Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Sommerfield was born in Germany, where some of his family members had died in concentration camps. He emigrated, settled in Chicago, and joined the police department. His supervisor was Sergeant Knasiak. For years, Sommerfield endured vicious anti-Semitic abuse from Knasiak. After Knasiak insulted the Mexican ethnicity of Sommerfield’s girlfriend, Sommerfield filed a formal complaint register (CR). Two days later, Knasiak accused Sommerfield of insubordination for an unrelated incident, recommending suspension. This was the only CR Knasiak had ever issued. Sommerfield’s five-day suspension was unprecedented for the minor infraction of “failure to report location.” Later Sommerfield was denied a promotion, although he was rated “well-qualified.” Sommerfield sued. The court dismissed Knasiak. Sommerfield won a jury verdict of $30,000 against Chicago.Sommerfield again sued Knasiak and the city in 2008, alleging harassment, discrimination on the basis of race, religion, and national origin, and retaliation based on protected activities. The district court dismissed the claims against the city but awarded Sommerfield $540,000 in punitive damages, $8,703.96 in pre-judgment interest, plus another $54,315.24 in economic damages. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. While the evidence was not “overwhelming,” there was ample evidence from which the jury could conclude that Knasiak filed the CR out of discriminatory animus and that Knasiak was the real decision-maker with respect to the adverse actions taken against Sommerfield. Upholding the award of punitive damages, the court stated that, although Knasiak’s harassment never turned physically violent, his conduct was “extremely reprehensible.” View "Sommerfield v. Knasiak" on Justia Law

In 2013, LeVan was elected to the office of Milton Township Assessor, displacing his political rival, Earl. Shortly after he took office, LeVan discharged a group of Deputy Assessors who had publicly supported Earl in his run for reelection. The dismissed employees sued LeVan under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging that the Deputy Assessor position is not one for which political affiliation is a valid job requirement, as the position did not authorize the employees to have meaningful input in policy decisions.The district court concluded that LeVan is not entitled to qualified immunity. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Unless political affiliation is an appropriate job requirement, the First Amendment forbids government officials from discharging employees based on their political affiliation. Taking as true the plaintiffs’ well-pleaded allegations about the characteristics of the Deputy Assessor position, a reasonable actor in LeVan’s position would have known that dismissing the deputies based on their political affiliation violated their constitutional rights. View "Hanson v. LeVan" on Justia Law

Tonyan, a Dunham’s store manager, suffered a series of injuries, requiring multiple surgeries and restrictions to her shoulder, arm, and hand movement. After her doctor imposed permanent restrictions, including one preventing her from lifting more than two pounds with her right arm, Dunham’s fired her. Dunham’s claims, because of its lean staffing model, that store managers must perform various forms of physical labor, such as unloading and shelving merchandise, as essential functions of their job duties.The Seventh Circuit affirmed the summary judgment rejection of her claims, alleging disparate treatment and failure to accommodate her disability, 42 U.S.C. 12112(a) and 42 U.S.C. 12112(b)(1)–(7). Physical tasks were essential functions of Tonyan’s job; in light of the severe restrictions on her movement, no reasonable factfinder could determine that Tonyan was capable of performing the essential functions of her position. The court rejected Tonyan’s argument under the FLSA “primary duty” test for overtime exemption; an exempt employee may spend more than 50 percent of his time performing non‐exempt work, such as manual labor. Tools were available throughout Tonyan’s employment and they did not permit Tonyan to perform her duties, which she delegated. Even with tools, a person restricted to lifting no more than two pounds with one of her arms could not lift canoes, for instance, to their proper storage space. View "Tonyan v. Dunham's Athleisure Corp." on Justia Law

A 2012-2015 collective bargaining agreement (CBA) contained a union security clause that required Maysteel employees either to become union members or to pay a “service fee for representation.” Under a dues check‐off provision, Maysteel, with an employee’s authorization, deducted dues or fees from the employee’s paycheck. A new agreement was to take effect on March 5, 2015, the day after the old agreement expired; the parties agreed to implement it on March 2, with the start of a new pay period. The new agreement was actually signed on March 18. On March 11, Wisconsin’s Act 1, a right-to-work law prohibiting union security clauses, took effect and applied to CBAs “upon renewal, modification, or extension of the agreement occurring on or after” that date.Plaintiffs unsuccessfully demanded that Maysteel stop fee deductions, then filed charges with the NLRB, which negotiated a settlement that did not require reimbursement of the deductions or invalidation of the union security clause. The plaintiffs sued, alleging unfair labor practices under state law. Defendants removed the case to federal court. The judge denied remand and granted the defendants summary judgment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The federal question at the heart of the complaint was whether the 2012 CBA was "renewed, modified, [or] extended on or after March 11, 2015.” Wisconsin is not entitled to give an independent answer to this question, different from federal law. The CBA was formed before Act 1 took effect. View "Sarauer v. International Association of Machinists & Aerospace Workers" on Justia Law

FedEx twice fired Kotaska because she could not lift up to 75 pounds. The first time, she was limited to lifting only 60 pounds after a shoulder injury. Eventually, her condition improved so that she could lift 75 pounds to her waist. A FedEx supervisor rehired her “oě the books.” Within three, FedEx discovered her capabilities above the waist remained severely limited and dismissed her again. Kotaska filed suit under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. 12101–12213.The district court granted FedEx summary judgment because Kotaska had not shown she was a qualięed individual or that the second dismissal was in retaliation for her complaints about the first. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The parties agree that lifting packages, including above the waist and shoulders, is an essential function (really the essential function) of a handler. Kotaska did not dispute FedEx’s judgment that a handler must be able to lift up to 75 pounds by herself and up to 150 pounds with help. Whatever precise weight a handler might need to lift above the waist or shoulders, no reasonable fact-finder could place that weight within Kotaska’s stringent medical restrictions. View "Kotaska v. Federal Express Corp." on Justia Law

