Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The defendant pleaded guilty to being in the U.S. illegally after having been removed. The judge sentenced him to 84 months in prison. The statutory maximum prison sentence for illegal reentry is usually 2 years, 8 U.S.C. 1326(a), but removal after conviction for an aggravated felony (defendant had two such convictions) increases the maximum to 20 years. § 1326(b)(2). Defendant’s appellate attorney asked to be allowed to withdraw from the case on the ground that there is no colorable basis for appealing, but also stated that the district court imposed conditions beyond its authority. The Seventh Circuit modified the judgment of the district court to eliminate the post-release terms concerning the use of controlled substances, drug tests, and collection of a DNA sample, and otherwise dismissed the appeal, granting the lawyer’s motion to withdraw. View "United States v. Gutierrez-Ceja" on Justia Law

Zheng, a native of China, arrived in the U.S. in 1991 and applied for asylum, which was denied. The INS charged him with removability in 1998, but Zheng renewed his request for asylum, asserting that his wife (who arrived from China in 1994) would be forcibly sterilized under China’s one-child policy because they had two children. The immigration judge denied his application, relying on Zheng’s lack of credibility, and the BIA affirmed in 2002. Zheng remained in the U.S. and filed three motions to reopen, which were denied as untimely and successive and because Zheng failed to demonstrate changed country conditions as to forced sterilization, 8 U.S.C. 1229a. In 2011, Zheng filed a fourth motion, arguing that he would be persecuted in China because he converted to Christianity in 2010 while in immigration detention. He submitted evidence to show that China’s treatment of Christians had materially worsened since 1999. The BIA rejected the claim. The Seventh Circuit denied appeal. BIA’s conclusory rejection of Zheng’s argument was error, but was harmless, given the highly generalized nature of Zheng’s evidence, which failed to show with any meaningful level of specificity that the persecution against Zheng’s practice of Christianity had materially worsened since 1999. View "Zheng v. Holder" on Justia Law

Rodriquez entered the U.S. illegally in 1988 and came to the attention of the Department of Homeland Security in 2005, following a misdemeanor DUI conviction. He subsequently pleaded guilty to using a fraudulent social security card, 18 U.S.C. 1546(a). He sought cancellation of removal based on hardship to his children, who are U.S. citizens, but failed to timely comply with the IJ’s request for biometrics. The IJ deemed the petition abandoned and ordered removal, after which Rodriguez provided the information. Following a remand, DHS notified the BIA that Rodriguez had been removed. BIA withdrew the remand. The Seventh Circuit remanded. An IJ then held that Rodriguez was ineligible for cancellation of removal, based on his conviction of a crime of moral turpitude (8 U.S.C. 1229b(b)(1)(C)). The BIA affirmed. The Seventh Circuit dismissed an appeal, holding that fraudulent use of a social security card is a crime involving moral turpitude. View "Marin-Rodriguez v. Holder" on Justia Law

Moral, a citizen of Ecuador, was admitted to the U.S. in 1988 as an immigrant. The U.S. Department of Homeland Security began removal proceedings in 2011 because of his multiple criminal convictions, including unlawful use of a weapon and sexual abuse of a minor. The Immigration Judge granted five continuances, four of which allowed Moral to pursue state-court post-conviction proceedings seeking to set aside his guilty plea for sexual abuse of a minor occurring in 2002. After the state criminal court dismissed his petition, the IJ denied his request for another continuance and ordered removal. The BIA denied an appeal. The Seventh Circuit dismissed an appeal for lack of jurisdiction under the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. 1252(a)(2)(C). The court reasoned that the provision, which is phrased more broadly than subsection (B), applies to denial of a continuance. View "Moral-Salazar v. Holder" on Justia Law

Vahora is a Muslim citizen of India. In 2002, a train caught fire in Gujarat, India. Many Hindu pilgrims and activists were killed, and violence between Hindus and Muslims followed. Vahora testified that he and several Muslim friends were shot and that Hindu leaders continued to pursue him during the four years he remained in India before travelling to Guatemala, then to the U.S. He applied for asylum one year after arriving. An immigration judge ruled that, assuming the application was timely, and even accepting Vahora’s testimony as true, Vahora had not presented a cognizable claim of past persecution or shown that he had a well-founded fear of future persecution because he did not demonstrate that the Indian government was unable or unwilling to protect him. The Board of Immigration Appeals affirmed, finding that the persecution of which Vahora complains was not carried out by persons the government of India was unable or unwilling to control. The Seventh Circuit denied review, noting that Vahora never sought help from any authorities. View "Vahora v. Holder" on Justia Law

