Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Gates testified that his supervisor, Rivera, addressed him with the N‐word twice, and once threatened to write up his “black ass.” The district court granted the employer summary judgment on Gates’s claim for a racially hostile work environment under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. 2000e‐2, stating that Gates faced a high bar, “as ‘[t]he workplace that is actionable is one that is ‘hellish.’” The court found that Rivera’s comments were not severe or pervasive enough to rise to the level of a hostile work environment. The Seventh Circuit reversed in part. The district court erred in applying the “hellish” standard and failed to focus on the difference in Seventh Circuit hostile environment cases between having the plaintiff’s co‐workers show racial hostility and having the plaintiff’s supervisor show racial hostility, especially in using poisonous racial epithets. View "Gates v. Board of Education of the City of Chicago" on Justia Law

Ruark was working for Union Pacific, using a hydraulic rail drill. Ruark was involved connecting the drill to the hydraulic lines and used the machine to drill several holes without noticing any leaking fluid or other malfunction. As he drilled the last hole, Ruark reached down to turn the drill off. Hot fluid sprayed over him, including in his eyes. Ruark declined medical attention. The supervisor sent him home to clean up. Ruark returned the following day, but did not do much work, because, he claims, “it hurt too bad.” Ruark saw his regular nurse practitioner the next day, for “sinus and stomach problems.” Ruark did not return to work because he was convicted of a felony unrelated to the accident. Ruark sued under the Federal Employers Liability Act, 45 U.S.C. 51-60. Ruark’s prison sentence interrupted his trial preparation. The judge denied a motion for a continuance because the case had been pending for almost three years, Ruark had been well represented by his initial counsel, and Ruark's incarceration did not justify reopening exhausted deadlines and allowing Ruark to begin discovery anew. The judge allowed Ruark’s trial testimony by video deposition and deposition of Ruark’s treating physician. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the rejection of Ruark’s theory of negligence based on res ipsa loquitur. That doctrine requires that the defendant was in control of the instrumentality that caused the injury and that the plaintiff was not also negligent; those conditions were not met. A jury could not assume that “the matter spoke for itself.” The court did not abuse its discretion by refusing to grant a continuance. View "Ruark v. Union Pacific Railroad Co." on Justia Law

Walker had worked at Ingersoll since 2008 and had a history of conflict with coworkers. On October 21, 2014, Walker was listening to music while working. Rafferty told Walker to mute the radio. Walker alleges that he was “bumped” and threatened with additional violence. Ingersoll questions whether physical contact or threats occurred. The men engaged in a shouting match. The unit supervisor, Thompson, calmed them down. Walker returned to work; Rafferty went home. They worked without incident on October 22. On October 23, Walker met with Thompson and another supervisor. Walker told Thompson that he no longer trusted or respected him because he had not disciplined Rafferty and suggested that the conflict with Rafferty was affecting his physical wellbeing. The supervisors suspended Walker with pay while determining how to proceed. On October 26, Thompson and his supervisor decided to terminate Walker’s employment. The human resources manager began the termination process. On October 29, Walker’s attorney informed Ingersoll that he intended to sue for discrimination and retaliation unless Ingersoll brought him back to work. Walker reported the alleged physical assault to local police. The prosecutor declined to bring charges. Ingersoll formally terminated Walker’s employment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of Ingersoll. Walker had abandoned his Title VII racial discrimination claims and did not identify a causal connection between his termination and conduct protected by Illinois law. View "Walker v. Ingersoll Cutting Tool Co." on Justia Law

Winsted was 42 years old when he applied for disability benefits, asserting an onset date of October 2010. Although he initially alleged he became disabled in 2005, two prior applications alleging this onset date were denied and deemed administratively final. Winsted suffers from multiple physical impairments, including degenerative disc disease, osteoarthritis, and anxiety, mostly associated with his previous work in hard labor as an industrial truck driver, a highway maintenance worker, and an operating engineer. An ALJ denied benefits, finding that Winsted could work with certain limitations. The district court affirmed. The Seventh Circuit remanded. The ALJ did not adequately explain how the limitations he placed on Winsted’s residual functional capacity accounted for the claimant’s mental difficulties; the ALJ did not consider Winsted’s difficulties with concentration, persistence, and pace. View "Winsted v. Berryhill" on Justia Law

JCB, an Indiana state-chartered bank, had an agreement with INVEST, a registered broker-dealer, to offer securities to JCB customers. In 2017, JCB assigned DuSablon to assist in identifying and establishing an investment business with a new third-party broker-dealer. DuSablon failed to do so and abruptly resigned. JCB learned that DuSablon had transferred customers’ accounts from INVEST into his own name and had started a competing business. JCB sought a preliminary injunction, asserting violations of the Indiana Uniform Trade Secrets Act, breach of contract, breach of fiduciary duty, tortious interference, unfair competition, civil conversion, and computer trespass. DuSablon moved to dismiss, arguing that JCB lacked standing and that Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA) rules barred the suit; he removed the case, asserting exclusive federal jurisdiction under 15 U.S.C. 78aa and the Securities and Exchange Act. Although JCB did not plead a federal claim, DuSablon contended that JCB’s response to his motion to dismiss “raises a federal question as all of [JCB’s] claims ... rest upon the legality of direct participation in the securities industry which is ... regulated by the [Securities] Act.” The district court remanded,, concluding that it lacked jurisdiction and that removal was untimely, ordering DuSablon to pay JCB costs and fees of $9,035.61 under 28 U.S.C. 1447(c). The Seventh Circuit dismissed an appeal. DuSablon lacked an objectively reasonable basis to remove the case to federal court. View "Jackson County Bank v. DuSablon" on Justia Law

