Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Cotts was injured in 2004 while incarcerated. He complained of intense pain, and was diagnosed with an inguinal hernia, two inches in diameter, pushing into his groin. Cotts visited the health unit 16 times and stated that pain was interfering with walking, sleeping, and using the restroom. Care providers manually shoved it back. Cotts testified that this procedure was painful and that often the hernia popped back out. Cotts claims that a doctor told him that regardless of pain, he would not have surgery because the hernia was reducible. On parole, he was admitted to the emergency room with “unbearable” pain. There was no surgery; Cotts could not pay. Cotts was arrested for parole violation and sent to a different facility, where the doctor told him his hernia necessitated surgery. It was the size of a grapefruit in his groin and a small grapefruit in his right scrotum. He was transferred again and returned repeatedly to the health care unit but was denied surgery. In February 2007, Cotts had surgery. Cotts filed suit, 42 U.S.C. 1983. Despite an agreement by the parties, the district court used jury instructions that suggested that “cruel and unusual punishment” was an independent element of liability beyond showing deliberate indifference to serious medical need and that damages were an element of liability. The Seventh Circuit reversed; the misleading instructions prejudiced Cotts. View "Cotts v. Osafa" on Justia Law

VRichards, an Indiana inmate, had complained since January 2008 about abdominal pain and blood in his stool; physicians in the prison system assured him that he was fine. In October 2008 they sent him to a hospital, where specialists diagnosed ulcerative colitis. By then it was too late to do anything but excise the colon and construct an ileo-anal pouch. Richards filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 in December 2010, contending that defendants violated the eighth amendment by indifference to his serious medical condition. The district court dismissed the complaint as untimely. Richards concedes that his claim accrued in October 2008, but contends, however, that the time was tolled while he was physically unable to sue despite the exercise of reasonable diligence. The Seventh Circuit reversed and remanded for determination of Richards’ physical condition and his ability to file suit. View "Richards v. Mitcheff" on Justia Law

Nicholson was a sales associate for Pulte, a national homebuilder. When she failed to make her sales quotas for several months in a row, Pulte put her on a performance-improvement plan and later fired her when her sales did not improve. Nicholson claimed that her termination was related to her need to care for her ailing parents and sued under the Family and Medical Leave Act, 29 U.S.C. 2601, alleging that the company interfered with her statutory rights and retaliated against her in violation of the Act. The district court granted summary judgment for Pulte. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Nicholson did not put Pulte on adequate notice that she needed FMLA-qualifying leave to care for her parents. At most, she made a few casual comments to her supervisors about her parents’ ill health. At the time the decision to terminate her employment was made, she had asked for only a single day off to attend a doctor’s appointment with her father, which her supervisor allowed. View "Nicholson v. Pulte Homes Corp." on Justia Law

In 2000, TIN hired Pagel as an outside salesman. The position allows flexibility in scheduling sales calls. In 2006, Pagel began reporting to Kremer and was, for the first time, given performance evaluations. Kremer requested daily sales and two-week itinerary reports. Pagel experienced chest pain and labored breathing, and visited physicians in July 2006. Tests revealed a blockage in his heart. On August 24, Kremer met with Pagel to discuss his declining performance. On August 29, Pagel was admitted to the hospital for angioplasty and stent placement. The following week, Pagel’s symptoms returned and he was re-admitted. A CT scan revealed an unrelated mass in his lung. Pagel claims each absence was covered by the Family and Medical Leave Act, 29 U.S.C. 2601, and that he gave Kremer prior notification of each absence. While Pagel was in a clinic for a PET scan, Kremer called to say that he wanted to do a ride-along the next day. Pagel hastily attempted to schedule calls for September 19. The day went badly, Paget was terminated. The district court entered summary judgment for the company, rejecting claims under the FLMA. The Seventh Circuit reversed, finding that issues of material fact remained unresolved. View "Pagel v. TIN Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff sought to develop a rapid, self-administered test to determine a person’s HIV status. The development process included collection of human blood and saliva samples. Plaintiff sued the United States under the Federal Tort Claims Act for the destruction of its blood and saliva specimens by the Food and Drug Administration. The specimens had been seized during a criminal investigation and the freezer in which they were stored broke down. The district court entered summary judgment that the suit arose from a law enforcement officer’s detention of property, excepting the claims from the FTCA waiver of sovereign immunity, 28 U.S.C. 2680(c). The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The government presented uncontroverted evidence that the officer detained the specimens as a law enforcement officer View "On-Site Screening, Inc. v. United States" on Justia Law

