Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

In 1956, Ephrem, a Catholic nun, experienced apparitions of the Virgin Mary. Devotions to Our Lady of America was launched. Ephrem joined a cloistered house, approved by the Pope. Fuller entered the cloister in 1965. In 1979 its three members (including Fuller and Ephrem) formed a new congregation. In 1993 Ephrem founded Our Lady of America Center. Upon her death in 2000, she was succeeded by Fuller and willed her property to Fuller. Most had been created by Ephrem or donated to the cloister or the Center. Fuller registered trademarks for artifacts, including Ephrem’s diary, medallions, and statues. In 2005 McCarthy, a lawyer, and Langsenkamp, “a Papal Knight,” began helping Fuller promote devotions to Our Lady. Fuller gave them a statue and other artifacts. In 2007, the three had a disagreement that resulted in this lawsuit. The men claim to be the authentic promoters of devotions to Our Lady and the lawful owners of the artifacts. Another layman, Hartman, began a campaign to smear McCarthy’s and Langsenkamp’s reputations. Fuller is no longer a nun. A jury returned a verdict in favor of McCarthy and Langsenkamp. The Seventh Circuit affirmed awards: $150,000 in compensatory damages, $200,000 in punitive damages (against Hartman only), plus $295,000 in attorney’s fees and sanctions and $281,000 in costs, to be paid by Fuller, Hartman, and their lawyer. The court vacated an injunction concerning the defamation. View "McCarthy v. Fuller" on Justia Law

Cincinnati Insurance issued a liability policy to Painters, which allowed the insured to add an “additional insured” by oral agreement, if that agreement preceded the occurrence and “a certificate of insurance ... has been issued.” No permission from Cincinnati is required, if the insureds have a relationship consistent with the policy. Painters was hired to paint Vita’s premises and orally agreed to add Vita as an additional insurer. Painters’ worker fell, before there was any written confirmation of the oral agreement, and remains in a coma. In a suit by the insurer, seeking a declaration that Vita was not covered based on a certificate issued to Vita the day after the accident, the court granted summary judgment in favor of Cincinnati. The Seventh Circuit reversed. Summary judgment was premature. The policy is ambiguous. A certificate could be regarded a prerequisite to coverage of the additional insured, but also could be intended merely to memorialize the oral agreement. The policy could also mean that the oral agreement must be memorialized in writing before the insured can file a claim. Oral agreements are valid contracts and the policy is explicit that an oral agreement is sufficient to add an insured. The certificate is not a contract, but “a matter of information only” that “confers no rights upon the certificate holder.” View "Cincinnati Ins. Co. v. Vita Food Prods, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff was arrested for an alleged sexual assault, which allegation turned out to be false. Plaintiff brought this lawsuit against Defendants, Polk County and a Polk County investigator, advancing claims under 42 U.S.C. 1983 for false arrest and false imprisonment, and state common law claims for false imprisonment, malicious prosecution, negligence, and defamation. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Defendants, concluding that the investigator had arguable probable cause to effect Plaintiff’s arrest and was entitled to qualified immunity and that Polk County could not be held liable under Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. The court declined to assert supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s state law claims and dismissed them without prejudice. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, holding (1) the investigator was entitled to qualified immunity because she reasonably believed probable cause existed to arrest Plaintiff; (2) there was no dispute as to any material fact with regard to Plaintiff’s Monell claims; (3) the district court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing without prejudice Plaintiff’s state law claims; and (4) the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Plaintiff’s motion to alter or amend the judgment. View "Burritt v. Ditlefsen" on Justia Law

Francis Foster filed suit against Principal Life Insurance Company, alleging, inter alia, tortious interference with prospective economic advantage. Principal filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the grounds that Foster lacked standing to sue and that he failed to state a claim. The district court dismissed the complaint but did so on the theory that Foster’s claims were “derivative” of a related lawsuit and that his settlement of that lawsuit barred his claim against Principal. The district court also denied Foster’s motion to amend his complaint. The Seventh Circuit vacated the judgment, holding (1) Foster’s complaint stated a claim for intentional interference with prospective economic advantage, and Foster’s claim was not precluded by any other litigation; and (2) on remand, the district court should consider anew Foster’s motion to amend the complaint. View "Foster v. Principal Life Ins. Co." on Justia Law

Anthony Zimmerman, the president and owner of Premier Forest Products Products, Inc. (together, Plaintiffs), was hired to harvest trees on certain property. When the landowner discovered that Zimmerman had been harvesting trees without regard to fence lines and had taken more trees than he was supposed to, the landowner warned Zimmerman to leave the property. When Zimmerman refused to do so, the landowner sought help from the Carroll County Sheriff’s Office. The sheriff’s office arrested Zimmerman for criminal trespass. Plaintiffs sued the sheriff’s office and its sheriff, deputy, chief deputy, and detective (collectively, Defendants), alleging that Defendants violated his constitutional rights in arresting him for criminal trespass. The district court granted summary judgment for Defendants, concluding that Defendants had probable cause to arrest Defendant and, alternatively, that Defendants were entitled to qualified immunity. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, holding that Zimmerman failed to establish that probable cause was lacking under the circumstances presented in this case or that Defendants engaged in arbitrary conduct unjustifiable by any government interest. View "Zimmerman v. Doran" on Justia Law

