Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Wisconsin’s Act 10 significantly changed Wisconsin public‐sector labor law: it prohibited government employers from collectively bargaining with their general employees (not public safety employees) over anything except base wages and precluded general‐employee unions from using automatic payroll deductions and fair‐share agreements. Act 10 mandated that general‐employee unions submit to a recertification election every year (instead of remaining certified indefinitely) and certification requires affirmative votes from an absolute majority of the bargaining unit, not just those voting. Public‐employee unions and an individual union member sued, claiming that these changes infringe their First Amendment petition and association rights and deny union members the equal protection of the laws. The district court rejected the challenges. The Seventh Circuit, having previously held that Act 10’s prohibition on payroll deductions did not violate the First Amendment and that Act 10’s distinction between public safety and general employees was viewpoint‐neutral, affirmed. The court concluded that the law does not implicate the First Amendment and applied rational basis review. Its limitations on the scope of statutory collective bargaining are rationally related to a legitimate government interest: promoting flexibility in state and local government budgets by providing public employers more leverage in negotiations. View "Laborers Local 236, AFLO-CIO v. Walker" on Justia Law

Since 1994, Harper has served as Fulton County Treasurer, an elected position with a four-year term. The 21-member County Board sets salaries for elected officials. From 1983–2002, the County Treasurer and County Clerk were paid the same salary. When Rumler, the County Clerk, announced his retirement, the board increased his salary in order to allow him to receive greater retirement benefits. From 2003–2006, the County Clerk’s salary exceeded the County Treasurer’s salary. After Rumler’s retirement, the new County Clerk, James Nelson, and the County Treasurer were paid the same salary from 2007–2010. In the meantime, disputes between Harper and the Board apparently prompted the Finance Committee to recommend against increasing the County Treasurer’s salary in 2010. The Board adopted the recommendation, 10–8, but voted (16–2) to give the County Clerk annual pay raises. Harper filed a 42 U.S.C. 1983 action, alleging sex discrimination in compensation. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the county. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Harper failed to show that the Board’s concerns about the content and timeliness of her reports were merely excuses covering sex discrimination. View "Harper v. Fulton Cnty." on Justia Law

Bryn Mawr Chicago nursing home, a Medicaid provider, is subject to Illinois Department of Public Health (IDPH) inspections. In 2010, IDPH inspected the facility following allegations that a resident had been sexually assaulted. Bryn Mawr was eventually cited for three deficiencies, 42 C.F.R. 488.301, two based on sexual abuse and one based on failure to sufficiently monitor a resident. Bryn Mawr challenged the findings by Informal Dispute Resolution, which involved exchange of written information without a live hearing. IDPH simultaneously conducted internal review and found that the deficiencies based on allegations of sexual abuse were not sufficiently supported by credible evidence, but the third party upheld the deficiency findings. Ultimately IDPH maintained the deficiency findings. Meanwhile, Bryn Mawr also engaged in a parallel process to “correct” deficiencies. At the follow-up inspection, IDPH determined that the deficiencies had been corrected, so that remedies would not be imposed. IDPH passed the deficiency findings on to the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, which published them on its website and factored them into its 5-Star Rating System. Bryn Mawr’s rating was supposed to fall from five to four stars because of the deficiencies, but CMS mistakenly reduced it to two stars. Regardless of a partial correction, Bryn Mawr was displeased that it had not had the opportunity to challenge the findings at a hearing and sued to compel a hearing. The district court granted summary judgment to defendants. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. View "Bryn Mawr Care, Inc. v. Sebelius" on Justia Law

