Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Before the 2008 presidential election, federal agents were investigating then-Governor Blagojevich and obtained warrants authorizing the interception of his phone calls. When Barack Obama, then a Senator from Illinois, won the election, Blagojevich was to appoint his replacement. Interceptions revealed that Blagojevich viewed the opportunity to appoint a new Senator as a bonanza. After two trials, Blagojevich was convicted of 18 crimes, including attempted extortion from campaign contributors, corrupt solicitation of funds, wire fraud, and lying to federal investigators. The district court sentenced Blagojevich to 168 months’ imprisonment. The Seventh Circuit vacated convictions on five counts, concerning Blagojevich’s proposal to appoint Valerie Jarrett to the Senate in exchange for an appointment to the Cabinet, and remanded. The court rejected a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, but concluded the instructions permitted the jury to convict even if it found that his only request of Obama was for a Cabinet position. A proposal to trade one public act for another, logrolling, is unlike the swap of an official act for a private payment. The instructions do not ensure that the jury found that Blagojevich offered to trade the appointment for a private salary. Because the court affirmed on most counts and concluded that the sentencing range lies above 168 months, Blagojevich is not entitled to release pending further proceedings. View "United States v. Blagojevich" on Justia Law

Dibble and Akemann were arbitrators for the Illinois Workers’ Compensation Commission. At the time of their appointments, the Workers’ Compensation Act, 820 ILCS 305/14, provided that each arbitrator would be appointed for a term of six years, with the possibility of reappointment. The legislature passed Public Act 97–18, which was signed on June 28, 2011 and took effect three days later, ending the terms of all incumbent arbitrators effective July 1, 2011 and providing that the Governor would make new appointments. The law allowed incumbent arbitrators to serve as holdovers until the Governor made new appointments. By July 1, 2012, both Dibble and Akemann had lost their positions. They alleged that by shortening their six‐year terms as arbitrators under the prior law, Public Act 97–18 deprived them of a property interest without due process of law. The Seventh Circuit affirmed judgments for defendants. Plaintiffs’ claims for injunctive relief were moot, and the defendants were entitled to qualified immunity on plaintiffs’ claims for damages. Even if plaintiffs plausibly allege a constitutional violation, the applicable law was not clearly established under the circumstances of these cases, where a statutory amendment eliminated the property interest that a statute had previously conferred. View "Dibble v. Quinn" on Justia Law

Sprint wanted to expand its access to Illinois Bell’s infrastructure at regulated rates even when Sprint customers make calls to, or receive calls from, persons outside the region (Illinois) in which Illinois Bell operates. Sprint invoked “the duty to provide, for the facilities and equipment of any requesting telecommunications carrier, interconnection with the local exchange carrier’s network for the transmission and routing of telephone exchange service and exchange access,” 47 U.S.C. 251(c)(2)(A). Illinois Bell refused to make an interconnection agreement, citing a regulation by the Federal Communications Commission. Sprint asked the Illinois Commerce Commission to arbitrate the disputes with the Bell company. The Commission rejected Sprint’s claims, and the district court affirmed. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Sprint’s approach would create an incentive for phone companies to engage in postage-stamp pricing so that they would never have to pay access charges when placing calls from their subscribers to subscribers of other companies. Illinois Bell’s approach, though equally arbitrary, has at least the virtue of not affecting how telephone companies decide to price their services. View "SprintCom, Inc. v. Sheahan" on Justia Law

Engstrand, a former dairy farmer, applied for Disability Insurance Benefits and Supplemental Security Insurance because of pain caused by diabetic neuropathy and osteoarthritis, in July 2010, when he was 47. He alleged an onset of disability in July 2007, more than a year before his date last insured in September 2008. The ALJ concluded that his account of his limitations was not credible, that the opinion of his treating physician was not entitled to deference, and that Engstrand was not disabled. The Seventh Circuit reversed and remanded, stating that the ALJ wrongly evaluated the significance of his daily activities and did not explain his rejection of the doctor's testimony. View "Engstrand v. Colvin" on Justia Law

Ortiz, working for a concrete products manufacturer, was in a sand storage bin trying to scrape its wall, when he sank and was engulfed by sand up to his neck. Workers tried to dig him out. Plant manager MacKenzie was notified within 10 minutes. He decided there was no emergency and left the scene. Rescue efforts were not progressing; Ortiz asked the workers to call 911. No one did. Eventually, MacKenzie called 911. The Fire Department’s Technical Rescue Team arrived within minutes. Ortiz had been trapped for 90 minutes. Using a vacuum truck to remove the sand, the team extricated Ortiz in about four hours. He sustained serious injuries to his lower body. The bin is a “permit-required confined space.” OSHA requires “procedures for summoning rescue and emergency services, for rescuing entrants … and for preventing unauthorized personnel from attempting a rescue.” The plan must specify that emergency services are to be summoned immediately and forbid others to attempt rescue. Other regulations require danger signs and a protective barrier. An OSHA inspector cited the employer for three “serious” and one “willful” violation, 29 U.S.C. 666. An ALJ imposed a penalty of $70,000. The Seventh Circuit denied a petition for review that challenged the finding of the willful violation and the finding of violation of the requirement of a barrier. View "Dukane Precast, Inc. v. Perez" on Justia Law

