Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The National Organic Standards Board, an advisory committee, has 15 members, all appointed by the Secretary of Agriculture, 7 U.S.C.6518(b), (c); its principal task is advising the Secretary what belongs on the “National List of approved and prohibited substances that shall be included in the standards for organic production and handling” Plaintiffs, who operate organic farms, asked the Secretary to appoint them to the Board, but the Secretary appointed Beck and Swaffar. Plaintiffs contend that Beck and Swaffar are ineligible to fill the seats to which they were appointed. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the suit for lack of standing. Beck and Swaffer, appointed to seats reserved for “individuals who own or operate an organic farming operation,” were office employees of agribusinesses that produce some organic products and some non-organic products. Plaintiffs argued that by deflecting the Board from making recommendations most likely to promote organic farmers’ interests, Beck and Swaffar have called organic-farming into disrepute and reduced organic sales; that is not the kind of person-specific loss needed to show standing. Any injury plaintiffs assert could not be redressed by a favorable decision. The Secretary has a statutory right to appoint Board members but no corresponding duty to evaluate any particular applicant. View "Cornucopia Institute v. United States Department of Agriculture" on Justia Law

Jane Doe is a transgender man residing in Marion County, Indiana. Doe is originally from Mexico. The U.S. granted him asylum because of the persecution he might face in Mexico for being transgender. Doe alleges that he faces harassment and discrimination in the U.S. when he gives his legal name or shows his identification to others. Doe sought to legally change his name from Jane to John so that his name conforms to his gender identity and physical appearance, which are male. Doe asserts that the statute governing name changes is unconstitutional because it requires petitioners to provide proof of U.S. citizenship, Ind. Code 34‐28‐2‐2.5(a)(5). As an asylee, Doe cannot provide such proof. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the dismissal of Doe’s case for lack of standing. The Eleventh Amendment generally immunizes state officials from suit in federal court unless the official has “some connection with the enforcement” of an allegedly unconstitutional state statute. The Governor, the Attorney General, and the Executive Director of the Indiana Supreme Court Administration, do not enforce the challenged law. The County Clerk of Court is not a state official, but Doe cannot establish “redressability” because the Clerk has no power to grant or deny a name-change petition but may only accept and process petitions. View "Doe v. Holcomb" on Justia Law

Jane Doe is a transgender man residing in Marion County, Indiana. Doe is originally from Mexico. The U.S. granted him asylum because of the persecution he might face in Mexico for being transgender. Doe alleges that he faces harassment and discrimination in the U.S. when he gives his legal name or shows his identification to others. Doe sought to legally change his name from Jane to John so that his name conforms to his gender identity and physical appearance, which are male. Doe asserts that the statute governing name changes is unconstitutional because it requires petitioners to provide proof of U.S. citizenship, Ind. Code 34‐28‐2‐2.5(a)(5). As an asylee, Doe cannot provide such proof. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the dismissal of Doe’s case for lack of standing. The Eleventh Amendment generally immunizes state officials from suit in federal court unless the official has “some connection with the enforcement” of an allegedly unconstitutional state statute. The Governor, the Attorney General, and the Executive Director of the Indiana Supreme Court Administration, do not enforce the challenged law. The County Clerk of Court is not a state official, but Doe cannot establish “redressability” because the Clerk has no power to grant or deny a name-change petition but may only accept and process petitions. View "Doe v. Holcomb" on Justia Law

The plaintiffs formed the Fredericksburg partnership to search for oil and contracted with Kraft for management services. The IRS began a criminal investigation of the partnership, Kraft, and Kraft principals Valeri and Blum. In 2003, the plaintiffs and the IRS settled allegations against the partnership in exchange for the payment of taxes for the tax year 1994. The statute of limitations for 1994 tax liability had expired, but the IRS had obtained a waiver from Valeri. The plaintiffs allege that the IRS did not sign the agreement and Valeri could not waive the statute of limitations on plaintiffs’ behalf, 26 U.S.C. 6229(a)–(b); that the IRS never sent the plaintiffs required notices that the IRS had begun an administrative proceeding, 26 U.S.C. 6223(a); and that plaintiffs did not discover these alleged violations until 2009. The plaintiffs never sent formal refund claims but filed suit in 2012. The Seventh Circuit affirmed dismissal of the refund claims for lack of jurisdiction for failure to exhaust administrative remedies and claims for damages because they alleged IRS errors only in assessing taxes, not in collecting them, and were outside the scope of section 7433. The court rejected claims to exceptions under the “informal claim doctrine,” noting that the plaintiffs never perfected their claims. View "Goldberg v. United States" on Justia Law

The Milchteins have 15 children. The two eldest refused to return home in 2011-2012 and were placed in foster care by Wisconsin state court orders. In federal court, the Milchteins argued that state officials violated the federal Constitution by either discriminating against or failing to accommodate their views of family management in the Chabad understanding of Orthodox Judaism. Those children now are adults. State proceedings with respect to them are closed. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the Milchteins’ suit as moot, rejecting arguments the district court could have entered a declaratory judgment because the Milchteins still have 12 minor children, who might precipitate the same sort of controversy. The Milchteins did not seek alteration of the state court judgment, so the Rooker-Feldman doctrine did not block this suit but it is blocked by the requirement of justiciability. The Milchteins want a federal judge to say where a state judge erred but not act on that error: “a naked request for an advisory opinion.” If Wisconsin again starts judicial proceedings concerning the Milchteins’ children, the "Younger" doctrine would require the federal tribunal to abstain. Younger abstention may be inappropriate if the very existence of state proceedings violated the First Amendment but the Milchteins do not contend that it is never permissible for a state to inquire into the welfare of a religious leader’s children. View "Milchtein v. Chisholm" on Justia Law

