Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Eilman, a college student, was arrested outside an airport after behaving so badly that agents had called police. Eilman had developed bipolar disorder following an auto accident the previous year. She had not taken her medication and did not tell the police about her mental-health condition. By phone, her mother and stepfather told officers about her disorder. They did not believe the stepfather and the officer who talked to her mother did not share the information. Officers thought that Eilman was being difficult or was on drugs. In custody, Eilman alternated between calm and manic. Officers released her into a neighborhood she did not know, near a public-housing project with an exceptionally high crime rate without returning her cell phone. She was raped and either jumped or was thrown out a seventh-story window. She suffered permanent, serious brain damage. In a suit by her guardian under 42 U.S.C. 1983, the district court denied some of defendants’ claims of qualified immunity. The Seventh Circuit reversed in part, noting that whether police should have understood Eilman’s need for medical care is a factual issue and that police may have made her situation worse by releasing her far from where she was arrested.Easterbrook

Defendant attempted to murder his ex-wife by beating her with a baseball bat, sealing her in a garbage can filled with snow, and leaving her in an unheated storage facility. He was convicted and sentenced to life in prison. The victim suffered severe injuries that resulted in her suffering a miscarriage and the amputation of all her toes. A Wisconsin state court awarded her $3.4 million for battery, false imprisonment, and intentional infliction of emotional distress, and her husband and daughters $300,000 for loss of consortium. Defendant filed for bankruptcy under Chapter 7. The bankruptcy judge ruled that his debts were nondischargeable as debts "for willful and malicious injury," 11 U.S.C. 523(a)(6). The district court affirmed. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, noting that the purpose of bankruptcy law is to provide a fresh start for the honest, but unfortunate, debtor.

Plaintiffs were involved in a physical altercation with employees of a nightclub. Plaintiffs sustained visible injuries. Club employees took them outside, handcuffed them and called the police. The officers were apparently unwilling to listen to plaintiffs' side of the story; they were taken to a squad car and placed in the rear seat, though they were never told they were under arrest. Both were charged with assault and battery. Although there were surveillance cameras, tapes were never requested and were destroyed before plaintiffs filed their suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 against the city, officers, the club, and its owner. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of all defendants, holding that the club and owner were not functioning as state actors; that plaintiffs failed to show a conspiracy between the city and the club; that there was probable cause to arrest plaintiffs; and that probable cause defeats a claim of malicious prosecution. The Seventh Circuit affirmed.

Plaintiff suffered an on-the-job injury. The following day, managers decided to terminate her position as part of a national reduction in force. Informed of this decision upon her return from medical leave, plaintiff filed a workers’ compensation claim and, later, sued the company for terminating her in retaliation for exercising workers’ compensation rights. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the employer. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, noting that the company established nondiscriminatory reasons for its decision. Plaintiff did not show a causal link between her decision to seek medical attention and the termination.

The village, on the Mississippi River, experienced a 500-year rain in 2007. Debris carried by the water clogged the trestle beneath the railroad bridge, causing runoff to back up and inundate the village. Residents sued the railroad, alleging faulty design and maintenance of the trestle. The district court dismissed for failure to state a claim, holding that Wis. Stat. 88.87 provided the exclusive remedy and that relief was foreclosed under that statute because plaintiffs had not filed a timely notice of claim. The statute imposes a duty on railroad companies that construct and maintain railroad grades in or across drainage courses not to impede the flow of surface water in an unreasonable manner and grants injured landowners the right to sue for equitable relief and inverse condemnation but not damages. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Plaintiff forfeited claims that section 88.87 did not apply, so the court declined to address preemption by the Federal Railway Safety Act.

