Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Melesio‐Rodriguez was brought to the U.S. from Mexico as a child. She became a lawful permanent resident in 1998, at age 19. She was convicted of battery and attempted possession of cocaine in 2003 and of attempted burglary in 2013. DHS charged her as removable under 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(2)(B)(i)) and alleged that she had failed to disclose a cocaine‐possession conviction that occurred before she was granted permanent resident status. An immigration judge found Melesio‐Rodriguez removeable. She told the judge she did not wish to apply for protection but expressed interest in applying for a U‐visa, for which she was potentially eligible as a victim of domestic violence. The judge stated that only USCIS had jurisdiction over U‐ visas and that he would order removal. Melesio‐Rodriguez said she understood “really clearly” and confirmed twice that she wished to accept the order as final rather than reserve an appeal. Melesio‐Rodriguez then retained counsel and unsuccessfully moved for reconsideration, arguing that the IJ had not fully apprised her of her rights; one of her convictions was not a “conviction” for immigration purposes; she was eligible for a U‐visa; she feared torture in Mexico; and the removal proceedings violated the Fifth and Eighth Amendments. The Seventh Circuit dismissed her petition for review. Melesio‐Rodriguez is a criminal alien and the question of her waiver of appeal is factual in nature, so the court lacked jurisdiction, 8 U.S.C. 1252(a)(2)(C). View "Melesio-Rodriguez v. Sessions" on Justia Law

Melesio‐Rodriguez was brought to the U.S. from Mexico as a child. She became a lawful permanent resident in 1998, at age 19. She was convicted of battery and attempted possession of cocaine in 2003 and of attempted burglary in 2013. DHS charged her as removable under 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(2)(B)(i)) and alleged that she had failed to disclose a cocaine‐possession conviction that occurred before she was granted permanent resident status. An immigration judge found Melesio‐Rodriguez removeable. She told the judge she did not wish to apply for protection but expressed interest in applying for a U‐visa, for which she was potentially eligible as a victim of domestic violence. The judge stated that only USCIS had jurisdiction over U‐ visas and that he would order removal. Melesio‐Rodriguez said she understood “really clearly” and confirmed twice that she wished to accept the order as final rather than reserve an appeal. Melesio‐Rodriguez then retained counsel and unsuccessfully moved for reconsideration, arguing that the IJ had not fully apprised her of her rights; one of her convictions was not a “conviction” for immigration purposes; she was eligible for a U‐visa; she feared torture in Mexico; and the removal proceedings violated the Fifth and Eighth Amendments. The Seventh Circuit dismissed her petition for review. Melesio‐Rodriguez is a criminal alien and the question of her waiver of appeal is factual in nature, so the court lacked jurisdiction, 8 U.S.C. 1252(a)(2)(C). View "Melesio-Rodriguez v. Sessions" on Justia Law

Doe sought lawful permanent residence in the U.S. under the EB-5 visa program, which requires applicants to invest in a new U.S. commercial enterprise, 8 U.S.C. 1153(b)(5)(A). Doe invested $500,000 in Elgin Assisted Living EB-5 Fund, to build and operate a memory care facility. The U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services denied Doe’s petition because the facility had not been built since it was proposed in 2011. Doe filed suit. The court granted the government summary judgment. Doe is represented by the three-attorney Kameli Law Group. Floss, an associate, is Doe’s counsel of record. Kameli is the firm’s principal. While briefing was underway, the Securities and Exchange Commission filed suit, accusing Kameli of defrauding 226 immigrants who invested over $88 million. Kameli allegedly misappropriated the memory care center's funds. The Seventh Circuit disqualified the firm from Doe’s appeal. The Illinois Rules of Professional Conduct prohibit representation if “there is a significant risk that the representation of one or more clients will be materially limited by the lawyer’s responsibilities to another client, a former client or a third person or by a personal interest.” Neither of Kameli's conflicts can be waived by informed client consent. It “strains credulity to think that Kameli would be diligent.” Kameli would not advise Doe to allege fraud and seek reconsideration of the USCIS decision. Kameli also has divided obligations to his investor-clients, which create an unacceptably high risk of materially limiting Doe’s representation by Floss. View "Doe v. Nielsen" on Justia Law

