Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Turkhan, born in 1960 in Iraq, entered the U.S. in 1979, eventually becoming a legal permanent resident. He is an Assyrian Christian, has not left the U.S. since 1979, is married to a U.S. citizen, and is the father of children, ages 10 and 19. In 1990, he pleaded guilty to cocaine charges. In prison, he obtained his G.E.D., became a nursing assistant, worked as a mental-health companion, and received a letter of commendation. In 1994, an IJ found him deportable. Existing law allowed waiver of deportation for certain excludable legal permanent residents (Section 212(c)). At the hearing, Turkhan attempted to have relatives testify; although arrangements were to have been made, no interpreter was provided. The IJ found Turkhan statutorily eligible but denied relief. The BIA affirmed and, in 1997, declined to reconsider, citing the 1996 Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty and Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Acts. The Seventh Circuit denied habeas relief. In 2001, the Justice Department issued regulations for reopening section 212 cases. The Supreme Court held that persons rendered removable by guilty pleas entered before AEDPA may obtain relief. The BIA denied Turkhan’s renewed motions twice. In 2006, he additionally sought withholding of removal under the Convention Against Torture. The BIA remanded for consideration of “changed country conditions in Iraq.” An IJ found Turkhan ineligible for section 212(c) relief but granted CAT deferral of removal. The BIA affirmed. The decision did not restore Turkhan’s lawful permanent resident status nor abrogate the deportation order. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting arguments concerning the scope of the BIA remand and that Turkhan’s right to procedural due process was violated. The court was “mystified by the government’s decision … [but] the decision is not ours to make.” View "Turkhan v. Lynch" on Justia Law

In 2009, the United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) determined that Cadavedo, a native of the Philippines, had engaged in marriage fraud. During an interview, Cadavedo’s wife had admitted that Cadavedo had promised to pay her to marry him for immigration purposes. She gave a sworn statement to USCIS and withdrew her I-130 petition to adjust his status. That USCIS finding bars him from obtaining adjustment of his status to become a lawful permanent resident, 8 U.S.C. 1154(c). Cadavedo received a notice to appear, charging him as removable, in 2012. In 2014, an immigration judge denied Cadavedo’s request for a continuance to allow him to challenge the USCIS finding. The Board of Immigration Appeals affirmed. The Seventh Circuit denied relief. Cadavedo made his request during the hearing he sought to have continued, and his entitlement to the belated relief he wanted to seek from USCIS is speculative at best. View "Cadavedo v. Lynch" on Justia Law

Cisneros came to the U.S. in 1988 at age 17 and stayed after the expiration of his visa. In 1995, he married U.S. citizen; his status was adjusted to lawful permanent resident. They divorced in 2002. Cisneros consistently supported his ex-wife and the couple’s children and now has grandchildren. He has a history of alcoholism. In 2012, Cisneros committed unarmed robbery, an aggravated felony under 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii), resulting in loss of his legal permanent resident status and making him inadmissible under 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(I), because robbery is a crime of moral turpitude. Cisneros applied for a waiver under 8 U.S.C. 1182(h)(1)(B), which gives the Attorney General the discretionary power to waive inadmissibility for the spouse, parent, or child of a U.S. citizen who would suffer “extreme hardship” if removed. An immigration judge granted Cisneros’s application. DHS appealed; the BIA revoked the waiver. The Seventh Circuit denied a petition for review, noting that its authority extends only to legal or constitutional issues, not discretionary determinations. View "Cisneros v. Lynch" on Justia Law

In 2013, Santashbekov applied for asylum claiming that he faced persecution for his political activism as a member of the youth wing of the Ata Meken party in his native Kyrgyzstan, 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(42), 1158(b)(1)(A). After the 2010 revolution, according to the U.S. State Department, Kyrgyzstan continued to face instability and human rights problems, including arbitrary arrests and torture by law enforcement and security forces. The immigration judge characterized Santashbekov’s testimony about his own situation as “vague” and “extremely confusing.” Santashbekov testified that he had experienced persecution by Kurmanov, who Santashbekov believes is a member of an opposing political party and a police or government official; Kurmanov and his associates asked him to repudiate Ata Meken and detained and beat him several times in 2011. Santashbekov changed his address and his name, which was formerly Sultanhodzhaev. He submitted hospital paperwork that confirms that he received medical treatment in Kyrgyzstan corresponding to the beatings he described. He submitted criminal court documents showing that Kurmanov was prosecuted and that Santashbekov was named as a “plaintiff” in the proceeding. The Board affirmed the immigration judge’s denial, also noting inconsistencies in Santashbekov’s testimony. The Seventh Circuit upheld the denial as supported by substantial evidence. View "Daniiar Santashbekov v. Loretta Lynch" on Justia Law

Arias came to the U.S. without authorization in 2000. She has raised three children here and has consistently paid income tax. Her longtime employer calls her an “excellent employee.” Her sole criminal conviction, falsely using a social security number to work (42 U.S.C. 408(a)(7)(B)), was classified as a “crime involving moral turpitude” by the BIA, which disqualified Arias from seeking discretionary cancellation of removal under 8 U.S.C. 1229b(b)(1). The Seventh Circuit remanded for reconsideration. Many violations of the cited statute would amount to crimes involving moral turpitude, but for both legal and pragmatic reasons, it is unlikely that every violation of the statute necessarily qualifies as a crime involving moral turpitude. The BIA misapplied the framework for identifying crimes involving moral turpitude that it was bound to apply at the time of its decision; after the BIA’s decision, the Attorney General vacated that framework in its entirety. The court noted the current vacuum of authoritative guidance on how the Board should determine whether a crime involves moral turpitude. View "Arias v. Lynch" on Justia Law

