Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Since 2006 Ray has experienced pain in his shoulder. He contends that the pain stems from an injury and that an MRI scan would point the way toward successful treatment; Shah, Ray’s treating physician at the correctional center, believes that the pain stems from arthritis and that a scan would not help in diagnosis and treatment. The district court rejected Ray’s suit under 42 U.S.C.1983. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, noting that Ray has been examined often, x-rays have been taken, and physicians have prescribed painkillers; staff also has arranged for Ray to be assigned a lower bunk. Because Ray’s claim fails the objective component of cruel-and-unusual-punishments analysis, his contention that Dr. Shah displayed subjective antipathy is irrelevant. View "Ray v. Wexford Health Sources, Inc." on Justia Law

Devbrow entered the Indiana prison system in 2000. During intake, he told the medical staff that he had prostate problems and would need to be tested for prostate cancer within two to four years. In 2004 a test revealed an elevated PSA, but the medical staff did not order a prostate biopsy for more than a year. In a biopsy six months later, Devbrow was diagnosed with prostate cancer that had spread to his spine; treatment options were severely limited. Devbrow sued prison doctors and a nurse practitioner under 42 U.S.C. 1983 for deliberate indifference to serious medical needs in violation of the Eighth Amendment. The district court entered judgment for the defendants based on the two-year statute of limitations, construing the claim as a constitutional violation that in April 2005 when the biopsy was ordered. The Seventh Circuit reversed. The statute of limitations for a section 1983 deliberate-indifference claim does not begin to run until the plaintiff knows of his injury and its cause. Devbrow did not know of his injury when the defendants ordered a biopsy; he discovered it six months later when he learned he had cancer that might have been diagnosed and treated earlier. View "Devbrow v. Kalu" on Justia Law

In consolidated cases, business owners appealed the district court’s denial of a preliminary injunction against enforcement of provisions of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act and related regulations requiring group health insurance coverage for contraception and sterilization procedures, 42 U.S.C. 300gg‐13(a)(4). Employers who do not comply face a penalty of $100 per day per employee and an annual tax surcharge of $2,000 per employee, 29 U.S.C. 1132(a). The Seventh Circuit granted an injunction, pending appeal, concluding that the businesses had established a reasonable likelihood of success on their claims, that the equitable balance favored granting the injunction; and that harm to religious‐liberty rights outweighed the temporary harm to the government’s interest in providing greater access to cost‐free contraception and related services. The court rejected arguments that a secular, for‐profit corporation cannot assert a claim under Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 42 U.S.C. 2000 bb; that the free‐exercise rights of the individual plaintiffs are not affected because their corporation is a separate legal entity; and that the mandate’s burden on free‐exercise rights is too remote and attenuated to qualify as “substantial” because the decision to use contraception benefits is made by third parties, individual employees, in consultation with their medical providers. View "Grote v. Sebelius" on Justia Law

Roddy, born in 1964, suffers from several serious medical problems, including severe lower back pain attributable to degenerative disc disease. When her pain became unbearable, she stopped working and applied for disability insurance benefits. She was unsuccessful before the Social Security Administration. An administrative law judge found that there were jobs in the national economy within her capabilities, although she no longer could perform her old job as a shift manager at a Taco Bell restaurant. The district court affirmed. The Seventh Circuit vacated and remanded. The ALJ improperly discounted the opinion of a physician and improperly considered Roddy’s testimony about her ability to do housework. View "Roddy v. Astrue" on Justia Law

The 57-year-old woman, diagnosed with frozen shoulder and later with chronic obstructive pulmonary disease, stopped medical treatment in 2003, having no health insurance and income of $4500 to $9000 a year as a clerical worker. Her last significant employment, as a hotel night-clerk, ended in 2007. She got another clerical job, but was immediately fired because unable to lift a box of paper. She sought social security disability benefits and resumed treatment. She had regained the full range of motion, but muscles in her arms and shoulders were weak and she had chronic obstructive pulmonary disease, causing bronchitis, respiratory infections, and shortness of breath. The ALJ decided that she was capable of performing as hotel clerk and was not disabled; he disregarded findings by a doctor whom he had appointed and with whom the applicant had no prior relationship. He noted the “lack of aggressive treatment” and that she smoked, overlooking that she stopped smoking 30 years earlier. The ALJ focused on her ability to do laundry, take public transportation, and grocery shop. The Appeals Council declined review. The Seventh Circuit remanded, stating that: “Really the Social Security Administration and the Justice Department should have been able to do better.” View "Hughes v. Astrue" on Justia Law

