Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

In 2003 Tipton Hospital awarded Babchuk medical staff privileges and gave his professional corporation an exclusive contract to provide radiology services. In 2012 Tipton cancelled both his medical privileges and his corporation’s contract. In Babchuk’s suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, the district judge granted summary judgment in favor of all defendants, reasoning that the plaintiffs had failed to prove they had a federally protected property interest in Dr. Babchuk’s hospital privileges or in the contract between his professional corporation and the hospital. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, finding that the conduct of which Babchuk complained was not state action and, therefore, not actionable under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The fact that some of Tipton’s revenues are siphoned off to the state university that owns it does not make the hospital a state actor. The university may well exert pressure direct and indirect on Tipton, just as federal and state governments in manifold ways exert pressure on private institutions. “Government is omnipresent; that doesn’t make all employees of private entities state actors.“ View "Babchuk v. IN Univ. Health, Inc" on Justia Law

On July 5, 2013, the Governor of Wisconsin signed into a law a statute that the Wisconsin legislature had passed one month earlier prohibiting a doctor from performing an abortion unless he or she has admitting privileges at a hospital no more than thirty miles from the clinic in which the abortion is performed. Planned Parenthood of Wisconsin and Milwaukee Women’s Medical Services (which operate the only four abortion clinics in Wisconsin) joined by two doctors employed by Planned Parenthood, challenged the statute’s constitutionality under 42 U.S.C. 1983, first seeking and obtaining a preliminary injunction and ultimately seeking a permanent injunction against enforcement of the statute. After a trial, the trial judge granted a permanent injunction against enforcement of the statute. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, holding (1) Plaintiffs had standing to sue; and (2) the statute is unconstitutional because it imposes a burden excessive in relation to the aims of the statute and the benefits likely to be conferred by it. View "Planned Parenthood of Wisconsin, Inc. v. Schimel" on Justia Law

Plaintiff has a neurological disorder, tardive dyskinesia. Plaintiff’s involuntary movements include tongue thrusting, pursing of the lips, choking, and side-to-side chewing of the jaw. She becomes mute, screams or makes non-verbal sounds, particularly under stress. She also suffers post-traumatic stress disorder and bipolar disorder, with severe anxiety. Shortly after plaintiff was diagnosed with TD, a personal injury suit that she had filed went to trial. She had no lawyer. Before trial, she sought accommodations of her medical problems, and was permitted to have a friend and a family member take notes, was given a podium, and was allowed to take occasional recesses. She was denied other requested help—a microphone, an interpreter, and a jury instruction explaining her disorder, lest the jurors think she was just acting up. She was hectored by the judge, who told the jury that the plaintiff has a “speech impediment.” She suffered other embarrassments in front of the jury, which returned a verdict for the defendant. Plaintiff unsuccessfully moved for a new trial on the ground that she was disabled within the meaning of the Americans with Disabilities Act yet had been denied reasonable accommodations. The Seventh Circuit reversed and remanded, finding that plaintiff was denied a full and fair opportunity to vindicate her claims. View "Reed v. State of Illinois" on Justia Law

Religious, not-for-profit organizations challenged the “contraceptive mandate” of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010 (ACA), 42 U.S.C. 300gg-13(a)(4), arguing that the ACA’s accommodations for religious organizations impose a substantial burden on their free exercise of religion, and that the ACA and accompanying regulations are not the least restrictive means of furthering a compelling government interest, in violation of the plaintiffs’ rights under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 (RFRA), 42 U.S.C. 2000bb. The district court entered a preliminary injunction. The Seventh Circuit reversed, stating: It is the operation of federal law, not any actions that the plaintiffs must take, that causes the provisions of services that the plaintiffs find morally objectionable. The accommodation has the legal effect of removing from objectors any connection to the provision of contraceptive services. View "Grace Schools v. Burwell" on Justia Law

Textron began operations at its fastener manufacturing plant in Rochester, Indiana, in 1954; it remained in operation through 2006. The plant released vinyl chloride, a toxic gas, which eventually seeped into the groundwater, contaminating nearby residential wells. One of those wells belonged to the Woods. Both Textron and the Indiana Department of Environmental Management performed testing on the Woods’ well. The family left immediately. While living at the Rochester house, their adopted children, C.W. and E.W., experienced gastrointestinal issues (vomiting, bloody stools), immunological issues, and neurological issues. Both children were younger than two years old when the family left the house; their health improved after leaving. The parents sued on behalf of their children, alleging negligence, negligence per se, negligent infliction of emotional distress, and willful and wanton misconduct. The court excluded their three expert witnesses, finding they did not use reliable bases to support their opinions, and granted Textron summary judgment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, finding that the district court properly applied the Daubert framework to the experts and, without the experts, the plaintiffs could not prove causation. View "C.W. & E.W. v. Textron, Inc." on Justia Law