The major political parties in Marion County, Indiana followed a tradition of “slating” candidates that have the financial and organizational backing of party leadership in the primaries. Indiana enacted an “anti-slating” statute, prohibiting distribution of a list endorsing multiple political candidates during a primary election unless all such candidates have given written consent, Ind. Code 3-14-1-2(a). More than 10 years ago, that law was challenged as violating the First Amendment, resulting in a federal injunction against its future enforcement and a consent decree in which all parties stipulated and the court declared that the law was facially unconstitutional. The Marion County Election Board was a defendant, but nonetheless enforced the statute against a candidate running for state representative in the 2012 primary. That candidate sought an injunction. The district court dismissed the case under the “Younger” abstention doctrine, citing a still-ongoing Election Board investigation. The Seventh Circuit reversed. The Election Board’s investigation is too preliminary a proceeding to warrant Younger abstention, at least in light of the Supreme Court’s 2013 decision, Sprint Communications, Inc. v. Jacobs. Even if Younger abstention were theoretically available, the previous final federal judgment against the Election Board would amount to an extraordinary circumstance making Younger abstention inappropriate. View "Mulholland v. Marion Cnty. Election Bd." on Justia Law

In 2008, Shields, an Illinois prisoner was lifting weights and ruptured the pectoralis tendon in his left shoulder. Although he received some medical attention, he did not receive the prompt surgery needed for effective treatment. Due to oversights and delays by those responsible for his medical care, too much time passed for surgery to do any good. He has serious and permanent impairment that could have been avoided. After his release from prison, Shields filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging that several defendants were deliberately indifferent to his serious medical needs and violated his rights under the Eighth Amendment to the Constitution. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, reasoning that Shields was the victim not of any one person’s deliberate indifference, but of a system of medical care that diffused responsibility for his care to the point that no single individual was responsible for seeing that he timely received the care he needed. As a result, no one person can be held liable for any constitutional violation. Shields’ efforts to rely on state medical malpractice law against certain private defendants also failed. View "Shields v. IL Dep't of Corrs." on Justia Law

Until 1998, Vanaria was employed by the Cook County Probation Department. He was terminated following investigation of allegations that he had sought sexual favors in exchange for looser conditions of probation. In 2002 the county rehired Vanaria, who was a political operative. He began working at a county hospital in a position excluded from decrees prohibiting hiring decisions based on politics. The hospital did not conduct background investigations of patronage hires. A pharmaceutical representative alleged that Vanaria had attempted to condition her participation in a hospital program on her giving him a massage. An investigation resulted in oral counseling for Vanaria, but no discipline. In 2007, Vanaria offered Krystal, an unemployed massage therapist, a position as a physical therapist. When she stated that she was not qualified as a physical therapist, he explained that he could make things happen because people owed him favors. He provided her with legitimate application forms and insurance paperwork. When Krystal returned to his office with her Social Security card, Vanaria asked Krystal to close the door and told her that if she truly wanted the job, she had to kiss and massage him. Krystal agreed to have Vanaria visit her at her home massage studio, where they had sexual contact. Krystal eventually called the hospital’s HR department and learned that no position had ever existed, Vanaria eventually pled guilty to official misconduct and bribery. The district court rejected Krystal’s Title VII (42 U.S.C. 2000e), equal protection, and due process claims and state law claims. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. View "Wilson v. Cook County" on Justia Law

A large group of African-American police officers and firefighters sued the City of Indianapolis, alleging that the examination process it uses to rank candidates for promotion in the police and fire departments has a disparate impact on black candidates and is intentionally discriminatory. They filed lawsuits targeting promotion decisions made in successive promotion cycles starting inv2002, but most of the challenged decisions were based on scores generated by testing administered by the police department in 2008 and the fire department in 2007. The district court dismissed many of the claims as either time-barred or substantively flawed. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Although the district court mistakenly assumed that allegations of intentional discrimination necessarily defeat a disparate-impact claim, here the disparate-impact claims fail because they are stated as legal conclusions, without any factual content to support an inference that the examination procedures caused a disparate impact on black applicants for promotion. The disparate-treatment claims lacked evidentiary support and were properly resolved on summary judgment. Although the second complaint concerns a different set of promotion decisions, it attacked the same eligibility list that was at issue in the first case and was, therefore, barred. View "Adams v. City of Indianapolis" on Justia Law

