Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Yahya entered the U.S. on a six-month tourist visa in either 2000 or 2001 and overstayed. According to Yahya, in 2003, he voluntarily appeared to register in the National Security Entry-Exit Registration System and was placed in removal proceeding (8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(1)(B)). He accepted an order of voluntary departure but did not depart. He claims he did not want to put his eight-month-old, American-born son on a 24-hour flight to Indonesia. More than 12 years later, Yahya moved to reopen his removal proceedings. Because the 90-day deadline had passed, he cited an exception, raising a claim for asylum “based on changed country conditions arising in the country of nationality,” 8 U.S.C. 1229a(c)(7)(C)(i), (ii), claiming that he feared that his “moderate” Islamic faith would make him a target for “radical fundamentalist Islamic groups” in Indonesia. The BIA upheld the IJ’s denial of the motion. The Seventh Circuit denied a petition for review. The BIA properly compared objective evidence of religious violence in Indonesia from 2003, the time of Yahya’s original proceedings, to the evidence he presented now. He has evidence of only one attack against moderate Muslims between 2003 and 2016, which is not sufficient to show a material change in country conditions. View "Yahya v. Sessions" on Justia Law

Perez grew up in Honduras. When Perez was 14, a street gang told him to join or “suffer the consequences.” Perez moved. Later that year, the gang confronted Perez again. Perez ran away and dropped out of school. Later, Perez witnessed the murder of a friend whose brother belonged to a rival gang. Perez was beaten and an unidentified person fired shots in the direction of Perez and his friends. Perez reported these events to the police, who did nothing. In 2008 Perez was admitted to the U.S. as a lawful permanent resident. He returned to Honduras in 2010 for a vacation. He attended a neighborhood festival and was recognized by gang members. Perez ran and cut short his vacation. Three years later, in Indiana, Perez pleaded guilty to engaging in sexual misconduct with a minor. An IJ found Perez removable for having committed an aggravated felony, 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43)(A), and noted that Perez was ineligible for asylum and withholding of removal because his conviction was a “particularly serious crime.” He sought deferral of removal under the Convention Against Torture. Family members testified about their fear that Perez would be killed if he were removed to Honduras. The BIA affirmed the denial of relief. The Seventh Circuit remanded. The BIA erred by truncating the crucial factual inquiry about Perez’s risk of torture if he is returned to Honduras and by asking the wrong question with respect to internal relocation. View "Perez v. Sessions" on Justia Law

The Byrne Memorial Justice Assistance Grant Program allocates substantial funds annually to provide for the needs of state and local law enforcement, including personnel, equipment, training. In 2017, the Attorney General tied receipt of the funds to the recipient’s compliance with conditions. Chicago, a “sanctuary city,” argued the conditions were unlawful and unconstitutional. The district court agreed and enjoined, nationwide, the enforcement of a condition mandating advance notice to federal authorities of the release date of persons in state or local custody who are believed to be aliens and a condition requiring the local correctional facility to ensure agents access to such facilities to meet with those persons. Compliance with those conditions would require the allocation of state and local resources, including personnel. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, noting that it was not assessing “optimal immigration policies” but enforcing the separation of powers doctrine. The statute precisely describes the formula through which funds should be distributed to states and local governments and imposes precise limits on the extent to which the Attorney General can deviate from that distribution. It “is inconceivable that Congress would have anticipated" that the Attorney General could abrogate the distribution scheme and deny funds to states and localities that would qualify under the Byrne JAG statutory provisions, based on a decision to impose conditions—the putative authority for which is provided in another statute (34 U.S.C. 10102(a)(6)). View "City of Chicago v. Sessions" on Justia Law

Cruz-Martinez, a Mexican citizen, came to the U.S. illegally in 1993. He was removed in 2002 under a stipulated removal order for “Rocha-Martinez,” which was an alias. Cruz-Martinez states that in 2005 armed men who had fought with his brothers threatened him at his mother’s home in Mexico while looking for his brother; the police did nothing. Cruz-Martinez returned to the U.S. without permission. He acquired criminal convictions for aggravated assault, possession of cocaine, and obstructing police. Cruz-Martinez married a U.S. citizen with whom he has a child and is a step-father to her other children. All of his siblings and his mother now reside in the U.S. Some, including his mother, have gone back and forth to Mexico without incident; none have sought protection from persecution. In 2014, DHS reinstated the 2002 removal order. The Chicago Asylum Office made a positive reasonable-fear determination. The IJ denied Cruz-Martinez’s applications for asylum and for withholding of removal under the Convention Against Torture, finding no clear probability of persecution or torture. The Board affirmed, denying Cruz-Martinez’s request for consideration of new evidence concerning the State Department’s travel warning and news articles about conditions in Mexico. The Seventh Circuit denied his petition for review, upholding the reinstatement of the removal order, the refusal to consider new evidence, and findings that Cruz-Martinez was ineligible for asylum and not eligible for CAT protection. View "Cruz-Martinez v. Sessions" on Justia Law

