Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Cornejo’s father came to the U.S. in 1983 and, in 1994, brought his family to this country without admission. At age 18, Cornejo began having trouble with the law, including charges of driving without a license, possession of a controlled substance and paraphernalia, first degree criminal trespass, theft and criminal mischief, and violation of probation. Between 2002 and 2005, Cornejo avoided legal problems, but in 2005 he was charged with domestic battery and criminal damage to property. In 2006 he pled guilty to aggravated unlawful use of a weapon after he brandished a firearm during an argument with a neighbor. During immigration proceedings, Cornejo had four domestic battery charges and was twice arrested for DUI. After his conviction for the weapons violation, DHS initiated removal based on his illegal presence and his conviction for a crime of moral turpitude. During proceedings, Cornejo married a citizen and a petition for an alien relative was filed on his behalf. The IJ determined that Cornejo had not shown that his removal would result in extreme hardship to a qualified relative and that, even if he had made a showing, he did not merit a favorable exercise of discretion. The BIA affirmed. Cornejo moved to reopen based on new evidence of hardship to his U.S.-citizen daughter. The BIA denied the motion. The Seventh Circuit denied review.View "Reyes-Cornejo v. Holder" on Justia Law

Soto entered the U.S. in 1978 as an infant and became a lawful permanent resident in 1991 at age 13. She was convicted of theft in 2002, of passing a worthless check in 2003, and of possessing methamphetamine in 2005, a felony under Kansas law. In 2005, immigration authorities initiated removal on grounds of commission of an aggravated felony, of two crimes involving moral turpitude, and of a controlled substance offense, 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(2)(A)(ii), (a)(2)(A)(iii), and (a)(2)(B)(i). At the time, the circuits were split on whether a drug possession conviction that was a state law felony but that would be a federal misdemeanor should be considered an aggravated felony for purposes of immigration. In 2006 the Seventh Circuit held that such convictions were not aggravated felonies for immigration purposes. Soto claims that an immigration officer and a legal aid organization stated that she had no chance of avoiding removal, so she signed a stipulation with an admission of the factual allegations, waiver of any right to seek relief from removal, and an acknowledgment that she signed voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently. Three weeks after removal, Soto returned to the U.S. illegally to live with her four U.S.‐born children and their U.S.‐citizen father, whom she married in 2009. In 2010 authorities discovered Soto and reinstated the 2005 order of removal using an expedited process. The Board of Immigration Appeals dismissed her appeal, filed from Mexico. The Tenth Circuit ruled that it lacked jurisdiction to review the 2005 order. Soto moved to reopen the 2005 removal order, arguing that the 90‐day deadline did not apply or was equitably tolled. The IJ and BIA rejected her arguments. The Seventh Circuit held that that her illegal reentry after her 2005 removal permanently bars reopening that earlier removal order.View "Cordova-Soto v. Holder" on Justia Law

Salim, an Indonesian citizen of Chinese ethnicity and Christian faith, claims that while living in Indonesia as a teenager, he endured ongoing harassment from Muslim students at nearby public schools because of his Chinese ethnicity. He was robbed for his lunch money several times, and once a student with a knife threatened him and punctured his neck. Salim claims it was difficult for Chinese individuals and Christians to travel safely around Jakarta during intense rioting in 1998. Several Chinese businesses were burned during that time, though his family’s business was not harmed. Salim left Indonesia in 2000 and filed a timely application for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture. An IJ denied requested relief on grounds that Salim failed to show past or future persecution. The Board of Immigration Appeals dismissed appeal of denial of a motion to reopen because Salim offered no new, previously unavailable evidence and relied on case law from outside the circuit. The Seventh Circuit denied a petition for review, finding that Salim’s motion to reopen did not point to any evidence that was previously undiscoverable. View "Salim v. Holder" on Justia Law

Camarena, a Mexican citizen, was admitted to the U.S. for permanent residence in 1977, at age 10. He did not become a citizen. After a felony conviction for indecent solicitation of a minor, his permanent-residence status was revoked, and he was ordered removed. Camarena is homosexual and HIV positive and claims that gays are persecuted in Mexico and that gays infected by HIV face extra risk. Although he is not eligible for asylum, he applied for withholding of removal under 8 U.S.C. 1231(b)(3), and relief under the Convention Against Torture. The immigration judge granted his application, finding, on the basis of statistics and expert testimony that Camarena probably would be killed or injured in Mexico as a result of his sexuality and disease. The BIA remanded; the IJ adhered to his position. The BIA then reversed and, after a remand, adhered to its position. The BIA accepted the IJ’s findings of historical fact but disagreed about the risk implied by those facts. The Seventh Circuit again remanded, for the BIA to consider, not whether aggregate data imply that Camarena is likely to be killed, but whether the IJ clearly erred in finding that he is more likely than not to be persecuted. View "Rosiles-Camarena v. Holder" on Justia Law

Boika, a Belarusian citizen, entered the U.S. legally in 2006, but overstayed. At her removal proceedings, she applied for asylum under 8 U.S.C. 1158, withholding of removal under 8 U.S.C. 1231(b)(3), and relief pursuant to the Convention Against Torture. Her husband, Zhits, made parallel claims, derivative from Boika’s claims based on their marital status, 8 U.S.C. 1158(b)(3)(A). Boika claimed that she could establish a well‐founded fear of future persecution upon return to Belarus, based on past persecution for her political involvement in Belarus, between2004 and 2006. An immigration judge denied her asylum application based on an adverse credibility finding. The Board of Immigration Appeals affirmed. The Seventh Circuit denied review. Boika moved to reopen based on materially changed country conditions, 8 U.S.C. 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii), claiming that after Belarusian President Lukashenko’s election in 2010,the Belarusian government’s severe crackdown on political opposition resulted in widespread human rights abuses. She submitted new corroborating evidence about her activity in the Belarusian opposition movement while she has been in the U.S. The Board denied Boika’s motion. The Seventh Circuit granted their petition and remanded. View "Boika v. Holder" on Justia Law

