Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Wojciechowicz came to the U.S. in the 1980s. In 1999 he married a U.S. citizen, with whom he has two children. He became a lawful permanent resident in 2004. Wojciechowicz stole over $100,000 in connection with window installation jobs. He pleaded guilty to state charges in 2011 and was sentenced to two years of probation and restitution. In 2019 Wojciechowicz traveled to Poland for his sister’s funeral. When he attempted to reenter the U.S., Customs officials determined his convictions constituted crimes involving moral turpitude and rendered him inadmissible. 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(I). In removal proceedings, Wojciechowicz unsuccessfully sought a waiver of inadmissibility. An IJ concluded that he had failed to show extreme hardship and that the severity of his prior crimes weighed against waiver as a discretionary matter. The BIA affirmed; the Seventh Circuit dismissed a petition for review for lack of jurisdiction.Days before his removal date, Wojciechowicz received a pardon from Governor Pritzker for his convictions. The BIA stayed his removal but declined to reopen removal proceedings. ICE—in violation of the stay and with no explanation— removed Wojciechowicz to Poland. The Seventh Circuit denied a second petition for review. Under the Immigration and Nationality Act, a pardon does not make an otherwise inadmissible noncitizen admissible, even if a pardon can save a resident noncitizen from being removed. View "Wojciechowicz v. Garland" on Justia Law

After DHS reinstated prior removal orders and initiated another removal proceeding, Mejia sought withholding of removal, 8 U.S.C. 1231(b)(3), and protection under the Convention Against Torture. He claimed that if returned to Mexico, he would face violence from the criminal gang, Union of Tepito. When Mejia initially refused to transport drugs for Tepito, the gang beat him and mocked his religion; police were nearby and ignored the beating but Mejia could not say whether they saw it. Mejia capitulated but, after a few drug deliveries, he relocated to a different area on the outskirts of Mexico City. The gang found him, hit his head with a gun, and threatened to kill him. Mejia fled to the U.S. He testified that he believed he could not relocate within Mexico because he did not know if other gangs were affiliated with Tepito and feared people would discriminate against his Mexico City accent.The IJ found Mejia credible but denied relief, finding that the gang’s prior attacks did not qualify as persecution or torture; Mejia failed to demonstrate future persecution would be likely, that his persecution was tied to membership in a qualifying social group, or that Mexican officials would be unwilling or unable to protect him. The IJ decided that Mejia could avoid the gang by relocating within Mexico. The BIA affirmed. The Seventh Circuit denied a petition for review. Mejia’s counsel had not disputed the relocation finding. View "Mejia v. Garland" on Justia Law

In 1996, Melvin Osorio-Morales’s family member, Jeremias, was dating Argueta, who was also dating a member of the Hernandez family. The men had a shootout; Jeremias was killed. In retaliation, the Osorio family killed Robert Hernandez. The Hernandez family set fire to the Osorio home, burning a grandmother alive. Two uncles escaped with significant burns. Apparently, a criminal case was brought after the fire, but the accused Hernandez family members were subsequently released, setting off a bloody feud. Melvin was born a year later. Melvin never had a violent interaction with the Hernandez family, but had to “watch [his] back” and carry weapons for protection. Melvin testified that one cousin was left paralyzed, three uncles were killed, two cousins committed suicide out of fear of what the Hernandez family would do to them, and another cousin was stabbed to death.Melvin entered the U.S. in 2014. The BIA affirmed the denial of his claims for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture. The Seventh Circuit denied relief. Findings that the Honduran government is not “unable or unwilling” to control the threat from the Hernandez family were supported by substantial evidence. A government’s decision not to prosecute, without more information, does not show an “unwillingness or inability to protect.” View "Osorio-Morales v. Garland" on Justia Law

Petitioner petitioned for a review of the denial of her application for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture (CAT). The immigration judge found that Petitioner was not credible due to her inconsistent and evasive testimony. The Board of Immigration Appeals affirmed.   The Seventh Circuit affirmed, holding that substantial evidence supports the adverse credibility determination. The court explained that the record shows that the immigration judge considered Petitioner’s testimony and evidence, pointed to several material inconsistencies and instances of evasive or untruthful testimony, and determined that Petitioner’s overall testimony lacked credibility. These findings find substantial support in the record. Thus, Petitioner has not met her burden to establish eligibility for asylum. And, because the burdens for securing withholding of removal or protection under the CAT are more stringent, those claims fail as well. View "Meixiang Cui v. Merrick B. Garland" on Justia Law