Melesio‐Rodriguez was brought to the U.S. from Mexico as a child. She became a lawful permanent resident in 1998, at age 19. She was convicted of battery and attempted possession of cocaine in 2003 and of attempted burglary in 2013. DHS charged her as removable under 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(2)(B)(i)) and alleged that she had failed to disclose a cocaine‐possession conviction that occurred before she was granted permanent resident status. An immigration judge found Melesio‐Rodriguez removeable. She told the judge she did not wish to apply for protection but expressed interest in applying for a U‐visa, for which she was potentially eligible as a victim of domestic violence. The judge stated that only USCIS had jurisdiction over U‐ visas and that he would order removal. Melesio‐Rodriguez said she understood “really clearly” and confirmed twice that she wished to accept the order as final rather than reserve an appeal. Melesio‐Rodriguez then retained counsel and unsuccessfully moved for reconsideration, arguing that the IJ had not fully apprised her of her rights; one of her convictions was not a “conviction” for immigration purposes; she was eligible for a U‐visa; she feared torture in Mexico; and the removal proceedings violated the Fifth and Eighth Amendments. The Seventh Circuit dismissed her petition for review. Melesio‐Rodriguez is a criminal alien and the question of her waiver of appeal is factual in nature, so the court lacked jurisdiction, 8 U.S.C. 1252(a)(2)(C). View "Melesio-Rodriguez v. Sessions" on Justia Law

Melesio‐Rodriguez was brought to the U.S. from Mexico as a child. She became a lawful permanent resident in 1998, at age 19. She was convicted of battery and attempted possession of cocaine in 2003 and of attempted burglary in 2013. DHS charged her as removable under 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(2)(B)(i)) and alleged that she had failed to disclose a cocaine‐possession conviction that occurred before she was granted permanent resident status. An immigration judge found Melesio‐Rodriguez removeable. She told the judge she did not wish to apply for protection but expressed interest in applying for a U‐visa, for which she was potentially eligible as a victim of domestic violence. The judge stated that only USCIS had jurisdiction over U‐ visas and that he would order removal. Melesio‐Rodriguez said she understood “really clearly” and confirmed twice that she wished to accept the order as final rather than reserve an appeal. Melesio‐Rodriguez then retained counsel and unsuccessfully moved for reconsideration, arguing that the IJ had not fully apprised her of her rights; one of her convictions was not a “conviction” for immigration purposes; she was eligible for a U‐visa; she feared torture in Mexico; and the removal proceedings violated the Fifth and Eighth Amendments. The Seventh Circuit dismissed her petition for review. Melesio‐Rodriguez is a criminal alien and the question of her waiver of appeal is factual in nature, so the court lacked jurisdiction, 8 U.S.C. 1252(a)(2)(C). View "Melesio-Rodriguez v. Sessions" on Justia Law

Doe sought lawful permanent residence in the U.S. under the EB-5 visa program, which requires applicants to invest in a new U.S. commercial enterprise, 8 U.S.C. 1153(b)(5)(A). Doe invested $500,000 in Elgin Assisted Living EB-5 Fund, to build and operate a memory care facility. The U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services denied Doe’s petition because the facility had not been built since it was proposed in 2011. Doe filed suit. The court granted the government summary judgment. Doe is represented by the three-attorney Kameli Law Group. Floss, an associate, is Doe’s counsel of record. Kameli is the firm’s principal. While briefing was underway, the Securities and Exchange Commission filed suit, accusing Kameli of defrauding 226 immigrants who invested over $88 million. Kameli allegedly misappropriated the memory care center's funds. The Seventh Circuit disqualified the firm from Doe’s appeal. The Illinois Rules of Professional Conduct prohibit representation if “there is a significant risk that the representation of one or more clients will be materially limited by the lawyer’s responsibilities to another client, a former client or a third person or by a personal interest.” Neither of Kameli's conflicts can be waived by informed client consent. It “strains credulity to think that Kameli would be diligent.” Kameli would not advise Doe to allege fraud and seek reconsideration of the USCIS decision. Kameli also has divided obligations to his investor-clients, which create an unacceptably high risk of materially limiting Doe’s representation by Floss. View "Doe v. Nielsen" on Justia Law

