Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Cano, a citizen of Mexico, entered the U.S. without authorization in 2002. He pled guilty in Wisconsin state court in 2011 to operating a vehicle to flee or elude a police officer. About a year later, the Department of Homeland Security served him with a Notice to Appear and charged him with inadmissibility as a person present without being admitted or paroled and as an alien convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude. Cano conceded removability. He later sought reconsideration of the immigration judge’s determination that he is removable as an alien convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude, and he requested cancellation of removal under 8 U.S.C. 1229b(b). The immigration judge concluded that the Wisconsin conviction was for a crime involving moral turpitude, so Cano was not eligible for cancellation of removal. The Board of Immigration Appeals affirmed. The Seventh Circuit denied review. Citing the statute’s requirement that to be convicted a person must “knowingly” flee or attempt to elude an officer after receiving an officer’s signal, the court found the Board’s determination reasonable. Knowingly fleeing or attempting to elude an officer is an act wrong in itself and therefore a crime involving moral turpitude. View "Cano v. Holder" on Justia Law

Indiana’s Bureau of Motor Vehicles will not register or transfer a vehicle title unless the buyer furnishes a Social Security number. For corporations and similar entities, it requires a federal employer identification number (EIN). It is possible to obtain an EIN without having a Social Security number. Aliens whose visas do not allow them to work in the U.S. and aliens who lack authority to be in the U.S. can get an EIN. Defendants established a business that obtained an EIN, registered a limited liability company, and submitted the required paperwork and fees, using clients’ real names and addresses. Clients paid $350, which included fees for the BMV. Defendants were convicted of conspiracy (8 U.S.C. 1324(a)(1)(A)(v)(I)), to violate 8 U.S.C. 1324(a)(1)(A)(iii) and (iv) by shielding unauthorized aliens from detection and encouraging them to reside in the U.S. and conspiracy to commit mail or wire fraud, 18 U.S.C. 1349. The Seventh Circuit reversed and vacated. The Count One convictions could be sustained only if provision of any service—food, medicine, transportation—to an unauthorized alien is a felony. To convict of mail or wire fraud, the false statements must have deprived a victim of “money or property.” There was no allegation that title papers and licenses are Indiana’s “property.” View "United States v.Reyes" on Justia Law

Esparza testified that he came to the U.S. in 1999 and returned to Mexico from late 2001 to early in 2002; again in late 2002; and finally early in 2008. In 2010 he was stopped for driving without a license, which led to the institution of removal proceedings. He applied for cancellation of removal, claiming that he has been physically present in the U.S. for a continuous period of not less than 10 years, 8 U.S.C. 1229b(b)(1)(A), which requires that the petitioner not have departed the U.S. “for any period in excess of 90 days or for any periods in the aggregate exceeding 180 days.” The petitioner has the burden of proof by a preponderance of the evidence. The dates that he gave would have established that his total time in Mexico since 1999 was only 114 days, with no trip lasting longer than 90 days. The IJ denied cancellation of removal, stating that Esparza “simply cannot recall dates with the necessary specificity.” The Board of Immigration Appeals affirmed. The Seventh Circuit vacated, stating: “It’s difficult to prove a negative” especially concerning dates years in the past, with no documentation. Esparza presented his evidence, which was weak but not nothing, and all the government did was point out weaknesses. “Some evidence would seem to preponderate over no evidence.”View "Lopez-Esparza v. Holder" on Justia Law

A removable alien who has lived in the U.S. for seven years (including five as a permanent resident) is entitled to seek cancellation of removal unless he has committed an “aggravated felony.” 8 U.S.C. 1229b(a)(3). Velasco, a citizen of Mexico who was admitted for permanent residence, became removable after multiple criminal convictions. An immigration judge concluded that one of these convictions was for “sexual abuse of a minor”, which 8 U.S.C.1101(a)(43)(A) classifies as an aggravated felony, and that Velasco was, therefore. ineligible for cancellation of removal. The BIA affirmed, citing the definition of “sexual abuse” in 18 U.S.C. 3509(a)(8) rather than the one in 18 U.S.C. 2243(a). The conviction at issue was under Cal. Penal Code 261.5(c), which makes it a crime to engage in sexual intercourse with a person under the age of 18, if the defendant is at least three years older. Velasco was 18 at the time; the girl was 15. Deferring to the BIA, the Seventh Circuit affirmed.View "Velasco-Giron v. Holder" on Justia Law

DHS initiated removal proceedings, charging Antia with removability under 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(6)(A)(i) as an alien present without being admitted or paroled and alleging that Antia had been convicted of “indecent liberties with a child,” a crime of moral turpitude, 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(I). The Form I‐213, a “Record of Deportable/Inadmissible Alien” prepared by DHS “typically a record of an immigration inspector’s conversation with an alien who will probably be subject to removal,” stated that Antia “voluntarily admitted” that he was not a citizen or U.S. national and was a citizen of Columbia. Chicago Police Department rap sheets indicated that Antia was born in Puerto Rico. Antia retained counsel and, before an IJ, declined to admit or deny the allegations against him or to designate Colombia as the country of removal. The IJ scheduled a contested hearing, but denied Antia’s request for subpoenas for the makers of “all Government documents that are coming in.” As the only witness, Antia refused to answer questions. Antia’s counsel reiterated his request to subpoena the preparers of the documents. The IJ again denied the request as overly broad; denied a request to cross‐examine the preparer of the I‐213; and rejected Antia’s challenge to the government’s failure to produce any other witnesses. The BIA affirmed. The Seventh Circuit denied a petition for review, finding none of the challenged rulings erroneous. View "Antia-Perea v. Holder" on Justia Law

