Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Souley, a citizen of Niger, entered the U.S. in 2005 on a visitor’s visa and overstayed. Apparently unaware of a 2008 removal order, Souley married a U.S. citizen in 2009. After his removal was reopened, Souley’s wife’s I-130 petition was denied for lack of clear and convincing evidence that the marriage was bona fide and entered into in good faith, 8 U.S.C. 1154(g), 1255(e). Souley sought to continue his removal proceedings to give his U.S. citizen wife time to file a second I-130 visa petition on his behalf. The IJ thought her second, unfiled petition had no greater chance of success and denied the request for a continuance, noting that Souley’s wife had failed to appeal that decision or introduce any new evidence to support the existence of a valid marriage. The Board upheld the IJ’s ruling, The Seventh Circuit denied review. Souley had over a year and a half to gather additional documents to support a second I-130 petition, yet he failed to do so. Souley never explained what documents he would present if the IJ had given him more time. View "Souley v. Holder" on Justia Law

Bouras, a citizen of Algeria, entered the U.S. in 1997 as a nonimmigrant business visitor and overstayed his visa. In 2006, while living in Chicago, he married Schreiner, who lived in Ohio. He was granted conditional permanent resident status based on his marriage to a U.S. citizen. For most of their two-and-a-half year marriage, Bouras continued working in Chicago; Schreiner remained in Ohio. For at least six months, Bouras was in Algeria alone, visiting family. The marriage ended by divorce before Bouras had obtained unconditional permanent residency. He was placed in removal proceedings after he failed to convince USCIS that he had entered the marriage in good faith, 8 U.S.C. 1186a(c)(4)(B). Bouras testified, but neither his ex-wife nor any other witness appeared at the hearing to testify about the marriage. Bouras sought a continuance so that his ex-wife could testify. The immigration judge denied that request, stating that no “extenuating circumstances” justified a continuance and finding that Bouras had not established the marriage had been in good faith. The Board of Immigration Appeals upheld that decision. The Seventh Circuit denied review; denial of Bouras’s last-minute request for a continuance was not an abuse of discretion. View "Bouras v. Holder" on Justia Law

Keirkhavash did not depart when her tourist visa lapsed. Two days before the statutory deadline, she sought asylum, contending that Iran would persecute her because she had supported a group (MEK) seeking overthrow of Iran’s government. She claimed she had been expelled from college, denied employment, imprisoned, kicked and denied food while confined, leading her to flee Iran in 1999. The IJ credited this testimony but denied the application because the State Department had classified MEK as a terrorist organization, which made Keirkhavash ineligible under 8 U.S.C. 1158(b)(2)(A)(v). The Board of Immigration Appeals remanded, concluding that she remained eligible for relief under the Convention Against Torture. Before the new hearing, Keirkhavash changed her story, claiming that some unknown person had forged her signature and that she and her father had given testimony consistent with the written statement because her lawyer told them to lie. She now claims that her former husband had accused her of adultery, which could lead to her being stoned in Iran and that Iran would persecute her because of her statement that she had supported MEK, despite the statement’s withdrawal. No corroboration was offered for either ground. The BIA and Seventh Circuit upheld denial of her petitions, characterizing Keirkhavash and her father as confessed liars. View "Keirkhavash v. Holder" on Justia Law

Sibanda arrived in the U.S. on a non‐immigrant visa. She sought asylum in 2009, claiming that, after her husband died, her brother‐in‐law attempted to rape her and force her to become his second wife, in accordance with the custom of “bride‐price” practiced by several tribes. Sibanda testified that Zimbabwean law did not protect her; when she sought help from the police, they told her that they would not intervene in a family matter. Her family and her tribal chief insisted that she was bound by the custom. The IJ denied relief, finding that Sibanda credibly had testified that a bride‐price had been paid for her marriage. He did not address the credibility of her testimony about her duties to and attacks by her brother-in-law, but concluded that Sibanda’s failure adequately to corroborate her testimony meant that she had not demonstrated past persecution. She had not presented a country report or “any statements from any authority or anyone else who was aware” of the attacks. The Board of Immigration Appeals also found her account credible, but dismissed her appeal for insufficient corroboration. The Seventh Circuit remanded; the Board did not adequately consider whether more corroborating information was reasonably available to Sibanda. View "Sibanda v. Holder" on Justia Law

A citizen of Mexico, Duarte entered the U.S. without inspection in 2000. In 2011, after he was acquitted of heroin trafficking, DHS issued a Notice to Appear. Duarte did not appear. A removal order issued. Duarte claimed he was unaware of the notice. The IJ reopened proceedings. Duarte applied for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture, claiming that he had cooperated with the U.S. DEA and feared retribution from the Zeta drug cartel. At the hearing, Duarte denied the DEA story, but claimed that the threats stemmed from his escape, after the cartel held him for ransom in 1996. Duarte submitted an affidavit from a friend in Mexico about phone calls from suspected cartel members warning that Duarte would face retribution. The IJ denied asylum and withholding of removal. Duarte on appeal that he was targeted for persecution because of his “membership in the particular group of successful business[men],” under extortionate attacks by cartels. The BIA held that Duarte failed to preserve the issue, but considered testimony and determined that the cartel detained him for money rather than to persecute him on any basis recognized by law. Duarte did not submit evidence to suggest torture at the hands (or with the acquiescence) of government actors. The Seventh Circuit denied review. View "Duarte-Salagoza v. Holder" on Justia Law