McCray worked at the Milwaukee VA Vet Center as a readjustment counselor, 1997-2000. After earning a Master’s degree, he returned to the VA in 2004 as a Mental Health Case Manager. McCray had served in the Army for eight years in the 1980s and sustained multiple physical and mental injuries. In 2013, his VA disability rating was 100 percent. McCray also suffers from hypertension, arthritis, diabetes, sarcoidosis (in remission), and PTSD.McCray alleges that the VA failed to accommodate his disabilities and that he suffered disparate treatment as an African-American man. The van McCray used to transport VA clients allegedly lacked adequate legroom and was unsafe; the VA waited 11 months before replacing it. In 2013, McCray experienced difficulty concentrating at work, which he attributed to discrimination and retaliation by co‐workers after he filed EEOC charges. After returning from a leave of absence and experiencing panic attacks, his reassignment request was denied. McCray indicated that he could probably continue working in an office on a lower floor. That request was denied, although there were vacant offices lower in the building.The district court dismissed his suit under the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. 701. The Seventh Circuit reversed in part. McCray’s complaint presents a plausible claim for relief based on the delay in accommodating his disability with respect to the van. On remand, McCray can further develop his office space claim. McCray waived his disparate treatment claims. View "McCray v. Wilkie" on Justia Law

Delgado, an agent with the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives, sought relief under the Whistleblower Protection Act, 5 U.S.C. 1214(q)(1)(A), 2302(b)(8), for retaliation he suffered after reporting his suspicions that another ATF agent may have committed perjury during a federal criminal trial. In 2018, the Seventh Circuit held that the Merit Systems Protection Board had acted arbitrarily in dismissing his administrative appeal under the Act and that Delgado had properly alleged “a protected disclosure” and had exhausted his administrative remedies so that the Board had jurisdiction to evaluate his claim. On remand, the Board, acting only through an Administrative Judge (since 2017 the Board has lacked a quorum), denied relief.The Seventh Circuit remanded, only with respect to the relief Delgado is entitled-to. The Administrative Judge “paid only lip-service” to its earlier decision, “ignoring critical holdings and reasoning.” Delgado proved that he made a disclosure that was protected under the Act and proved retaliation for his protected disclosure, which affected decisions to deny him several promotions. Noting that it had “already remanded, only to be met by obduracy,” and that the government had the opportunity to offer evidence to support its affirmative defense, which fails as a matter of law, the court held that Delgado is entitled at least to pay and benefits as if he had been promoted effective March 2014. View "Delgado v. United States Department of Justice" on Justia Law

Henderson joined the VA police department Hines VA Hospital in 1986. Henderson filed an employment discrimination action against the Department of Veteran Affairs. After being denied a promotion in 2013, Henderson, who is African American, alleged race and age discrimination and retaliation claims, under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 2000e-2, and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. 621. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the judgment for the VA, following a remand for a determination of whether the VA’s explanations for not selecting Henderson for a criminal investigator position were a pretext for racial discrimination. The district court acted properly with respect to testimony on subjects not disclosed in Henderson’s interrogatory answer. Henderson failed to explain the substance of the testimony he sought to present so it is not possible to conclude that the district court erred in excluding it. The court’s decision that it would not permit evidence of discriminatory action against other African Americans after the award of the criminal investigator job was proper because some of those actions are in litigation; the slight additional value from the cumulative evidence was outweighed by the risk of jury confusion. View "Henderson v. Wilkie" on Justia Law

McCann began her employment with Badger’s predecessor in 2010. At her 2013 evaluation, she received an overall appraisal of “Right on Track” but her supervisor noted some shortcomings in her ability to deal with conflict, work with others, communicate, and problem-solve with her coworkers. The review also noted limitations in McCann’s abilities to perform new tasks and to understand others’ roles in the department. Her supervisors noted similar problems in subsequent years. In 2015, McCann reported having arthritis and carpal tunnel syndrome and that she would need time off for medical appointments. At around the same time, the company experienced financial problems. All employees over the age of 60, including McCann, were offered an early retirement package. Involuntary staff reductions became necessary.After her termination, McCann filed suit under the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. 12112, and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. 621–634. The Seventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment for Badger on her disability claim related to the elimination of her position. McCann failed to come forward with evidence that, but for her disability, Badger would not have eliminated her position. View "McCann v. Badger Mining Corp." on Justia Law

In 2014, Tyburski, then age 74, applied for a promotion with his employer, the Chicago Department of Water Management. His application was rejected. Tyburski sued, claiming that he was denied the promotion because of his age in violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. 621–634. He also brought a hostile work environment claim under the ADEA regarding harassment he allegedly experienced at two Department facilities.The Seventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of the city. Tyburski has not supplied evidence showing that his age, rather than his failing score on the requisite verbal exam, was the reason he missed out on the desired promotion. Assuming a hostile work environment claim is cognizable under the ADEA, Tyburski failed to present sufficient evidence for a factfinder to conclude that the purported harassment he experienced was severe or pervasive. Tyburski also failed to exhaust this claim regarding conduct that allegedly occurred at one facility, as he did not file a charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission reporting that conduct. View "Tyburski v. City of Chicago" on Justia Law