Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Four Iranian nationals, who had previously completed mandatory military service in Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), were denied visas to enter the United States. Their family members, three U.S. citizens and one lawful permanent resident, filed a suit against the President and several federal officials responsible for visa applications. They alleged that the defendants unlawfully deprived visa applicants the opportunity to establish eligibility for terrorism-related inadmissibility grounds (TRIG) exemptions, violating their rights under the Administrative Procedure Act and the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause. The district court dismissed the case under the doctrine of consular nonreviewability, which bars judicial review of consular decisions. The Plaintiffs appealed, and the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. The court held that the doctrine of consular nonreviewability applied, and that the plaintiffs failed to show any evidence of bad faith that could overcome this doctrine. The court also held that the applicants were not entitled to any more explanation for their visa denials than the citation to the section of the law on which the denial was based. View "Pak v. Biden" on Justia Law

In this case, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the denial of asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”) for petitioner Kamaljit Singh, a native and citizen of India. Singh alleged that he had been persecuted in India due to his support for a minority political party, and feared return due to ongoing threats. The immigration judge (“IJ”) and the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) both denied Singh’s application on credibility grounds, finding inconsistencies in his account. On appeal, the Seventh Circuit upheld the BIA's decision, finding that the BIA's adverse credibility finding was supported by substantial evidence. The court also agreed with the BIA's determination that the harm Singh had suffered in India did not rise to the level of past persecution necessary to establish eligibility for asylum or withholding of removal. In addition, the court held that Singh had waived his claims for future persecution and CAT protection by failing to properly raise them before the BIA. Lastly, the court determined that Singh's due process claims, including a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, had not been properly exhausted before the BIA and therefore could not be reviewed on appeal. As a result, Singh's petition for review was denied. View "Singh v. Merrick Garland" on Justia Law

Kibambe Mwendapeke, a permanent resident of the United States and a citizen of the Congo, was convicted of complicity to robbery in the first degree under Kentucky law. Later, the Department of Homeland Security initiated removal proceedings against Mwendapeke based on his conviction. He appealed, arguing that his conviction should not categorize him as an "aggravated felon," which would render him removable. The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit ruled that Mwendapeke's conviction is indeed a categorical match for an "aggravated felony."The court applied the categorical approach to determine whether Mwendapeke's crime was a "crime of violence" under 18 U.S.C. § 16(a), a requirement for classification as an "aggravated felony." The court found that Kentucky’s first-degree robbery statute, under which Mwendapeke was convicted, meets the level of force and has the required mens rea, or state of mind, for a "crime of violence" under § 16(a). The court also concluded that Kentucky’s complicity statute is not overbroad with respect to generic aiding-and-abetting liability. Therefore, the court ruled that Mwendapeke's conviction constituted an aggravated felony, making him removable. The court denied his petition for review. View "Mwendapeke v. Merrick B. Garland" on Justia Law

Uulu lived with his wife and children in Kyrgyzstan. He joined an opposition party. In 2013, Uulu attended a peaceful protest, during which police fired tear gas at the crowd and attacked protesters. They took Uulu to a police station where they hit him with a filled bottle and placed cellophane over his head, causing him to lose consciousness. Uulu testified that he was detained for several hours with a chemical in the room, making him dizzy. The next morning he was returned to the station. When he returned home, unknown men beat him until he was unconscious. He woke up in the hospital.Two months later, he entered the United States on a tourist visa. Uulu says that the Kyrgyz government subsequently convicted him of “organizing mass riots” and sentenced him in absentia. An asylum officer classified him as removable (8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(1)(B)). In 2018, an immigration court held a hearing at which Uulu testified and presented corroborating documents. The judge ordered Uulu’s voluntary removal, finding that Uulu made shifting statements about key events in his asylum application, interview, and hearing testimony, including about whether police harmed him, how long he was detained, and the attack. Uulu’s corroborating statements were from interested parties who were not available for cross-examination. The BIA affirmed. The Seventh Circuit denied a petition for review. Acknowledging concerns about the review of his corroborating evidence, the court found Uulu’s account included too many inconsistencies to upset the conclusion that he was not credible. View "Uulu v. Garland" on Justia Law

Munoz, a citizen of Honduras, moved to Guatemala but never acquired lawful status there. She entered into a relationship with Mazariegos, with whom she had two daughters. Mazariegos began a relationship with another woman, Oneida. Munoz and her children left Guatemala for the United States. She applied for asylum, 8 U.S.C. 1158(b)(1)(A), withholding of removal, section 1231(b)(3)(A), and relief under the Convention Against Torture. At her credible fear interview, Munoz stated that she was afraid of Oneida who had insulted and threatened her; she stated that she had not been physically harmed by anyone. She also stated that the police would protect her in Guatemala. She later claimed that she was the victim of domestic violence and asserted that the police would not help a foreigner. She feared the harassment would continue if she went to Honduras. She later changed her story and denied any physical violence but alleged kidnapping of her daughter.The IJ held that Munoz’s testimony was not credible based on the cumulative effect of the inconsistent, vague, and evasive testimony, and thus she did not meet her burden under the REAL ID Act; documentary evidence did not rehabilitate her claim. The BIA affirmed, agreeing that the testimony was inconsistent, implausible, and vague, and ordered removal. The Seventh Circuit denied a petition for review, finding the denial of relief to be supported by substantial evidence. View "Munoz-Rivera v. Garland" on Justia Law

