Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The Wisconsin DNR decided to terminate a separate Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (WPDES) permit for Flambeau’s mining operation and to regulate Flambeau’s storm water discharge under its mining permit, allowing more frequent inspections. Flambeau has been in compliance since the permit issued in 1998. Plaintiff filed suit under the Clean Water Act’s citizen‐suit provision, 33 U.S.C. 1365(a)(1), alleging that Flambeau violated the CWA by discharging pollutants without a permit. They argued that the CWA permit shield did not apply because Flambeau did not have a WPDES permit and its mining permit was not issued pursuant to the CWA because Flambeau could not establish that the EPA had specifically approved the regulation under which the DNR issued the permit. The district court agreed and, after a trial, determined that Flambeau had violated the CWA and assessed penalties. The Seventh Circuit reversed, finding that the permit shield applies, characterizing the suit as an attempt to collaterally attack the WPDES program. View "WI Res. Prot. Council v. Flambeau Mining Co." on Justia Law

Hester, a white male, began working for the Department’s laboratory in 1994. In 2007 he was reprimanded for failing to timely report test results. Hester later applied for promotion. Liu interviewed him, but chose another white male. When the supervisory position opened again, Hester again applied and was interviewed. Liu chose a white female in her mid-twenties, Gentry, who had been working in the lab for four years, citing Gentry’s performance record and concern that Hester did not have a good working relationship with others. In 2009, Hester received a form listing his “performance deficiencies.” A second performance appraisal report found that Hester still did not meet expectations for “job knowledge” and “communication.” The Department terminated his employment. Hester, then in his 50s, could be fired only for just cause. The State Employees Appeals Commission rejected his challenge. Hester sued, alleging violations of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. 621, and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. 2000e. The district court entered summary judgment, holding that Indiana was immune from liability for private damages under the ADEA, and that Hester did not adequately show that the Department discharged Hester because of a protected characteristic. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. View "Hester v. IN Dep't of Health" on Justia Law

In 2009 the Fire Protection District passed an ordinance under which it took over fire alarm monitoring for all commercial properties in the District. Private alarm companies that had previously provided that service sued, alleging interference with their business, illegal monopoly, violations of constitutional rights, and exceeding statutory powers. Before the district court issued an opinion on remand, the District repealed the 2009 ordinance. Under a new ordinance, the District would not own any transmitters and would permit property owners to contract with private companies for alarm transmission, monitoring, and equipment; signals would still be transmitted via the District’s network to the District’s receiver. The district court entered a modified permanent injunction, requiring the District to permit alarm companies to receive and transmit signals directly from property alarm boards, independently of the District. The injunction barred the District from requiring that fire signals be sent to its station, charging residents for fire protection services, or selling or leasing fire alarm system equipment. It required the District to allow alarm companies to use any technology equivalent to wireless transmission and compliant with the NFPA code, to adopt the most current version of the NFPA code, and to refund fees. The Seventh Circuit affirmed as modified. The new injunction sets appropriate boundaries and does not contravene the earlier decision in most ways. The court struck provisions requiring refunds to subscribers and requiring the District to adopt the most current versions of the NFPA code. View "ADT Sec. Servs., Inc. v. Chicago Metro. Fire Prevention Co." on Justia Law

Gray filed returns for tax years 2001 through 2004 after the IRS notified her in 2006 that it planned to assess her tax liability on its own. The IRS accepted Gray’s calculations, but imposed penalties for late filing and payment, 26 U.S.C. 6651. When Gray did not pay, the IRS filed liens. Gray timely requested a Collections Due Process hearing, 26 U.S.C. 6330, at which she unsuccessfully argued that penalties, liens, and levies should be eliminated. The IRS then mailed Gray “notices of determination” approving liens and levies. Gray sought review in Tax Court, waiting more than 30 days to file. The court concluded that it lacked jurisdiction because Gray’s petitions were untimely. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The statute creates a 30-day time limit for appealing CDP determinations, 26 U.S.C. 6330(d)(1); no longer period applied to Gray’s cases. Gray then claimed that IRS employees engaged in wide-ranging wrongdoing in dealing with her and sought damages for unauthorized tax collection, 26 U.S.C. 7433. More than six months later, after the IRS moved to dismiss for failure to exhaust administrative remedies, Gray filed an administrative claim. The district court dismissed. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, stating that the exhaustion requirement is not actually jurisdictional, but is still mandatory. View "Gray v. United States" on Justia Law

In 2011 Wisconsin reduced subsidies for the Wisconsin Care Program, which funds grants for organizations administering programs for disabled persons who live in group homes. The plaintiffs are developmentally disabled and suffered the largest cuts. Persons who had received smaller payments bore smaller cuts. For some (frail elderly) per capita payments increased. Plaintiffs claim that making larger absolute cuts for persons whose care is most expensive violated the Rehabilitation Act and the Americans with Disabilities Act and that reduction in payments increases the risk that they will be moved from group homes to institutions. The district judge noted that states have waived sovereign immunity with respect to the Rehabilitation Act, as a condition to receiving federal funds. The Supreme Court has held that the portions of the ADA that are not designed to implement disabled persons’ constitutional rights cannot be used to override states’ sovereign immunity. The district court concluded that the relevant provisions of the ADA do not concern the Constitution and that other claims were premature because no plaintiff has been moved to an institution. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, noting that without information about care provided to other disabled persons, there is no useful theory of discrimination. View "Amundson v. WI Dep't of Health Servs." on Justia Law