Senne parked his car on the street in front of his Palatine, Illinois house in violation of an ordinance. A police officer stuck a parking ticket face down under the windshield wiper; it included Senne’s name, birthdate, sex, height, weight, driver’s license number, and address (outdated), plus the vehicle’s description and vehicle identification number. Senne filed a purported class action under the Driver’s Privacy Protection Act, 18 U.S.C. 2721, which forbids knowing disclosure of personal information obtained in connection with a motor vehicle record, “except as provided in subsection (b).” Subsection (b) permits “disclosure” “in connection with any civil, criminal, administrative, or arbitral proceeding”” and “use by any government agency, including any court or law enforcement agency, in carrying out its functions.” After a remand, the court rejected his claims. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, noting that there was no evidence that anyone has ever taken a parking ticket from a windshield in Palatine and used personal information on the ticket. There has never been a crime or tort, resulting from personal information placed on traffic tickets. Had the Village made parking ticket information publicly available over the Internet, or included highly sensitive information such as a social security number, the risk of a nontrivial invasion of privacy would be much greater and might outweigh the benefits to law enforcement. View "Senne v. Village of Palatine" on Justia Law

Illinois requires that motor carriers of property, conducting intrastate operations, obtain a license from the Illinois Commerce Commission, which requires appropriate insurance or surety coverage. A carrier complies by submitting proof of insurance or bond coverage and is then issued a public carrier certificate, stating that the holder “certifies to the Commission that it will perform transportation activities only with the lawful amount of liability insurance in accordance with 92 Ill. Admin. Code 1425.” Drivers must have a copy of the license with them at all times. It is a Class C misdemeanor offense for an operator not to produce proof of registration upon request. Three carriers were cited by the ICC police for conducting regulated activity without a license. During a follow-up investigation, the carriers refused to comply, reasoning that documents sought by the ICC would reveal their rates, routes, and services, so the requirement was preempted by the Federal Aviation Administration Authorization Act, 49 U.S.C. 14501(c). The ICC rejected the argument. The Seventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of the ICC, concluding that the document requests had no significant economic impact on rates, routes or services and, alternatively, that efforts to enforce the licensing requirement are exempted from preemption. View "Nationwide Freight Sys., Inc. v. Ill. Commerce Comm'n" on Justia Law

Most federal employees receive health benefits through the Federal Employee Health Benefits Program (FEHBP). Until the 2010 enactment of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA), members of the U.S. Senate and House of Representatives, and their staff members, were eligible for FEHBP insurance. The ACA limited their options to plans created under the ACA or offered through a health insurance exchange established under the ACA; they could no longer receive insurance through the FEHBP (42 U.S.C. 18032(d)(3)(D)). The Office of Personnel Management conducted notice-and-comment rulemaking and issued the final rule, 78 Fed. Reg. 60653-01. Senator Johnson and his legislative counsel sought to enjoin implementation of that rule, which, they claimed, was contrary to the ACA and other law because it allows the government to make pre-tax employer contributions to non-FEHBP plans and makes members of Congress and their staffs eligible for an ACA insurance exchange reserved for small businesses. The Seventh Circuit affirmed dismissal, finding that the plaintiffs had not identified a judicially cognizable injury that is traceable to aspects of the OPM regulation that they challenge. The court noted that the challenged regulation creates a benefit for Senator Johnson and that he is free to decline that benefit. View "Johnson v. United States Office of Pers. Mgmt." on Justia Law

Enacted after the attacks of September 11, 2001, the Terrorism Risk Insurance Act (TRIA), authorizes execution, in satisfaction of judgments against terrorists, on blocked assets that are seized or frozen by the United States. The plaintiffs, victims of terror, hold a judgment against al Qaeda for their $2.5 billion subrogation claims. The Seventh Circuit vacated summary judgment in favor of plaintiffs. Although plaintiffs have constitutional and statutory standing and TRIA is a remedial statute, under the statute the only assets subject to execution are blocked assets. Assets that are subject to a United States government license for final payment, transfer, or disposition, among other requirements, do not qualify as blocked assets. By the time plaintiffs filed their initial claims, the Office of Foreign Assets Control had already issued its license and the funds had already been arrested to preserve them for forfeiture; the funds were no longer blocked. View "United States v. Art Ins.Co." on Justia Law

The plaintiff, then age 40, applied to the Social Security Commission in 2009 for benefits, claiming to be disabled from gainful employment as a result of psychiatric disorders (depression and bipolar disorder), chronic back and hip pain, and an anal fissure. He had been trained as a machinist and, until 2002, had worked intermittently as a machinist and an assembly line worker. The administrative law judge denied his claim on the ground that he was capable of performing unskilled sedentary work. The district court upheld the denial of benefits. The Seventh Circuit reversed, noting contradictions and gaps in the ALJ’s reasoning. The court did “not say that Voigt is in fact totally disabled from gainful employment, however— only that he’s entitled to a more careful analysis of his claim by the Social Security Administration.” View "Voigt v. Colvin" on Justia Law