Sixteen days after Defendant, a dentist, learned Plaintiff, an inmate of Illinois’s Stateville prison, was complaining of a tooth abscess, Defendant diagnosed an abscessed molar, prescribed penicillin to bring the infection under control, and extracted the molar. Plaintiff sued the dentist and a prison guard (together, Defendants), charging them with deliberate indifference to his abscess. The district judge granted summary judgment in favor of Defendants. The Seventh Circuit reversed, holding that the evidence of deliberate indifference by Defendants to Plaintiff’s serious medical need precluded granting summary judgment in their favor. Remanded. View "Dobbey v. Mitchell-Lawshea" on Justia Law

The law firm represented Goesel, a minor, and his parents in a personal-injury suit that settled before trial. The law firm needed judicial approval to finalize the settlement. The contingent-fee agreement entitled the firm to one-third of the gross settlement; all litigation expenses would be covered by the Goesels’ share. The court refused to approve the settlement unless litigation expenses were deducted off the top and one-third of the net settlement was allocated to the firm and rejected the firm’s attempt to count the cost of computerized legal research as a separately compensable expense rather than rolling it into the fee recovery. The Goesels declined to participate in an appeal, so the court appointed an amicus to argue in support of the decision. The Seventh Circuit reversed. Though the court enjoys substantial discretion to safeguard the interests of minors in the settlement of litigation, this discretion is not boundless. Here, the judge criticized aspects of the firm’s contingent-fee agreement that have received the express blessing of Illinois courts. Once these improper reasons are stripped away, the only rationale that remains—that “fairness and right reason” require that the Goesels receive 51% of the gross settlement amount rather than 42%—is insufficient to justify discarding a reasonable contingent-fee agreement. View "Williams, Bax & Saltzman, P.C. v. Boley Int'l (H.K.) Ltd" on Justia Law

Morady sold life insurance policies. Davis, a former lawyer, approached elderly African-Americans and paid them small amounts to become the nominal applicant-buyers of the policies, with Morady as the insurance agent, and to put the policies into an irrevocable trust, with Davis as trustee. The beneficial interest in the trust would be sold to an investor who would pay the remaining premiums and wait for the death of the insured. The insurer would not have sold the policies had it known that the premiums would be paid by an unrelated third party in the expectation that the policy would be transferred to him; its contracts with agents, including Morady, required them to conform to an “absolute prohibition against participation in any type of premium financing scheme involving an unrelated third party,” but the law allows an investor to purchase the beneficial interest in an existing life insurance policy. The net loss to Ohio National (beyond $120,000 commissions paid to Morady) was $605,000 in litigation expenses to void the policies. The total death benefits specified in the illegal policies amounted to $2.8 million. The Seventh Circuit agreed that Morady’s conduct constituted fraud and a breach of her contract and affirmed summary judgment, with damages of $726,000. View "Ohio Nat'l Life Assurance Corp. v. Davis" on Justia Law

Caterpillar bought a South Milwaukee factory that manufactures strip-mining equipment and became the employer party to a collective-bargaining agreement with a United Steelworkers local union. Two months later, a crane operator (a member of the bargaining unit) was killed when a 36-ton crawler crushed him after shifting while being rotated by the crane. He had been lying underneath the crawler to unhook chains attaching it to the crane. Police officers, OSHA agents, company executives, and local union officials, converged within hours on the accident scene. The local union’s officials were not safety specialists. The president of the local union informed Caterpillar’s regional manager that a member of the national union’s emergency response team would come to inspect the accident site. The manager promised to cooperate but changed his mind and, the next day, refused to allow the union investigator to enter the factory. The company stated that because it was cooperating with the police and with OSHA, no further investigation was warranted. The Seventh Circuit enforced the National Labor Relations Board’s order requiring Caterpillar to allow the union’s investigator access to the site. The materials shown the investigator were not an adequate substitute for on-site investigation, and the investigation itself would impose trivial costs on the company. View "Nat'l Labor Relations Bd. v. Caterpillar Inc." on Justia Law

Textron began operations at its fastener manufacturing plant in Rochester, Indiana, in 1954; it remained in operation through 2006. The plant released vinyl chloride, a toxic gas, which eventually seeped into the groundwater, contaminating nearby residential wells. One of those wells belonged to the Woods. Both Textron and the Indiana Department of Environmental Management performed testing on the Woods’ well. The family left immediately. While living at the Rochester house, their adopted children, C.W. and E.W., experienced gastrointestinal issues (vomiting, bloody stools), immunological issues, and neurological issues. Both children were younger than two years old when the family left the house; their health improved after leaving. The parents sued on behalf of their children, alleging negligence, negligence per se, negligent infliction of emotional distress, and willful and wanton misconduct. The court excluded their three expert witnesses, finding they did not use reliable bases to support their opinions, and granted Textron summary judgment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, finding that the district court properly applied the Daubert framework to the experts and, without the experts, the plaintiffs could not prove causation. View "C.W. & E.W. v. Textron, Inc." on Justia Law