Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Yurt suffers from a psychotic disorder which causes him to experience auditory hallucinations and bouts of uncontrollable rage. He also has obsessive compulsive disorder, moderately severe chronic obstructive pulmonary disease (COPD), and chronic bifrontal tension headaches. He has worked as a cook and a janitor, last working in May 2010, when he suffered a mental break and was terminated for threatening a coworker with a knife. He applied for Disability Insurance Benefits from the Social Security Administration, but an ALJ denied his application. The Appeals Council declined review. The district court affirmed. The Seventh Circuit reversed and remanded, agreeing that the ALJ erred by failing to include many of his medical limitations in the hypothetical that she posed to the vocational expert. View "Yurt v. Colvin" on Justia Law

E.Y., a child, was diagnosed with diplegic cerebral palsy. His mother alleges that E.Y.’s illness resulted from medical malpractice by the federally-funded Friend Family Health Center, where she received her prenatal care, and the private University of Chicago Hospital, where she gave birth. Federal law makes a suit against the Center a suit against the United States under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) that had to be filed within the FTCA’s two-year statute of limitations, 28 U.S.C. 2401(b). The district court granted summary judgment for the government, finding that the suit was filed about two weeks too late. The mother argued that although she was aware she might have a claim against the University Hospital more than two years before filing this suit, she remained unaware that the Friend Center might be involved until she received a partial set of medical records on December 14, 2006, making her suit timely. The Seventh Circuit reversed. A reasonable trier of fact could find that Ms. Wallace the mother was unaware and had no reason to be aware of the Friend Center’s potential involvement in her son’s injuries until less than two years before she filed suit. View "E. Y., v. United States" on Justia Law

Townsend applied for social security disability benefits and supplemental security income in 2003, at age 44, claiming that she had become incapable of full‐time gainful employment in May 2002 when she had stopped working as a result of multiple physical and psychiatric ailments, including fibromyalgia. In 2012 an ALJ decided that she had become totally disabled in November 2008. By the time that decision was rendered she had died (of pulmonary diseases apparently unrelated to the ailments alleged to have made her totally disabled). Her father was substituted for her. The district court upheld the decision. The Seventh Circuit reversed and remanded, noting multiple errors in determining the onset of total disability. View "Williams v. Colvin" on Justia Law

Breedlove pleaded guilty to drug trafficking and firearms offenses. Before his sentencing hearing, Breedlove filed a “Notice of Ineffective Counsel,” complaining of a conspiracy between his counsel, co-defendants and the court. Breedlove was provided new counsel, who recommended that Breedlove be evaluated for competence. Dr. Szyhowski diagnosed Breedlove as having paranoid schizophrenia. Breedlove was committed to a federal medical facility in Butner, North Carolina. The Bureau of Prisons requested authorization to involuntarily administer antipsychotic medications. At a hearing, the government presented a psychologist and a psychiatrist who jointly authored the report that recommended involuntary medication. In the psychiatrist's opinion, Breedlove’s delusions would remain fixed and prevent him from consenting to medication. Both doctors testified that Breedlove would be closely monitored while at Butner, but acknowledged that when Breedlove was returned to Illinois, they did not know the extent to which he would be monitored. The defense did not call witnesses, but merely submitted testimony from another case that the 79% success-rate figure in the Butner study was too high. The district court granted the request to medicate and denied Breedlove’s motion for reevaluation. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. In Sell v. United States (2003) the Supreme Court determined that to allow involuntary medication, the government must prove by clear and convincing evidence that: important governmental interests are at stake; involuntary medication would significantly further those interests; no viable alternative exists; and administration of the drugs is in the patient’s best medical interest. The district court’s findings were adequate on each factor. View "United States v. Breedlove" on Justia Law

Gienapp worked at Harbor Crestnursing care facility. In January 2011 she told Chattic, its manager, that she needed leave to care for her daughter, who was being treated for thyroid cancer. Chattic granted leave under the Family and Medical Leave Act, 29 U.S.C. 2612(a)(1). While on leave, Gienapp submitted an FMLA form, leaving blank a question about the leave’s expected duration. Harbor Crest did not ask her to fill in the blank, nor did it pose written questions as the 12-week period progressed. A physician’s statement on the form said that the daughter’s recovery was uncertain, and that if she did recover she would require assistance at least through July 2011. Chattic inferred from this that Gienapp would not return by April 1, her leave’s outer limit, and hired a replacement. When Gienapp reported for work on March 29, Chattic told her that she no longer had a job. The district court entered summary judgment, ruling that Gienapp had forfeited her FMLA rights by not stating exactly how much leave she would take. The Seventh Circuit reversed. Gienapp could not give a firm date; Department of Labor regulations call her situation “unforeseeable” leave, governed by 29 C.F.R. 825.303, which does not require employees to tell employers how much leave they need. View "Gienapp v. Harbor Crest" on Justia Law