Kopplin, a former train conductor, brought claims of negligence and negligence per se against the Wisconsin Central railroad under the Federal Employers’ Liability Act, 45 U.S.C. 51, alleging that Kopplin injured his elbow in trying to operate a broken railroad switch on January 24, 2014. The district court granted the railroad summary judgment because Kopplin could not prove that the broken switch caused his injury. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. A video of the incident shows no immediate signs of injury and Kopplin never mentioned any pain to his coworkers until two hours later. He had continued to perform other physical tasks. Kopplin’s sole causation expert conceded, in a deposition, that he knew so little about Kopplin’s job that it would be mere speculation to say throwing a switch even could cause the elbow injury and that he did not investigate whether Kopplin’s other physical activities could have caused his renewed elbow problems. That expert later provided an affidavit in which he definitively stated that the January 24 incident caused the elbow injury, explaining that the nature of the injury was so clear that there was no need to even consider other potential causes. The judge refused to consider the affidavit because it contradicted sworn deposition testimony. View "Kopplin v. Wisconsin Central Limited" on Justia Law

Cervantes began working as an Ardagh pallet loader in 1991. He was promoted to forklift driver, then to electro‐mechanic in 2000. On June 20, 2015, after completing his shift, he remained at the Ardagh facility to assist his father, an Ardagh employee, with fixing a machine. Supervisor Stewart unsuccessfully attempted to call Cervantes on his radio. When Stewart located Cervantes, he explained that he had not responded because he was not working a second shift. Stewart stated that if he was not accepting second shift assignments, he must leave. He eventually complied. Cervantes was written up for insubordination and temporarily suspended. Following an investigation, Ardagh demoted Cervantes to forklift driver. Cervantes filed a charge with the Illinois Department of Human Rights, claiming only “Retaliation.” He did not check boxes for race, national origin, or any other basis of discrimination. The IDHR dismissed the charge. Cervantes sued under Title VII, 42 U.S.C. 20003 and the Illinois Human Rights Act, claiming Ardagh failed to promote him, issued him performance warnings, and demoted him based on his race and national origin and in retaliation for his previous complaints about harassment and discrimination. The district court granted Ardagh summary judgment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Cervantes did not exhaust his administrative remedies for his discrimination claims. His retaliation claim fails because there is no evidence of a causal connection between any protected activity by Cervantes and an adverse employment action by Ardagh. View "Cervantes v. Group" on Justia Law

Scheidler, employed by the Indiana Department of Insurance (IDOI), sought accommodations for disabilities related to her mental health. She asked, among other things, that her coworkers not startle her. She received these accommodations for several years. In May 2013, a frustrated supervisor reached toward Scheidler and said, “I could just strangle you.” An investigation into the incident discovered that several months earlier Scheidler commented in an elevator about a coworker’s apparent promotion prospects: “It’s who you know and who you blow.” IDOI terminated Scheidler. She sued for disability discrimination, retaliation, and other claims. She lost some claims at summary judgment and the rest at trial. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The closest Scheidler comes to advancing a failure-to-accommodate claim is under the theory that she asked her coworkers not to startle her, but the supervisor threatened to strangle her in an episode that was an isolated, “one-off” event. Scheidler claimed that her elevator comment was statutorily protected activity but the court held she failed both the subjective and objective factors because she did not have a sincere, good-faith belief she opposed an unlawful practice and because her comment did not involve discrimination prohibited by Title VII. View "Scheidler v. Indiana" on Justia Law

In March 2014, Kleber, an attorney, applied for a senior inhouse position in CareFusion’s law department. The job description required applicants to have “3 to 7 years (no more than 7 years) of relevant legal experience.” Kleber was 58 and had more than seven years of pertinent experience. CareFusion hired a 29-year-old applicant who met but did not exceed the experience requirement. Kleber filed suit, alleging disparate treatment and disparate impact under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. 623(a)(2). The district court dismissed Kleber’s disparate impact claim, reasoning that the text of section 4(a)(2) did not extend to outside job applicants. Kleber then voluntarily dismissed his separate claim for disparate treatment liability to appeal. Following en banc review, the Seventh Circuit affirmed. The plain language of section 4(a)(2) makes clear that Congress, while protecting employees from disparate impact age discrimination, did not extend that same protection to outside job applicants; that reading is reinforced by the ADEA’s broader structure and history. View "Kleber v. CareFusion Corp." on Justia Law

Calvert was the sole owner of E.L.C., an electrical contracting company. After a labor organization unsuccessfully campaigned to unionize his workforce, Calvert laid off most of E.L.C.’s electricians, effectively preventing future unionization attempts. The NLRB determined that E.L.C. violated the National Labor Relations Act prohibition on discrimination against workers for exercising their statutory rights, 29 U.S.C. 158(a)(3) and ordered E.L.C. to compensate the electricians with backpay. Calvert shifted E.L.C.’s operations to new corporate entities. The NLRB discovered Calvert’s plan and held him personally responsible for the backpay award. Facing more than $400,000 in liability, Calvert filed for Chapter 7 bankruptcy. The Board argued that the debt was not dischargeable because it arose from a willful and malicious injury, 11 U.S.C. 523(a)(6). Calvert denied that he acted maliciously. The bankruptcy judge declined to apply collateral estoppel and found that Calvert had not acted maliciously, so the debt was not exempt from discharge. In the district court, the Board again raised collateral estoppel but failed to analyze the elements of the doctrine or provide citations to the agency record. The district judge and Seventh Circuit affirmed. The Board did not challenge the evidence or the factual findings but based its entire case on collateral estoppel while providing only a generalized discussion of preclusion doctrine that is untethered to specific findings. View "National Labor Relations Board v. Calvert" on Justia Law