Bernard, a Jamaican citizen, says he realized as a preteen that he was bisexual, but hid it out of fear. He claimed that his family and other Jamaicans persecuted members of the LGBT community. Bernard arrived in the U.S. in 1998, then 19 years old, on a visitor’s visa. He married an American citizen; they divorced. Bernard then had a long relationship with another woman, but also dated men. Between 2002 and 2013 Bernard was convicted of multiple crimes including weapons and drug offenses, and, in 2011 domestic battery, for stabbing his girlfriend’s sister. He never served time in custody. In 2016 removal proceedings, Bernard sought withholding of removal, 8 U.S.C. 1231(b)(3)(A), and deferral of removal under the Convention Against Torture, stating that, if removed, he feared persecution or torture based on his bisexuality and membership in the Jamaica Labour Party. The IJ denied relief, finding that Bernard was not credible enough to sustain his burden on his testimony alone and that the underlying facts of his domestic-battery offense were “particularly serious.” The BIA affirmed. The Seventh Circuit dismissed, for lack of jurisdiction, the portion of Bernard’s petition seeking review of the “particularly serious crime” designation, and denied the remainder of the petition, stating that substantial evidence supports the IJ’s reasoning. View "Bernard v. Sessions" on Justia Law

Bernard, a Jamaican citizen, says he realized as a preteen that he was bisexual, but hid it out of fear. He claimed that his family and other Jamaicans persecuted members of the LGBT community. Bernard arrived in the U.S. in 1998, then 19 years old, on a visitor’s visa. He married an American citizen; they divorced. Bernard then had a long relationship with another woman, but also dated men. Between 2002 and 2013 Bernard was convicted of multiple crimes including weapons and drug offenses, and, in 2011 domestic battery, for stabbing his girlfriend’s sister. He never served time in custody. In 2016 removal proceedings, Bernard sought withholding of removal, 8 U.S.C. 1231(b)(3)(A), and deferral of removal under the Convention Against Torture, stating that, if removed, he feared persecution or torture based on his bisexuality and membership in the Jamaica Labour Party. The IJ denied relief, finding that Bernard was not credible enough to sustain his burden on his testimony alone and that the underlying facts of his domestic-battery offense were “particularly serious.” The BIA affirmed. The Seventh Circuit dismissed, for lack of jurisdiction, the portion of Bernard’s petition seeking review of the “particularly serious crime” designation, and denied the remainder of the petition, stating that substantial evidence supports the IJ’s reasoning. View "Bernard v. Sessions" on Justia Law

Correa-Diaz, born in 1986 and a citizen of Mexico, entered the U.S. as a minor without parole. In 2004, Correa-Diaz, age 18, was arrested, based on a police officer’s observation of his conduct, in an automobile, with a 14-year-old girl. He pleaded guilty and was sentenced to two years’ imprisonment on an attempted sexual intercourse charge and six months’ imprisonment a sexual contact charge. The court suspended Correa-Diaz’s sentence. In 2015, Correa-Diaz pleaded guilty to counterfeiting in violation of Indiana law and was charged as removable under 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii) for having been convicted of an aggravated felony, as defined by 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43)(A). The Seventh Circuit denied relief, rejecting arguments that the 2004 offenses did not constitute aggravated felonies. Because the Indiana law focused solely on the age of the participants, section 1101(a)(43)(A) requires the age of the victim to be less than 16. That condition was satisfied and “perform[ing] or submit[ing] to sexual intercourse or deviate sexual conduct” in violation of Indiana law constitutes “sexual abuse,” defined by the BIA “[t]he employment, use, persuasion, inducement, enticement, or coercion of a child to engage in, or assist another person to engage in, sexually explicit conduct or the rape, molestation, prostitution, or other form of sexual exploitation of children.” View "Correa-Diaz v. Sessions" on Justia Law