Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Schomas, 54 years old, suffers from scoliosis and degenerative disc disease. Following a hearing, the Social Security Administration denied his application for Disability Insurance Benefits. The district court and the Seventh Circuit upheld the denial, rejecting a challenge to the ALJ’s credibility finding and assessment of his residual functional capacity. The court acknowledged that the ALJ’s decision was “problematic,” but concluded that Schomas waived most of his arguments, and that the rest were unfocused or undeveloped. View "Schomas v. Astrue" on Justia Law

Baugh suffered severe brain injury when the Cuprum ladder he was using to clean his gutters collapsed. In a suit, alleging defective design and negligence, there were no eyewitnesses, and, because of the injury, Baugh could not testify. Three months before trial, Cuprum informed plaintiff’s counsel that it intended to use an exemplar of the ladder at trial, built to the exact specifications of the ladder Baugh had been using. In a pretrial conference, the ladder was marked as an exhibit “for Demonstrative Purposes.” Plaintiff objected. Discovery had closed two years earlier, and the ladder had not been included in expert disclosures. The judge determined that since the ladder was being offered only as a demonstrative exhibit, plaintiff’s objections were irrelevant. Cuprum used the ladder during trial to argue that, contrary to plaintiff’s design defect theory, the ladder would not collapse under a normal load with all legs on the ground. Cuprum’s expert presented testimony and video in which he tested the ladder, including jumping on the ladder as if it were a pogo stick. Over plaintiff’s objection, the judge allowed the jury to inspect the ladder during deliberation. The jury returned a verdict for Cuprum. The Seventh Circuit reversed, finding that sending the ladder to the jury room was not harmless error. View "John Baugh v. Cuprum S.A. De C.V." on Justia Law

Madden had almost reached the railroad crossing when her car stalled. She re‐started it and drove onto the crossing; the car stalled again. The crossing gates began to descend, the warning lights began flashing, and the crossing bells sounded. Madden tried to restart her car, according to witnesses, and another driver got out of his car and started walking toward the crossing. He saw Madden open her car door when the train was only 45 to 50 yards from the crossing, and start to run. The train struck the car, pushing it against her, causing fatal injuries. Her estate sued the railroad, claiming that the crossing gates had descended, the warning lights had begun flashing, and the locomotive horn had been blown, all fewer than 20 seconds before the train reached the crossing, in violation of federal safety regulations, 49 C.F.R. 222.21(b)(2), 234.225. The district court entered judgment in favor of the railroad. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, stating that neither “the children’s testimony, reflecting their incompetent efforts to reconstruct the accident, nor the experts’ worthless evidence, nor both bodies of evidence combined (0 + 0 = 0), would enable a reasonable jury to infer negligence on the part of the railroad. View "Nunez v. BNSF Ry. Co." on Justia Law

In 1999 Brooks, an assembly-line operator for Prairie Packaging, was seriously injured on the job and lost his left hand, wrist, and forearm. He filed a workers’ compensation claim seeking recovery for permanent and total disability, which remains pending. Prairie treated Brooks as a disabled employee on a company-approved leave of absence, so that he continued to receive healthcare coverage. Pactiv acquired Prairie in 2007 and continued this arrangement. In 2010 Pactiv sent Brooks a letter instructing him to submit documents verifying his ability to return to work; failure to submit would mean termination of employment. Because his injury was totally disabling, Brooks did not submit verification and Pactiv fired him; he lost his healthcare coverage under the employee-benefits plan. Brooks sued Pactiv and Prairie under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act, 29 U.S.C. 1001–1461, for benefits due and breach of fiduciary duty and asserted an Illinois law claim for retaliatory discharge. The district court dismissed. The Seventh Circuit affirmed with respect to ERISA because Brooks did not allege that the employee-benefits plan promised him post-employment benefits. Pactiv acted as an employer, not as a fiduciary, in terminating Brooks’s employment and cancelling his health insurance. The court reinstated the state law claim. View "Brooks v. Pactiv Corp." on Justia Law

Weigle and Moore were experienced mechanics employed by Truckers 24‐Hour in Indianapolis; they undertook a job to rebuild the braking system on a semi‐truck trailer. The trailer somehow moved as both were working underneath it, causing the support stands to tip over and the trailer to come crashing down. The support stands were designed by SPX. In a suit against SPX, the mechanics alleged inadequate warnings and defective design under the Indiana Product Liability Act, Ind. Code 34‐20‐1‐1. The district court granted SPX summary judgment, finding that the warnings were adequate as a matter of law and that, as a result, the support stands were not defective under Indiana law. The Seventh Circuit affirmed as to the inadequate‐warnings claims, but vacated with respect to the defective‐design claims. A reasonable fact finder could determine that the SPX support stands were in a defective condition that was unreasonably dangerous. That the SPX support stands differ from most others on the market tends to show that their design is not contemplated by reasonable expected users. View "Weigle SPX Corp." on Justia Law

