Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The plaintiff, now 62 years old, applied in 2011 to the Social Security Administration for disability benefits, citing ailments including asthma, chronic obstructive pulmonary disease (COPD), asbestosis, and a heel spur in his right foot. He had been a sheet metal journeyman for 33 years; the job requires physical strength and he had been given accommodations on the job for several years. The Social Security Appeals Council declined to review the administrative law judge’s denial and the district judge affirmed. The Seventh Circuit reversed and remanded, referring to the ALJ’s “seemingly inconsistent conclusions” and stating that the denial was “not a reasoned analysis of the plaintiff’s claim.” View "Dimmett v. Colvin" on Justia Law

In 1988, Department of Professional Regulation investigator visited Gekas, a Springfield, Illinois dentist, and expressed concern that Gekas had administered nitrous oxide to a child. He ordered Gekas to provide information on all prescriptions on a continuing basis. Gekas contacted Deputy Governor Riley for assistance. After a meeting, the Department imposed less onerous requirements. In 2002, a Department investigator raided Gekas’ offices, with the assistance of the Federal Drug Enforcement Agency. After failed negotiations, the Department issued a cease and desist order against Gekas for the unlicensed practice of medicine and prescribing controlled substances while not a licensed physician and sought to have his license suspended, on grounds that Gekas had prescribed 4,600 doses of Hydrocodone and Vicoprofen to a patient. Gekas contacted his Senator. In 2008, the cease-and-desist was vacated and the complaint dismissed. Gekas submitted a FOIA request concerning the administrative complaint. The Department responded that no public documents were available. In 2009, Gekas filed suit; it was dismissed by stipulation in 2010. Meanwhile, a Chairman on the Illinois Board of Dentistry issued subpoenas against Gekas, stating that there was reasonable cause to believe that Gekas had violated the Illinois Dental Practice Act. Gekas filed suit, alleging First Amendment retaliation. The district court granted defendants summary judgment, finding no evidence of retaliatory motive. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. View "Gekas v. Vasiliades" on Justia Law

In 2009-2011, Callahan frequently drove a taxicab in Chicago. She does not own a cab, nor does she own a medallion that represents the city’s permission to operate a taxi. She leased both from owners by the week, day, or half day. Callahan asserts that her net proceeds (fares and tips, less lease fees and gasoline) averaged less than the minimum wages required by the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. 201, and the Illinois Minimum Wage Law. Callahan contends that Chicago must make up the difference because its regulations (Chicago sets rates that taxis may charge) are confiscatory and are so extensive that Chicago must be treated as her employer. The Seventh Circuit affirmed dismissal. Callahan does not own any asset whose market value has been reduced by the regulation of taxi fares. Persons who own cabs or medallions are (potentially) adversely affected by caps on what owners can charge; Callahan owns her own time, but Chicago does not require her to devote any of that time to taxi driving. Extensive regulation does not make the government the employer of the regulated parties. View "Callahan v. City of Chicago" on Justia Law

The 1983 Shakman Accord resulted from resolution of political patronage litigation; to eliminate political considerations in employment decisions the city agreed to create and implement a hiring plan to effectuate the goal of eradicating political patronage. Shakman “adds speech and political affiliation to the list” of impermissible bases of employment discrimination delineated by Title VII of the Civil Rights Act. Eight applicants for the position of police officer with the Chicago Police Department, disqualified from consideration, sued the city, claiming violations of the city’s 2011 Hiring Plan, violation of the Shakman Accord, and equal protection violations under the Illinois Constitution. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the dismissals of the Shakman claims, which were filed beyond the 180-day time limit and were, therefore, barred by the statute of limitations.. View "Bonnstetter v. City of Chicago" on Justia Law

In 2014, the IRS issued an administrative summons to Titan, to inspect its 2009 records in connection with an audit of the company’s 2010 tax return. Titan had taken an operating-loss carryforward in the 2010 tax year for a loss that occurred in 2009. Titan had claimed this same loss in 2009; the IRS had already audited its return for that tax year. Titan refused to comply with the 2014 summons, citing 26 U.S.C. 7605(b), which provides that “only one inspection of a taxpayer’s books of account shall be made for each taxable year unless … the [Treasury] Secretary … notifies the taxpayer in writing that an additional inspection is necessary.” Because the Secretary had not issued this notice, Titan asserted that the reinspection of its 2009 records was not permitted. The district court ordered Titan to comply with the summons. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Section 7605(b) applies if the IRS seeks to inspect a taxpayer’s records when auditing a tax liability for a given year when the agency has already inspected the records in auditing the taxpayer’s liability for that same tax year. It does not apply when the IRS seeks already-inspected records for an audit of a different tax year. View "United States v. Titan Int'l, Inc." on Justia Law

