Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Isunza came to the U.S. from Mexico at age 17 in 1978. His parents were lawfully present in the U.S., but Isunza became a permanent resident through the sponsorship of his wife in 1994. In 1998, he was found guilty of possession of 0.1 grams of cocaine and placed on probation. He successfully renewed his permanent resident card in 2000 and traveled to Mexico without incident in 2000, 2001, 2006, and 2011. When he returned to Chicago from Mexico in 2011, authorities confiscated his permanent resident card. DHS alleged that Isunza was subject to removal as an alien convicted of a controlled substance offense, 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(II). Isunza argued that his continuous residency in the U.S. after re-entering in 2000 made him eligible for cancellation of removal, 8 U.S.C. 1229b(a). The IJ found him ineligible because the clock for accruing time toward continuous residency stopped when Isunza was convicted in 1998; his subsequent departures from and returns to the U.S. did not start the clock again. The BIA dismissed his appeal. The Seventh Circuit denied an appeal, without considering a new argument that his admission into the U.S. as a minor should count toward his continuous residency. The BIA reasonably interpreted the statute and refused to consider that argument. View "Isunza v. Lynch" on Justia Law

Chen was born in China, in 1976. In 2004, Chen married Feng and they had a daughter. In 2005, the Chinese government appropriated Chen’s farmland, to build an industrial park. Chen was allowed to keep his house and received compensation, which Chen believed was inadequate. Chen and other farmers protested. Chen was held at the police station for four days. He claims the police repeatedly interrogated, threatened, and beat him. The police told Feng that Chen was in jail with dangerous criminals and would be released if she signed the land‐transfer agreement. She signed and paid a release fee. Chen obtained a visa, stating that he was a manager who wanted to learn about American technology. Feng remained in China; she told Chen that he had been threatened with incarceration and sterilization if he returned. Chen stayed in the U.S. beyond his authorization date, then sought asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture. DHS commenced removal proceedings under 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(1)(B). The IJ denied all relief, finding Chen’s testimony credible, but not detailed or persuasive enough without corroboration to meet his burden of proof. Alternatively, the IJ ruled that Chen did not meet the statutory definition of a “refugee,” 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(42)(A). The BIA affirmed. The Seventh Circuit denied Chen’s petition for review, finding the denial of relief supported by substantial evidence. View "Chen v. Lynch" on Justia Law

Estrada fled Honduras in 1994 after police there detained and tortured him. An immigration judge granted Estrada relief from removal, finding that he will more likely than not face torture if he is removed to Honduras. The Board of Immigration Appeals reversed, finding Estrada not eligible for withholding of removal because he was convicted in an Illinois state court of statutory rape in 1996, a crime the Board deemed “particularly serious.” The Seventh Circuit remanded, finding that the BIA applied the wrong standard of review. While Estrada may be ineligible for "withholding of removal," under the Immigration Act, 8 U.S.C. 1231(b)(3)(A), or the Convention Against Torture, he may be eligible for “deferral of removal” under only the Convention. The immigration judge found it more likely than not that Estrada will be tortured if he is removed to Honduras. The Board was required to review that factual finding only for clear error, not de novo. View "Estrada-Martinez v. Lynch" on Justia Law

Mendoza-Sanchez entered the U.S. at age 18, in 1983, and became a lawful permanent resident. He sold cocaine obtained from members of the violent La Linea cartel, known to work with corrupt Mexican police officers. In 2010 he was sentenced to 12 years in prison. A fellow prisoner who was a member of La Linea attacked him in the prison cafeteria, broke his teeth, and stated that members of the cartel, who had been arrested, believed that he had snitched and that the cartel would have him killed if he returned to Mexico. At his immigration hearing, Mendoza-Sanchez presented evidence that La Linea’s reach is nationwide and that the “law enforcement agencies are infiltrated by the Cartels.” He sought deferral of removal under the Convention Against Torture. The immigration judge described Mendoza as “a credible witness,” but concluded that he did not establish eligibility for deferral of removal. The Board of Immigration Appeals affirmed, based on Mendoza-Sanchez’s not having “presented sufficient evidence to establish that … a Mexican public official would acquiesce (or be willfully blind) to such harm.” The Seventh Circuit remanded, stating that a petitioner for deferral of removal under the CAT need not prove that the government is complicit in the misconduct of its police officers. View "Mendoza-Sanchez v. Lynch" on Justia Law

Vivas-Ceja, a citizen of Mexico, was removed from the U.S. on three occasions. In 2013, he was arrested at an airport in Madison, Wisconsin, for illegally reentering the country. He pleaded guilty to illegal reentry after removal, 8 U.S.C. 1326. The maximum sentence for a defendant with a prior conviction for an aggravated felony can be up to 20 years. The definition of “aggravated felony” is supplied by the definition of “crime of violence” in 18 U.S.C. 16(b), which includes “any … offense that is a felony and that, by its nature, involves a substantial risk that physical force against the person or property of another may be used in the course of committing the offense.” The district court concluded that Vivas-Ceja’s Wisconsin conviction for fleeing an officer was a crime of violence, and imposed a sentence of 21 months. The Seventh Circuit vacated, finding section 16(b)’s definition of “crime of violence” unconstitutionally vague in light of the 2015 decision, Johnson v. United States. In Johnson the Supreme Court found the “residual clause” of the Armed Career Criminal Act, 18 U.S.C. 924(e)(2)(B)(ii), unconstitutionally vague. Section 16(b) is materially indistinguishable from the ACCA’s residual clause. View "United States v. Vivas-Ceja" on Justia Law