Bryn Mawr Chicago nursing home, a Medicaid provider, is subject to Illinois Department of Public Health (IDPH) inspections. In 2010, IDPH inspected the facility following allegations that a resident had been sexually assaulted. Bryn Mawr was eventually cited for three deficiencies, 42 C.F.R. 488.301, two based on sexual abuse and one based on failure to sufficiently monitor a resident. Bryn Mawr challenged the findings by Informal Dispute Resolution, which involved exchange of written information without a live hearing. IDPH simultaneously conducted internal review and found that the deficiencies based on allegations of sexual abuse were not sufficiently supported by credible evidence, but the third party upheld the deficiency findings. Ultimately IDPH maintained the deficiency findings. Meanwhile, Bryn Mawr also engaged in a parallel process to “correct” deficiencies. At the follow-up inspection, IDPH determined that the deficiencies had been corrected, so that remedies would not be imposed. IDPH passed the deficiency findings on to the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, which published them on its website and factored them into its 5-Star Rating System. Bryn Mawr’s rating was supposed to fall from five to four stars because of the deficiencies, but CMS mistakenly reduced it to two stars. Regardless of a partial correction, Bryn Mawr was displeased that it had not had the opportunity to challenge the findings at a hearing and sued to compel a hearing. The district court granted summary judgment to defendants. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. View "Bryn Mawr Care, Inc. v. Sebelius" on Justia Law

In 2008, Shields, an Illinois prisoner was lifting weights and ruptured the pectoralis tendon in his left shoulder. Although he received some medical attention, he did not receive the prompt surgery needed for effective treatment. Due to oversights and delays by those responsible for his medical care, too much time passed for surgery to do any good. He has serious and permanent impairment that could have been avoided. After his release from prison, Shields filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging that several defendants were deliberately indifferent to his serious medical needs and violated his rights under the Eighth Amendment to the Constitution. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, reasoning that Shields was the victim not of any one person’s deliberate indifference, but of a system of medical care that diffused responsibility for his care to the point that no single individual was responsible for seeing that he timely received the care he needed. As a result, no one person can be held liable for any constitutional violation. Shields’ efforts to rely on state medical malpractice law against certain private defendants also failed. View "Shields v. IL Dep't of Corrs." on Justia Law

In 2006 Buechel was incarcerated at FCI-Greenville federal correctional institution, where he contracted Methicillin-Resistant Staphylococcus aureus, (MRSA), a staph infection resistant to certain antibiotics. Buechel was hospitalized for more than 40 days and was left with serious and permanent damage to his heart and lungs. He sued under the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. 1346(b), alleging that his injuries were caused by the prison’s negligence. The district court issued a pretrial order that limited Buechel’s negligence claim to a theory that he contracted MRSA from contact with one fellow inmate, in the prison laundry in July 2006, or more generally as a result of sloppy procedures in handling infected prison laundry. After a bench trial, the court held that Buechel had not proved that he contracted MRSA from either the inmate or the laundry procedures and entered judgment in favor of the government. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the finding that Buechel failed to prove that he contracted MRSA from the inmate or as a result of inadequate laundry procedures, but vacated and remanded for consideration of a broader theory. Buechel’s administrative claim and complaint presented a broader theory that the prison was negligent more generally in its failure to adhere to its MRSA-containment policies.View "Buechel v. United States" on Justia Law

The Affordable Care Act, 42 U.S.C. 300gg-13(a)(4), requires health insurance providers (including third party administrators) to cover certain preventive services without cost to the insured, including, “with respect to women … preventive care and screenings,” including all FDA-approved contraceptive methods, sterilization, and patient education for women with reproductive capacity. The University of Notre Dame self‐insures employees’ medical expenses; Meritain administers the employee health plan. For students’ medical needs, Notre Dame has a contract with Aetna. Because Catholic doctrine forbids the use of contraceptives, Notre Dame has never paid for contraceptives for employees or permitted Aetna to insure the expense of contraceptives. Because of those religious objections and the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 42 U.S.C. 2000bb‐1(a), the government created a religious exemption, 45 C.F.R. 147.130(a)(1)(iv)). New regulations enlarged the exemption, so that Notre Dame came within its scope. To exercise its right to opt out of paying for coverage for contraceptives, the university completed a form that alerts insurers that Notre Dame is not going to pay, so they will have to pay. The government will reimburse at least 110 percent of the third‐party administrator’s costs and Aetna can expect to recoup its costs from savings on pregnancy medical care. Several months after the regulations were promulgated, the University unsuccessfully sought a preliminary injunction. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, noting that the University had not indicated exactly what it wanted enjoined at this stage. The insurance companies were not parties, and, therefore, could not be enjoined from providing the required coverage. A religious institution has no right to prevent other institutions from engaging in acts that merely offend the institution and the University has complied by completing the required form. View "Univ. of Notre Dame v. Sebelius" on Justia Law

Charlie has Type 1 diabetes, managed with an insulin pump, a personal diabetes manager, and a continuous glucose monitor. Before Charlie entered kindergarten, his parents worked with the school district to develop a “504 plan” to enable him to attend public school. Charlie’s plan incorporated doctor’s orders for how insulin doses and snacks would be administered at school; required his school to train three “Diabetes Personnel;” and that all staff members who would interact with Charlie be given general training about diabetes. The school hired a licensed nurse, to perform Charlie’s care and held one general training session and one session specific to Charlie’s equipment, attended by almost all staff who would interact with Charlie. In Charlie’s second year, the parents complained to the Department of Education that the school was violating the 504 plan by failing to have three Trained Diabetes Personnel and refusing to allow the nurse to adjust insulin doses on a case-by-case basis. A mediated agreement required the school to conduct training for three nurses and generally required the school to follow the 504 plan. The parents continued to be dissatisfied and moved Charlie to a private school with no medically trained staff and no formal plan for his diabetes care. The district court rejected their suit under the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. 794, and the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. 12132. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, finding neither intentional discrimination nor failure to reasonably accommodate Charlie’s diabetes.View "CTL v. Ashland Sch. Dist." on Justia Law