Bernard, a Jamaican citizen, says he realized as a preteen that he was bisexual, but hid it out of fear. He claimed that his family and other Jamaicans persecuted members of the LGBT community. Bernard arrived in the U.S. in 1998, then 19 years old, on a visitor’s visa. He married an American citizen; they divorced. Bernard then had a long relationship with another woman, but also dated men. Between 2002 and 2013 Bernard was convicted of multiple crimes including weapons and drug offenses, and, in 2011 domestic battery, for stabbing his girlfriend’s sister. He never served time in custody. In 2016 removal proceedings, Bernard sought withholding of removal, 8 U.S.C. 1231(b)(3)(A), and deferral of removal under the Convention Against Torture, stating that, if removed, he feared persecution or torture based on his bisexuality and membership in the Jamaica Labour Party. The IJ denied relief, finding that Bernard was not credible enough to sustain his burden on his testimony alone and that the underlying facts of his domestic-battery offense were “particularly serious.” The BIA affirmed. The Seventh Circuit dismissed, for lack of jurisdiction, the portion of Bernard’s petition seeking review of the “particularly serious crime” designation, and denied the remainder of the petition, stating that substantial evidence supports the IJ’s reasoning. View "Bernard v. Sessions" on Justia Law

Bernard, a Jamaican citizen, says he realized as a preteen that he was bisexual, but hid it out of fear. He claimed that his family and other Jamaicans persecuted members of the LGBT community. Bernard arrived in the U.S. in 1998, then 19 years old, on a visitor’s visa. He married an American citizen; they divorced. Bernard then had a long relationship with another woman, but also dated men. Between 2002 and 2013 Bernard was convicted of multiple crimes including weapons and drug offenses, and, in 2011 domestic battery, for stabbing his girlfriend’s sister. He never served time in custody. In 2016 removal proceedings, Bernard sought withholding of removal, 8 U.S.C. 1231(b)(3)(A), and deferral of removal under the Convention Against Torture, stating that, if removed, he feared persecution or torture based on his bisexuality and membership in the Jamaica Labour Party. The IJ denied relief, finding that Bernard was not credible enough to sustain his burden on his testimony alone and that the underlying facts of his domestic-battery offense were “particularly serious.” The BIA affirmed. The Seventh Circuit dismissed, for lack of jurisdiction, the portion of Bernard’s petition seeking review of the “particularly serious crime” designation, and denied the remainder of the petition, stating that substantial evidence supports the IJ’s reasoning. View "Bernard v. Sessions" on Justia Law

Correa-Diaz, born in 1986 and a citizen of Mexico, entered the U.S. as a minor without parole. In 2004, Correa-Diaz, age 18, was arrested, based on a police officer’s observation of his conduct, in an automobile, with a 14-year-old girl. He pleaded guilty and was sentenced to two years’ imprisonment on an attempted sexual intercourse charge and six months’ imprisonment a sexual contact charge. The court suspended Correa-Diaz’s sentence. In 2015, Correa-Diaz pleaded guilty to counterfeiting in violation of Indiana law and was charged as removable under 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii) for having been convicted of an aggravated felony, as defined by 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43)(A). The Seventh Circuit denied relief, rejecting arguments that the 2004 offenses did not constitute aggravated felonies. Because the Indiana law focused solely on the age of the participants, section 1101(a)(43)(A) requires the age of the victim to be less than 16. That condition was satisfied and “perform[ing] or submit[ing] to sexual intercourse or deviate sexual conduct” in violation of Indiana law constitutes “sexual abuse,” defined by the BIA “[t]he employment, use, persuasion, inducement, enticement, or coercion of a child to engage in, or assist another person to engage in, sexually explicit conduct or the rape, molestation, prostitution, or other form of sexual exploitation of children.” View "Correa-Diaz v. Sessions" on Justia Law