Arias and her sister, Maria, sold tortillas in El Salvador. Months after their business opened, a note was slipped under their door, demanding they pay $50 per week and enclose a piece of intimate clothing. The note threatened death if the police were contacted. Arias recognized the handwriting as belonging to a former classmate who she knew was a member of the Mara 18 gang. A friend of Arias told Arias that Mara 18 had killed her son because she had filed a police complaint in response to a similar demand. Unable to afford payments and afraid of the gang, the sisters closed the business. Arias illegally entered the U.S. in 2014. Maria remained in El Salvador, in a different home. Maria does not leave the home. Arias’s son only leaves home to attend school; he is driven to and from school to avoid gangs.An IJ denied Arias’s applications for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture. The BIA affirmed, finding that the gang targeted Arias to raise money for its criminal ventures, not for membership in an identified social group; she did not show she would be individually targeted for harm. Arias had not shown a nexus between her fear of future harm and a protected ground. The Seventh Circuit denied a petition for review, finding the denials supported by substantial evidence. Arias failed to establish a well-founded fear of future persecution. View "Arias v. Garland" on Justia Law

Caldera-Torres, a citizen of Mexico in the U.S. without permission, sought cancellation of removal under 8 U.S.C. 1229a(c)(4), 1229b(b)(1). To be eligible for that relief an alien must show that he has not been convicted of a crime of domestic violence. Caldera-Torres has a Wisconsin conviction for battery, arising from an attack on the mother of his daughter. An IJ and the BIA concluded that this conviction makes Caldera-Torres ineligible.The Seventh Circuit denied a petition for review, rejecting Caldera-Torres’s argument that, although Wis. Stat. 940.19(1) qualifies as a federal “crime of violence,” it is not a crime of domestic violence, because the victim’s identity is not an element of the offense. Section 1227(a)(2)(E)(i) does not say or imply that the “protected person” aspect of the definition must be an element of the crime. It is enough that the victim’s status as a “protected person” be established. A “crime of domestic violence” is a generic “crime of violence” plus the victim’s status as a “protected person.” All other circuits that have addressed section 1227(a)(2)(E)(i) recently have held that the victim’s status as a “protected person” need not be an element of the crime of conviction. It is irrelevant how Wisconsin classified Caldera-Torres’s conviction for its own purposes. View "Caldera-Torres v. Garland" on Justia Law

In 2000, Britkovyy, a Ukrainian citizen, entered the U.S. through Mexico and twice stated that he was born in the U.S. The following day, Britkovyy—through an interpreter—explained that he had misunderstood the question and had not claimed citizenship. Britkovyy was paroled (allowed to enter but not “admitted”) and charged as inadmissible for falsely representing himself as a citizen. Britkovyy did not appear; an IJ ordered him removed in absentia. Britkovyy never left the country and married a U.S. citizen. In 2007, Britkovyy’s outstanding immigration was discovered warrant during a traffic stop. His wife petitioned for family-based permanent residency for Britkovyy. He applied to adjust his immigration status with both the immigration court (in re-opened removal proceedings) and with USCIS. The immigration court concluded it lacked jurisdiction; USCIS has exclusive jurisdiction to adjust the status of an “arriving alien,” and Britkovyy was an arriving alien because he was paroled, not admitted. USCIS denied Britkovyy’s application under 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(6)(C)(ii), 1255(a). His removal proceedings remain pending.The immigration statutes do not provide for judicial review of the USCIS denial, so Britkovyy filed suit under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). While his appeal from the dismissal of his suit was pending, the Supreme Court held that 8 U.S.C. 1252(a)(2)(B)(i) strips federal courts of jurisdiction to review facts found as part of discretionary-relief proceedings under section 1255, which governs adjustment of status. The Seventh Circuit concluded it lacked jurisdiction. Section 1252(a)(2)(B)(i) strips courts of jurisdiction to review USCIS’s denial of an adjustment-of-status application. This immigration-specific jurisdiction-stripping statute precludes an APA challenge. View "Britkovyy v. Mayorkas" on Justia Law

