Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The 57-year-old woman, diagnosed with frozen shoulder and later with chronic obstructive pulmonary disease, stopped medical treatment in 2003, having no health insurance and income of $4500 to $9000 a year as a clerical worker. Her last significant employment, as a hotel night-clerk, ended in 2007. She got another clerical job, but was immediately fired because unable to lift a box of paper. She sought social security disability benefits and resumed treatment. She had regained the full range of motion, but muscles in her arms and shoulders were weak and she had chronic obstructive pulmonary disease, causing bronchitis, respiratory infections, and shortness of breath. The ALJ decided that she was capable of performing as hotel clerk and was not disabled; he disregarded findings by a doctor whom he had appointed and with whom the applicant had no prior relationship. He noted the “lack of aggressive treatment” and that she smoked, overlooking that she stopped smoking 30 years earlier. The ALJ focused on her ability to do laundry, take public transportation, and grocery shop. The Appeals Council declined review. The Seventh Circuit remanded, stating that: “Really the Social Security Administration and the Justice Department should have been able to do better.” View "Hughes v. Astrue" on Justia Law

Hentz is an accountant with a firm employed by pension funds to perform accounting and auditing services. The firm possessed a compact disc containing confidential and protected information, including the names, birth dates, and Social Security numbers of approximately 30,000 participants and beneficiaries of the funds. The firm agreed in writing to ensure that it would safeguard the information on the compact disc. Hentz placed the compact disc in a laptop, put the laptop in her personal vehicle, and parked in the open at her residence. The laptop and disc were stolen. The funds incurred nearly $200,000 in credit monitoring and insurance expenses and sued Hentz, who tendered the defense to Nationwide, which had written her homeowner’s insurance policy. Nationwide obtained a declaration that it had no duty to defend or indemnify Hentz because the policy does not cover damage to property rented to, occupied or used by or in the care of the insured or arising out of or in connection with a business conducted from an insured location or engaged in by an insured, whether or not the business is owned or operated by an insured or employs an insured. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. View "Nationwide Ins. Co. v. Central Laborers' Pension Fund" on Justia Law

Scherr, an elderly woman who required the use of a walker, booked a room at the Courtyard Marriott Hotel in Overland Park, Kansas and requested a room that complied with the Americans With Disabilities Act. The hotel had recently undergone a renovation and had installed spring-hinged door closers on the bathroom doors of some of its rooms, including the ADA-compliant room assigned to Scherr. While attempting to exit her bathroom, the door, which she had pushed open and then released to use her walker, quickly slammed shut on her, striking her and knocking her down. She underwent surgery for a broken wrist and an injured hip and later brought a personal injury action against the hotel, which settled in 2010. Prior to settlement, Scherr brought a suit under the ADA seeking injunctive relief against the hotel and 56 other Courtyard Marriotts for using the spring-hinged door closers. The district court ruled that Scherr had standing to sue the Overland Park hotel, but not the 56 other Marriotts, and that the applicable statute of limitations did not bar her suit, but later granted Marriott summary judgment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, holding that the spring-hinged door closers comply with ADA regulations. View "Scherr v. Marriott Int'l, Inc." on Justia Law

School administrators approved a seventh grade field trip to Mauthe Lake. Students were not required to attend. The school district forbids swimming on field trips unless a lifeguard is present. The administrator, present at the lake, knew that there was no lifeguard and that there were places in the swimming area where water would be over the children’s heads. Several students entered the lake at the beach. The chaperone told the children not to go deeper than their chests, Kamonie, with others, walked until the water reached his chest, and was pulled down to water over his head. He drowned inside the designated swimming area. His parents sued (42 U.S.C. 1983), claiming that the defendants deprived Kamonie of his life in violation of the due process clause. The district judge dismissed. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. A state does not deprive a person of his life in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment by failing to prevent death, but only if the death was caused by the reckless act by a state employee acting within the scope of employment. Negligence enhanced the risk to Kamonie, but negligence is not enticement, or deliberate indifference, or blindness to obvious dangers. The parents may have state law claims, but damages would be capped at $150,000. View "Slade v. Bd. of Sch. Dirs.of the City of Milwaukee" on Justia Law