Shideler suffers osteogenesis imperfecta, “brittle bone disease.” In 2006, at age 48, he applied for Social Security Disability Insurance benefits, 42 U.S.C. 423(d), alleging an onset date of 1995. His date last insured was 2000. The ALJ found that despite Shideler’s limitations, there were a sufficient number of jobs in the regional economy available to a person with his restrictions, and denied his application. The Appeals Council denied review. The district court and Seventh Circuit affirmed. The record supported the vocational expert’s testimony concerning available jobs as a clerk, assuming certain restrictions: never climb ladders, ropes, or scaffolds and only occasionally climb ramps or stairs; never crouch, kneel or crawl; never perform overhead reaching; avoid exposure to extreme heat and cold; and perform work that includes occasional, but not frequent, use of fingers. Despite his testimony that he had broken at least 55 bones over the course of his life, the record showed that Shideler had only four surgeries and made a full recovery. The record contained no evidence that Shideler visited any doctors between May 2000 and December 2006. View "Shideler v. Astrue" on Justia Law

A former inmate sued under the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C.794–94e, the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. 12111–213, and the Eighth Amendment, claiming that prison officials ignored his need for placement in an ADA-compliant facility, and refused to consider him for a work-release program solely because he walks with a cane. Imprisoned for driving on a suspended license, the inmate had advanced osteoarthritis and vascular necrosis in his hip. The prison declined his request for installation of grab bars or for a transfer. The district court screened the complaint before service and dismissed. The Seventh Circuit vacated. While the court correctly dismissed the Eighth Amendment count, the inmate adequately alleged that refusal to accommodate his disability kept him from accessing meals and showers on the same basis as other inmates. View "Jaros v. Taylor" on Justia Law

An Illinois prisoner who alleges that he is confined to a wheelchair because of an unspecified “nerve condition” claimed that, by applying a quorum rule, prison officials subjected him to cruel and unusual punishment and violated his rights under the Americans with Disabilities Act. Under the rule, under which outdoor recreation does not occur without participation by10 disabled individuals, defendants allegedly refused to allow him to engage in any physical outdoor recreational activity for seven weeks. The district court dismissed. The Seventh Circuit reversed and remanded. Regardless of whether state officials are immune under the ADA, the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. 701, applies and the suit was dismissed prematurely. View "Norfleet v. Walker" on Justia Law

In 2000, C&D hired Jones, who had periodic leg and back pain and bouts of anxiety, requiring him to see a physician once every two or three months and to undergo tests two or three times per year. He took prescription medication. In 2003, C&D implemented an attendance policy that assesses points for policy violations. Points are not assessed for preapproved leave under the Family and Medical Leave Act, 29 U.S.C. 260. By October 1, 2009, Jones had accrued two and one-half points; three points results in termination. In September 2009, Jones spoke with C&D’s FMLA Coordinator, about his medical condition. His treating physician, Lubak, faxed FMLA certifications indicating that Jones required periodic treatment. Jones missed his entire scheduled shift on October 1. He claims to have left a voicemail for his supervisor prior to his absence, but the company disputes this. On October 1, he visited the doctor’s office to check on paperwork and obtain a prescription refill, but was never examined or evaluated by Dr. Lubak. C&D terminated Jones’s employment. The district court granted C&D summary judgment, reasoning that Jones was not entitled to leave on October 1 because he did not receive medical treatment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed.

Ekstrand taught kindergarten from 2000 to 2005. In 2005, she was reassigned to teach a first-grade class at her own request. She was relocated to a classroom with no exterior windows in a busy, loud area of the school. Ekstrand repeatedly requested a change of classroom. The principal worked to make the classroom more hospitable, but denied requests to switch rooms. After the school year began, Ekstrand experienced symptoms of seasonal affective disorder, a form of depression. Both her psychologist and her primary care physician recommended a leave of absence. Her initial leave was only three months, but the following winter, her doctor advised that Ekstrand would be unable to return to teach for the remainder of the 2005-06 term. The leave of absence was later extended to include the 2006-07 term. The district court granted the district summary judgment, but on remand, a jury returned a verdict in favor of Ekstrand under the Americans with Disabilities Act. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. There was sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to decide that Ekstrand was a qualified individual with a disability and that the school district knew of that disability, but failed to accommodate her with a new classroom.