Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Perez began work at Staples in 2011 and became a sales representative in 2015. Perez’s performance issues began five months later. His supervisor, Coha placed Perez on a “weekly activity plan.” Six months later Perez was still not meeting the company’s objectives, so Coha placed him on another plan. The two met weekly to discuss Perez’s work. In 2016, Staples divided its sales representatives into account managers, who targeted repeat local business and account developers, who targeted larger, multiple-location accounts with higher dollar amounts. Perez was classified as an account manager. Coha reassigned some of Perez’s accounts. Perez’s job performance continued to falter; he was placed on another plan. While Perez was on the plan, he served jury duty and voiced his discomfort with his company’s sale of a detergent banned in another state. In June 2016, Staples terminated Perez’s employment.Perez sued, alleging violations of the Illinois Jury Act and the Illinois Whistleblower Act, and common-law retaliatory discharge. The Seventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of Staples. Perez was terminated not in retaliation for protected activities but because of his poor sales production. Staples documented his poor performance before the detergent issue arose; no reasonable jury could conclude that Staples fired Perez because of his jury service. View "Perez v. Staples Contract & Commercial, LLC" on Justia Law

Indiana legislators, lobbyists, and legislative staff enjoy a party on the day the legislature adjourns for the year. The March 2018 celebration was held at AJ’s Lounge in Indianapolis. Hill, the state’s Attorney General, appeared at the party and made passes at several women, moving from verbal to physical harassment, including groping. A special prosecutor concluded that criminal charges were inappropriate. The Indiana Supreme Court suspended Hill’s law license for 30 days, a punishment mitigated by his long, previously unblemished record. His bid for renomination failed. His term as Attorney General ended in January 2021.Women legislative employees filed suit under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, other statutes, and Indiana’s common law. The district judge dismissed all claims against Hill without prejudice to their renewal in state court and dismissed all claims against Indiana, ruling that it is not the plaintiffs’ employer. Claims against the House and Senate remain pending in the district court. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the dismissals. Indiana cannot be treated as the plaintiffs’ “employer” under 42 U.S.C. 2000e(b), e–2(a). They were hired, and are supervised, by the House or Senate, which holds the sole power to discipline, fire, or reward them. The statute requires people to sue their own employers, so it is irrelevant whether the state employs the Attorney General. View "DaSilva v. State of Indiana" on Justia Law

Dr. Dubnow, a board-certified physician with more than 40 years of experience, was Chief of the Emergency Department at Lovell Federal Health Care Center (FHCC). In 2017, he diverted an ambulance transporting an infant to Lake Forest Hospital, located a few minutes away from the FHCC. Lake Forest has a Level-II trauma center and is staffed with pediatric specialists. The child was pronounced dead upon arriving at Lake Forest. The FHCC, a VA hospital, investigated Dubnow’s diversion decision. This investigation eventually resulted in his removal. A review board concluded that none of the grounds for his removal were supported but the final reviewing authority reversed the review board’s decision. The district court affirmed the VA’s removal decision.The Seventh Circuit vacated the removal. The VA failed to properly apply the deferential “clearly contrary to the evidence” standard when reviewing the board’s decision to overturn Dubnow’s removal; the decision was arbitrary. The relevant question was whether the diversion was appropriate; if so, Dubnow’s removal could not be sustained. To conclude that treating the patient at the FHCC was possible, or even appropriate, is not to conclude that diverting the ambulance to a better-equipped hospital was inappropriate. A “conclusion that there was ‘no need’ to divert the patient is two steps removed from the analysis” under 38 U.S.C. 7462(d). View "Dubnow v. McDonough" on Justia Law

Reives, who is Black, worked for the Illinois State Police (ISP) from 1989 until he retired in 2018. In 2016, he had been suspended for 60 days for violating internal rules of conduct prohibiting false statements in connection with his employment. The same year, Reives’s supervisors downgraded his ratings on his performance evaluation, leading him to receive a lower ranking on a list of officers certified for promotion. Reives sued, alleging that these two incidents constituted race discrimination under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.The Seventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment for ISP. When a plaintiff alleges that an employer disciplined him more harshly than his comparator, the most relevant similarities are those between the employees’ alleged misconduct, performance standards, and disciplining supervisor. Reives and his comparator, Kim, engaged in different misconduct and were punished for violating different rules. Reives cannot establish a prima facie case of race discrimination under the McDonnell Douglas approach. Reives’s claim also fails under a more straightforward evaluation of the evidence. Reives was still certified for promotion in 2016 and did not explain how his lower ranking affected his promotion prospects. View "Reives v. Illinois State Police" on Justia Law

See is a law-enforcement officer for the Illinois Gaming Board, which often hires State Police officers. As a union representative, See expressed concern that the Board’s promotion policies gave State Police employees unfair advantages. See then began to exhibit signs of paranoia. He complained to Board management that his supervisor was spreading malicious rumors about him to intimidate and scare him. He said that his wife was “seriously afraid” that the State Police would harm them. Management became concerned about his mental stability and placed him on administrative leave pending an examination of his fitness for duty. A few weeks later See passed the examination and returned to work.See filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 alleging retaliation for exercising his First Amendment rights and discrimination under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), section 12112, by requiring him to undergo a medical examination without a job-related justification. The Seventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment for the defendants. Even if See established a prima facie case of retaliation, the defendants offered a legitimate, nonretaliatory reason for placing him on leave and requiring a fitness-for-duty examination: they were genuinely concerned about his mental health. See presented no evidence that this reason was pretextual. See is an armed law enforcement officer, so the possibility of mental instability posed a serious public-safety concern the examination was job-related and consistent with business necessity. View "See v. Illinois Gaming Board" on Justia Law