Zhakypbaev, a citizen of Kyrgyzstan, was admitted to the U.S. in 2012 as a nonimmigrant student to attend the Computer Systems Institute. His wife and three daughters were admitted based on his status. He did not attend the Institute after February 4, 2013, and in April 2013, filed applications for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture. His claims were premised on the events surrounding the ouster of president Bakiev in Kyrgyzstan in April 2010. Zhakypbaev claimed that based on his connections with the Bakiev family and with Bakiev’s political party, he was persecuted and had a well‐founded fear of future persecution in Kyrgyzstan. The Immigration Judge denied relief, holding that Zhakypbaev failed to demonstrate that his persecution was connected to his political opinion or social group and that he had failed to establish a threat of torture. The BIA affirmed. The Seventh Circuit denied a petition for review. The IJ and BIA could properly conclude that Zhakypbaev’s claimed persecution, a beating and questioning, did not result from his political affiliation but from his potential as a witness because of his employment. View "Zhakypbaev v. Sessions" on Justia Law

Zhakypbaev, a citizen of Kyrgyzstan, was admitted to the U.S. in 2012 as a nonimmigrant student to attend the Computer Systems Institute. His wife and three daughters were admitted based on his status. He did not attend the Institute after February 4, 2013, and in April 2013, filed applications for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture. His claims were premised on the events surrounding the ouster of president Bakiev in Kyrgyzstan in April 2010. Zhakypbaev claimed that based on his connections with the Bakiev family and with Bakiev’s political party, he was persecuted and had a well‐founded fear of future persecution in Kyrgyzstan. The Immigration Judge denied relief, holding that Zhakypbaev failed to demonstrate that his persecution was connected to his political opinion or social group and that he had failed to establish a threat of torture. The BIA affirmed. The Seventh Circuit denied a petition for review. The IJ and BIA could properly conclude that Zhakypbaev’s claimed persecution, a beating and questioning, did not result from his political affiliation but from his potential as a witness because of his employment. View "Zhakypbaev v. Sessions" on Justia Law

Perez-Montes, a citizen of Mexico, entered the U.S. in 1989 as a lawful permanent resident. In 2001 he joined the Army and served two tours in Afghanistan. He received a general discharge under honorable conditions. He did not apply for citizenship. In 2010, he was convicted of a cocaine offense, which led to removal proceedings. Aliens convicted of aggravated felonies remain eligible for deferral of removal under the Convention Against Torture. Perez-Montes contended that he was at risk of being tortured or killed in Mexico because his military training would lead drug gangs to recruit him; that the police would fail to protect him; and that the Mexican government tortures its citizens who return after serving in the U.S. military. An immigration judge and the Board of Immigration Appeals rejected his argument. The Seventh Circuit denied a petition for review, rejecting an argument that the Board and the IJ erred by asking, instead, whether he faced a “substantial risk” of torture in Mexico. “More likely than not” is the standard burden in civil litigation and does not impose a statistical or quantitative requirement; “substantial risk” means nothing more than the “more likely than not” standard. It was designed, rather, as a non-quantitative restatement of that standard. View "Perez-Montes v. Sessions" on Justia Law

Perez-Montes, a citizen of Mexico, entered the U.S. in 1989 as a lawful permanent resident. In 2001 he joined the Army and served two tours in Afghanistan. He received a general discharge under honorable conditions. He did not apply for citizenship. In 2010, he was convicted of a cocaine offense, which led to removal proceedings. Aliens convicted of aggravated felonies remain eligible for deferral of removal under the Convention Against Torture. Perez-Montes contended that he was at risk of being tortured or killed in Mexico because his military training would lead drug gangs to recruit him; that the police would fail to protect him; and that the Mexican government tortures its citizens who return after serving in the U.S. military. An immigration judge and the Board of Immigration Appeals rejected his argument. The Seventh Circuit denied a petition for review, rejecting an argument that the Board and the IJ erred by asking, instead, whether he faced a “substantial risk” of torture in Mexico. “More likely than not” is the standard burden in civil litigation and does not impose a statistical or quantitative requirement; “substantial risk” means nothing more than the “more likely than not” standard. It was designed, rather, as a non-quantitative restatement of that standard. View "Perez-Montes v. Sessions" on Justia Law