Cruz‐Velasco entered the U.S. without inspection in 1999. He has remained continuously present, raising his American‐born sons as a single father after the death of his partner. In 2014, Cruz‐Velasco was convicted of reckless driving, endangering safety, and operating a vehicle while intoxicated, with his nine‐ and 11‐year‐old sons in the car. In subsequent removal proceedings, Cruz‐Velasco sought cancellation of removal, 8 U.S.C. 1229b(b). While in removal proceedings, Cruz‐Velasco was convicted again with DUI and sentenced to serve another 10 days in jail. Cruz‐Velasco stopped drinking after his 2016 arrest and completed a court‐ordered substance abuse program.The IJ held that he was ineligible for cancellation of removal, having failed to establish that his sons would suffer hardship beyond what is predictable as a result of a parent’s removal and because his DUI convictions demonstrated a lack of good moral character. While his BIA appeal was pending, the Attorney General ruled that two or more DUI convictions in the relevant period raise a presumption that a noncitizen lacks good moral character, which cannot be overcome solely by showing rehabilitation. The BIA affirmed the removal order Amid the 2020 COVID‐19 pandemic, Cruz‐Velasco sought to reopen his application, submitting new evidence that he had been diagnosed with diabetes and that this condition increased his risk of dying from COVID‐19 in Mexico. The BIA denied Cruz‐Velasco’s motion, without specifically addressing arguments concerning his diabetes. The Seventh Circuit denied a petition for review. View "Cruz-Velasco v. Garland" on Justia Law

Porosh, a citizen of Bangladesh, claims he joined a political party, Jamaat in 2012, at age 15, and that an opposing party, Awami, called and threatened to kill Porosh; attacked Porosh and broke his hand; and held him against his will for two days. Porosh did not report the first two incidents to the police because he believes Awami controls the government. After he escaped, Porosh tried to report these three incidents. The police allegedly threatened to kill him if he filed a report. Porosh moved to another city but he claims Awami was still looking for him. In 2015, Porosh moved to Malaysia. In 2020, Awami contacted his father, threatening that if they found Porosh, they would kill him. Due to the COVID-19 pandemic, Malaysia announced that everyone with a temporary work permit would be returned to their home country. Porosh went to the United States with what he believed to be a valid work permit. When he presented the permit in Chicago, officers identified it as fake.After an interview, officers determined Porosh had a “credible fear of persecution” based on “political opinion” but an IJ rendered an adverse credibility determination and denied Porosh asylum. The BIA dismissed Porosh’s appeal. The Seventh Circuit denied a petition for review. While some of the IJ’s conclusions lack evidentiary support, on the whole, the decision is supported by findings that have a credible basis in the record. View "Porosh v. Garland" on Justia Law

Zaragoza, a citizen of Mexico and a lawful U.S. permanent resident, pleaded guilty to the Indiana offense of criminal neglect of a dependent after locking her six-year-old son in a closet for six hours. She was sentenced to one year in jail, suspended to time served plus 30 days. After completing her sentence, she traveled abroad. When she returned, DHS found Zaragoza inadmissible based on the neglect conviction, which the agency classified as a “crime involving moral turpitude,” 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(I). An immigration judge entered a removal order. In the meantime, Zaragoza petitioned the state court to modify her sentence, to bring herself within the “petty offense” exception to inadmissibility, which is available to first-time offenders sentenced to six months or less. The state court reduced her sentence to 179 days.The BIA rejected Zaragoza’s arguments, finding that the Indiana offense was categorically a crime involving moral turpitude and that the sentence modification order was not effective to establish Zaragoza’s eligibility for the petty-offense exception. The Board relied on a 2019 Attorney General decision declaring that state-court sentence modification orders are effective for immigration purposes only if based on a legal defect in the underlying criminal proceeding (Thomas). The Seventh Circuit remanded. Applying Thomas in Zaragoza’s case is an impermissibly retroactive application of a new rule. View "Zaragoza v. Garland" on Justia Law