A Lithuanian national, Smykiene entered the U.S. in 1995 on a visitor’s visa. Six months after it expired, she was arrested by Border Patrol officers in New York. The officers gave her an order to show cause why she should not be deported and also told her to provide an address. The Immigration Court sent certified mail to the address that Smykiene with her hearing notice. The Postal Service returned the mail with the notation “Attempted—Not Known.” There was no follow-up. Smykiene did not appear and the immigration judge ordered her deported. A year later she married a man who, two years after that, became a naturalized U.S. citizen. In 2010, when authorities located her, Smykiene swore that she had not received the notice and that at the time she was handed the order to show cause she couldn’t understand English. The Board of Immigration Appeals affirmed an order of removal. The Seventh Circuit remanded, stating that: “The government cites no authority for the proposition that an innocent mistake, especially of the kind likely to be made by a newcomer … from a non-English-speaking country, forfeits the right to reopen an order of removal in absentia.” View "Smykiene v. Holder" on Justia Law

Mustafa, a citizen of Pakistan, and his family entered the U.S. legally as non-immigrant visitors in 2003. Two days before the expiration of his visa, Mustafa filed an application for asylum and withholding of removal. Mustafa claimed that as a member of the Nawaz faction of the Pakistani Muslim League political party, he fears if he were to return to Pakistan, he would be targeted for having cooperated with the opposition government by providing information about the financial affairs of his former employer, who is also a former Pakistani Senator. The Board of Immigration Appeals affirmed the immigration judge’s denial of their applications, finding that Mustafa could not establish a fear of future persecution on account of a protected statutory ground because the threats and attacks Mustafa had experienced before coming to the U.S. were motivated solely by a personal dispute between Mustafa and his former boss and that he had not shown that the current government would persecute him on account of his membership in the PML-N. The Seventh Circuit remanded for further proceedings because the conclusion that Mustafa’s attackers were motivated solely by a desire for personal revenge was unsupported by substantial evidence. View "Mustafa v. Holder" on Justia Law

Boadi legally entered the U.S. in 2000 but overstayed and married Bonds, a U.S. citizen, in 2001. He adjusted his status to conditional lawful permanent resident in 2003, 8 U.S.C. 1186a(a)(1). In 2007, Boadi and Bonds sought removal of the “condition” to his permanent resident status, with documentation supporting the authenticity of their marriage. DHS’s interview with the couple revealed that Boadi lived in Ohio and Bonds in Illinois and that Boadi may have lived with his ex-wife, another Ghanian national. Bonds could neither name Boadi’s three children nor the street on which Boadi lived. They gave conflicting answers regarding their respective children’s relationships and who paid the bills. Boadi failed to respond to a letter and DHS terminated his legal status in 2009 and issued a notice to appear. Boadi and Bonds divorced only weeks after the notice to appear, which automatically terminates an alien’s conditional legal status, 8 U.S.C. 1186a(b)(1)(A)(ii), distinct from DHS’s existing allegation of fraud. Boadi unsuccessfully requested a good-faith marriage waiver. Removal proceedings began. The immigration judge made an adverse credibility determination and found Boadi removable under 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(1)(D)(i). The Board of Immigration Appeals affirmed. The Seventh Circuit denied review. View "Boadi v. Holder" on Justia Law

Chen illegally entered the U.S. in 2006. Shortly thereafter, his wife gave birth to the couple’s second child in China. Chinese authorities then forcibly sterilized her. Chen filed for asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture, arguing that he suffered persecution when he learned that his wife had been forcibly sterilized. While his removal proceedings were pending, Chen began practicing Falun Gong, a spiritual practice, then supplemented his requests for relief from removal arguing that he feared future persecution because of his Falun Gong activities. Concluding that Chen had not suffered past persecution and lacked a well-founded fear of future persecution, an Immigration Judge denied relief. The Board of Immigration Appeals affirmed. The Seventh Circuit denied an appeal. There was substantial evidence to support a conclusion that Chen had not shown that his Falun Gong practices were likely to attract the attention of the authorities.View "Chen v. Holder" on Justia Law

The Chaudhry family, citizens of Pakistan, lawfully entered the U.S. in 2003, under a business visitor visa. Before the expiration of that status, Chaudhry and his employer Amtal obtained a status change to skilled worker, extending Chaudhry’s lawful nonimmigrant status through January 21, 2005. Amtal filed a Form I-140 petition that sought to designate Chaudhry a multi-national executive or manager; Chaudhry simultaneously submitted Form I-485 for adjustment of status to lawful permanent resident. CIS rejected both applications because Chaudhry no longer worked for Amtal. Supported by his new employer, Sarus, Chaudhry submitted new documents. CIS approved Sarus’s I-140 employment-based visa petition in 2007, but in 2008, rejected Chaudhry’s I-485 adjustment-of-status application because more than 180 days had elapsed between the expiration of lawful nonimmigrant status and the filing of the final adjustment application. The IJ rejected Chaudry’s argument that he remained in lawful status through the date CIS rejected his first and second adjustment applications. The Board acknowledged that “unlawful presence” and “unlawful status” are distinct concepts, but held that the pendency of prior adjustment applications had no bearing on Chaudhry’s nonimmigrant status after it expired. The Seventh Circuit denied an appeal. View "Chaudhry v. Holder" on Justia Law