Scottie Pippen won six championship rings with the Chicago Bulls and was named to the National Basketball Association’s list of the 50 greatest players in its history. Since he retired in 2004, he has lost much of the fortune he amassed during his playing days through bad investments. He has pursued multiple lawsuits against former financial and legal advisors. The media learned of Pippen’s problems and several news organizations incorrectly reported that he had filed for bankruptcy. Pippen contends that the false reports have impaired his ability to earn a living by product endorsements and appearances. He filed suit, alleging that he was defamed and cast in a false light. The district court dismissed, finding that the falsehoods did not fit any of the categories of statements recognized by Illinois law to be so innately harmful that damages may be presumed and that the complaint did not plausibly allege that the defendants had published the falsehoods with knowledge the statement was false or reckless disregard of whether it was false, as required for a public figure such as Pippen to recover defamation damages. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. View "Pippen v. NBC Universal Media LLC" on Justia Law

Safety National sold an excess liability insurance policy to TKK, to cover excess losses resulting from liability imposed “by the Workers’ Compensation or Employers’ Liability Laws” of Illinois. The widow of a former TKK employee sued, alleging that TKK’s negligence caused the employee to become ill with and die from mesothelioma. The claim was subject to an affirmative defense: the Illinois Workers’ Occupational Diseases Act bars common law claims by or on behalf of an employee against a covered employer “on account of damage, disability or death caused or contributed to by any disease contracted or sustained in the course of the employment.” After Safety National denied coverage, TKK filed suit. The district court granted TKK summary judgment for its costs in defending and settling the widow’s suit, reasoning that the reference to “Employers’ Liability Laws” included the common law negligence claim even if the claim ultimately must fail because of the statutory bar. The court denied TKK’s claim for attorney fees and costs in the coverage lawsuit itself, except a modest award for what the court considered a vexatious motion to reconsider. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The key policy term, “Employers’ Liability Laws,” is broad enough to include claims under the common law, including “groundless” claims. View "TKK USA, Inc. v. Safety Nat'l Cas. Corp." on Justia Law

Healix and HHI compete in the business of infusion therapy services: administration of substances such as pharmaceuticals intravenously or by any method other than ingestion. Some medical care providers offer these services to patients in their offices. Healix and HHI provide support. In 2007 Healix recruited the Clinic as a new customer. The Clinic had two members: Keller, a physician, and Porter, a nurse practitioner. Under their five-year contract, Healix would provide services after the Clinic built an in-office pharmacy and hired staff to work there. The Clinic was responsible for the cost of construction. Healix required Keller and Porter to execute personal guarantees and took a security interest in accounts receivable. Four months after signing the contract, the Clinic notified Healix that it would not fulfill its responsibilities. The Clinic was in breach, but Healix did not sue. One month later, the Clinic entered into a contract with HHI. Healix learned of the new contract and sued HHI for copyright and trademark infringement and for tortious interference with a contract. The intellectual property claims were dismissed. After a trial, the district judge rejected the tortious-interference claim. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, finding lack of causation because the evidence indicated that the Clinic would have “walked away” regardless of HHI’s actions. View "Healix Infusion Therapy, Inc. v. HHI Infusion Servs., Inc.." on Justia Law

Part of Crosby’s finger was amputated while using a “kicking method” of removing metal from bundles. His employer, Cooper, discouraged that method as dangerous. Crosby claimed medical and temporary total disability benefits under the Illinois Workers’ Compensation Act. When he returned, Crosby stated that he would continue using the “kicking method.” Cooper suspended him for three days and stated that any future safety policy violation would result in immediate termination. The president of Crosby’s union, Zimmerman, filed a grievance on Crosby’s behalf. After returning from suspension, Crosby was given additional training during which, he alleges, Cooper introduced new safety rules and procedures. Within hours of Crosby’s return to work, Cooper’s safety specialist accused him of violating a new safety rule by tossing a pallet. Crosby denied doing so. Zimmerman notified Crosby that Cooper had decided to fire him and suggested that Crosby ask Cooper to call the decision a “permanent layoff with no recall rights,” so that Crosby would be eligible for unemployment benefits and a neutral job reference. Cooper accepted on the condition that Crosby dismiss the grievance. Crosby later claimed that the settlement was a sham and that he was fired for filing a workers’ compensation claim. Cooper removed his retaliatory discharge suit to federal court, claiming that the suit was a disguised action under the Labor Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. 185, which preempts state‐law claims that require interpretation of a collective bargaining agreement (CBA). Cooper asserted that the suit should be dismissed for failure to exhaust remedies under the CBA. The Seventh Circuit reversed the district court and remanded to state court, rejecting the claim of complete preemption. View "Crosby v. Cooper B-Line, Inc." on Justia Law

Stollings lost his index finger and portions of other fingers in a table saw accident and sued Ryobi, the saw’s manufacturer, alleging defective design because it failed to equip the saw with either a riving knife, a small blade that holds the wood cut open to prevent kickbacks, or braking technology that automatically stops the saw blade upon contact with human tissue. Stollings contends either feature would have prevented the accident. A jury returned a verdict in favor of Ryobi. The Seventh Circuit vacated, finding that the court erred in failing to stop Ryobi’s counsel from arguing that Stollings’s counsel brought the case as part of a joint venture with the inventor of an automatic braking technology to force saw manufacturers to license the technology, and in admitting hearsay evidence to support that improper argument. The court also erred in excluding the testimony of one of Stollings’s expert witnesses and in giving the jury a sole proximate cause instruction where Ryobi was not asserting a comparative fault defense or blaming a third party. View "Stollings v. Ryobi Techs., Inc." on Justia Law