Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

In 2008, Shields, an Illinois prisoner was lifting weights and ruptured the pectoralis tendon in his left shoulder. Although he received some medical attention, he did not receive the prompt surgery needed for effective treatment. Due to oversights and delays by those responsible for his medical care, too much time passed for surgery to do any good. He has serious and permanent impairment that could have been avoided. After his release from prison, Shields filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging that several defendants were deliberately indifferent to his serious medical needs and violated his rights under the Eighth Amendment to the Constitution. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, reasoning that Shields was the victim not of any one person’s deliberate indifference, but of a system of medical care that diffused responsibility for his care to the point that no single individual was responsible for seeing that he timely received the care he needed. As a result, no one person can be held liable for any constitutional violation. Shields’ efforts to rely on state medical malpractice law against certain private defendants also failed. View "Shields v. IL Dep't of Corrs." on Justia Law

Crompton began working as a railroad conductor for BNSF in 2001. In 2011, he was working on BNSF 5695, travelling from Paducah, Kentucky, to Centralia, Illinois. Before the train departed on the day at issue, a BNSF engineer performed the required daily inspection and found no defects with the locomotive, including its doors and latches. During the trip, Crompton exited the front cab door several times, and found nothing wrong with the door or its latch. As the train approached Neilson Junction, traveling downhill, Crompton exited the front cab door to throw a switch. He claims that he closed and latched the front cab door before he stepped out onto the platform. The door remained closed for 51 seconds, and then suddenly flew open, knocking Crompton off the train. He suffered injuries to his head, neck, and back. He sued under the Federal Employment Liability Act, 45 U.S.C. 51-60 and the Locomotive Inspection Act, 49 U.S.C. 20701, claiming that BNSF failed to keep the locomotive and its parts in good working order, and that he was injured due to BNSF’s negligence. A jury awarded damages. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, finding the evidence sufficient to establish negligence.View "Crompton v. BNSF Ry. Co." on Justia Law

Lewis was injured in an automobile accident and her health plan paid $180,000 for her medical treatment Lewis filed a tort suit against the driver (her son-in-law), represented by Georgia lawyer Lashgari, and obtained a $500,000 settlement. Lashgari knew the plan had a subrogation lien, but split the proceeds between himself and Lewis. He claimed that the plan was owed nothing. The plan filed suit under ERISA to enforce the lien, 29 U.S.C. 1132(a)(3). The defendants argued that because the settlement funds have been dissipated, the suit was actually for damages, not authorized by ERISA. The district judge ordered the defendants to place $180,000 in Lashgari’s trust account pending judgment. The defendants did not comply. A year later, the defendants having neither placed any money in a trust account nor produced any evidence of their inability to pay, the judge held them in civil contempt, ordered them to produce records that would establish their financial situations, and ordered Lashgari to documents relating to the contempt to the General Counsel of the State Bar for possible disciplinary proceedings against him. The defendants appealed the contempt order. The Seventh Circuit dismissed, characterizing the appeal as frivolous and the defendants’ conduct as outrageous. View "Cent. States, SE & SW Areas Health & Welfare Fund v. Lewis" on Justia Law

Golden purchased automobile insurance from State Farm. The mandatory liability portion of her policy provided that State Farm would defend the insured against a third-party lawsuit using attorneys chosen by State Farm. Following a collision, Golden was represented by in-house counsel. She later filed a purported class action, claiming that “historically and traditionally” State Farm and other insurers defended third-party claims against insureds by hiring private, independent attorneys. State Farm now routinely uses in-house staff attorneys to represent insureds against such claims. Golden filed a purported class action, alleging that State Farm owes its insureds a duty to explain in its policies that house counsel may be used. The district court dismissed, holding that Indiana law creates no obligation to provide advance notification to an insured that an insurer uses house counsel to defend insureds. The court denied Golden’s request to certify the question to the Indiana Supreme Court. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, noting that Golden did not allege that she received deficient representation or that she ever objected to the use of house counsel in her suit. All of her claims depended on the existence of a duty to disclose; State Farm had no duty to disclose.View "Golden v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co." on Justia Law

Pittman, a pretrial detainee, stated, during intake, that he had no major medical problems, no thoughts about killing or injuring himself, no previous suicide attempts, and no psychiatric history. Weeks later he stated that he was suicidal and was placed on a 15-minute suicide watch. During subsequent evaluations, he denied suicidal thoughts. Staff members were unaware that evaluations for suicidal tendencies had been conducted in connection with an arrest two years earlier. Pittman continued to complain about health issues and to act out in an effort to be housed outside lockdown. The night he attempted to hang himself, Pittman was seen crying in his cell. His guardian claims, but staff denies, that he requested to talk to CRISIS staff. The attempt rendered him severely brain-damaged and disabled. His guardian alleged deliberate indifference to his risk of suicide and willful and wanton failure to provide adequate medical care and to protect him. The district court granted summary judgment to the defendants. The Seventh Circuit reversed in part, holding that there was a genuine issue of triable of fact with respect to the claims against two defendants and that the county may have vicarious liability on the state law claim for the actions of those defendants. View "Pittman v. Cnty. of Madison" on Justia Law