Defendant-appellant Dr. Kamal Patel was a physician who commonly prescribed home health care services for his patients. Federal investigators learned that defendant had been receiving undisclosed payments from Grand Home Health Care. Patel was charged with six counts of violating (and one count of conspiring to violate) the Anti-Kickback Statute. During his bench trial, at the close of the government’s evidence, defendant moved to acquit, arguing that he had not “referred” any patients to Grand because there was no evidence that he steered or directed his patients to Grand; rather, the patients independently chose Grand as their provider after defendant prescribed home health care. The district court rejected that argument, holding that, even if a patient had initially chosen Grand, defendant “referred” the patient to Grand when he certified or recertified that the patient needed care, that the care would be provided by Grand, and that Grand could be reimbursed by Medicare for services provided. On appeal, defendant argued that the district court erred by holding that the certification and recertification, via a standardized Medicare form (Form 485), of patients for treatment constituted a “referral” under the Anti-Kickback Statute. He also argued that even if those certifications were referrals, there was insufficient evidence to conclude that Patel was paid “in return for” certifications, as required by the statute. Finding no reversible error, the Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment. View "United States v. Patel" on Justia Law

Scrogham, then age 53, applied for disability benefits under the Social Security Act, submitting medical conditions including degenerative discs, spinal stenosis, sleep apnea, hypertension, arthritis, atrial fibrillation and restless leg syndrome. An ALJ denied the application and the Appeals Council denied his request for review. The district court affirmed, holding that the ALJ did not err in giving less weight to the opinion of a treating physician than to the opinions of nontreating physicians, that the ALJ permissibly found Scrogham not to be credible and that the ALJ’s decision otherwise was supported by substantial evidence. The Seventh Circuit reversed and remanded. The ALJ impermissibly ignored a line of evidence demonstrating the progressive nature of Scrogham’s degenerative disc disease and arthritis and inappropriately undervalued the opinions of Scrogham’s treating physicians, whose longitudinal view of Scrogham’s ailments should have factored prominently into the ALJ’s assessment of his disability status. Even considering only “the snapshots of evidence that the ALJ considered,” that limited evidence does not build the required logical bridge to her conclusions. The ALJ apparently misunderstood or at least considered only partially some of the evidence about Scrogham’s daily activities, rehabilitation efforts and physicians’ evaluations.View "Scrogham v. Colvin" on Justia Law

Two nurses, formerly employed by Momence, alleged that, during their employment at Momence, they uncovered evidence that Momence knowingly submitted "thousands of false claims to the Medicare and Medicaid programs” in violation of the False Claims Act (FCA) and Illinois Whistleblower Reward and Protection Act. They filed a qui tam action on behalf of the government and alleged that Momence retaliated against them for reporting its fraud. A jury awarded the government more than $3 million in compensatory damages and imposed about $19 million in fines for the qui tam claims. Pursuant to the FCA, the compensatory damages were trebled to more than $9 million. The district court set aside the fines as violating the Excessive Fines Clause of the Eighth Amendment. The jury also awarded the nurses $150,000 and $262,320, respectively, on their retaliation claims. The Seventh Circuit vacated. Both claims failed as a matter of law. Rejecting claims of “worthless services” and false certification, the court stated that, at best, a reasonable jury might be able to say that some of Momence’s claims were false, but that is not enough to satisfy the burden of proof. The employment of one nurse was not terminated, the other’s employment was terminated for an unrelated matter.View "Absher v. Momence Meadows Nursing Ctr., Inc." on Justia Law

Hansen’s employer has an attendance policy, under which employees accumulate points for unexcused absences. When an employee incurs 10 points within a year, his employment is subject to termination. Leave under the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA), 29 U.S.C. 2601–2654 is not counted. As of May 2, 2011, Hansen had nine points. He was absent from work from May 3-6 and May 9. On May 3, he requested FMLA leave for depression. On May 11, he provided medical certification, documenting episodic flare-ups periodically preventing him from performing his job. Hansen’s absences earlier that month were approved as FMLA leave. Hansen requested FMLA leave for eight days in June and incurred no attendance points for these absences. Based on the doctor’s faxed response to an inquiry, three subsequent requests were denied. Hansen accumulated 13 points in one year and his employment was terminated because he “exceeded [his] frequency” under which he could “miss 4 times every 6 months.” Later, the doctor sent a letter, modifying his original certification. The letter did not mention the July absences. The company did not retract the termination. Hansen sued under the FMLA alleging interference and retaliation. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the employer, holding that without expert testimony Hansen could not show that his serious health condition rendered him unable to work during the absences for which he was terminated. The Seventh Circuit reversed. The law does not require a plaintiff to present expert testimony as to his incapacity, and Hansen’s evidence has raised a genuine issue of material fact for trial. View "Hansen v. Fincantieri Marine Grp LLC" on Justia Law

To compensate teaching hospitals for the extra financial burden of providing training, the Medicare program provides additional reimbursement for expenses beyond the immediate costs of patient care, including for “indirect medical education” (IME) costs to account for the time medical interns and residents spend in ways that enhance their ability to provide patient care but that are not connected to the treatment of any particular patient, 42 U.S.C. 1395ww(d)(5)(B)(ii). The district court held that time spent by interns and residents in research activities wholly unrelated to the diagnosis or treatment of patients could be counted as part of this indirect-education time and that Rush University Medical Center, was entitled to Medicare reimbursements for these activities between the years 1983 and 2001. The Seventh Circuit reversed and remanded, noting that the Secretary of Health and Human Services has interpreted the Medicare Act consistently since 1983 to exclude pure research activities from compensable IME costs. Congress codified this exclusion for Fiscal Years 2001 onward in the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010, but explicitly declined to lay down a rule for the years 1983 to 2001. The Secretary has now promulgated a regulation excluding pure research from the IME cost calculation for all years since 1983. View "Rush Univ. Med. Ctr v. Sebelius" on Justia Law