Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Dominguez-Pulido unlawfully entered the U.S with his parents around 1993. Approximately 15 years later, Dominguez-Pulido was convicted of burglary, a felony offense under Illinois law. An Immigration Judge concluded that he was removable as an alien present without admission and denied various forms of relief from removal. The Board of Immigration Appeals dismissed his appeal. The Seventh Circuit upheld the denials, citing 8 U.S.C. 1252(a)(2)(C), which limits judicial review of final orders for removal that involve a conviction for a crime involving moral turpitude. The court rejected claims that the “moral turpitude” clause was void for vagueness; that Dominguez-Pulido’s fear of persecution bears a nexus to his membership in a particular social group— individuals deported from the U.S. who have or who are perceived to have money, and who have family members in the U.S. who could pay ransom; and that his removal would violate the Eighth Amendment. View "Dominguez-Pulido v. Lynch" on Justia Law

Arrazabal , a Salvadoran, entered the U.S. in 1995 at age 19, and became a lawful permanent resident alien because his mother and sister were naturalized citizens. He became involved with the Los Angeles chapter of the MS-13 gang, which has members in El Salvador. He was imprisoned for illegal gun possession and, later, for possessing cocaine. In prison he obtained prominent MS-13 tattoos. In 2001 Arrazabal’s status was revoked. His application for asylum was denied; he was removed. Years later, Arrazabal attempted to reenter illegally and was charged under 8 U.S.C. 1326. He again sought asylum, claiming that he feared he would be killed if returned to El Salvador because he wanted to quit MS-13, but his tattoos made him a target. The officer found that Arrazabal had shown reasonable probability that he had been tortured in El Salvador and that these police beatings created a reasonable possibility that he would be tortured if returned. Because his 2001 removal order made him ineligible for asylum, Arrazabal applied for withholding of removal and CAT protection, which were denied for lack of credibility. The judge did not believe that Arrazabal had refrained from criminal activity while active in MS-13, that he had been framed by U.S. police officers twice, that the IJ who ordered him removed was racist, that he suffered abuse by Salvadoran police, or that he had received death threats from fellow gang members. The BIA affirmed. The Seventh Circuit vacated, finding that the IJ overlooked key evidence. View "Arrazabal v. Lynch" on Justia Law

Karroumeh, a citizen of Jordan then married to a Jordanian woman with whom he had two children, was admitted to the U.S. as a visitor in 1996. Within months, he obtained a proxy divorce and married Wright, a U.S. citizen who also had children. Wright filed a Form I-130, Petition for Alien Relative in conjunction with a Form I-485, Application to Register Permanent Residence or Adjust Status. Both were conditionally granted in 1998. In 2000, they successfully petitioned to remove the conditions from Karroumeh’s lawful permanent resident status, 8 U.S.C. 1186a(c)(1)(A). In 2001, Karroumeh filed his first application for naturalization During an interview, Karroumeh revealed that he and Wright were divorcing. Karroumeh withdrew his application. His divorce was finalized. In 2003 and 2006, Karroumeh filed two more applications for naturalization. In 2008, USCIS began to investigate Karroumeh for immigration fraud and obtained a sworn statement from Wright, including multiple contradictions. USCIS denied Karroumeh’s application. DHS commenced removal proceedings under 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(1)(A). The Seventh Circuit remanded the order of removal, finding that Karroumeh was prejudiced by his inability to cross-examine Wright, a key government witness whose evidence was presented through a written statement. View "Karroumeh v. Lynch" on Justia Law

Hernandez and his mother entered the U.S. unlawfully when he was a small child. They adjusted their status to that of lawful permanent residents in 1989, when Hernandez was seven. His mother became a naturalized citizen when he was 16, but her naturalization did not confer citizenship on him automatically. Both of his parents would have had to naturalize before he turned 18, or they would have had to legally separate. Neither happened. Over the next 15 years, Hernandez was convicted for three controlled-substance violations, two retail thefts, and as a felon-in-possession of a firearm. In 2015 the government instituted removal proceedings based on his criminal history, under 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(2)(B)(i); (A)(iii); (C); and (A)(ii), At his hearing, the IJ informed Hernandez of his right to representation and asked whether he wanted a continuance. Hernandez did not respond, but explained that he thought he was a citizen. The IJ determined that Hernandez never obtained citizenship and asked Hernandez whether he feared being harmed if he were returned to Mexico, offering to continue the case to allow him to apply for asylum. Hernandez again declined. After the IJ entered an order of removal, Hernandez obtained counsel. The BIA affirmed. The Seventh Circuit denied his petition for review, rejecting an argument that Hernandez was denied representation by counsel. View "Estrada-Hernandez v. Lynch" on Justia Law

Zyapkov, a Bulgarian citizen, entered the U.S. in 2002 with a visitor’s visa. His daughter had entered two years earlier and eventually obtained citizenship through the “diversity lottery,” 8 U.S.C. 1153(c). Three months after Zyapkov’s arrival, he married Gregory, a U.S. citizen. Gregory and, later, Zyapkov’s daughter filed Form I‐130 “immediate relative” petitions on his behalf. Gregory’s petition was pending in 2008 when DHS initiated removal proceedings accusing Zyapkov of overstaying his visa and working as a truck driver without authorization. USCIS denied Gregory’s petition based on a conclusion that the marriage to was a sham. Zyapkov unsuccessfully sought a continuance. The finding of marriage fraud would make Zyapkov inadmissible, 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(6)(C)(i), and ineligible for permanent residency regardless of his daughter’s pending petition. The Board dismissed his appeal of the removal order. The following month, with his daughter’s approved I‐130 petition approved, Zyapkov successfully asked the Board to reopen. He sought to adjust his status to permanent resident. On remand the IJ conducted hearings, denied Zyapkov’s application to adjust his status, and denied relief from removal, based on inconsistencies in testimony about the marriage. The Board and the Seventh Circuit affirmed. Since Zyapkov is inadmissible, he is ineligible for adjustment of status; even assuming eligibility, there was no legal or constitutional error in the IJ’s exercise of discretion. View "Zyapkov v. Lynch" on Justia Law

