Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Simpson unsuccessfully applied to work as a Correctional Officer at the Cook County Department of Corrections four times in 2014-2017. Simpson believed the hiring practices underlying those rejections violated his rights—and those of other unsuccessful Black applicants—under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. 2000e-2(a)(1). Invoking disparate treatment and disparate impact theories, Simpson’s class action complaint alleged that, through the use of a five-step hiring process for correctional officers, the Department both intended to discriminate against Black applicants and succeeded in producing that result. The district court denied Simpson’s motion for class certification, finding that none of his proposed classes—a general class of all unsuccessful applicants and five subclasses of candidates dismissed at each step of the hiring process—satisfied Rule 23(a)(2)’s requirement that they present “questions of law or fact common to the class.”The Seventh Circuit vacated. The district court’s analysis apparently merged Simpson’s disparate impact claims with his disparate treatment claims for intentional discrimination. While disparate treatment claims may require a more searching commonality inquiry, disparate impact claims most often will not: the common questions are whether the challenged policy has in fact disparately impacted the plaintiff class and, if so, whether that disparate impact is justified by business necessity. The court did not clearly delineate its reasoning for declining to certify three of Simpson’s disparate impact subclasses. View "Simpson v. Dart" on Justia Law

In 2016, Lax raised concerns about discrimination. After notification of his right to file a formal complaint, Lax filed a formal complaint of disability discrimination against his employer (DHS), alleging he had been improperly placed on indefinite suspension and had his security clearance suspended after he checked himself into a hospital for mental health treatment and missed two days of work.DHS's final agency decision, rejecting Lax’s complaint, was sent to Lax’s work email address on July 17, 2019. One minute later, Lax was sent the password to open an attachment, which contained: the final decision, a “Notice of Appeal Rights,” a privacy statement, and a certificate of service. The “Notice of Appeal Rights” stated that Lax had the right to file suit in federal court within 90 days of receiving the final decision. Lax concedes that he opened these emails and read them on the day they were sent but claims that he was unable to open the attached document until the next day; government security measures prevented him from accessing his work email account on any non-work device.On October 16, 2019 (91 days after July 17), Lax filed suit. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the suit as untimely under 42 U.S.C. 2000e5(f)(1). Lax did not satisfy the extraordinary circumstances element for equitable tolling. View "Lax v. Mayorkas" on Justia Law

After being fired from the CTA, Miller and McGuire (both Caucasian) sued their former employer, alleging racial discrimination and retaliation in violation of federal (42 U.S.C 1981 and 1983, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964) and Illinois state law. Following discovery, the defendants moved for summary judgment. Despite receiving two extensions, however, Miller and McGuire failed to respond. Finding no persuasive excuse for this failure, the district court denied their third extension and took up the motion without a responsive pleading. The court concluded that the undisputed evidence did not support the claims and granted CTA summary judgment.The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying an extension, and evidence of basic elements of a retaliation claim was lacking. Miller and McGuire could not avoid summary judgment based on the suspicious timing of their discharges alone unless, “[a]t minimum,” they first produced evidence supporting a reasonable inference that Bonds (a CTA officer) knew of their EEO complaints. They did not. Undisputed evidence showed that CTA had legitimate (nonracial) reasons for terminating Miller and McGuire’s employment and these reasons were not pretextual. View "Miller v. Chicago Transit Authority" on Justia Law

Under a 2014 policy, United pilots only accrued sick time during the first 90 days of military leave. Moss, a pilot and a Lieutenant Colonel in the Marine Corps Reserves, sued, alleging violations of the Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act (USERRA), 38 U.S.C. 4301, which requires employers to provide employees on military leave any seniority-based benefit the employee would have accrued but for the military leave. He claimed that sick time is a seniority-based benefit that should have continuously accrued or sick-time accrual was available to pilots on comparable periods of leave.The district court granted United summary judgment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. For a benefit to be seniority-based, the benefit must be a reward for length of service. Sick leave is not such a reward but is "a future-oriented longevity incentive." United’s sick-time accrual policy contains a work requirement and is in the nature of compensation, not a reward for long service. . View "Moss v. United Airlines, Inc." on Justia Law

Reinebold, then 56 years old, applied to be the head baseball coach of Indiana University South Bend (IUSB). After IUSB declined to hire Reinebold, he sued IUSB, Athletic Director Bruce, and Assistant Athletic Director Norris under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) and 42 U.S.C. 1983. The district court dismissed all of Reinebold’s claims with his concession except for his section 1983 claims against Bruce and Norris in their individual capacities. The district court then entered summary judgment in favor of Bruce and Norris, finding that Reinebold did not identify a suitable comparator and did not show that he was intentionally treated differently because of his age.The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The hiring committee distinguished Reinebold and his proposed comparator Buysse (age 31) based on their respective performances during their interviews. The evidence shows that Reinebold performed poorly during his phone interview. Buysse performed well. An employer is not required to score a job interview using objective criteria. View "Reinebold v. Bruce" on Justia Law

