Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff taught sixth-grade at a public school and met with a student’s parents about a threat the student had made against another student. He met the parents again after seeing the student beating another student. The father threatened a lawsuit and told plaintiff that an older son, who had assaulted the assistant principal, should have assaulted plaintiff. During a subsequent class, the student used an assignment to write a song with lyrics about stabbing plaintiff. The police liaison encouraged plaintiff to file criminal charges; under Illinois law declaring a knowing threat of violence against a person at a school is disorderly conduct, 720 ILCS 5/26-1(a)(13). School administrators feared a suit and were not supportive. After plaintiff filed charges, his evaluations went from satisfactory to unsatisfactory and administrators advised him that they would recommend that he not be rehired. Plaintiff resigned and filed suit, claiming retaliation for exercise of First Amendment rights. The district court granted summary judgment for defendants on the ground that the complaint was not protected by the First Amendment because it did not involve a matter of public concern. The Seventh Circuit reversed. Principles underlying the suit are well settled, which defeats claims of qualified immunity. View "Gschwind v. Heiden" on Justia Law

Defendant left his seriously dysfunctional home at age 14 and began living with an adult who sold him to older men for sex. They were joined by two young girls. The four engaged in group sex. Defendant was convicted of first degree sexual assault of a child, based on oral sex performed on defendant (then age 15) by a 12-year-old, and sentenced to 40 years. Wisconsin state courts rejected his claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. The district court denied a petition for habeas corpus. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting an argument that defendant received constitutionally ineffective assistance from his trial counsel, who failed to request a jury instruction including the statutory words defining the charged offense: "either by the defendant or upon the defendant's instruction." The state court determination that any error was not prejudicial was not unreasonable, in light of the circumstances surrounding the incident and the possibility that the statutory language court be read as covering situations in which a defendant allowed the sexual conduct. The court noted that it was not unmindful of the circumstances that led defendant to the situation and that it trusted the parole board to take those circumstances into account.

The state agency took a 15-month-old away from his home and parents and into temporary protective custody, following an accident and a hospital visit. Protective custody involved a safety plan that limited the parents' access to the child; the parents claimed to have been threatened into accepting the plan. In the parents' suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, the court determined that child welfare workers could have reasonably believed that taking temporary protective custody of the child was supported by probable cause and that the seizure did not violate a clearly established right. The Seventh Circuit affirmed with respect to the Fourth Amendment, substantive due process, and procedural due process claims premised on the initial removal, but vacated with respect to the Fourth Amendment and substantive due process claims premised on the continued withholding of the child as well as the substantive due process and procedural due process claims premised on the safety plan.