Mohit and Ankush Seghal filed an I-130 petition seeking lawful permanent resident status for Mohit, who is a citizen of India, as the husband of Ankush, who is a U.S. citizen. The petition was denied Mohit had tried years earlier to gain lawful residence in the U.S. by a fraudulent marriage to another woman, making him ineligible for relief even though his marriage to Ankush is legitimate, 8 U.S.C. 1154(c). The decision to grant or deny an I-130 petition is not a matter of agency discretion, and Mohit is not subject to a removal order, so he properly challenged the denial in the district court under the Administrative Procedure Act. The district court found that substantial evidence supported the agency’s finding of marriage fraud and thus granted summary judgment against the Seghals. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Although the agency’s handling of the case involved procedural errors, the decision was legally sound. Substantial evidence, including Mohit’s own written admission, supported the agency’s finding that Mohit’s earlier marriage was fraudulent. View "Sehgal v. Lynch" on Justia Law

Musa, a citizen of Botswana, entered the U.S. in 2008 on a visitor’s visa. She met a U.S. citizen and they married. Musa’s husband filed an I‐130 “alien relative” petition on her behalf, and Musa applied at the same time to adjust her status to permanent resident, 8 U.S.C. 1151(b)(2)(A)(i), 1255(a); The Department of Homeland Security denied both: Musa’s husband was discovered not to have ended a previous marriage. In 2009 Musa was placed in removal proceedings because her visa had expired. In 2010, Musa divorced and applied for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture because she feared that if she returned to Botswana her family would force her to undergo female genital mutilation. The agency denied relief. The Seventh Circuit granted the petition requesting withholding of removal. Substantial evidence did not support the agency’s conclusion that Musa likely will not be subjected to FGM. The court held that it lacked jurisdiction to review the agency’s determination that Musa’s asylum application was untimely and denied the petition with respect to the Convention Against Torture because the agency did not err by finding that the government in Botswana would not acquiesce to forced FGM. View "Musa v. Lynch" on Justia Law

Jankovic, a citizen of Bosnia and Herzegovina, was admitted to the U.S. as a refugee in 2003 and received permanent residence status in 2005, but was ordered removed on the ground that he obtained that status by fraud. He concedes committing fraud, which authorized his removal, 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(6)(C)(i). He sought a waiver on the ground that his removal would cause extreme hardship for his wife Dragana, who was admitted with him in 2003 and became a U.S. citizen in 2009. An Immigration Judge rejected that request on grounds that Dragana would not suffer extreme hardship and that, even if she would suffer hardship, his history of lying to immigration officials justified the exercise of discretion against relief. The IJ also discussed whether Jankovic had committed war crimes during the Bosnian conflict by assisting in the persecution of ethnic minorities, rendering him inadmissible, but stated that he did not need to reach a final conclusion on that subject. The Board of Immigration Appeals affirmed. The Seventh Circuit dismissed his petition for review, noting that it lacks jurisdiction to review the agency’s discretionary decisions and that either ground was sufficient to support removal. View "Jankovic v. Lynch" on Justia Law

Rostran, a Nicaraguan citizen, entered the U.S. illegally in 2006, and decided to stay. He claims to fear that the government of Nicaragua would encourage or condone his being murdered by its supporters because of his and his family’s political views, but did not make a timely application for asylum, 8 U.S.C. 1158(a)(2)(B). In 2010 he was convicted of public intoxication and driving under the influence. Eventually he was ordered to be removed to Nicaragua. He then applied for asylum and for withholding of removal under 8 U.S.C. 1231(b)(3)(A), arguing that his “life or freedom would be threatened in [Nicaragua] because of [his] race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion.” The immigration court and the Board of Immigration Appeals rejected his claims. The Seventh Circuit affirmed as to asylum, but vacated the denial of withholding of removal as not adequately reasoned. “What is missing ... are data that would enable a rational determination of whether there was a greater than 50 percent probability that the alien would lose his life or his freedom if removed to his country of origin.” View "Gutierrez-Rostran v. Lynch" on Justia Law

In 1991, Lopez, age 12, illegally entered the U.S. He has not returned to Mexico, although his sister still lives in the neighborhood where he grew up. In 2009, Lopez was charged with dealing and possessing illegal drugs. He pled guilty to one count and was convicted of a Class A Felony for “Dealing in Cocaine over 3 grams.” While Lopez was in prison, DHS interviewed him, ultimately ordering removal under 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43)(B). In 2014, an asylum officer found that Lopez had a reasonable fear of persecution or torture if he returned to Mexico because he is homosexual and HIV-positive. An IJ found that Lopez was not eligible for asylum or withholding of removal because he was convicted of a “particularly serious crime” and that he was not eligible for deferral of removal under the Convention Against Torture because, it was not “more likely than not” that he would be tortured if returned to Mexico. The BIA dismissed an appeal. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Lopez did not satisfy his burden to show that it is more likely than not that he would be tortured by the government or with the government’s acquiescence if he returned to Mexico. View "Martinez-Lopez v. Lynch" on Justia Law