Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Child Craft manufactured furniture. Bienias owns Summit. The parties had a long-standing business relationship. Child Craft contracted with Summit to supply raw wood for a planned line of high-end baby furniture, the “Vogue Line.” Summit sourced the goods from an Indonesian manufacturer, Cita. At Bienias’s request, Child Craft did not have direct contact with Cita. In 2008-2009 Child Craft issued purchase orders to Summit, worth about $90,000. Each included detailed specifications, including that the moisture content of the wood needed to be between 6% and 8%. The goods never conformed to its specifications, in spite of Bienias’s assurances that they would. Child Craft identified the goods as defective upon receipt and refused to pay for shipments. It spent considerable time trying to re-work the products. Child Craft was never able to sell the Vogue Line and ceased operations in 2009. Summit sued for breach of contract and conversion based on refusal to pay. Child Craft counterclaimed for breach of contract and negligent misrepresentation, seeking to $5 million in compensatory damages plus punitive damages of $5 million. Only Child Craft’s counterclaim for negligent misrepresentation against Bienias personally was tried. A judge awarded $2.7 million, against Bienias and Summit. The Seventh Circuit reversed the award. Under Indiana law, a buyer who has received non-conforming goods cannot sue a seller for negligent misrepresentation to avoid the economic loss doctrine, which limits the buyer to contract remedies for purely economic loss. There is no basis for transforming the breach of contract claim into a tort claim to hold the seller’s president personally liable. View "JMB Mfg., Inc. v. Harrison Mfg., LLC." on Justia Law

Alaura, age 22, was struck in the back of his head by an assailant wielding a bar stool. The blow shattered his skull, necessitating emergency surgery to remove part of his brain and place a metal plate in his skull. During this craniotomy Alaura had a seizure. Alaura has repeatedly seen neurologists, complaining of headaches, dizziness, and confusion, and has been diagnosed with post-traumatic headaches, cognitive impairment, and occipital neuralgia, an injury to or inflammation of nerves that run from the spinal cord at the base of the neck up through the scalp. It causes piercing or throbbing pain in the neck, the back of the head, and the front of the head behind the eyes. A year later, Alaura still complained of daily headaches, “absence-type” seizures several times a week, and back and neck pain. The Seventh Circuit reversed denial of Alaura’s claim for social security disability benefits as premature, stating that the “long list” of severe impairments “don’t sound like trivial obstacles to being able to hold full-time employment.” The administrative law judge’s explanations were “thin,” he made no effort to consider the combined effects on Alaura’s ability to work of all his impairments and limitations. View "Alaura v. Colvin" on Justia Law

After a night of heavy drinking, Lauren Spierer, a 20-year-old Indiana University student, left the apartment of a classmate and disappeared. Four years later, she remains missing. Lauren’s parents sued three students who were with Lauren before her disappearance, alleging negligence and violations of Indiana’s Dram Shop Act. After some claims were dismissed but before discovery was conducted, the defendants moved for summary judgment on the grounds that the plaintiffs could only speculate about whether the defendants were the proximate cause of any injury sustained. The district court and Seventh Circuit agreed. Despite Lauren’s visible intoxication, the facts do not establish that defendants had the right or ability to control her movement to such degree as to force her to remain in a certain place. Although each defendant tried to assist Lauren in some way, that assistance did not create a legal duty to care for Lauren. View "Spierer v. Rossman" on Justia Law

Vandenberg, attending a cruise on a chartered yacht, was injured when he fell from the upper deck because the bench on which he was sitting tipped over, while the boat was anchored in Lake Michigan. The bench was not secured to the deck, nor did the upper deck have a railing. The fall left Vandenberg paralyzed from the chest down. The yacht was owned by a closely held corporation. Vandenberg alleged that Rose Paving, a company run by Rose, one of three owners of the corporation, was a booking agent that maintained a marketing relationship for the chartering of the yacht. He filed suit, alleging negligence, and settled with the defendants. The defendants agreed to pay $25 million through the assignment of their claims against their insurers. Westfield was the insurance provider for defendant Rose Paving. Westfield disputed that its insurance policies with Rose Paving covered the yacht accident and sought a declaratory judgment. The district court granted Westfield’s motion for judgment on the pleadings. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, finding that injuries came under the policies’ watercraft exclusion. View "Westfield Ins. Co. v. Vandenberg" on Justia Law

On May 7, 2005, a commuter aircraft, operated by Transair, crashed into terrain on its way to the Lockhart River airfield in Queensland, Australia. All 15 people on board died. The estates sued several companies and one individual, alleging that they contributed to the crash. The Seventh Circuit consolidated appeals in the case against the successor to the plane’s manufacturer and the case against the manufacturer of the plane’s warning system and maker of navigational charts. In both, the district court granted the defendants summary judgment and the Seventh Circuit affirmed. The successor had no duty to warn the plane’s operator of the need to install a more enhanced warning system, and the operator did not rely on any alleged voluntary undertaking of a duty to warn. The plaintiffs did not properly present any evidence from which a reasonable jury could infer that the defendants’ products probably contributed to the crash, and the warning system’s manufacturer had no duty to alert the customer that an improved system should be installed. View "Thornton v. M7 Aerospace, L.P." on Justia Law