Jeudy entered the U.S. from Haiti in 1980 without inspection. He became a lawful permanent resident in 1989. In 2009, the government charged him as removable based on his 1995 guilty plea to attempted possession of crack cocaine, 8 U.S.C. 1251(a)(2)(B)(i). An alien found to be deportable at that time could be eligible for discretionary relief. Among other requirements, an alien had to accrue a certain period of continuous presence or residence in the U.S. While conviction rendered him deportable, he continued to accrue time toward a period of continuous residence. In 1996, he reached the required seven years under 8 U.S.C. 1182(c). In 1997, the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act added the “stop-time rule,” which cuts off the accrual of time toward those years of continuous residence upon service of notice to appear or commission of certain offenses, 8 U.S.C. 1229b(d)(1). Jeudy has no family in Haiti, and has three children who are American citizens. The immigration judge found that the stop-time rule applied retroactively to cut off Jeudy’s period of continuous residence in 1995. The Board of Immigration Appeals affirmed. The Seventh Circuit granted Jeudy’s petition for review. The stop-time rule does not convey a clear intent to govern retroactively, and the stop-time rule would have an impermissible retroactive effect if it were applied to Jeudy’s 1995 drug offense.View "Jeudy v. Holder" on Justia Law

Khan is a Mohajir: his parents were immigrants into Pakistan when it was partitioned from the British Indian Empire in 1947. Some Mohajirs formed a political party—the Mohajir Qaumi Movement—in response to perceived repression by nonimmigrant locals. Khan joined in 1992 when he was 14 or 15 years old. He distributed flyers, attended meetings, and recruited people to the cause. The group became increasingly violent, however, and many Mohajirs, including Khan, left to join a new, supposedly more peaceful group, MQM-Haqiqi. But this party too resorted to violence, so Khan eventually left. Khan became a target and was repeatedly attacked, kidnapped, and tortured by members of the first party. He fled to the U.S. on a visitor visa, and when it expired, sought asylum and other forms of relief from removal. While his case was pending, he married a U.S. citizen, making him eligible for permanent residency through his marriage. An immigration judge accepted the government’s position, rejecting Khan under the “terrorism bar,” 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(3)(B)(i)(I); the BIA affirmed. The Seventh Circuit denied review, declining to interpret the “knowledge exception” to the terrorism bar because Khan did not raise it before the BIA.View "Khan v. Holder" on Justia Law

Ramirez, a citizen of Guatemala, was admitted to the U.S. as a permanent resident in 1977, then seven years old. He has remained in the U.S. After three years of high school, he joined the Marine Corps. He later obtained his GED, attended community college, and received certification to become an optical technician. He has been consistently employed as an adult. He lives with his fiancé, who suffers from lupus and Sjögren’s syndrome and is unable to work, and their son, born in 2003. Ramirez’s mother, siblings, grandmother, and uncles live in the U.S. In 1990 he: was convicted of inflicting corporal injury upon a spouse or cohabitant and sentenced to 79 days in jail; received a bad conduct discharge from the military for writing bad checks and was sentenced to 90 days’ incarceration; and pled guilty to committing a lewd and lascivious act with a child under the age of 14, received a sentence of six years’ imprisonment and relinquished parental rights to his daughter, the victim’s half-sister. Ramirez was last convicted in 1990. He has, however, been questioned or arrested multiple times since then. An immigration judge found Ramirez “credible” at a hearing requesting discretionary relief from removal, but relied on uncorroborated arrest reports to find that Ramirez failed to show “rehabilitation.” The BIA affirmed. The Seventh Circuit granted a petition for review, stating that the BIA erred by failing to follow its own binding precedent.View "Avila-Ramirez v. Holder" on Justia Law

Petitioner, a citizen and native of Mexico, appealed the BIA's affirmance of the IJ's denial of his application for cancellation of removal. The court held that the courts of appeal lack jurisdiction to review the denial of discretionary relief in immigration proceedings. The court adhered to the rule that 8 U.S.C. 1252(a)(2)(B) excludes from the court's jurisdiction challenges to an IJ's application of the law to the facts of a case when the grounds for relief sought are discretionary, and that in such a case the subpart (B) exclusion is unaffected by section 1252(a)(2)(D). In this case, the court dismissed the petition for review to the extent that the court lacked jurisdiction and the court denied the remaining arguments. View "Adame v. Holder, Jr." on Justia Law

Albu, a Romanian citizen, applied for asylum in 2003. His application would have been deficient in a number of ways, but at the prompting of his attorney (who was subsequently convicted of asylum fraud) he engaged in deception, lying about religious persecution, his date of entry, and his home address. When his lies came to light, he was subject to 8 U.S.C. 1158(d)(6), which makes any person who files a frivolous asylum application permanently ineligible for any immigration benefits. He was placed in removal proceedings. Both the Immigration Judge and Board of Immigration Appeals applied the statutory bar and denied him cancellation of removal. The Seventh Circuit denied an appeal. View "Albu v. Holder" on Justia Law