Welch called 911. A Wishard ambulance arrived. Welch was 34 weeks pregnant. Paramedics ascertained that her water broke and she had a prolapsed umbilical cord. After consulting with her obstetrician’s office, paramedics contacted the Beech Grove emergency room and transported her there. Beech Grove did not have an obstetrics facility. Rather than delivering the baby, the physician sent Welch in the Wishard ambulance to another hospital, where the baby was delivered by Caesarean section. He had suffered hypoxia resulting in severe brain damage. Plaintiffs alleged that Wishard violated the Emergency Medical Treatment and Active Labor Act, 42 U.S.C. 1395dd. The district court granted defendants summary judgment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, finding that the situation did not fit the definition of “come to the emergency room:” that an individual in an ambulance owned and operated by the hospital is deemed to have come to the emergency room unless the ambulance is operated under communitywide emergency medical service protocols that direct it to transport the individual to a hospital other than the owner. The Wishard ambulance was operating under EMS protocols when it transported the plaintiffs. Although the definition was adopted after the incident, it was merely a clarification. View "Beller v. Health & Hosp. Corp. of Marion Cnty. IN" on Justia Law

Ruppel sued CBS in Illinois alleging CBS’s predecessor, Westinghouse, caused the mesothelioma from which he suffers. Westinghouse had included asbestos in the turbines it supplied to the U.S. Navy, and Ruppel was allegedly exposed to it during his Naval service and later when he worked on an aircraft carrier as a civilian. CBS removed the case under the federal officer removal statute, which permits removal of certain suits where a defendant that acted under a federal officer has a colorable federal defense, 28 U.S.C. 1442(a)(1). Ruppel moved to remand and, without allowing response, the district court granted the motion. The district court concluded Ruppel only sued CBS for failing to warn about the dangers of asbestos for which there is no federal defense. The Seventh Circuit reversed. CBS’s relationship with Ruppel arises solely out of CBS’s duties to the Navy. It also has a colorable argument for the government contractor defense, which immunizes government contractors when they supply products with specifications approved by the government. View "Ruppel v. CBS Corp." on Justia Law

The insurers provided law enforcement liability coverage to the city of Waukegan and its employees acting within the scope of employment. In 2009, Starks filed a civil rights suit against the city and some current and former police officers, among others, alleging that each played a role in his wrongful conviction for a 1986 crime. The insurers obtained a declaratory judgment that they have no duty to defend or indemnify. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, noting that the policies were not in effect at the time of the crime, that Starks was not exonerated during the period when the policies were in place, and that any outrageous conduct that might be grounds for a claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress also fell outside the policy dates. View "Northfield Ins.Co. v. City of Waukegan" on Justia Law

American citizen-civilians, employees of a private Iraqi security services company, alleged that they were detained and tortured by U.S. military personnel while in Iraq in 2006, then released without being charged with a crime. Plaintiffs sought damages and to recover seized personal property. The district court denied motions to dismiss. In 2011, the Seventh Circuit affirmed in part, holding that plaintiffs sufficiently alleged Secretary Rumsfeld's personal responsibility and that he is not entitled to qualified immunity. On rehearing en banc, the Seventh Circuit reversed, stating that a common-law claim for damages should not be created. The Supreme Court has never created or even favorably mentioned a nonstatutory right of action for damages on account of conduct that occurred outside of the U.S. The Military Claims Act and the Foreign Claims Act indicate that Congress has decided that compensation should come from the Treasury rather than from federal employees and that plaintiffs do not need a common-law damages remedy in order to achieve some recompense. Even such a remedy existed, Rumsfeld could not be held liable. He did not arrest plaintiffs, hold them incommunicado, refuse to speak with the FBI, subject them to loud noises, or threaten them while they wore hoods. View "Vance v. Rumsfeld" on Justia Law

Lynch was injured while working at a jobsite as a mechanic for Metropolitan Rail (Metra), when the top rail of a chain-link fence he was installing fell and struck him on the back of his neck and shoulders. In his suit under the Federal Employers’ Liability Act, 45 U.S.C. 51, the district court granted summary judgment in favor of Metra. The Seventh Circuit vacated and remanded, finding that Lynch adequately raised material issues of fact concerning whether Metra was negligent. View "Lynch v. NE Reg'l Commuter R.R.Corp." on Justia Law

Fleishman began working for Continental in 1984 as a trial attorney defending workers’ compensation claims. Izzo oversaw the attorneys. Beginning in 2003, Fleishman suffered a series of medical problems related to a brain aneurism. He took intermittent medical leaves between July 2003 and June 2005. Izzo mentioned to Fleishman that his numbers “were off” because he was out on leave and inquired whether Fleishman thought about retirement. Fleishman declined and did not request another leave or accommodation after his return, although he had a noticeable dent on the side of his head. He was assigned to a new group that handled high-value cases. And his supervisor began receiving a series of performance-related complaints that ultimately led to his termination in 2007 at the age of 54. Fleishman filed suit under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. 623 (a)(1) and the Americans with Disabilities Act 42 U.S.C. 12112(a). The district court granted Continental summary judgment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Fleishman offered no evidence of age discrimination and does not meet the definition of disabled under the ADA. View "Fleishman v. Cont'l Cas. Co." on Justia Law