Dugan was involved in an automobile accident with a vehicle owned by Rainey and claimed more than $200,000 in damages. Rainey’s insurer, American Family, offered $100,000 (the limit under Rainey’s policy). The Dugans accepted, then sought recovery from Nationwide pursuant to the underinsured motorist provisions of their policy, which insured four vehicles and provided underinsured motorist coverage limits of $100,000 per person and $300,000 per accident for each of the four covered vehicles. The policy declarations page lists each of the vehicles separately with the separate underinsured motorist limit applicable to each vehicle and the separate premium charged for each vehicle. The Dugans made a demand of $400,000, the aggregate limit of the four underinsured motorist coverage limits. Nationwide denied payment, stating that express policy language limited their recovery to $100,000, less the $100,000 American Family payment. Nationwide sought a declaratory judgment and the Dugans counterclaimed, claiming that, because the policy’s language was ambiguous, they were entitled to aggregate, or “stack,” the underinsured motorist limits applicable to each vehicle, subject to the $100,000 setoff. The Seventh Circuit affirmed that, even if the policy permitted stacking, Illinois law entitles Nationwide to apply its setoff four times, once against each “separate, stackable policy” limit, thereby exhausting Nationwide’s underinsured motorist coverage View "Nationwide Agribusiness Ins. v. Dugan" on Justia Law

The Higginses visited an Indiana amusement park. The filter pump connected to the park’s lazy river malfunctioned. As staff worked to fix the problem, pool chemicals—bleach and hydrochloric acid—accumulated in the pump. When the pump restarted, the chemicals discharged into the water and a cloud of chlorine gas released into the air. The Higginses were not nearby, but their niece was, and they received a cell phone call, prompting them to head in that direction. When they arrived, Kent Higgins inhaled an unspecified amount of chemical fumes that lingered. Complaining of chest tightness, burning eyes, shortness of breath, and nausea, Higgins visited the emergency room, where he was diagnosed with “mild chemical exposure” and discharged with instructions to follow up with his primary care physician. Higgins saw a pulmonologist later that summer, but waited more than a year before consulting his primary physician. He was diagnosed with reactive airways dysfunction syndrome and chronic asthma more than 14 months after the incident. In his negligence suit, the court disqualified Higgins's expert concerning causation. The Seventh Circuit affirmed and agreed that the causation issue was too complex for an unassisted jury and that Higgins’s treating physician’s qualifications and methodology were too uncertain to permit her to opine on such matters. View "Higgins v. Koch Dev. Corp." on Justia Law

Intercon, which provides electronic recycling services, engaged BAN to evaluate its business for certification as environmentally friendly. BAN concluded that Intercon shipped hazardous waste to companies in China that use disposal methods that violate policy in Illinois, where Intercon operates and were inconsistent with Intercon’s public representations. BAN reported its conclusion to state and federal agencies. Intercon sued for defamation. BAN asserted an Anti-SLAPP (strategic lawsuit against public participation) defense. The district court declined to dismiss, the remedy under the state Anti-SLAPP law, reasoning that a special motion to strike was inconsistent with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, concluding that the Washington State Anti-SLAPP law cited by BAN would require the judge to resolve jury questions. View "Intercon Solutions, Inc. v. Puckett" on Justia Law

Humphrey sued under the Federal Tort Claims Act on behalf of her daughter Teniscia, alleging that medical malpractice during Teniscia’s 2008 birth left her permanently disabled. Teniscia’s father, Lee, participated in the litigation, but did not ask to be joined as a party. Humphrey and Lee are not married; Teniscia lives with Humphrey, but both are Teniscia’s legal custodians. The case was settled for $13 million, used to buy an annuity to provide care over the course of Teniscia’s life. Porter, who represents Lee, demanded a share of the 25% contingent fee that had been negotiated between Humphrey and her lawyer, who opposed this request, arguing that Lee was not a party and that Porter had not performed any of the legal work that led to the settlement. After the settlement Lee moved to file an amended complaint naming himself as a plaintiff. The district court denied Lee’s motion, stating that Lee not only had approved the settlement but also had not filed an administrative claim, as the FTCA requires. Lee then moved to intervene. The court denied that motion as untimely. Porter unsuccessfully sought fees notwithstanding Lee’s non-party status. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, concluding that the district court could not have allowed intervention even on a timely motion. View "Lee v. United States" on Justia Law

After years of working as a locomotive engineer, and more briefly as a limousine driver, Duncan applied for a disability annuity (Railroad Retirement Act, 45 U.S.C. 231a(a)(1)(v)) in 2010. His application alleged constant back pain stemming from a 2003 workplace injury in which he slipped on ice, hit his head, and injured his back. The Railroad Retirement Board denied his application and denied it again upon reconsideration in 2011. A hearing officer denied Duncan’s application in 2012. In 2013, a three-member board affirmed. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, concluding that substantial evidence supports the Board’s decision that Duncan retains the capacity to perform a reduced range of work. View "Duncan v. United States R.R. Ret. Bd." on Justia Law