Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Parker suffers from MS and sciatica and has received social security disability benefits for that diagnosis for several years. Brooks hired Parker in 2017. Parker worked as a receptionist 25 hours per week (usually mornings). Parker had different supervisors and received mixed feedback on her performance. Parker had to be “coached” concerning her use of paid time off (PTO). In 2018, Parker requested time off to get treatment for pain. Her supervisor, Williams, learned that during Williams’ absence, Parker had taken unapproved time off and made schedule changes. Williams approved the requests but warned that Parker was exceeding her PTO. Parker acknowledged that she needed to do a better job complying with the policy. Williams understood Parker’s statements to be admissions and emailed HR employees, recommending termination. After receiving their assent, Williams informed Parker that she was being terminated. Brooks apparently told the Indiana Department of Workforce Development that Parker had voluntarily quit to accept other employment. In response to her EEOC complaint, Brooks stated that its reason for terminating Parker was repeated failure to follow established PTO policies.In a suit under the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. 12101, the Seventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of Brooks. Parker did not produce evidence that would allow a reasonable juror to infer a link between her request for accommodation (time off for pain treatment) and her termination. View "Parker v. Brooks Life Science, Inc." on Justia Law

Lesiv works for the Illinois Central Railroad. His brother, Lyubomir, had also worked there but left shortly after he filed a discrimination and retaliation charge against Illinois Central. Lyubomir later filed a discrimination suit in state court; Lesiv testified in a 2018 deposition. Almost three months later, his supervisors gave Lesiv a dangerous work assignment and suspended him after he refused to complete it. Lesiv asserts that Illinois Central violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act by direct individual retaliation because he testified in his brother’s lawsuit, 42 U.S.C. 2000e-3(a), and by third-party retaliation, to harm his brother in retaliation for his brother’s charges.The Seventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment for Illinois Central on both claims. A retaliation claim requires proof that the employer took a “materially adverse” action against an employee because he engaged in protected activity or because another person close to him did so. A jury could find here that the dangerous work assignment and the suspension amounted to materially adverse actions but could not find retaliatory motives. Lesiv had no evidence that his supervisors took these actions against him because of his or his brother’s protected activities. None of the relevant supervisors knew that Lesiv had engaged in protected activity by testifying in his brother’s lawsuit. View "Lesiv v. Illinois Central Railroad Co." on Justia Law

Kingman, Rhinelander Wisconsin’s Director of Public Works, spoke at a City Council meeting with a declaration of no confidence in a colleague. Rhinelander investigated Kingman’s contentions and found them without merit. In the process, however, third-party investigators discovered that Kingman himself had not only mistreated his employees but also had gone so far as to retaliate against those who had complained about the toxic work environment he created in his department.Kingman was fired and filed a lawsuit, 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging that the termination reflected retaliation for exercising his First Amendment rights at the City Council meeting. The Seventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of Rhinelander and individual defendants, concluding that no reasonable jury could find that the Council’s vote to fire Kingman reflected unlawful retaliation. Regardless of whether Kingman spoke to the council as a private citizen or in connection with his employment, Kingman’s behavior toward his subordinates is just the type of “significant intervening event” and seriously “inappropriate workplace behavior” that separates an employee’s protected activity “from the adverse employment action he receives.” View "Kingman v. Frederickson" on Justia Law

In 2017 Nigro, a certified nurse anesthetist, began working at Riley Hospital. Division Director, Dr. Sadhasivam, recruited her and started implementing a new team-based care model. Within a year, an internal investigation revealed department-wide concern over the model’s efficacy and impact on team dynamics. Some employees believed that Sadhasivam’s leadership style resulted in a tense workplace. In 2017-2019, Nigro was the subject of multiple complaints, mostly concerning her attitude and ability to work on a team. Coworkers described her as “rude, snappy and belittling,” with management expressing concern that her behavior undermined the department’s already delicate atmosphere of collegiality. After investigating the complaints, hospital decision-makers issued a “coaching memorandum” to Nigro. A month later, it was determined that Nigro had engaged in timekeeping fraud by not working at times when she had been clocked in, Sadhasivam and three female administrators, agreed to terminate her for misconduct.Nigro filed suit under Title VII, 42 U.S.C. 2000e-2(a)(1), alleging sex-based discrimination and retaliation because of a supportive affidavit she had signed in another employee’s discrimination case. The Seventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of the defendants. There is neither direct nor indirect evidence to support Nigro’s Title VII claim. View "Nigro v. Indiana University Health Care" on Justia Law

Brooks began working for Avancez in 2018. She alleges that there were statements about her age and being slow. Brooks had problems with coworkers. Shortly before her termination, Brooks stated, in a meeting, that she was a veteran and has PTSD. The others claim that she said “anything can happen,” which they interpreted as a threat. Brooks denies making a threat. Brooks refused to sign a disciplinary form and wrote a letter, complaining of age discrimination, a hostile work environment, and harassment by co-workers that was causing her PTSD to “go into relapse.” A month later, Brooks received a three-day suspension for bypassing a quality-control system meant to detect errors in products. Following a subsequent incident, a coworker claimed that Brooks threatened her by saying “we can take it outside.” After an investigation, Brooks was terminated “for disrespectful and disruptive conduct and attitude and for insubordination for failing to sign personnel meeting notes.”The Seventh Circuit affirmed the summary judgment rejection of her claims of discrimination based on age and disability (PTSD). Brooks has not provided evidence that the stated reason for her discharge is a pretext for illegal discrimination. View "Brooks v. Avancez" on Justia Law

