Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Georgieva and her husband Dimitrov, Bulgarian citizens, were admitted to the U.S. in 2002 under the visa waiver program and timely requested asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture. Because of continuances, they did not appear before an immigration judge until 2011. Georgieva described bullying she experienced as a Roma child; not being admitted to college because she was Roma; being tricked by her employer and “forced to have sex with a strange man who paid for her like she was meat;” having the police refuse to act; becoming involved Euroroma, which advocates for Roma rights in Europe; receiving threats from associates of her former boss; being abducted outside the Euroroma office and beaten; and being denied medical attention. Dimitrov testified that Georgieva suffered from pain and headaches as a result of the beating. Both testified that they fear persecution if returned to Bulgaria; their families have left that country. They have American-born sons, aged six and 10. The older son has been diagnosed with autism. The immigration judge noted many discrepancies in the testimony, found that there was not enough corroborating documentary evidence, and ordered the couple removed to Bulgaria. The BIA affirmed. The Seventh Circuit denied a petition for review. View "Georgieva v. Holder" on Justia Law

Haldar, an Indian citizen, came to the U.S. in 1999 and has been a permanent resident since 2006. He founded GVS-Milwaukee, a Hare Krishna religious society and, from 2004 to 2007, GVS sponsored 25 applicants for religious-worker “R-1 visas,” 8 C.F.R. 214.2(r)(1), 17 of which were approved. In 2007 the State Department advised the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) that GVS-Milwaukee might be involved in visa fraud. DHS also received a similar anonymous tip and began an investigation that included temple visits, surveillance, searches of Haldar’s luggage on international trips, and interviews with GVS-sponsored visa recipients. In 2010 Haldar was convicted of conspiracy to defraud the U.S. under 18 U.S.C. 371. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting arguments (not raised in the district court) that certain statements from the prosecutor and a government witness improperly called into question the validity of his temple and were unfairly prejudicial under Federal Rule of Evidence 403; the prosecutor misrepresented testimony during his closing argument and relied on facts outside the record; and the district court on its own initiative should have instructed the jury not to scrutinize the religious qualifications of the visa recipients. View "United States v. Haldar" on Justia Law

Saldana entered the U.S. at age 7, became a lawful permanent resident at 20, but was charged with removability at 34, in 2003, for committing an aggravated felony, 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(2)(A)(ii), and a controlled-substance offense. He argued that mere possession of cocaine was not a drug-trafficking crime, and thus not an aggravated felony under 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43)(B) that would render him ineligible for discretionary relief. The IJ denied his application for cancellation of removal. Saldana did not appeal and was removed to Mexico. The agency precedent on which the IJ relied was overturned three years later by the Supreme Court. By then Saldana had reentered illegally and was again convicted of possessing cocaine. After his 2011 release Saldana was charged with illegal presence in the U.S. after removal, 8 U.S.C. 1326(a), (b)(1), but sought dismissal based on deficiencies in the underlying removal order. The district court denied the motion, finding that he had failed to exhaust administrative remedies; that his lawyer never promised to appeal; that Saldana did not take advantage of remedies available at the time (habeas corpus) and did not justify these failures other than asserting lack of legal knowledge; and that he could not show that removal was fundamentally unfair because he had no due-process right to apply for discretionary relief. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Despite being informed of his rightsl, he did not file an appeal or ask his lawyer to do so, nor did he exhaust available remedies by a motion to reopen. View "United States v. Alegeria-Saldana" on Justia Law

