Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Ruppel sued CBS in Illinois alleging CBS’s predecessor, Westinghouse, caused the mesothelioma from which he suffers. Westinghouse had included asbestos in the turbines it supplied to the U.S. Navy, and Ruppel was allegedly exposed to it during his Naval service and later when he worked on an aircraft carrier as a civilian. CBS removed the case under the federal officer removal statute, which permits removal of certain suits where a defendant that acted under a federal officer has a colorable federal defense, 28 U.S.C. 1442(a)(1). Ruppel moved to remand and, without allowing response, the district court granted the motion. The district court concluded Ruppel only sued CBS for failing to warn about the dangers of asbestos for which there is no federal defense. The Seventh Circuit reversed. CBS’s relationship with Ruppel arises solely out of CBS’s duties to the Navy. It also has a colorable argument for the government contractor defense, which immunizes government contractors when they supply products with specifications approved by the government. View "Ruppel v. CBS Corp." on Justia Law

American citizen-civilians, employees of a private Iraqi security services company, alleged that they were detained and tortured by U.S. military personnel while in Iraq in 2006, then released without being charged with a crime. Plaintiffs sought damages and to recover seized personal property. The district court denied motions to dismiss. In 2011, the Seventh Circuit affirmed in part, holding that plaintiffs sufficiently alleged Secretary Rumsfeld's personal responsibility and that he is not entitled to qualified immunity. On rehearing en banc, the Seventh Circuit reversed, stating that a common-law claim for damages should not be created. The Supreme Court has never created or even favorably mentioned a nonstatutory right of action for damages on account of conduct that occurred outside of the U.S. The Military Claims Act and the Foreign Claims Act indicate that Congress has decided that compensation should come from the Treasury rather than from federal employees and that plaintiffs do not need a common-law damages remedy in order to achieve some recompense. Even such a remedy existed, Rumsfeld could not be held liable. He did not arrest plaintiffs, hold them incommunicado, refuse to speak with the FBI, subject them to loud noises, or threaten them while they wore hoods. View "Vance v. Rumsfeld" on Justia Law

Lynch was injured while working at a jobsite as a mechanic for Metropolitan Rail (Metra), when the top rail of a chain-link fence he was installing fell and struck him on the back of his neck and shoulders. In his suit under the Federal Employers’ Liability Act, 45 U.S.C. 51, the district court granted summary judgment in favor of Metra. The Seventh Circuit vacated and remanded, finding that Lynch adequately raised material issues of fact concerning whether Metra was negligent. View "Lynch v. NE Reg'l Commuter R.R.Corp." on Justia Law

In 2004, Illinois enacted Hospital Provider Funding Legislation imposing a tax on hospital providers, except for certain categories of exempt hospitals, for fiscal years 2004 and 2005, 305 ILCS 5/5A-2(a). The Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services disallowed the reimbursement of Medicare expenses (42 U.S.C. 1395f(b)(1)) to a group of Illinois hospitals, finding that the amount of a tax assessment paid by the hospitals was a reasonable cost, but was subject to offset by any payments those hospitals received from an Illinois State fund. The district court and Seventh Circuit affirmed, finding that the decision was not inconsistent with established policy. The court rejected an argument that the hospitals incurred the full cost of the tax, as they were billed by and wrote checks to the state, reasoning that the argument ignored the real net impact of the tax and of Access Payments by the state.View "Abraham Lincoln Mem'l Hosp. v. Sebelius" on Justia Law

Klene, a citizen of the Philippines, applied for U.S. citizenship. USCIS denied the application after concluding that Klene’s marriage to a U.S. citizen had been fraudulent. Klene asked a district court for relief under 8 U.S.C.1421(c), which allows a judge to make an independent decision about an alien’s entitlement to be naturalized. USCIS opened removal proceedings. The court dismissed Klene’s suit, based 8 U.S.C. 1429, which provides: “[N]o application for naturalization shall be considered by the Attorney General if there is pending against the applicant a removal proceeding pursuant to a warrant of arrest issued under the provisions of this chapter or any other Act.” USCIS acts as the Attorney General’s surrogate. The Seventh Circuit vacated and remanded. While a court cannot order the Attorney General to naturalize an alien, it can enter a declaratory judgment of entitlement to citizenship without violating section. A judgment declaring that Klene’s marriage was bona fide would bring the removal proceeding to a prompt close. This approach preserves the alien’s entitlement under section1421(c) to an independent judicial decision while respecting the limit that section 1429 places on the Attorney General’s powers. View "Klene v. Napolitano" on Justia Law

