames, discussed the sexual activities of other employees, and talked about how one female employee dressed inappropriately. Porter testified that he was aware of and may have used the offensive nicknames. Swyear did not tell anyone she was offended nor did she make any formal or informal complaints. At one point, Swyear reported that a fellow representative had made overtures to her during a business trip. The company investigated but decided that discipline was not required. After two reviews, during which Swyear was given instructions about improving her job performance with respect to punctuality and use of company vehicles, Swyear’s employment was terminated. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the rejection, on summary judgment, of her claims of sexual discrimination, sexual harassment, and retaliation under Title VII, 42 U.S.C. 2000e, and breach of contract. View "Swyear v. Fare Foods Corp." on Justia Law

Ross worked as a coal miner for approximately 30 years. He smoked cigarettes for almost as long but was able to quit after his first heart attack. Ross continued to work as a coal miner even though he suffered another heart attack and had difficulty breathing at work. Approximately six years after Ross stopped working in the coal mines, his breathing problems became severe. In 2012, Ross sought benefits under the Black Lung Benefits Act, 30 U.S.C. 901. The Department of Labor’s Benefits Review Board vacated a denial. On remand, the ALJ granted Ross’s claim. The Board affirmed. The Seventh Circuit enforced the decision. Rejecting a due process argument, the court noted the employer had the opportunity to argue its case twice before the ALJ and twice before the Board, including the chance to submit supplemental medical opinion evidence. A theory that something must be amiss because the ALJ changed his mind on remand is particularly unpersuasive here because the parties submitted five additional medical opinions after the Board’s second decision. Ross proved by a preponderance of the evidence that he was totally disabled. View "Consolidation Coal Co. v. Director, Office of Workers’ Compensation Programs, United States Department of Labor" on Justia Law

For 25 years, Wrolstad worked at CUNA, eventually becoming a financial reporting manager. In 2009 his position was eliminated in a corporate restructuring. He was 52 years old. At his supervisor’s suggestion, Wrolstad applied for vacant positions at the company, including a job as a pension participant support specialist. CUNA hired a 23-year-old for that position. Wrolstad signed a severance agreement waiving all claims in exchange for 50 weeks of severance pay. Months later Wrolstad filed a complaint with the Madison Equal Opportunities Commission, claiming age discrimination. An investigator dismissed the complaint. CUNA sent Wrolstad a letter explaining that it would sue to enforce the waiver if he did not drop his appeal. Wrolstad refused. CUNA filed a breach-of-contract. Wrolstad filed a second complaint with the Commission, claiming retaliation. Both claims were transferred to the EEOC, which issued a right-to-sue notice. Wrolstad then sued CUNA under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. 621. A district judge granted CUNA summary judgment, ruling that the age-discrimination claim lacked evidentiary support and the retaliation claim was time-barred. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Wrolstad’s effort to revive his age-discrimination claim cited new arguments and evidence that he did not bring to the district judge’s attention. The arguments were forfeited and fail on the merits. The retaliation claim accrued when CUNA sent the letter announcing its unequivocal decision to enforce the severance agreement. View "Wrolstad v. CUNA Mutual Insurance Society" on Justia Law

For 35 years, Terry worked as a teacher and an administrator for the District. After the 2013–2014 school year, the District closed the school where Terry served as the Principal because of declining enrollment and reassigned her as the Assistant Principal at another school. The District picked a male employee (Cain) over Terry for a separate promotion, although Terry had earned the highest ranking of the applicants from the interviewers. Terry filed suit, alleging sex discrimination under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. 2000e-2(a)(1), and the Fourteenth Amendment (42 U.S.C. 1983); retaliation under Title VII; and unequal pay, 29 U.S.C. 206(d)(1). The Seventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of the District on Terry’s federal claims. Even assuming Terry’s change in position constituted a material adverse action, Terry did not marshal any evidence that the District had a discriminatory purpose. The chronology of events alone is not evidence that the District lied when it said it picked Cain for the promotion because of his experience working at the particular school. Timing, even combined with Terry’s positive employment history, is not enough to create a dispute of material fact as to whether the District retaliated against Terry. The difference in salary between Terry and Cain was based on the salary freeze (and not based on sex). View "Terry v. Gary Community School Corp." on Justia Law

Current and former flight attendants challenged a SkyWest Airlines compensation policy of paying for their work in the air but not on the ground, alleging violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. 201 (FLSA), and various state and local wage laws. The sought to certify a class of similarly situated SkyWest employees. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the federal claim. The flight attendants plausibly allege they were not paid for certain hours of work but under the FLSA the relevant unit for determining a pay violation is the average hourly wage across a workweek. The flight attendants failed to allege even a single workweek in which one of them received less than the federal minimum wage of $7.25 per hour. The dormant Commerce Clause, however, does not bar the other claims.. States possess authority to regulate the labor of their own citizens and companies; the dormant Commerce Clause does not preclude state regulation of flight attendant wages in this case, particularly when the FLSA itself reserves that authority to states and localities. View "Hirst v. Skywest, Inc." on Justia Law