The petitioner uses two names (Tarsem Singh and Simranjit Singh) and has used different birth certificate translations, listing birthdates that differ by as much as four years. He has passports showing both identities and has claimed three different dates of entry. In 1997, Singh was detained by INS. Singh asserts that he then spoke very little English and did not understand the agents. Charging documents indicate that he had counsel, but he claims that that and other information on the documents was incorrect. After his release, Singh’s father created a new identity for him. INS mailed notice of his immigration hearing to his employer’s address, but there is no evidence that Singh ever received it. Singh was ordered deported in absentia. In 2010, the immigration court granted Singh’s motion to reopen. Singh argued that, contrary to the I‐213, he was only 15 in 1997 so that his detention violated INS regulations and his due process rights and that he had been inspected and admitted into the U.S., so that he was eligible for adjustment of status, 8 U.S.C. 1255(a). The IJ ruled that Singh was removable. The BIA agreed, reasoning that even if Singh was 15 when he was detained, he was properly served with notice. INS regulations do not require service in the respondent’s native language, and personal service is effective for minors over age 14. The Seventh Circuit denied review. His claims hinged on establishing that he really was Tarsem and was 15 years old in 1997, which he could not do. Singh also could not establish that he was inspected and admitted when he entered this country.View "Singh v. Holder" on Justia Law

Cabrera entered the U.S. without inspection in 2001. After a 2009 arrest, he applied for withholding of removal under 8 U.S.C. 1231 saying that he feared return to Mexico because of threats and mistreatment by his wife, who holds local office. Cabrera stated that he feared his wife would use political influence to have people cause him harm, including torture at the hands of Mexican law enforcement. He asserted membership in a particular social group: “individuals who face persecution by corrupt governmental and law enforcement authorities instigated by a politically connected spouse” and applied for protection under the Convention Against Torture. The immigration judge found his testimony credible but denied his applications, finding that Cabrera had not proposed a valid social group because he did not identify a shared characteristic aside from persecution and had not shown that he would be harmed based on his membership in that group. The judge concluded that his wife had “a personal vendetta” and that Cabrera could not show a likelihood of torture because he had not been injured and had not shown that his wife ever followed through on her threats. The BIA affirmed. The Seventh Circuit denied review. A “particular social group” must be linked by something more than persecution. Substantial evidence supports a conclusion that his wife tried to hurt Cabrera out of personal animosity. View "Ruiz-Cabrera v. Holder" on Justia Law

Jyotsnaben Patel was admitted to the U.S. in 1992 as a nonimmigrant visitor; her husband, Pravin, entered illegally six months later. They applied for asylum and were charged with removability: Jyotsnaben because she had overstayed her visa, 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(1)(B), and Pravin under 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(6)(A)(I). An immigration judge found them not credible, denied the applications, and granted voluntary departure. The Patels failed to comply, which rendered them inadmissible for 10 years, 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(9)(A). With no brief on file, the BIA dismissed an appeal in 2004 and ordered them to leave within 30 days. Still in the U.S. seven years later, they sought to stay removal for humanitarian reasons. ICE granted their application permitting them to remain for one year. Instead of seeking to adjust status, the Patels moved to reopen the removal proceedings in May 2013, so that they could seek government consent to have the proceedings administratively closed. After that, the Patels believed, they could seek a provisional waiver of inadmissibility on the basis of their citizen-daughter, then travel abroad to apply for a visa to return legally. DHS opposed and the BIA denied the motion, as filed after the 90-day period for motions to reopen. The Seventh Circuit denied a petition for review. View "Patel v. Holder" on Justia Law

While R. was an investigator for Mexico’s Federal Agency of Investigation, he arrested hundreds of suspects and repeatedly testified against drug traffickers. Drug organizations tried to kill him. The Agency repeatedly transferred him, but threats soon resumed. He was wounded twice while on duty and eluded capture several times. Assassins shot at him, missed, and wounded his father. He quit the Agency, opened an office-supply business, and tried to conceal his former job. Strangers continued looking for him. He sought asylum in the U.S., contending that he had been persecuted as a member of the social group of honest police officers. The IJ denied the application. The Board of Immigration Appeals agreed, distinguishing between honest police and effective honest police, reasoning that only if criminal organizations target all honest officers would R. be entitled to asylum, 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(42)(A). The Seventh Circuit vacated. The law calls for assessments of causation and risk. That R. is at more risk than that most “honest police” is a poor reason to disqualify him. The Board did not consider whether Mexico’s more-than-400,000 officers are willing and able to protect former colleagues. Nothing R. can do will erase his employment history. The court questioned why DHS wants to remove R. He appears to have led an exemplary life in the U.S. since entering (lawfully) and applying for asylum. View "R. R. D. v. Holder" on Justia Law

