Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Blue, a bus driver insured under Hartford group disability plans, stopped working because of chronic headaches in 1998; Hartford approved short-term disability (STD) benefits. Blue was diagnosed with sphenopalatine ganglion neuralgia. Hartford approved long-term (LTD) benefits in 2001. To qualify for STD benefits, Blue needed to show inability to perform his own occupation; for LTD benefits, he needed to show that he could not do “any occupation or work for which he was or could become qualified by training, education or experience.” In 2002, Hartford amended its LTD policy, retroactive to 1993, adopting the more lenient “own occupation” standard. Hartford received annual physician’s reports, and by 2008, his provider indicated that Blue was capable of full-time light or sedentary work. Hartford notified Blue that he was no longer eligible for LTD benefits, quoting the “any occupation” language; it apparently did not send the 2002 retroactive amendment. In 2011, Hartford acknowledged its mistake to the district court, reinstated benefits, and issued a check for retroactive benefits. After granting one, but denying a second, extension of time, the district court ruled without Blue’s response, finding the contract claim was moot and granting Hartford summary judgment on the bad faith claim. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. View "Blue v. Hartford Life & Accident Ins. Co." on Justia Law

In 2010-2011 several hundred plaintiffs filed 10 lawsuits in Illinois state courts against Abbott, for personal injuries they allege were caused by Depakote, a prescription. Plaintiffs moved the Supreme Court of Illinois to consolidate and transfer their cases to St. Clair County, pursuant to Illinois Supreme Court Rule 384; the Supreme Court has not ruled. Abbott removed each of the cases to federal court, asserting that the motion to consolidate brought the cases under the “mass action” provision of the Class Action Fairness Act, 28 U.S.C. 1332(d)(11)(B)(i), which allows the removal of any case where 100 or more people propose to try their claims jointly. Cases filed in St. Clair and Madison counties were removed to the Southern District of Illinois and cases filed in Cook County were removed to the Northern District; plaintiffs moved to remand in both courts. The Northern District denied plaintiffs’ motion to remand. The Seventh Circuit held that removal was proper, rejecting plaintiffs’ argument that they did not propose a joint trial because their motion to consolidate did not address how the trials of the various claims in the cases would be conducted, other than proposing that they all take place in St. Clair County.View "Abbott Labs., Inc. v. Alexander" on Justia Law

Carroll and Kelliher worked at Merrill Lynch. Carroll lodged a complaint that led to the firing of two employees. Restructuring followed and a supervisory position opened. Although Carroll did not apply, she felt “overlooked” when Merrill Lynch hired another. Carroll felt that Kelliher, apparently not involved with the earlier human resources complaint, was performing some of her duties. Around 9:00 PM on Thanksgiving, Carroll called Kelliher at home. As Carroll later admitted, she “fucking snapped;” she acknowledged that, if she received a similar call, she would feel “threatened.” Mrs. Kelliher overheard loud accusations and began listening from another receiver. Increasingly frightened, she pushed the “record” button on her answering machine. The Kellihers did not call the police, but called a Merrill Lynch supervisor. At his supervisors’ request, Kelliher played the recording and reported Carroll’s call to the police. Two months later, Carroll filed a police report, accusing the Kellihers of violating the Illinois eavesdropping statute. Merrill Lynch fired Carroll for her conduct on the call. Carroll sued Kelliher and Merrill Lynch. The district court entered summary judgment on her claim under the Illinois statute, concluding that the recording fell within the statute’s fear of crime exemption. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. View "Carroll v. Merrill Lynch, Jim Kelliher, and Pat Kelliher" on Justia Law

Turbo blowers are used in waste water treatment plants to maintain the oxygen dissolved in the water at a level needed by the aerobic bacteria that break down organic waste into carbon dioxide, nitrogen, and water. In 2006 Neuros began offering such blowers to facilities in North America. Two years later, KTurbo began marketing its blowers. In 2008 Neuros won a bid to supply blowers to a Utah plant. Lee, the chief executive officer of KTurbo, was dissatisfied, and slides and related tables that accused Neuros of fraud in its representations to the Utah purchaser. Lee made his presentation to engineering firms that advise treatment plants on which blowers to buy, but apparently failed to win any business away from Neuros. Lee also published his accusations on a website and sent them to the sales representatives. Neuros sued, charging violations of the Lanham Act, the Illinois Uniform Deceptive Trade Practices Act, and defamation. A bench trial resulted in a judgment in favor of Neuros on its defamation claim and an award of $60,000. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the award, but held that the other claims should not have been dismissed. View "Neuros Co., Ltd. v. KTurbo, Inc." on Justia Law

In his 40s, Kastner had worked as a truck driver and as a delivery manager. Having suffered injuries following a fall and subsequent heavy lifting at work, he suffered from a degenerative disc disorder and pain in various parts of his body, and sought disability insurance benefits under 42 U.S.C. 423(d). An administrative law judge determined that, though Kastner’s impairments are severe, they do not meet listed requirements for a presumptively disabling condition and that Kastner has residual capability to perform certain jobs in the economy. The Appeals Council denied review and the district court affirmed. The Seventh Circuit reversed and remanded, holding that the ALJ did not adequately explain why Kastner had not met the requirements for a presumptive disability. View "Kastner v. Astrue" on Justia Law