Rodriguez-Molinero, a Mexican citizen, has lived in the U.S. for many years as a lawful permanent resident. His involvement in the methamphetamine trade led to his conviction of federal drug crimes and a prison sentence that he has served. He remains in the custody of the Department of Homeland Security, and as an alien convicted of an aggravated felony consisting of trafficking in controlled substances, is subject to removal, 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii), 1101(a)(43)(B). He sought CAT deferral of removal on the ground that should he be sent back to Mexico he is highly likely to be tortured by the Zetas Mexican drug cartel. Longmire, his expert witness, stated in a report credited by the immigration judge that in 2012 the Zetas killed 49 people and dumped their bodies on a highway. In 2006, Rodriguez-Molinero was tortured by Mexican police, who burned him with cigarettes, beat him, and stabbed him with an ice pick at the behest of the cartel. He owes the gang about $30,000. Members of the Zetas kidnapped and murdered his great-uncle after asking for information about Rodriguez-Molinero. The Seventh Circuit reversed the immigration judge’s ruling that he had failed to show that he faced a substantial risk of torture were he to be removed to Mexico, or that the Mexican government would acquiesce in the torture. View "Rodriguez-Molinero v. Lynch" on Justia Law

Chinese farmworker Wang married in 1988. His wife gave birth to a daughter. Government officials required his wife to have an intrauterine device implanted. Five years later the IUD “fell off,” and she got pregnant. Officials forced her to abort the pregnancy. In 2000, they had another child, a son. Months later, officials went to their house and threatened to sterilize either Wang or his wife. Wang protested; the officials pushed him to the floor, kicked him, and beat him with batons. They forced his wife to have a contraceptive, “Norplant,” surgically inserted into her arm. His wife became ill and they had no more children. Nine years later Wang entered the U.S. on a business visitor’s visa, procured from a snakehead. More than a year after his entry, he sought asylum and withholding of removal, contending that he had been persecuted for resisting official demands to sterilize him or his wife. An IJ found that Wang did not testify credibly. The Seventh Circuit reversed and remanded the denial of relief; the IJ misunderstood Wang’s testimony about the procedure his wife received and erred by concluding that Wang could not show past persecution because he resisted only his wife’s forced contraceptive implant as opposed to forced abortion or sterilization. View "Wang v. Lynch" on Justia Law

Darinchuluun, a citizen of Mongolia, has a wife and son in Mongolia. He worked for a railroad that was a joint venture between Russia and Mongolia. In 2004 Darinchuluun discovered guns and ammunition in a box that was supposed to contain coal. He claims that he was threatened, but reported to his supervisor ,and was subsequently attacked and beaten. In 2006 Darinchuluun reported the illegal shipments to the Russian director of the railroad, Darinchuluun claims that he was again attacked and that the director was murdered. He applied for a visa to the United States, stating that he wanted to purchase software. He entered the U.S. in February 2010. In April 2010, Darinchuluun was stabbed by another Mongolian national during an altercation in a bar. Darinchuluun statedthat he had “no doubt” that the man who stabbed him was hired by those who had tried to hurt him in Mongolia. The police report indicated that Darinchuluun knew the assailant and that the incident was prompted by an argument about who had the superior immigration status. Before expiration of his visa, Darinchuluun applied for asylum. His application was denied. The Seventh Circuit denied a petition for review. Darinchuluun did not provide evidence that corroborated the key elements of his claim. View "Darinchuluun v. Lynch" on Justia Law

H-1B visas allow U.S. companies to hire noncitizen workers with specialized skills. The United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS), an agency within the Department of Homeland Security, is responsible for their issuance. Rubman sent USCIS a request under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA, 5 U.S.C. 552) seeking “copies of all documents reflecting statistics … about H-1B visa applications” from the last four years. USCIS responded with a single document: a data table that the agency had created to respond to his request. Rubman doubted the table’s accuracy and insisted that USCIS provide the documents he originally asked for: “‘ALL documents reflecting statistics’” about H-1B visa applications, including internal statistical reports and e-mails. CIS refused, insisting that additional records would not be helpful and would “only create additional confusion.” Rubman sued. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of USCIS. The Seventh Circuit reversed. An adequate search is one that was both performed in good faith and reasonably designed to uncover the requested records. USCIS failed to conduct an adequate search as required by law when it unilaterally narrowed Rubman’s request for “all documents” to a single, newly generated statistical table. View "Rubman v. United States Citizenship & Immigration Servs." on Justia Law

Zuniga entered the U.S. unlawfully from Mexico in 1989. In 1991, he was convicted of aggravated criminal sexual abuse. Zuniga, 30 years old, was in a consensual relationship with a 15-year-old girl. Illinois law criminalizes “sexual conduct with a victim who is at least 13 years of age but under 17 years of age [if] the person is at least 5 years older than the victim.” He and the girl maintained their relationship and had four children together. After his conviction, Zuniga was deported. He returned, again unlawfully, and remained, without incident until 2007, when he was arrested following an altercation with his eldest child. In 2013, Zuniga pleaded guilty to illegal reentry, 8 U.S.C. 1326(a). According to the plea agreement, Zuniga would receive two criminal-history points and a 16-level upward adjustment because he was previously deported after a “crime of violence” and a 3-level reduction for acceptance of responsibility. With a guidelines range of 41 to 51 months, the court sentenced him to 41 months. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting an argument that the categorical approach requires a narrower understanding of the generic definitions of “sexual abuse of a minor” and “statutory rape,” two crimes of violence enumerated under the guidelines, and that the 16-level increase overstated the seriousness of the conviction. View "United States v. Zuniga-Galeana" on Justia Law