McInnis, a law-school graduate who has never been licensed to practice, filed a pro se complaint accusing his employer, the Department of Education, of violating federal law (Whistleblower Protection Act, 5 U.S.C. 1211 to 1222; Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 2000e) by passing him over for promotion and giving him a performance appraisal that he says is both inaccurate and incomplete. He had worked for the Department for more than 20 years and claimed race and gender discrimination and retaliation. After he had failed for a second time to attend a scheduled hearing, the district court dismissed the suit for failure to prosecute. The Seventh Circuit affirmedView "McInnis v. Duncan" on Justia Law

USA Cleaning is a proprietorship with fewer than 10 employees that provides janitorial services to a cement plant owned by Essroc. After an inspection of the plant the Federal Mine Safety and Health Administration ordered three janitors to undergo 24 hours of safety training. The Administration issued a “withdrawal order,” forbidding the janitors from reenterng the plant until they completed training, 30 U.S.C. 814(g)(1). Essroc provided legal assistance to challenge the order; within a week the lawyers billed $22,000. A week after issuing the order, the Administration vacated it, without acknowledging error. The review commission dismissed USA Cleaning’s contest proceeding. USA Cleaning requested $22,000 in legal fees that Essroc had paid (Equal Access to Justice Act, 5 U.S.C. 504). The Administration refused; the review commission upheld the refusal. The Seventh Circuit dismissed, noting that not the Federal Mine Safety and Health Administration, but a separate body, the Federal MineSafety and Health Review Commission, was named as respondent along with the Secretary of Labor. The review commission is the equivalent of a court. It did not issue the order challenged by the petitioner, but merely upheld the refusal of the mine-safety administration to award attorneys’ fees. View "USA Cleaning Serv. & Bldg. Maint. v. Fed. Mine Safety & Health Comm'n" on Justia Law

Owens, a Chicago zoning inspector, was convicted of two counts of federal program bribery, 18 U.S.C. 666(a)(1)(B), for accepting two $600 bribes in exchange for issuing certificates of occupancy for four newly constructed homes. The Seventh Circuit reversed, finding that there was insufficient evidence, to establish beyond a reasonable doubt, that the issuance of the certificates of occupancy had a value of $5,000 or more as required by the statute. View "United States v. Owen" on Justia Law

Bontrager filed a putative class action complaint challenging Indiana’s $1,000 annual limit for dental services covered by Medicaid, 42 U.S.C. 1396. The district court granted a preliminary injunction, holding that Indiana is required to cover all medically necessary dental services, irrespective of the monetary cap. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Bontrager has an enforceable federal right capable of redress through Section 1983. The monetary cap, which excludes medically necessary treatment, is not a utilization control procedure, but allows a state to shirk its primary obligation to cover medically necessary treatments. The court acknowledged that Bontrager’s victory may be short-lived if the state decides to end coverage for all dental services. View "Bontrager v. IN Family & Soc. Servs." on Justia Law

Claiming anxiety, depression, suicidal tendencies, insomnia, vertigo, migraine headaches, fibromyalgia, carpal tunnel syndrome, and plantar fasciitis, Farrell, then 33 year old, applied for disability insurance benefits. Her initial application was denied, but the Social Security Administration Appeals Council remanded. The Administrative Law Judge again ruled against her, in part because of her failure to establish definitively that she suffered from fibromyalgia. The Appeals Council summarily affirmed this decision, despite new evidence before it that confirmed the fibromyalgia. The district court affirmed. The Seventh Circuit reversed. The Social Security Administration’s regulations require the Appeals Council to consider “new and material evidence.” The ALJ did not adequately deal with competing expert opinions. View "Farrell v. Astrue" on Justia Law