While working at an animal shelter, Povey injured her wrist moving a dog. She had surgery and underwent physical therapy. Jeffersonville’s Human Resources Director explained that the shelter did not have light duty positions. Povey’s supervisor nonetheless limited her duties and exempted Povey from working weekends because it would entail heavy lifting. Co-workers complained. Although an investigation concluded that there was no illegal harassment, Povey reported that she felt harassment “behind her back” and filed a complaint. Jeffersonville then received medical notice of Povey’s permanent physical restrictions which prohibited repetitive hand movement or lifting, pushing or pulling more than five pounds with her right arm. Povey’s employment was terminated. Povey sued under 42 U.S.C. 12101, alleging violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act. The district court granted Jeffersonville summary judgment, finding that Povey did not demonstrate that her wrist injury impaired her from completing daily tasks; her perceived impairment foreclosed her from accepting a broad range or class of jobs; she was perceived unable to perform manual tasks; she was a qualified individual as defined under the ADA; or that she was terminated in retaliation for exercising her rights under the ADA. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. View "Povey v. City of Jeffersonville" on Justia Law

The Illinois inmate’s suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 alleged that his cell was infested with mice and cockroaches, that a window pane was missing and rain came in through the window, and that a warden had seen the conditions, yet nothing had been done. The district judge dismissed on alternative grounds: that the defendants were immune from suit by virtue of the Eleventh Amendment and that the complaint failed to allege harm. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, after noting that the complaint alleged that allowing rain to enter the cell created a health hazard, adequately alleging harm. Depending on how extensive infestation is, what odors or bites or risk of disease the pests create, the prisoner’s known particular psychological sensitivities, and how long infestation continues, a trier of fact might reasonably conclude that the prisoner had been subjected to harm sufficient to support a claim of cruel and unusual punishment even if he had not contracted a disease or suffered any pain. The suit is against a state and a state agency and Congress did not abrogate states’ sovereign immunity under section 1983, as it could have done. A state and its agencies are not suable “persons” under section 1983. View "Thomas v. State of IL" on Justia Law

In 2007, CSI entered into a contract with Sunrise to install carpets, countertops, flooring, and wall tiles at a new condominium within the geographical jurisdiction of the union’s Local 13. Though CSI was not a signatory to a collective bargaining agreement with Local 13, most other workers at the job site were union members. The union became aware that Sunrise was using non-unionized workers and began picketing and a strike. A union organizer stated that Sunrise should get rid of CSI and that if it used CSI on other job sites in the future, Local 13 would set up pickets at those jobs as well. Due to the threat, Sunrise canceled another contract and moved CSI workers to night hours at the condominium project. CSI’s president claims that the union organizer attacked him at the job site and brought claims for lost profits, assault and battery, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and unfair labor practices (secondary pressure) under the Labor Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. 187. The district court ruled in favor of defendants Regional Council, Local 13, and the union organizer on all counts. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. View "Carpet Serv. Int'l, Inc. v. Chicago Reg'l Council of Carpenters" on Justia Law

In 2003, the Leibovitch family was traveling along the Trans-Israel highway near Kalkilya through an area bordering the West Bank. Agents of the Palestine Islamic Jihad crossed from the West Bank into Israel and fired upon the Leibovitchs’ minivan using pistols and a Kalishnikov rifle. The Leibovitchs’ seven-year-old child, an Israeli national, was killed by the gunshots. Her three-year-old sister, an American citizen, survived but was severely injured by bullets that shattered bones in her right wrist and pierced her torso. Two grandparents and two siblings were also in the van during the attack, but survived. In 2008, the Leibovitchs brought suit against the Islamic Republic of Iran and its Ministry of Information and Security under the terrorism exception of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 28 U.S.C. 1605A, for providing material support and resources to the organization that carried out the attacks. The district court entered default judgment against Iran on the claim for injuries sustained by the U.S. citizen child, but found no jurisdiction over intentional infliction of emotional distress claims by other family members, who are not citizens. The Seventh Circuit reversed and remanded, holding that the Act confers subject-matter jurisdiction over the claims. View "Leibovitch v. Islamic Republic of Iran" on Justia Law

In 2007, an explosion occurred at a metal processing plant in Manchester, Georgia owned by GSMC, which had obtained insurance through Continental, covering damage to the plant. Continental made some payments to GSMC, but GSMC subsequently sued, alleging that the payments were inadequate. GSMC is now in bankruptcy. Plaintiffs, claiming that the failure of Continental to timely pay adequate damages to GSMC caused them damages, brought suit against Continental and Hylant, their former insurance broker. Three of the plaintiffs are businesses affiliated with GSMC, and are additional named insureds under the policy that covered the Manchester plant. The other plaintiffs are owners and operators of GSMC, and allege that they are third-party beneficiaries of the policy. The district court dismissed the claims of: breach of contract; promissory estoppel; bad faith; negligence; tortious interference with contract; negligent infliction of emotional distress; and breach of fiduciary duties. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, applying Indiana law. View "G & S Holdings LLC v. Cont'l Cas. Co." on Justia Law