Salgado unlawfully entered the U.S. in 1996 and stayed continuously for 20 years. He has children, born in 2001 and 2003, who are U.S. citizens. In 2005 Salgado was convicted in Wisconsin of possessing cocaine. In 2013, when Salgado was arrested for driving under the influence, DHS charged him with removability for having been convicted of a controlled-substance offense, 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(II), and for being present in the U.S. unlawfully, 1182(a)(6)(A)(i). An IJ ordered removal but the BIA remanded for consideration of Salgado’s claim that his lawyer had provided ineffective assistance by neglecting to seek relief from removal. On remand, Salgado applied for statutory withholding of removal and withholding under the Convention Against Torture, arguing that he has a well-founded fear of persecution on account of his membership in “Mexican nationals whose family members have suffered persecution at the hands of the Zetas and other drug cartels in Veracruz” and “Mexican nationals who have lived in the U.S. for many years and who, upon being removed to Mexico, are perceived as having money.” The IJ found his asylum application untimely because he did not file it within a year of entering the U.S. and no changed or extraordinary circumstances excused the late filing, The Seventh Circuit dismissed a petition for review, rejecting claims that the BIA improperly rejected the proposed social group and misapplied the CAT legal standard. View "Salgado-Gutierrez v. Lynch" on Justia Law

Fuller, now 51 years old, came to the U.S. from Jamaica in 1999 with a fiancé visa sponsored by Wood, a U.S. citizen. They soon married and in 2001 had a daughter. Fuller received conditional permanent resident status, 8 U.S.C. 1186a(a), but he and Wood failed to attend a required interview with USCIS. In 2004 his status was terminated. They divorced the next year. Also in 2004, Fuller had pleaded guilty to attempted criminal sexual assault and was sentenced to 30 months’ probation. He later violated the conditions of his probation and in 2012 was resentenced to four years’ imprisonment. Upon Fuller’s release from state custody in 2014, the DHS detained him and charged him as removable for being convicted of an aggravated felony, 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii), for being convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude, and for losing his conditional permanent resident status. Fuller unsuccessfully sought withholding of removal, arguing that he fears persecution and torture in Jamaica based upon his claimed bisexuality. The Seventh Circuit denied a petition for review, upholding the IJ’s factual determination that Fuller is not bisexual and that he would be perceived in Jamaica as bisexual, the basis of his purported fear of torture. View "Fuller v. Lynch" on Justia Law

Paz-Giron entered the U.S. without authorization around 1985 when he was 15 years old. Between 1998 and 2001, he was convicted four times in California for driving under the influence of alcohol. He was removed to Mexico in 2002. Paz-Giron returned to the U.S. and, in January 2013, he was again convicted of driving under the influence. Two months later he pleaded guilty to identity theft to obtain medical services, an aggravated felony under 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43)(M)(i) because it involved more than $10,000 in loss to the victim. In 2015 he was convicted of another DUI. In 2015 Paz-Giron was indicted and pled guilty to being unlawfully present in the United States after removal. He and was sentenced to 24 months in prison. The Seventh Circuit vacated the sentence. The district court misapplied an 8-level upward adjustment in the Sentencing Guidelines for aliens who unlawfully remain in the U.S. after being convicted of an aggravated felony, U.S.S.G. 2L1.2(b)(1)(C). Paz-Giron was removed in 2002, long before he committed the aggravated felony of identity theft. View "United States v. Paz-Giron" on Justia Law

Yang, now age 52, came to the U.S. from China in 2007 on a business‐visitor visa he obtained by misrepresenting that he hoped to attend a conference. Months later, he applied for asylum, asserting that his wife twice had been forced to undergo abortions and that he had been fired from his job for refusing to be sterilized. He corroborated his claims with medical records concerning a broken bone, allegedly the result of Chinese officials pulling his wife from a car, and letters from neighbors. His wife joined him in 2012 on a tourist visa that she overstayed. His application was denied. The IJ found Yang not credible based on Yang’s testimony that he did not know in 2006 whether he could have a second child legally and his wife’s difficulty in remembering details . The IJ concluded that, under the REAL ID Act, 8 U.S.C. 1158(b)(1)(B)(ii), Yang had not provided sufficient corroboration. The BIA agreed, noting Yang’s written statement accompanying his initial asylum application, in which he failed to mention any encounters with family‐planning officials after his wife’s second abortion or any reports that these officials sought him after he left China. The Seventh Circuit denied a petition for review, finding the denial supported by substantial evidence. View "Yang v. Lynch" on Justia Law

Lozano‐Zuniga, a citizen of Mexico, arrived in the U.S. in 2002, at age 14. In 2010, after a conviction for driving under the influence, he was charged with removability under 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(6)(A)(i), for having entered the country without being admitted or paroled. Lozano‐Zuniga conceded removability, but sought withholding of removal and protection under the Convention Against Torture, testifying that before leaving Mexico, his mother received a telephone call asking for information about family members in the U.S.; the caller implied that he would kidnap Lozano‐Zuniga or his sister to get ransom money from relatives living in the United States. His mother did not contact the police. She did not testify about the phone call or submit an affidavit. Lozano‐Zuniga also testified that he fears that, in Mexico, he would be targeted and forced to work for the Mexican gang, the Zetas, as part of their violent drug trafficking operations. Lozano‐Zuniga admitted that he had never been personally threatened by the Zetas, and that his grandmother lives without incident in his city of origin. Lozano‐Zuniga also testified that, in Mexico, people criticized his Seventh Day Adventist religion. An IJ found, and the BIA and Seventh Circuit agreed, that Lozano‐Zuniga was generally credible, but did not establish a clear probability that he would face persecution or torture upon his removal. View "Lozano-Zuniga v. Lynch" on Justia Law