Cano, a citizen of Mexico, entered the U.S. without authorization in 2002. He pled guilty in Wisconsin state court in 2011 to operating a vehicle to flee or elude a police officer. About a year later, the Department of Homeland Security served him with a Notice to Appear and charged him with inadmissibility as a person present without being admitted or paroled and as an alien convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude. Cano conceded removability. He later sought reconsideration of the immigration judge’s determination that he is removable as an alien convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude, and he requested cancellation of removal under 8 U.S.C. 1229b(b). The immigration judge concluded that the Wisconsin conviction was for a crime involving moral turpitude, so Cano was not eligible for cancellation of removal. The Board of Immigration Appeals affirmed. The Seventh Circuit denied review. Citing the statute’s requirement that to be convicted a person must “knowingly” flee or attempt to elude an officer after receiving an officer’s signal, the court found the Board’s determination reasonable. Knowingly fleeing or attempting to elude an officer is an act wrong in itself and therefore a crime involving moral turpitude. View "Cano v. Holder" on Justia Law

Indiana’s Bureau of Motor Vehicles will not register or transfer a vehicle title unless the buyer furnishes a Social Security number. For corporations and similar entities, it requires a federal employer identification number (EIN). It is possible to obtain an EIN without having a Social Security number. Aliens whose visas do not allow them to work in the U.S. and aliens who lack authority to be in the U.S. can get an EIN. Defendants established a business that obtained an EIN, registered a limited liability company, and submitted the required paperwork and fees, using clients’ real names and addresses. Clients paid $350, which included fees for the BMV. Defendants were convicted of conspiracy (8 U.S.C. 1324(a)(1)(A)(v)(I)), to violate 8 U.S.C. 1324(a)(1)(A)(iii) and (iv) by shielding unauthorized aliens from detection and encouraging them to reside in the U.S. and conspiracy to commit mail or wire fraud, 18 U.S.C. 1349. The Seventh Circuit reversed and vacated. The Count One convictions could be sustained only if provision of any service—food, medicine, transportation—to an unauthorized alien is a felony. To convict of mail or wire fraud, the false statements must have deprived a victim of “money or property.” There was no allegation that title papers and licenses are Indiana’s “property.” View "United States v.Reyes" on Justia Law

Esparza testified that he came to the U.S. in 1999 and returned to Mexico from late 2001 to early in 2002; again in late 2002; and finally early in 2008. In 2010 he was stopped for driving without a license, which led to the institution of removal proceedings. He applied for cancellation of removal, claiming that he has been physically present in the U.S. for a continuous period of not less than 10 years, 8 U.S.C. 1229b(b)(1)(A), which requires that the petitioner not have departed the U.S. “for any period in excess of 90 days or for any periods in the aggregate exceeding 180 days.” The petitioner has the burden of proof by a preponderance of the evidence. The dates that he gave would have established that his total time in Mexico since 1999 was only 114 days, with no trip lasting longer than 90 days. The IJ denied cancellation of removal, stating that Esparza “simply cannot recall dates with the necessary specificity.” The Board of Immigration Appeals affirmed. The Seventh Circuit vacated, stating: “It’s difficult to prove a negative” especially concerning dates years in the past, with no documentation. Esparza presented his evidence, which was weak but not nothing, and all the government did was point out weaknesses. “Some evidence would seem to preponderate over no evidence.”View "Lopez-Esparza v. Holder" on Justia Law

A removable alien who has lived in the U.S. for seven years (including five as a permanent resident) is entitled to seek cancellation of removal unless he has committed an “aggravated felony.” 8 U.S.C. 1229b(a)(3). Velasco, a citizen of Mexico who was admitted for permanent residence, became removable after multiple criminal convictions. An immigration judge concluded that one of these convictions was for “sexual abuse of a minor”, which 8 U.S.C.1101(a)(43)(A) classifies as an aggravated felony, and that Velasco was, therefore. ineligible for cancellation of removal. The BIA affirmed, citing the definition of “sexual abuse” in 18 U.S.C. 3509(a)(8) rather than the one in 18 U.S.C. 2243(a). The conviction at issue was under Cal. Penal Code 261.5(c), which makes it a crime to engage in sexual intercourse with a person under the age of 18, if the defendant is at least three years older. Velasco was 18 at the time; the girl was 15. Deferring to the BIA, the Seventh Circuit affirmed.View "Velasco-Giron v. Holder" on Justia Law

DHS initiated removal proceedings, charging Antia with removability under 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(6)(A)(i) as an alien present without being admitted or paroled and alleging that Antia had been convicted of “indecent liberties with a child,” a crime of moral turpitude, 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(I). The Form I‐213, a “Record of Deportable/Inadmissible Alien” prepared by DHS “typically a record of an immigration inspector’s conversation with an alien who will probably be subject to removal,” stated that Antia “voluntarily admitted” that he was not a citizen or U.S. national and was a citizen of Columbia. Chicago Police Department rap sheets indicated that Antia was born in Puerto Rico. Antia retained counsel and, before an IJ, declined to admit or deny the allegations against him or to designate Colombia as the country of removal. The IJ scheduled a contested hearing, but denied Antia’s request for subpoenas for the makers of “all Government documents that are coming in.” As the only witness, Antia refused to answer questions. Antia’s counsel reiterated his request to subpoena the preparers of the documents. The IJ again denied the request as overly broad; denied a request to cross‐examine the preparer of the I‐213; and rejected Antia’s challenge to the government’s failure to produce any other witnesses. The BIA affirmed. The Seventh Circuit denied a petition for review, finding none of the challenged rulings erroneous. View "Antia-Perea v. Holder" on Justia Law