After a steady buildup of performance problems, Sweet lost her job as a customer service representative in the Bargersville, Indiana clerk-treasurer’s office. Months before she was fired, Sweet criticized Longstreet, the elected clerk-treasurer, for reconnecting the utility service of a delinquent customer who was Longstreet’s wealthy business partner. Arguing that she was fired for vocalizing her opposition to the reconnection, she sued Longstreet and the town alleging retaliation in violation of her First Amendment right to freedom of speech. Sweet cited “suspicious timing” in the form of a five-month gap between her criticism and the termination of her employment; an ambiguous affidavit from a fellow employee; and the fact that her former employer offered several reasons for her termination rather than a single, consistent explanation.The Seventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment for the defendants in her suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983. Even if Sweet’s criticism of Longstreet was constitutionally protected, she lacks sufficient evidence to support an inference that it was a motivating factor in the termination of her employment. The evidence, considered as a whole, indicates that Sweet was fired for multiple reasons, including “her long documented history of deficient performance, failure to improve on requested areas, incidences of bullying and repeated mistakes.” View "Sweet v. Town of Bargersville" on Justia Law

Railey clocked in and out of work at the Sunset Food Mart by placing her hand on a biometric scanner. She brought a class action in state court in 2019 alleging violations of the Illinois Biometric Information Privacy Act. Two years into litigation, Sunset removed the case to federal court, alleging that Railey’s claims were completely preempted by the Labor Management Relations Act. Sunset explained the timing of the removal by pointing to an interrogatory response it received from Railey in October 2020 in which she confirmed her membership in a labor union.The district court found Sunset’s removal untimely. Citing the Class Action Fairness Act, 28 U.S.C. 1453(c)(1), the Seventh Circuit affirmed the remand to state court. A Class Action Fairness Act exception for “home-state controversies” directs that district courts “shall decline to exercise jurisdiction” over a class action in which “two-thirds or more of the members of all proposed plaintiff classes in the aggregate, and the primary defendants, are citizens of the State in which the action was originally filed,” 28 U.S.C. 1332(d)(4)(B). Railey brought a putative class action on behalf of Illinois citizens against a small Illinois grocery chain under Illinois law. Sunset missed its preemption-based removal window. View "Railey v. Sunset Food Mart, Inc." on Justia Law

Citing a budget deficit, Chicago’s Board of Education laid off 1,077 teachers and 393 paraprofessional educators in 2011. The Chicago Teachers Union and a class of teachers (CTU) sued, alleging that the layoffs discriminated against African-American teachers and paraprofessionals in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Acts of 1964 and the Civil Rights Act of 1991, 42 U.S.C. 2000e.The Seventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of the Board. While CTU made a prima facie case of disparate impact with evidence that African-Americans comprised approximately 30% of Union members at the time of the layoffs but made up just over 40% of Union members receiving layoff notices, the Board’s decision to tie layoffs to declining enrollment in schools was legitimate, job-related, and consistent with business necessity. Beyond noting the existence of open positions for which laid-off employees were qualified, CTU did not meet its burden of establishing that its proposed alternative of transferring employees was “available, equally valid and less discriminatory.” The Illinois statute’s designation of hiring discretion to principals neither promotes discrimination nor bears any relationship to the Board’s decision to tie layoffs to declining enrollment and the transfer alternative proposed by CTU is not consistent with the Collective Bargaining Agreement. CTU did not put forth any evidence of intentional discrimination by the Board. View "Chicago Teachers Union v. Board of Education of the City of Chicago" on Justia Law

Kerry began requiring workers to use fingerprints to clock in and out. Plaintiffs, former employees, say that Kerry did not obtain their consent before doing so in violation of the Illinois Biometric Information Privacy Act.The Seventh Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the suit as preempted by the Labor Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. 185 because its resolution depends on the interpretation of collective-bargaining agreements between Kerry and the plaintiffs' union. Federal law prevents states from interfering in relations between unions and private employers. Whether a topic of bargaining is mandatory or permissive, the union is the workers’ agent. If labor and management want to bargain collectively about particular working conditions, they are free to do so. Workers cannot insist that management bypass the union and deal with them directly about these subjects. The use of biometric data is a topic for bargaining between unions and management. States cannot bypass the mechanisms of federal law and authorize direct negotiation or litigation between workers and management. View "Fernandez v. Kerry, Inc." on Justia Law

Mahran, an Egyptian Muslim, sued Advocate Christ Medical Center, alleging employment discrimination under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Illinois Human Rights Act. Mahran, a pharmacist, alleged that Advocate failed to accommodate his need for prayer breaks; disciplined and later fired him based on his race, religion, and national origin; retaliated against him for reporting racial and religious discrimination; and subjected him to a hostile work environment based on his race, religion, and national origin. The district judge rejected all of the claims on summary judgment.The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting arguments that the judge wrongly required Mahran to show that Advocate’s failure to accommodate his prayer breaks resulted in an adverse employment action and that the judge failed to consider the totality of the evidence in evaluating his hostile-workplace claim. Mahran expressly agreed at trial that an adverse employment action is an element of a prima facie Title VII claim for failure to accommodate an employee’s religious practice. He cannot take the opposite position. While the judge should have considered all the evidence Mahran adduced in support of his hostile workplace claim, there was not enough evidence for a jury to find that Advocate subjected him to a hostile work environment. View "Mahran v. Advocate Christ Medical Center" on Justia Law