Stark, an excavation and paving company, typically handles about 250 jobs per year in central and southern Illinois. The Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) issued Stark several citations at two worksites in 2008, following inspections. Another OSHA inspection, 17 days later, resulted in a citation for a willful excavation cave-in protection violation. The Secretary proposed penalties of $2000 for the eyewear violation, $35,000 for the spoil piles violation, and $70,000 each for the cave-in protections violations. An ALJ affirmed the citation for the eyewear violation and the $2000 penalty, affirmed the spoil piles violation and awarded a $20,000 penalty, and determined that the cave-in protection violations were serious violations rather than willful violations and imposed a $7,000 penalty for each, for a total penalty of $36,000. The Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission affirmed as to the spoil piles violation and the serious cave-in protection violation, but vacated the eyewear violation. As to the earlier cave-in protection violation, the Commission determined that it should be characterized as willful rather than serious and assessed a penalty of $60,000, for a total penalty of $87,000. The Seventh Circuit denied a petition for review. Stark failed to demonstrate that it had a safety policy that was effectively enforced. View "Stark Excavating, Inc. v. Perez" on Justia Law

In 2012, the National Labor Relations Board found that Big Ridge violated the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. 158, by threatening employees with mine closure and job loss based on their support of the union and discharging employee Waller because of his union support. The Seventh Circuit vacated the order, finding that the Board lacked a quorum because three of the Board’s five members were improperly appointed under the Recess Appointments Clause of the Constitution. In 2014, a validly constituted Board considered the case anew and again found that Big Ridge violated the Act. The Seventh Circuit denied Big Ridge’s petition for review and granted the Board’s cross-application for enforcement of its order, holding hold that the Board had jurisdiction to consider the case anew with a properly constituted Board. The Board established, by a preponderance of the evidence that anti-union animus was a motivating factor in Waller’s discharge; Big Ridge has not met its burden to show that it would have discharged Waller despite his union activities. View "Nat'l Labor Relations Bd. v. Big Ridge, Inc." on Justia Law

The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) brought an enforcement action under Section 707(a) of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 2000e‐6, claiming that CVS Pharmacy violates Title VII by offering a severance agreement, with waivers of claims against CVS, that could deter terminated employees from filing charges with the EEOC or participating in EEOC proceedings. The district court granted summary judgment for CVS, interpreting Title VII as requiring the EEOC to conciliate its claim before bringing a civil suit. The EEOC had refused to engage in conciliation. The court was also skeptical that an employer’s decision to offer a severance agreement to terminated employees could serve as the basis for a “pattern or practice” suit under Title VII, without any allegation that the employer engaged in retaliatory or discriminatory employment practices. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Under Section 707(e), the EEOC is required to comply with all of the pre‐suit procedures contained in Section 706 when it pursues “pattern or practice” violations. Because the EEOC has not alleged that CVS engaged in discrimination or retaliation by offering the Agreement to terminated employees, the EEOC failed to state a claim on which relief can be granted. View "Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n v. CVS Pharmacy, Inc." on Justia Law

Defendants are national securities exchanges registered with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and operate as self‐regulatory organizations that regulate markets in conformance with securities laws under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. 78a. Plaintiffs are securities firms and members of the defendant exchanges. They compete for customer order flow by displaying buy and sell quotations for particular stocks. Between at least January 2004 and June 2011, each defendant charged “payment for order flow” (PFOF) fees. Each defendant exchange imposes PFOF fees when a trade is made for a customer; however, these fees are not imposed for proprietary “house trades,” where a firm trades on its own behalf. The Seventh Circuit affirmed dismissal of plaintiffs’ suit, in which they sought to recover PFOF fees they claim were improperly charged. The district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction based on plaintiffs’ failure to exhaust administrative remedies before the SEC. View "Citadel Sec., LLC v. Chicago Bd. Options Exch., Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff applied for disability benefits, listing eight impairments. The Social Security Administration denied Plaintiff’s application and did so again on reconsideration. The next year, Plaintiff testified before an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ). The ALJ disbelieved Plaintiff’s testimony that she could not sit, stand, or walk for extended periods of time and denied Plaintiff’s application for Disability Insurance Benefits and Supplemental Security Income. The Appeals Council denied review, making the ALJ’s decision the final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security. Plaintiff challenged the ALJ’s adverse credibility finding on appeal. The Seventh Circuit reversed, holding that the ALJ’s analysis was flawed in several respects, and the ALJ’s mistakes in evaluating Plaintiff’s credibility were not harmless. Remanded. View "Hill v. Colvin" on Justia Law