Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Morris died after a 2004 collision in Indiana; he was a passenger in Sampson’s vehicle. Sampson was insured by Mid-Century. The Estate made a claim for $50,000, the highest allowable amount. Nuzzo, a citizen of Ohio, was the assigned claims adjustor. The Estate ultimately filed a wrongful death suit. An Indiana state court awarded $1.2 million. Sampson assigned his rights against Mid-Century for an agreement that the Estate would not pursue collection against Sampson personally. In 2011, the Estate sued Mid-Century in California state court, alleging that its bad faith failure to pay the claim resulted in the excess jury verdict against Sampson. The court dismissed on forum non conveniens grounds. The Estate then sued Mid-Century and Nuzzo in Ohio state court, alleging tortious bad faith failure to pay the claim and breach of contract. The case was removed to an Ohio federal district court, then transferred to the district court in Indianapolis, which found that claims against Nuzzo were potentially viable under Ohio law, but that Indiana law governed both claims, so that Nuzzo was fraudulently joined. The court dismissed claims against Nuzzo and denied the Estate’s motion to remand. The Seventh Circuit vacated with instructions to remand, finding that Nuzzo was not fraudulently joined. View "Morris v. Nuzzo" on Justia Law

In 2006, W&S hired Martino, a naturalized citizen born in Italy, as a sales representative. He signed an agreement that prohibited him from engaging in any other business or work for remuneration or profit without consent. W&S only approved outside positions requiring five or fewer hours a week on average, not including Sundays, and average weekly pay of $100 or less. Martino also served as a pastor of a small church and he submitted an outside position request, indicating that his pastoral position involved eight to 10 hours per week, not including Sundays, with average weekly pay of $300. After rejecting Martino’s argument that his position was a public service, human resources responded that W&S was not discharging Martino but asking that he resign his pastoral position. Martino subsequently was unable to timely produce I-9 eligibility to work documentation. Within two months of hiring him, W&S terminated Martino. The district court entered summary judgment for W&S in Martino’s suit, alleging termination based on religious beliefs and defamation. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Martino’s evidence neither called into doubt W&S’s explanation for his discharge nor established a prima facie case of defamation. View "Martino v. W & S Fin. Grp." on Justia Law

Majors worked at GE’s Bloomington plant for 32 years. In 2000, she suffered a work-related injury to her right shoulder that left her limited to lifting no more than 20 pounds and precluded her from work above shoulder level with her right arm. The restrictions were considered temporary at first, but according to her medical file maintained by GE, the restrictions later were determined to be permanent. After GE denied her temporary and permanent positions to which she was otherwise entitled under the seniority-based bidding procedure, Majors sued under Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. 12101 and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 2000e, claiming retaliation for filing EEOC charges after being denied hours, and that GE constructively discharged her when she elected to retire. The district court granted GE summary judgment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Majors couldn’t perform an essential function of the position she sought without an accommodation that was not reasonable and presented insufficient evidence of retaliation. View "Majors v. Gen. Elec. Co." on Justia Law

Lees was sexually assaulted in her Carthage dorm room by men she believed to be Carthage students. She brought a negligence action against the college, seeking to introduce the opinion testimony of Dr. Kennedy, a premises-security expert, as evidence of the standard of care for campus safety. Kennedy was to testify that there were numerous security deficiencies at Carthage and at Lees’s residence hall, that there was history of sexual assault at the school, and that Carthage fell short of recommended practices in campus security. The district court excluded Kennedy’s testimony, finding that the industry standards were only aspirational and failed to account for variation between different academic environments and that recent sexual assaults at Carthage involved acquaintance rape, while the Lees attack was stranger rape; the court entered summary judgment for Carthage. The Seventh Circuit vacated, finding proposed testimony about standards published by the International Association of Campus Law Enforcement Administrators admissible under Rule 702 and not unreliable merely because the standards are aspirational; the standards represent an authoritative statement by premises-security professionals regarding recommended practices. Testimony about the absence of a “prop alarm” on the dorm’s basement door also reflects application of reliable principles and methods to the specific facts of the case. View "Lees v. Carthage Coll." on Justia Law

Cloe started working for the City of Indianapolis in 2007 as an Unsafe Buildings/Nuisance Abatement Project Manager. In 2008, she was diagnosed with multiple sclerosis, a chronic, incurable neurological disorder that rendered her disabled and significantly impaired her day-to-day life. In 2009, the city terminated her, ostensibly for poor performance. Cloe sued under the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. 12101, alleging that the city discriminated against her because of her disability; failed to reasonably accommodate her disability; and retaliated against her for requesting accommodations. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the city. The Seventh Circuit affirmed with respect to the reasonable accommodation claims, but reversed on the discrimination and retaliation claims, noting “suspicious timing, ambiguous statements oral or written, and other bits and pieces from which an inference of retaliatory intent might be drawn.” View "Cloe v. City of Indianapolis" on Justia Law