Welch called 911. A Wishard ambulance arrived. Welch was 34 weeks pregnant. Paramedics ascertained that her water broke and she had a prolapsed umbilical cord. After consulting with her obstetrician’s office, paramedics contacted the Beech Grove emergency room and transported her there. Beech Grove did not have an obstetrics facility. Rather than delivering the baby, the physician sent Welch in the Wishard ambulance to another hospital, where the baby was delivered by Caesarean section. He had suffered hypoxia resulting in severe brain damage. Plaintiffs alleged that Wishard violated the Emergency Medical Treatment and Active Labor Act, 42 U.S.C. 1395dd. The district court granted defendants summary judgment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, finding that the situation did not fit the definition of “come to the emergency room:” that an individual in an ambulance owned and operated by the hospital is deemed to have come to the emergency room unless the ambulance is operated under communitywide emergency medical service protocols that direct it to transport the individual to a hospital other than the owner. The Wishard ambulance was operating under EMS protocols when it transported the plaintiffs. Although the definition was adopted after the incident, it was merely a clarification. View "Beller v. Health & Hosp. Corp. of Marion Cnty. IN" on Justia Law

Ruppel sued CBS in Illinois alleging CBS’s predecessor, Westinghouse, caused the mesothelioma from which he suffers. Westinghouse had included asbestos in the turbines it supplied to the U.S. Navy, and Ruppel was allegedly exposed to it during his Naval service and later when he worked on an aircraft carrier as a civilian. CBS removed the case under the federal officer removal statute, which permits removal of certain suits where a defendant that acted under a federal officer has a colorable federal defense, 28 U.S.C. 1442(a)(1). Ruppel moved to remand and, without allowing response, the district court granted the motion. The district court concluded Ruppel only sued CBS for failing to warn about the dangers of asbestos for which there is no federal defense. The Seventh Circuit reversed. CBS’s relationship with Ruppel arises solely out of CBS’s duties to the Navy. It also has a colorable argument for the government contractor defense, which immunizes government contractors when they supply products with specifications approved by the government. View "Ruppel v. CBS Corp." on Justia Law

Omni, a technology consulting agency, hired Messier to work as a temporary programmer for Thrivent pursuant to an agreement between Omni and Thrivent. After leaving Omni and Thrivent, Messier had a difficult time finding a new job and began to suspect that Thrivent was saying negative things about him to prospective employers who called for reference checks. The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission alleges that during these reference checks, Thrivent was revealing information about Messier’s migraine condition to prospective employers in violation of the medical record confidentiality requirements of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. 12111. The district court found that Thrivent learned of Messier’s migraine condition outside the context of a medical examination or inquiry, so that the confidentiality provisions did not apply, and granted summary judgment to Thrivent. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, finding that Thrivent had no duty to treat its knowledge of Messier’s migraine condition as a confidential medical record because Messier had volunteered the information in responding to an inquiry about his absence from work. View "Equal Emp't Opportunity Comm'n v. Thrivent Fin. for Lutherans" on Justia Law

A chiropractor pleaded guilty to defrauding health insurers and to money laundering and was sentenced to 70 months (the bottom of the guidelines range) and to pay restitution of almost $2 million. At the guilty-plea hearing the judge asked the defendant whether he was “currently under the influence of any drugs, medicine, or alcohol,” and the defendant answered: “prescription medications.” He told the judge that he was taking medicines for “high anxiety, depression, adult attention hyperactivity disorder, and depression,” but stated that he was “thinking clearly.” He waived his right to appeal, but six weeks later moved to retract the plea, claiming that he had been taking psychotropic drugs, rendering his plea involuntary. The judge denied the motion because the defendant had presented no evidence that switching from Prozac to Lexapro could have the dramatic effects he claimed it had, and because at the plea hearing he had been alert and responsive and exhibited no signs of confusion. The Seventh Circuit affirmed.View "Unted States v. Hardimon" on Justia Law

Anderson, a U.S. Postal Service worker, suffers from asthma. While he is virtually symptom-free outside of the workplace, his asthma regularly flared up at his job as a part-time mail processor. Between 2002 and 2009, Anderson filed numerous Equal Employment Opportunity complaints, an Occupational Health and Safety Administration complaint, and union grievances relating to his condition, requesting reasonable accommodations. He was absent from work for extended periods of time throughout the 2002-2009 period. Anderson sued USPS, for alleged violations of the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. 701, and the Americans with Disability Act, for retaliation, disability discrimination, failure to accommodate, and violations of the Family Medical Leave Act. The district court granted USPS summary judgment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Anderson cannot point to temporal proximity between protected activity and adverse action on the part of USPS. Nor did he present evidence that similarly situated employees were treated differently or that USPS acted pretextually. View "Anderson v. Donahoe" on Justia Law