Pouhova is a Bulgarian citizen who entered the U.S. on a student visa in 1999. She overstayed her visa, married a U.S. citizen and applied for an adjustment of status. She was charged as removeable for assisting an alien trying to enter the U.S. illegally, 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(1)(E)(i). The government produced a written statement from the woman who attempted to use Pouhova’s Bulgarian passport to enter the U.S. in 2000. The document was taken in English, without an interpreter. The government also produced a Department of Homeland Security “record of deportable alien,” a report on that interview, prepared by the same inspector, but more than seven years later. Pouhova was ordered removed and appealed, arguing that she was deprived of her procedural rights because the immigration judge based his decision on the two hearsay documents. The Seventh Circuit vacated and remanded. Although the Federal Rules of Evidence do not apply to removal hearings, the documents are not reliable and should not have been used without giving Pouhova an opportunity to cross-examine the declarant or author. View "Pouhova v. Holder" on Justia Law

Belbachir, an Algerian citizen, 27 years old, entered the U.S. as a visitor in 2004. She overstayed and, in 2005, flew from Chicago to England, where immigration authorities returned her to Chicago. She was placed in the McHenry County Jail, which has a contract with the federal government to house detainees. She planned to seek asylum on the ground that she had a well‐founded fear of being persecuted if returned to Algeria. She committed suicide by strangling herself with her socks about eight days after arriving at the jail. Her estate sued under 42 U.S.C. 1983, arguing that defendants had deprived Belbachir of her life without due process of law, and under Illinois tort law. The district judge granted summary judgment in favor of defendants with respect to the section 1983 claims. The plaintiff appealed only with respect to McHenry County; the county sheriff and the director of the jail; and three employees of Centegra, a private firm, hired to provide medical services at the jail. The Seventh Circuit reversed with respect to one Centegra employee, who was aware of Belbachir’s suicidal thoughts and depressed condition, but failed to take action. The court otherwise affirmed. View "Belbachir v. McHenry Cnty., IL" on Justia Law

Petitioner, using a fake Italian passport, came to the U.S. in 2002, at age 23. Less than a year later, she applied for asylum and withholding of removal, claiming that she feared returning to Albania because, as a young woman living alone, she would be kidnapped and forced into prostitution and that police would not protect her because she is Christian and supports the Democratic party, which was not in power. She claimed that she was harassed by the leader of a Muslim gang and that police had taken no action. An IJ granted asylum, concluding that she belonged to a particular social group comprised of young women targeted by traffickers and that the Albanian government was unwilling or unable to protect such women. The decision was vacated by the BIA. The Seventh Circuit denied review, but on rehearing, en banc, vacated and ruled in favor of petitioner. The BIA erred in determining that her social group was not cognizable under the Act and that internal relocation was a feasible means of avoiding persecution. View "Cece v. Holder" on Justia Law

Papazoglou, a citizen of Greece, entered the U.S. on a visitor’s visa in 1986. In 1987, he married a U.S. citizen, Hariklia, and adjusted his status to lawful permanent resident in 1990. He has four children. In 2008, Papazoglou pled guilty to third-degree sexual assault and physical abuse of a child and was sentenced to 2 ½ years’ imprisonment and 4 ½ years of probation. DHS began removal proceedings, 8 U.S.C.A. 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii). Papazoglou sought adjustment of status based on his marriage, 8 U.S.C. 1255(a), and a waiver of inadmissibility arising from that aggravated felony conviction, 8 U.S.C. 1182(h). The IJ granted the waiver and the adjustment of status. The Board of Immigration Review found Papazoglou statutorily ineligible for waiver and that, even if he were eligible for waiver, he would not be entitled to it as a matter of discretion. The Seventh Circuit denied review, upholding the Boar’s interpretation of the statute as applied to Papazoglou and finding that judicial review of discretionary removal decisions based on commission of an aggravated felony is precluded by the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, 8 U.S.C. 1252(a)(2)(C). View "Papazoglou v. Holder" on Justia Law

Canadian immigration officers refused to allow Margulis to “enter” Canada, but when he attempted to return, U.S. customs officers discovered that he had a criminal record and placed him in removal proceedings under 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(2) even though his crimes had resulted in only 30 days of jail time. A lawful permanent resident is removable if he commits nontrivial crimes in the U.S.; if he leaves the U.S. he cannot be readmitted for at least five years, 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(9), (a)(9)(B). Immigration authorities can waive inadmissibility if the crimes that made the alien deportable are minor, 8 U.S.C. 1182(h) (section 212(h)). Margulis asked that the removal proceedings be terminated and that he be placed in admissibility proceedings. The Board of Immigration Appeals refused, finding that Margulis had never “entered” Canada and so could not have returned to the U.S. The Seventh Circuit remanded, reasoning that immigration officers did not treat Margulis as a lawful entrant, but deemed him already present in the U.S.; if they had thought he was seeking admission they would have placed him in admissibility proceedings rather than removal proceedings. View "Margulis v. Holder" on Justia Law