Paschall and Ragland worked as machine operators. During their employment, they experienced what they believed to be instances of sexual and racial harassment. A year after their employment ended, Paschall and Ragland sued their former employer. Paschall alleged that she was subjected to a hostile work environment based on her sex (Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 2000e-1-17), and based on her race, (Title VII and 42 U.S.C. 1981). Ragland alleged that he was subjected to a hostile work environment based on his race.The Seventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of the employer. Paschall and Ragland did not produce sufficient evidence from which a reasonable fact-finder could conclude that they satisfied all the elements of their claims. When a coworker is a harasser, the employer is liable only when the employee shows that the employer was negligent either in discovering or remedying the harassment. Here, the employer was not negligent in discovering or remedying the alleged harassment. View "Paschall v. Tube Processing Corp" on Justia Law

In 2017, Anderson began working as a Pre-Fund Underwriting Auditor for NLC, a residential mortgage lender. NLC randomly conducts internal post-funding audits. Anderson exhibited performance deficiencies. Her supervisor, Gourley, counseled her. Anderson received ongoing training. She also experienced health problems and exhausted all of her available sick days on an extended leave. When Anderson returned to work in January 2018, Gourley emailed her, having learned of additional performance issues, and requested that she complete more training. In February 2018, NLC uncovered more errors. In March, Anderson experienced more health issues and took leave (Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA), 29 U.S.C. 2601). Anderson asserts Gourley made comments about Anderson’s being “sick a lot” and about needing “a full team. “ During her leave, NLC’s audit system flagged several more errors in Anderson’s loans. In May 2018, HUD notified NLC of additional errors and cited NLC. Gourley recommended that Anderson be terminated for poor performance. Days after Anderson returned to work, NLC terminated her employment.The Seventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment for NLC in Anderson’s suit under the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. 12101, and for interference and retaliation associated with her FMLA rights. Anderson did not raise a genuine issue of material fact with respect to either claim. View "Anderson v. Nations Lending Corp." on Justia Law

When she began work, Campbell signed a contract with Keagle, the bar’s owner; it included an arbitration clause. After a dispute arose, the district judge denied Keagle’s motion to refer the matter to arbitration, finding several parts of the arbitration clause unconscionable: Keagle had reserved the right to choose the arbitrator and location of arbitration. Campbell had agreed not to consolidate or file a class suit for any claim and to pay her own costs, regardless of the outcome. The judge did not find that the contract was one-sided as a whole. Keagle accepted striking the provisions found to be unconscionable but sought to arbitrate rather than litigate.The Seventh Circuit remanded with instructions to name an arbitrator, reasoning that the mutual assent to arbitration remains. The Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. 4, provides that, absent a contrary agreement, the arbitration takes place in the same judicial district as the litigation; “who pays” may be determined by some other state or federal statute, such as the Fair Labor Standards Act, on which Campbell’s suit rests. The chosen arbitrator can prescribe the procedures. Under 9 U.S.C. 5, “if for any … reason there shall be a lapse in the naming of an arbitrator" the court shall designate an arbitrator. View "Campbell v. Keagle Inc" on Justia Law

The Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of USS on plaintiff's Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) claim, concluding that USS carried its burden to show that plaintiff's seizure disorder would pose a direct threat to himself and others at its Midwest Plant. In this case, USS's judgment was premised on the consideration of adequate evidence, as contemplated by the ADA and supporting regulations. Furthermore, USS's imposition of restrictions was based on information pertinent to plaintiff's personal experience with his seizure disorder. Therefore, the assessment USS conducted was sufficiently individualized. The court agreed with the district court that whether plaintiff's seizure disorder was controlled is a material fact about which there is no genuine dispute.Applying the direct threat analysis and weighing factors such as duration of the risk, the nature and severity of potential harm, the likelihood of harm that will occur, and imminence of harm, the court concluded that all the factors weigh in favor of finding that there is a direct threat. Therefore, USS has shown through undisputed evidence that, if hired for the Utility Person position, plaintiff's seizure disorder would pose a direct threat to himself and others at the Midwest Plant. View "Pontinen v. United States Steel Corp." on Justia Law

Bourke was exposed to fumes during his employment with the Veterans Administration. He received treatment at a VA hospital and contends that medical malpractice there caused him serious injuries. He sought compensation from the Department of Labor under the Federal Employees Compensation Act for on-the-job injuries and from the United States under the Federal Tort Claims Act for medical malpractice. The Department of Labor processed Bourke’s claim but found that he had not shown that his asserted injuries had been caused by exposure to fumes. The VA (handling the FTCA claim) concluded that, once Bourke applied to the Department of Labor, all other sources of relief were precluded. Bourke sued under the Tort Claims Act, conceding the Department of Labor’s conclusion that conditions at work did not cause the medical issues for which he was treated by the VA, and alleging medical malpractice.The district court rejected his complaint on the ground that the Federal Employees Compensation Act offers his sole avenue of relief.; once the Department of Labor adjudicates a claim, the applicant must accept the result because 5 U.S.C. 8116(c) forecloses other sources of relief and 5 U.S.C. 8128(b)(2) blocks judicial review of the Department’s decisions.The Seventh Circuit vacated. Bourke is not seeking judicial review of the Department of Labor’s decision. Someone who loses before the Department cannot contest that outcome in court but may pursue other remedies that are compatible with the Department’s views. View "Bourke v. United States" on Justia Law