Tian, a 48‐year old Chinese citizen, was admitted to the U.S.in 2001, on a non‐immigrant visa, to participate in an international exchange program. He overstayed and, in 2007, was questioned during an investigation of human trafficking. There were in no charges, but Tian was placed in removal hearings. While the matter was pending, Tian pled guilty to drawing and passing a check with intent to defraud and was ordered to pay $100,000 in restitution; his sentence was suspended. Tian sought asylum, withholding of removal, and Convention Against Torture protection, asserting that, in 1989, he participated in demonstrations and was detained by the police for 10 days, repeatedly assaulted, and undressed and tied to a tree for an entire day. After his release Tian had report to the Public Security Bureau regularly. Tian asserted that he was demoted from being a hotel manager to being a kitchen helper, and that his wife divorced him, because of persecution for his participation in the prodemocracy movement. He claimed that he failed to timely apply for asylum because of “language barriers” and “ignorance of U.S. laws.” Tian did not have documentation of participation in the demonstration, or his detention, or of subsequent medical treatment. The IJ and BIA rejected his claims. The Seventh Circuit dismissed, for lack of jurisdiction, the conclusion that Tian’s asylum application was time‐barred. Because Tian did not exhaust administrative remedies with regard to his CAT claim, the court denied that claim. Tian failed to establish eligibility for withholding of removal.View "Tian v. Holder" on Justia Law

L has lived in the U.S. since 1987 and was a victim of armed kidnapping and sexual assault, in 2006, because of her brother-in-law’s drug dealings. Drugs were subsequently found in her garage and, although she accepted a plea agreement to get probation and remain with her four children (U.S. citizens), she maintains that she was not involved in the drug trade. L applied for a U Visa under the Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act, 114 Stat. 1464 to forestall her impending removal. The decision whether to grant a U Visa to a crime victim who is otherwise ineligible for admission is discretionary and is exercised through USCIS, 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(15)(U). USCIS refused to waive her inadmissibility stemming from her uninspected entry and drug conviction. Facing certain removal, she asked the Immigration Judge to determine independently whether to waive her inadmissibility. The IJ declined and found that USCIS alone had jurisdiction to provide a waiver. The Board of Immigration Appeals affirmed. The Seventh Circuit remanded to the IJ with instructions to consider the waiver request under 8 U.S.C. 1182, noting that ambiguities in the “labyrinthine statutory structure” should be resolved in favor of the alien. View "L. D. G. v. Holder." on Justia Law

Aljabri, born in Jordan, married a U.S. citizen in 1997 and became a lawful permanent resident in 2000. In 2003, he sought naturalization under 8 U.S.C. 1430. USCIS conducted an interview and then delayed for nine years. In 2007 Aljabri was convicted of wire fraud, money laundering, and structuring transactions not to trigger financial institution reporting requirements. He was sentenced to 84 months in prison. In 2008 DHS alleged that Aljabri was removable under 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii), having been convicted of a crime causing victims a loss of more than $10,000. He was ordered removed in absentia. He filed suit, asking the district court either to naturalize him or declare him a U.S. citizen based on the still-pending 2003 application. The district court held that it lacked subject‐matter jurisdiction and dismissed in January, 2012. On May 3, 2012, USCIS denied the naturalization petition, stating that the final order of removal meant that he was no longer a lawful permanent resident and only permanent residents can be naturalized and that Aljabri could not demonstrate the good moral character necessary for naturalization. The Seventh Circuit reversed. The district court overlooked 8 U.S.C. 1447(b), which gives the court exclusive jurisdiction over the naturalization application until the matter is remanded to the agency. View "Aljabri v. Holder" on Justia Law