Rice, charged with attempted bank robbery, was known to have schizophrenia, and shortly before his death, was found incompetent to stand trial. Although seen by mental health professionals while detained, Rice often refused to take medications, eat, or bathe. He was hospitalized at psychiatric and other medical facilities several times and was awaiting placement at a state psychiatric facility. Rice died, about 15 months after arriving at the jail, of psychogenic polydipsia (excessive water drinking), a disorder known to manifest with schizophrenia. His estate filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging deliberate indifference. The district court entered summary judgment against the estate, which filed a second suit, reasserting state wrongful death claims previously dismissed. The judge dismissed, citing collateral estoppel, reasoning that a previous finding as to foreseeability of the cause of death precluded recovery on state claims. The Seventh Circuit reversed in part, holding that a material dispute of fact precluded summary judgment on one of the 1983 claims: that conditions of confinement were inhumane. The district court erred in dismissing state claims; the prior finding concerning foreseeability was not preclusive with respect to those claims.

Employers must maintain a log of work-related deaths, injuries, and illnesses, 29 C.F.R. 1904.4(a); an incident is "work-related" if "the work environment either caused or contributed to the resulting condition." Employees in the company's packing department fill containers, a process requiring repetitive hand movements, and pronation. When an employee developed lateral epicondylitis, painful swelling of ligaments and tendons around a joint, in her right arm, the company did not log the injury. The Department of Labor assessed a $900 penalty for failing to log a work-related injury. An ALJ sustained the penalty. The Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission declined review. The Seventh Circuit vacated, holding that substantial evidence was not enough to sustain the administrative decision. The ALJ was required to take account of competing evidence and inferences; the ALJ ignored strong indications that its favored witness was wrong. The court noted that inclusion of the work-relatedness requirement, requiring employers to judge the source of injury, "is a puzzle."

Insurers sought a declaration that they had no duty to defend or indemnify in tort suits brought against the insured village, concerning discovery of "perc," a carcinogenic common dry cleaning solvent, in one of its wells and the village's continued use of the well without disclosure. The district court, relying on a pollution exclusion in the policies, granted summary judgment for the insurers. The exclusion refers to "actual, alleged or threatened discharge, dispersal, seepage, migration, release or escape of 'pollutants'" and excludes from coverage expenses for "cleaning up ... or in any way responding to, or assessing the effects of pollutants." After exploring the reasons for the exclusion, the Seventh Circuit affirmed. The court rejected an argument that this was not a pollution case, because the amount of perc in the water was below the maximum level permitted by environmental regulations. The complaints actually filed "describe in copious detail the conduct giving rise to the tort suits, and in doing so inadvertently but unmistakably acknowledge the applicability of the pollution exclusion."

An off-duty police officer, Glover, shot and killed Prado during a late-night road incident. Glover claimed that Prado had tried to run him over and had a gun, which was not found. He claimed he was complying with a department rule, requiring officers to act even when off duty. Glover was placed on desk duty. An inquest jury found justification, but a year later Glover was charged with homicide and perjury and suspended from the force. He committed suicide. Prado's estate brought excessive-force and loss-of-life claims (42 U.S.C. 1983) and named the city a defendant under a statute that requires the city to pay judgments assessed against employees for acts committed within the scope of employment. The jury found that Glover used unreasonable force under color of law, but found that he was not within the scope of employment. The Seventh Circuit reversed. Because of the risk that jurors would mistakenly intuit that if the officer used excessive force, he must have acted outside the scope of employment so that refusal to give the modified scope-of-employment instruction was prejudicial error. Under Wisconsin law an employer who retains an employee after he commits a tort does not ratify his conduct.

County sheriff deputies responded to a call indicating that Marc had left the home he shared with his parents and was possibly a danger to himself and others. Officers located Marc and determined that he should be involuntarily committed. During initial evaluation at a hospital, officers discovered Marc's wallet, but their search was not thorough enough to discover that the wallet contained a razor blade. Later, still in police custody, Marc regained possession of the razor blade during transport to a mental health facility. He used the blade to commit suicide in the back of a squad car. His father filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging that the officers were deliberately indifferent to Marc's risk of suicide. The district court entered summary judgment for the defendants. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The totality of the officers' actions did not indicate deliberate indifference.