Steine was a subcontractor for installation of thermal units at a Wal-Mart store in Gas City, Indiana. Steine rented a boom lift from NES. Steine foreman Crager signed a one-page, two-sided NES “Rental Agreement” with a signature line is at the bottom of its front side. Above the signature line, the Agreement states: “Signer acknowledges that he has read and fully understands this rental agreement including the terms and conditions on the reverse side” and “Please note that there are important terms on the reverse side of this contract, including an indemnification provision.” Menendez, a Steine employee, died from injuries he suffered while operating the 40-foot boom lift. His family filed sued NES and others, alleging negligence. NES sought indemnification from Steine. The district court entered summary judgment in favor of Steine. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The indemnification clause in the rental agreement does not expressly state, in clear and unequivocal terms as Indiana law requires, that Steine agreed to indemnify NES for NES’s own negligence. View "NES Rentals Holdings, Inc.l v. Steine Cold Storage, Inc." on Justia Law

In 2008, Pepper, then 54 years old, applied for Supplemental Security Disability Insurance Benefits, alleging that she became unable to work in November 1998 as a result of numerous physical and mental impairments. The alleged onset date was later amended to October 2002, when Pepper last worked. Extensive medical records show that Pepper sought treatment for numerous health concerns over the years. At various times, Pepper has been assessed as having ongoing neck pain and limited range of motion in her neck, degenerative disc disease in her spine, left knee problems, migraine headaches, problems with her vision, diabetes, asthma, mitral valve prolapse, sciatica, dyslipidemia, hyperglycemia, hypertension, allergic rhinitis, obesity, plantar fasciitis in her left heel, caregiver stress, and depression. An ALJ denied the claim and the district court affirmed. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting arguments that the ALJ erred when addressing Pepper’s residual function capacity and that the ALJ’s credibility determination was inadequately supported and patently wrong. Substantial evidence supported denial of benefits. View "Pepper v. Astrue" on Justia Law

Binns was driving a truck on an interstate highway, transporting parts on behalf of U.S. Xpress. Binns was in the center lane negotiating a curve when he saw, in his mirror, a motorcycle sliding down the right lane. After pulling over, Binns ran back to find Betty Jordan lying on the pavement. She ultimately lost both legs below the knee. According to Binns, Betty repeatedly said, “it’s not his fault. It’s my fault.” Betty has no recollection of these statements or of seeing Binns. Binns relayed Betty’s statements to U.S. Xpress claims manager Bukovitz, State Trooper Litt, and insurance adjuster Niles; each of them testified to that effect at trial. Ted, who had been notified of his wife’s accident, had arrived on the scene and introduced himself to Binns. Binns testified that Ted said that Betty stated it was not Binns’s fault. Litt testified that Ted told him that Betty had said that the accident was her fault. Niles also testified that Ted told him that Betty said the accident was her fault. Ted denied the testimony. A jury returned a defense verdict. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. While the court erred in admitting certain evidence, the error was harmless in light of expert testimony that Binns could not have caused the accident. View "Jordan v. Binns" on Justia Law

During her birth in 2004, the 11-pound baby became lodged in the mother’s pelvis, so that nerves in her shoulder were injured (brachial plexus injury), resulting in a limited range of movement in her right arm A few months later her mother consulted a lawyer, who recommended against suing. Fifteen months later the mother consulted another lawyer; he agreed to represent her, but 16 months later, he withdrew. Finally, in 2010, the mother filed a malpractice suit against the Erie Family Health Center and the Center’s nurse-midwives who had provided her prenatal care. Erie is a private enterprise, but it receives grant money from the U.S. Public Health Service, so that its employees are deemed federal employees, 42 U.S.C. 233(g)(1)(A),(g)(4) and tort suits against it or its employees can be maintained only under the Federal Tort Claims Act, 42 U.S.C. 233(a),(g)(1)(A). The district court found the claim time-barred. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. While the limitations period for a tort suit under Illinois law would be eight years for a minor, 735 ILCS 5/13-212(b), the extension of the statute of limitations for a child victim does not apply to claims governed by the Federal Tort Claims Act. View "Arteaga v. United States" on Justia Law

The Illinois Department of Children and Family Services removed Woods, then seven years old from his parents’ home in 1991 and placed him in a residential treatment facility. There had been many reports of sexual abuse among residents of the facility and Woods, claiming to have been abused by another resident, filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The district court dismissed the suit as untimely because Woods failed to bring his claim within two years of its accrual, rejecting Woods’s contention that the 20-year limitations period applicable in Illinois to personal injury claims based on childhood sexual abuse applied. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The limitations period applicable to all Section 1983 claims brought in Illinois is two years, as provided in 735 ILCS 5/13-202, and this includes claims involving allegations of failure to protect from childhood sexual abuse. View "Woods v. IL Dep't of Children & Family Servs." on Justia Law