In the 1980s, the owners bought the Cottonwood seasonal campground in Cedar Grove, Indiana. Each of 50-80 campsites has a water spigot and sewer hookup for recreational vehicles. The property also has two restrooms with working toilets, sinks, and showers. In 1998, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) issued an Administrative Order under the Safe Drinking Water Act, 42 U.S.C. 300g-3(b), (g), finding that Cottonwood operated as a public water system and was required to sample its water system, and to notify any individuals who use the property of its past failure to monitor the water system. The owners tested the water only sporadically over the following years. They denied that the water system constituted a public water system under SDWA because the water spigots are marked as “Non-Potable,” so users would know that water is not provided for human consumption. The district court entered summary judgment, finding violation of SDWA. The Seventh Circuit dismissed an appeal, finding that the owners had not raised any of their appellate arguments in the district court. View "United States v. Ritz" on Justia Law

The 1987 Public Utilities Act, 220 ILCS 5/8-403.1, was intended to encourage development of power plants that convert solid waste to electricity. Local electric utilities were required to enter into 10-year agreements to purchase power from such plants designated as “qualified” by the Illinois Commerce Commission, at a rate exceeding that established by federal law. The state compensated electric utilities with a tax credit. A qualified facility was obliged to reimburse the state for tax credits its customers had claimed after it had repaid all of its capital costs for development and implementation. Many qualified facilities failed before they repaid their capital costs, so that Illinois never got its tax credit money back. The Act was amended in 2006, to establish a moratorium on new Qualified Facilities, provide additional grounds for disqualifying facilities from the subsidy, and expand the conditions that trigger a facility’s liability to repay electric utilities’ tax credits. The district court held that the amendment cannot be applied retroactively. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The amendment does not clearly indicate that the new repayment conditions apply to monies received prior to the amendment and must be construed prospectively. View "Illinois v. Chiplease, Inc." on Justia Law

Seitz and Welter were partners in Wasco, a property management company. Greg was also a police officer. Elgin’s police chief confronted Greg with the emails showing that Greg had used the Law Enforcement Agencies Data System (LEADS) to research cars parked in front of Wasco properties. Illinois limits use of LEADS to criminal justice purposes. The chief notified Gregg of a misconduct investigation regarding his use of LEADS. The city allegedly received its information after Tamara, Greg’s then wife and a fellow police officer, and Beeter accessed Greg’s email account and conveyed print-outs to the corporation counsel under cover of anonymity. Greg and Seitz sued Tamara and Beeter, alleging violations of the Federal Wiretap Act (FWA), the Stored Communications Act (SCA), and the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, and state law claims. They sued Elgin under the FWA. The district court dismissed the complaint against the city, concluding that the FWA, 18 U.S.C. 2511(1) prohibits “persons” from intercepting communications, but does not extend its definition of “person” to municipalities. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. A 1986 amendment permits suit against governmental units by adding “entity” to the text, but only for substantive provisions that identify an “entity” as a potential violator of that provision. View "Seitz v. City of Elgin" on Justia Law

A 1952 collective bargaining agreement still governs aspects of the employment of some members of the Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers and Trainmen, including the attendance and leave policy. In 2003 the Union Pacific Railroad adopted a new attendance policy. The union demanded arbitration under the Railway Labor Act, 45 U.S.C. 153, arguing that the new attendance policy conflicted with the 1952 agreement. An arbitrator found that the 2003 attendance policy did not conflict with the 1952 agreement. The union sought to vacate the arbitration award. The district court granted summary judgment against the union. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, holding that the arbitrator did not exceed his jurisdiction in interpreting the 1952 agreement. View "Bhd. of Locomotive Eng'rs & Trainmen v. Union Pac. R.R. Co." on Justia Law

Swanson purchased a lakeside home, next to the home of Whitworth, the elected mayor of Chetek. Swanson obtained a permit for “remodel-repair” and began work, including installation of a three-foot high fence between his property and Whitworth’s and along the street. Whitworth repeatedly told a building inspector that he should not have issued a permit; repeatedly entered the Swanson house without permission; used his influence to cause another inspector to delay a fence permit; told the fence installation team that Swanson was a drug dealer and unlikely to pay; and caused municipal prosecution of Swanson for construction of the fence in violation of a five-foot setback that did not apply to Swanson’s fence. Meanwhile, another neighbor of Swanson, installed a fence that encroached on part of Swanson’s property, without a permit, and was not prosecuted. Swanson filed a class-of-one equal protection suit and defamation and slander claims. The magistrate judge granted summary judgment for Whitworth, finding that Swanson did not show a similarly situated individual who received more favorable treatment. The Seventh Circuit reversed. A clear showing of animus, absent a “robust comparison” to a similarly situated individual, may sustain a class-of-one equal protection claim. View "Swanson v. Whitworth" on Justia Law