In Wisconsin, Register of Deeds is an elected position. If a vacancy occurs mid-term, the governor may appoint an interim Register for any unexpired portion of the term. The Marinette County Register announced her mid-term retirement. Chasensky, then employed as Chief Deputy Register of Deeds, sought the interim appointment. Chasensky was interviewed by Esser, Walker’s appointments official, who informed Chasensky that he would forward her application to Governor Walker for appointment to the position. Esser subsequently learned that Chasensky was involved in a personal bankruptcy proceeding. Esser informed Chasensky that Walker would not appoint her as interim Register. Chasensky claims that Werwie, Walker’s official spokesperson, publically broadcast that she was not appointed because she was in a bankruptcy proceeding and that “[d]erogatory comments and innuendo regarding [her] bankruptcy, personal financial matters and character which impugned and harmed [her] professional and personal reputation were intentionally publically disclosed by Governor Walker and Mr. Werwie” when Governor Walker spoke on the FOX television network. Werwie publically announced that Walker had planned to appoint her until he learned of her bankruptcy. In her suit alleging violation of privacy rights, employment rights, and of 11 U.S.C. 525(a) (bankruptcy discrimination), the district court held that the defendants waived qualified immunity by failing to raise it before their motion to dismiss the amended complaint. The Seventh Circuit reversed; the defendants are entitled to qualified immunity from Chasensky’s privacy and equal protection claims. View "Chasensky v. Walker" on Justia Law

After the end of World War II, holders of public and private bonds issued in Germany demanded repayment. Germany had suspended payment on many bonds during the 1930s, but some were not due until the 1950s or 1960s. A Debt Agreement involving 21 creditor nations specified that Germany would pay valid debts outstanding in 1945. Germany enacted a Validation Law requiring holders to submit foreign debt instruments for determination of whether the claims were genuine. In 1953 the U.S. and West Germany agreed by treaty (applicable to Germany as reconstituted in 1990) that the debts would be paid only if found to be legitimate. Holders had five years to submit documents for validation by a New York panel. Later claims went to an Examining Agency in Germany. Decisions were subject to review in Germany. Plaintiffs sued in 2008 under international diversity jurisdiction, 28 U.S.C. 1332(a)(2), to recover on bearer bonds issued or guaranteed by Germany before the war. One holder never submitted to validation. The other submitted bonds to a panel in Germany, which found them ineligible, and did not seek review. The district court dismissed, holding that the Treaty is binding and that the suit was barred by a 10-year (Illinois) statute of limitations. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting an argument that the Treaty amounted to a taking without just compensation. The Tucker Act, 28 U.S.C. 1491(a)(1), authorizes whatever compensation the Constitution requires and the Supreme Court has stated that there is no constitutional obstacle to an international property settlement. The Treaty is not self-executing; the Alien Tort Statute, 28 U.S.C. 1350, cannot be used to contest the acts of foreign nations within their own borders. How Germany administers the validation process is for German courts to consider. The case was also barred by the limitations period. View "Korber v. Bundesrepublik Deutscheland" on Justia Law

The Seventh Circuit considered appeals by Illinois and Illinois counties and a Wisconsin county of district court holdings that those governmental bodies cannot levy a tax on sales of real property by Fannie Mae (Federal National Mortgage Association) and Freddie Mac (Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation). Although both are now private corporations, the relevant statutes provide that they are “exempt from all taxation now or hereafter imposed by any State … or local taxing authority, except that any real property of the corporation shall be subject to State … or local taxation to the same extent as other real property,” 12 U.S.C. 1723a(c)(2), 12 U.S.C. 1452(e). The Seventh Circuit affirmed. A transfer tax is not a tax on realty. After 2008 Fannie Mae owned an immense inventory of defaulted and overvalued subprime mortgages and is under conservatorship by the Federal Housing Finance Agency. The states essentially requested the court to “pierce the veil,” in recognition of the fact that if the tax is paid, it will be paid from assets or income of Fannie Mae or Freddie Mac, but their conservator is the United States, and the assets and income are those of entities charged with a federal duty. View "Milwaukee Cnty v. Fed. Nat'l Mortg. Ass'n" on Justia Law