The Seventh Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court entering judgment upon the jury's verdict in favor of Paul Reina on his claim that Walmart violated the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. 12112(a), (b) and acted maliciously or in reckless disregard of Reina's rights, holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion.Reina, who was deaf and legally blind, worked as a cart attendant for Walmart for almost twenty years. After providing Reina with a job coach, Walmart eventually ended Reina's employment. Reina filed an administrative charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), which sued Walmart for violating the ADA. The jury concluded that Walmart violated the ADA by refusing Reina a reasonable accommodation in the form of a full-time job coach and acted maliciously or in reckless disregard of Reina's rights. The jury awarded Reina $200,000 in compensatory damages and $5 million in punitive damages. The Third Circuit affirmed, holding (1) the district court properly denied Walmart's motion for judgment as a matter of law; and (2) the district court did not abuse its discretion by declining to issue an injunction against Walmart as proposed by the EEOC. View "Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc." on Justia Law

St. Vincent Hospital adopted a COVID-19 vaccine requirement. Employees had until November 12, 2021 to get vaccinated unless they received a medical or religious exemption. In reviewing exemption requests, St. Vincent considered the employee’s position and amount of contact with others, the current health and safety risk posed by COVID, and the cost and effectiveness of other safety protocols. Dr. Halczenko treated gravely ill children, including those suffering from or at risk of organ failure.St. Vincent denied Halczenko’s request for religious accommodation on the ground that “providing an exemption to a Pediatric Intensivist working with acutely ill pediatric patients poses more than a de minim[i]s burden to the hospital because the vaccine provides an additional level of protection in mitigating the risk associated with COVID.” Halczenko and four other St. Vincent employees filed an EEOC complaint. The others—a nurse practitioner and three nurses, including two in the pediatric ICU—were granted religious accommodations. St. Vincent terminated Halczenko’s employment. Halczenko attributes his lack of success in finding new work to his non-compete agreement with St. Vincent, his preference not to move his family, and the limited demand for an unvaccinated physician in his specialty. In a purported class action, the Seventh Circuit affirmed the denial of preliminary relief, concluding that Halczenko had shown neither irreparable harm nor an inadequate remedy at law. View "Halczenko v. Ascension Health, Inc." on Justia Law

Stamey began working at Forest River in 2007 at age 51. He accumulated a strong work record, receiving several raises and avoiding any discipline. Stamey claims that his coworkers began harassing him in 2017 when he was 61. The alleged harassment continued for roughly 10 months and included verbal harassment, which Stamey described as escalating to the point where he “caught old age insults practically every morning on [his] way into the building, when [he] left for the day, during breaks, and whenever [he] walked into other parts of the plant.” The harassment also included interference with Stamey’s work. His coworkers repeatedly defaced his workstation, writing profanity on his tool cabinet, in the bathroom, and around the plant, and zip-tying his tools together. He resigned in 2018 at age 62 and sued, alleging that the company constructively discharged him in violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act by refusing to address a relentless and ruthless campaign of age‐based harassment by his coworkers.The district court granted River Forest summary judgment. The Seventh Circuit reversed. While the case is close, viewing the facts and drawing all reasonable inferences in Stamey’s favor, a jury could return a verdict in Stamey’s favor. If Forest River shows that Stamey’s account lacks credibility, the company may prevail. View "Stamey v. Forest River, Inc." on Justia Law

Lam began working at Springs as its senior manager of global trade in 2019. She learned that three of Springs’s manufacturing facilities in Mexico were inaccurately tracking import and export inventories because computer systems were not properly integrated. While attempting to resolve the issue, Lam came to believe that a product Springs imported (cellular fabric blankets) originated in China and not, as the supplier insisted, in Taiwan and Malaysia. Fabrics originating in China were subject to a 25 percent tariff. She claims that she repeatedly stated that the company would need to pay higher tariffs, was “angrily berated,” and was told to continue classifying the fabrics as Taiwanese and Malaysian. She was placed on a performance improvement plan that cited her failure to adequately address the inventory problem, her failure to supplement tariff concerns with a “risk assessment,” a “solution,” or a “process change,” her reliance on outside consultants; and her inability to communicate concisely.Law was ultimately fired and sued, alleging that Springs retaliated against her, in violation of the False Claims Act, over her opinion that the company owed the 25 percent tariff, 31 U.S.C. 3730(h). The Seventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of Springs. Springs’s conduct falls short of “harassment” under section 3730(h)(1); Lam has not established a connection between the tariff violations she reported and the decision to fire her. View "Lam-Quang-Vinh v. Springs Window Fashions, LLC" on Justia Law

Dr. Lewis, a 60-year-old African American woman, alleges that Indiana Wesleyan University discriminated against her when it took away her supervisory responsibilities and ultimately eliminated her position. She brought various claims against the University under 42 U.S.C. 1981, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act. The district court granted the university summary judgment on her retaliation claims and concluded that she had waived her age discrimination claim but did not address Dr. Lewis’s race discrimination claim.The Seventh Circuit affirmed in part, finding that Lewis waived her age discrimination claim, but remanded the race discrimination claim, as requiring factual development. Even when viewed in the light most favorable to Dr. Lewis, the facts do not support a causal connection between her protected activity of complaining about discrimination and an adverse employment action of retaliation. View "Lewis v. Indiana Wesleyan University" on Justia Law