Wojciechowicz came to the U.S. in the 1980s. In 1999 he married a U.S. citizen, with whom he has two children. He became a lawful permanent resident in 2004. Wojciechowicz stole over $100,000 in connection with window installation jobs. He pleaded guilty to state charges in 2011 and was sentenced to two years of probation and restitution. In 2019 Wojciechowicz traveled to Poland for his sister’s funeral. When he attempted to reenter the U.S., Customs officials determined his convictions constituted crimes involving moral turpitude and rendered him inadmissible. 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(I). In removal proceedings, Wojciechowicz unsuccessfully sought a waiver of inadmissibility. An IJ concluded that he had failed to show extreme hardship and that the severity of his prior crimes weighed against waiver as a discretionary matter. The BIA affirmed; the Seventh Circuit dismissed a petition for review for lack of jurisdiction.Days before his removal date, Wojciechowicz received a pardon from Governor Pritzker for his convictions. The BIA stayed his removal but declined to reopen removal proceedings. ICE—in violation of the stay and with no explanation— removed Wojciechowicz to Poland. The Seventh Circuit denied a second petition for review. Under the Immigration and Nationality Act, a pardon does not make an otherwise inadmissible noncitizen admissible, even if a pardon can save a resident noncitizen from being removed. View "Wojciechowicz v. Garland" on Justia Law

After DHS reinstated prior removal orders and initiated another removal proceeding, Mejia sought withholding of removal, 8 U.S.C. 1231(b)(3), and protection under the Convention Against Torture. He claimed that if returned to Mexico, he would face violence from the criminal gang, Union of Tepito. When Mejia initially refused to transport drugs for Tepito, the gang beat him and mocked his religion; police were nearby and ignored the beating but Mejia could not say whether they saw it. Mejia capitulated but, after a few drug deliveries, he relocated to a different area on the outskirts of Mexico City. The gang found him, hit his head with a gun, and threatened to kill him. Mejia fled to the U.S. He testified that he believed he could not relocate within Mexico because he did not know if other gangs were affiliated with Tepito and feared people would discriminate against his Mexico City accent.The IJ found Mejia credible but denied relief, finding that the gang’s prior attacks did not qualify as persecution or torture; Mejia failed to demonstrate future persecution would be likely, that his persecution was tied to membership in a qualifying social group, or that Mexican officials would be unwilling or unable to protect him. The IJ decided that Mejia could avoid the gang by relocating within Mexico. The BIA affirmed. The Seventh Circuit denied a petition for review. Mejia’s counsel had not disputed the relocation finding. View "Mejia v. Garland" on Justia Law

In 1996, Melvin Osorio-Morales’s family member, Jeremias, was dating Argueta, who was also dating a member of the Hernandez family. The men had a shootout; Jeremias was killed. In retaliation, the Osorio family killed Robert Hernandez. The Hernandez family set fire to the Osorio home, burning a grandmother alive. Two uncles escaped with significant burns. Apparently, a criminal case was brought after the fire, but the accused Hernandez family members were subsequently released, setting off a bloody feud. Melvin was born a year later. Melvin never had a violent interaction with the Hernandez family, but had to “watch [his] back” and carry weapons for protection. Melvin testified that one cousin was left paralyzed, three uncles were killed, two cousins committed suicide out of fear of what the Hernandez family would do to them, and another cousin was stabbed to death.Melvin entered the U.S. in 2014. The BIA affirmed the denial of his claims for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture. The Seventh Circuit denied relief. Findings that the Honduran government is not “unable or unwilling” to control the threat from the Hernandez family were supported by substantial evidence. A government’s decision not to prosecute, without more information, does not show an “unwillingness or inability to protect.” View "Osorio-Morales v. Garland" on Justia Law

Petitioner petitioned for a review of the denial of her application for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture (CAT). The immigration judge found that Petitioner was not credible due to her inconsistent and evasive testimony. The Board of Immigration Appeals affirmed.   The Seventh Circuit affirmed, holding that substantial evidence supports the adverse credibility determination. The court explained that the record shows that the immigration judge considered Petitioner’s testimony and evidence, pointed to several material inconsistencies and instances of evasive or untruthful testimony, and determined that Petitioner’s overall testimony lacked credibility. These findings find substantial support in the record. Thus, Petitioner has not met her burden to establish eligibility for asylum. And, because the burdens for securing withholding of removal or protection under the CAT are more stringent, those claims fail as well. View "Meixiang Cui v. Merrick B. Garland" on Justia Law

Arias and her sister, Maria, sold tortillas in El Salvador. Months after their business opened, a note was slipped under their door, demanding they pay $50 per week and enclose a piece of intimate clothing. The note threatened death if the police were contacted. Arias recognized the handwriting as belonging to a former classmate who she knew was a member of the Mara 18 gang. A friend of Arias told Arias that Mara 18 had killed her son because she had filed a police complaint in response to a similar demand. Unable to afford payments and afraid of the gang, the sisters closed the business. Arias illegally entered the U.S. in 2014. Maria remained in El Salvador, in a different home. Maria does not leave the home. Arias’s son only leaves home to attend school; he is driven to and from school to avoid gangs.An IJ denied Arias’s applications for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture. The BIA affirmed, finding that the gang targeted Arias to raise money for its criminal ventures, not for membership in an identified social group; she did not show she would be individually targeted for harm. Arias had not shown a nexus between her fear of future harm and a protected ground. The Seventh Circuit denied a petition for review, finding the denials supported by substantial evidence. Arias failed to establish a well-founded fear of future persecution. View "Arias v. Garland" on Justia Law