In 2006 Buechel was incarcerated at FCI-Greenville federal correctional institution, where he contracted Methicillin-Resistant Staphylococcus aureus, (MRSA), a staph infection resistant to certain antibiotics. Buechel was hospitalized for more than 40 days and was left with serious and permanent damage to his heart and lungs. He sued under the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. 1346(b), alleging that his injuries were caused by the prison’s negligence. The district court issued a pretrial order that limited Buechel’s negligence claim to a theory that he contracted MRSA from contact with one fellow inmate, in the prison laundry in July 2006, or more generally as a result of sloppy procedures in handling infected prison laundry. After a bench trial, the court held that Buechel had not proved that he contracted MRSA from either the inmate or the laundry procedures and entered judgment in favor of the government. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the finding that Buechel failed to prove that he contracted MRSA from the inmate or as a result of inadequate laundry procedures, but vacated and remanded for consideration of a broader theory. Buechel’s administrative claim and complaint presented a broader theory that the prison was negligent more generally in its failure to adhere to its MRSA-containment policies.View "Buechel v. United States" on Justia Law

The claimant alleges that Father Hanser, a former pastor at a Catholic Parish in Brookfield,Wisconsin, sexually abused him in the late 1970s when he was seven years old. In 2007 the claimant participated in a voluntary mediation program conducted by the Archdiocese to address claims of sexual abuse by priests. The mediation produced a settlement. The Archdiocese paid the claimant $100,000, and he released the Archdiocese from all claims relating to abuse by Father Hanser. When the Archdiocese filed its Chapter 11 petition four years later, the claimant submitted a claim based on the same allegations of abuse by Father Hanser, claiming that an Archdiocesan representative had fraudulently induced him to settle by giving him inaccurate information about when the Archdiocese first received reports of abuse by Father Hanser. The bankruptcy judge refused to set the agreement aside because the claimant had not shown that but for the alleged misrepresentations, he would not have accepted the settlement. The district court and Seventh Circuit affirmed. The claimant failed to show that the alleged misrepresentations were a substantial factor in his decision to accept the settlement and never made an offer of proof explaining what an expanded record would show. View " Doe v. Archdiocese of Milwaukee" on Justia Law

Wourms, age 16, was killed in a crash; he was driving erratically when an officer, warned by a 911 call from Wourms’ mother that her son was drunk and “going crazy,” turned on his emergency lights to signal him to pull over. Wourms increased his speed to about 80 mph in an area posted for 25 mph. His father sued under 42 U.S.C. 1983, arguing that the crash was caused by the police car intentionally ramming Wourms’s car, resulting in an unconstitutional seizure of his person and property. The officer denied that his car touched Wourms’s car. The district court entered summary judgment, finding the evidence insufficient for a reasonable jury to find that the cars had collided. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, noting that without a collision, Wourms was entirely responsible; the police officer had every legal right to signal Wourms to pull over. Even ramming a recklessly driven car to induce the driver to stop or cause the car to crash, need not be unreasonable. In this case, however, there were no marks on the police car that matched marks on Wourms’s car, no debris on the road where Wourms started to swerve, and no skid marks from the police car. Witness testimony indicated that the police could not have caught Wourms in time to hit his car before the crash.View "Wourms v. Fields" on Justia Law

Pierce claimed that she injured her lower back in 2004 while moving cases of glassware at her waitressing job. She quit her job and sought medical treatment. An MRI showed signs of disc degeneration. She received chiropractic and electric-shock treatments to her back. She also took prescription pain medication. After her back improved, she started a new job at a café. In March 2006 (her alleged onset date for disability), Pierce re-injured her back to the point that she could no longer sit or stand comfortably, and she had to quit her new job. The injury disrupted her sleep, caused numbness in her legs, and prevented her from being able to sit, stand, lift, or bend for long periods. She could not work for more than five hours without pain. An ALJ found that Pierce, then more than 55 years old, was not disabled. The Seventh Circuit remanded for further proceedings, finding the ALJ’s assessment of Pierce’s credibility was flawed in several respects. View "Pierce v. Colvin" on Justia Law

Horsfall worked as a real estate agent for First Weber, 2001-2002, and was the listing agent on First Weber’s contract with Call, who was trying to sell property. The contract gave First Weber exclusive rights collect commissions for sale of the property during the listing period and an exclusive right to collect commissions from sales to defined “protected buyers” for one year after the listing expired. The Acostas made an offer on the property and became “protected buyers.” Call’s contract with First Weber ended in August and at the same time, Horsfall left First Weber to establish his own brokerage, Picket Fence. In October, the Acostas contacted Horsfall. Without involving First Weber, Horsfall resuscitated the transaction with Call. The Acostas and Call executed a sales contract for the Call property. Picket Fence received a $6,000 commission, inconsistent with Horsfall’s status as First Weber’s agent under the earlier contract and in violation of Wisconsin real estate practice rules. Six years later, First Weber sued Horsfall in state court, asserting r breach of contract, tortious interference, and unjust enrichment. The state court entered a judgment against Horsfall for $10,978.91. Horsfall filed for Chapter 7 bankruptcy, listing First Weber as a creditor. First Weber responded that its judgment was non‐dischargeable under 11 U.S.C. 523(a)(6), as involving “willful and malicious injury.” The bankruptcy court, district court, and Seventh Circuit found the debt dischargeable. View "First Weber Grp., Inc. v. Horsfall" on Justia Law