The Milchteins have 15 children. The two eldest refused to return home in 2011-2012 and were placed in foster care by Wisconsin state court orders. In federal court, the Milchteins argued that state officials violated the federal Constitution by either discriminating against or failing to accommodate their views of family management in the Chabad understanding of Orthodox Judaism. Those children now are adults. State proceedings with respect to them are closed. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the Milchteins’ suit as moot, rejecting arguments the district court could have entered a declaratory judgment because the Milchteins still have 12 minor children, who might precipitate the same sort of controversy. The Milchteins did not seek alteration of the state court judgment, so the Rooker-Feldman doctrine did not block this suit but it is blocked by the requirement of justiciability. The Milchteins want a federal judge to say where a state judge erred but not act on that error: “a naked request for an advisory opinion.” If Wisconsin again starts judicial proceedings concerning the Milchteins’ children, the "Younger" doctrine would require the federal tribunal to abstain. Younger abstention may be inappropriate if the very existence of state proceedings violated the First Amendment but the Milchteins do not contend that it is never permissible for a state to inquire into the welfare of a religious leader’s children. View "Milchtein v. Chisholm" on Justia Law

Delgado, an ATF agent, alleges that his supervisors retaliated against him after he reported his suspicions that another agent improperly shot at a fleeing suspect, provided an inaccurate report, and testified falsely about the incident. Delgado filed a whistleblower complaint with the Office of Special Counsel (OSC), which is charged with investigating allegations under the Whistleblower Protection Act, 5 U.S.C. 1214(a)(1)(A), 2302(b)(8). The OSC declined to investigate, telling Delgado that he had not made a disclosure protected by the Act and had failed to provide sufficient evidence to support his allegations of retaliation. The Merit Systems Protection Board dismissed his appeal, finding that Delgado had not satisfied the requirement that he “seek corrective action before the Special Counsel before seeking corrective action from the Board.” The Seventh Circuit remanded, finding that the OSC and the Board applied unduly stringent and arbitrary requirements. Delgado’s disclosure of suspected wrongdoing either explicitly accused another federal employee of perjury or provided sufficient evidence to justify such a suspicion worthy of consideration by superiors. Either version would be a protected disclosure. The Act requires only that a complainant fairly present his claim with enough specificity to enable the agency to investigate and does not require a whistleblower to prove his allegations before the OSC. View "Delgado v. Merit Systems Protection Board" on Justia Law

Delgado, an ATF agent, alleges that his supervisors retaliated against him after he reported his suspicions that another agent improperly shot at a fleeing suspect, provided an inaccurate report, and testified falsely about the incident. Delgado filed a whistleblower complaint with the Office of Special Counsel (OSC), which is charged with investigating allegations under the Whistleblower Protection Act, 5 U.S.C. 1214(a)(1)(A), 2302(b)(8). The OSC declined to investigate, telling Delgado that he had not made a disclosure protected by the Act and had failed to provide sufficient evidence to support his allegations of retaliation. The Merit Systems Protection Board dismissed his appeal, finding that Delgado had not satisfied the requirement that he “seek corrective action before the Special Counsel before seeking corrective action from the Board.” The Seventh Circuit remanded, finding that the OSC and the Board applied unduly stringent and arbitrary requirements. Delgado’s disclosure of suspected wrongdoing either explicitly accused another federal employee of perjury or provided sufficient evidence to justify such a suspicion worthy of consideration by superiors. Either version would be a protected disclosure. The Act requires only that a complainant fairly present his claim with enough specificity to enable the agency to investigate and does not require a whistleblower to prove his allegations before the OSC. View "Delgado v. Merit Systems Protection Board" on Justia Law

In 1987, African‐Americans filed suit against Chicago Heights, alleging dilution of voting opportunity. The election practices at issue were found to violate the Voting Rights Act, 52 U.S.C. 10101. Appellants split from other class plaintiffs and objected to the first consent decree; they have been the main opposition to proposed remedies. In 2010, the district court entered a consent decree, establishing a seven‐ward, single aldermanic form of government; including a ward map that complied with constitutional requirements; and requiring the city to reapportion the wards as the population changed. The subsequent 2010 census showed that the wards’ populations had changed, requiring reapportionment. After public comment, the city approved its redrawn ward map and sought approval of that map. Appellants objected and sought leave to file their own map for implementation by the court. The court held that the Decree gave the city the exclusive right to reapportion the wards. The city’s map still contained seven wards, each with an individual population deviation of less than 10 percent. However, the overall deviation was 12.65%. The Seventh Circuit affirmed that the proposed map is constitutional. The city presented sufficient justification and made a good faith effort to reapportion the map with the smallest population deviations practicable, using legitimate and nondiscriminatory objectives, such as maintaining historical and natural boundary lines where possible, and easing voter confusion by redrawing unusual boundaries. View "McCoy v. Chicago Heights Election Commission" on Justia Law

In 1987, African‐Americans filed suit against Chicago Heights, alleging dilution of voting opportunity. The election practices at issue were found to violate the Voting Rights Act, 52 U.S.C. 10101. Appellants split from other class plaintiffs and objected to the first consent decree; they have been the main opposition to proposed remedies. In 2010, the district court entered a consent decree, establishing a seven‐ward, single aldermanic form of government; including a ward map that complied with constitutional requirements; and requiring the city to reapportion the wards as the population changed. The subsequent 2010 census showed that the wards’ populations had changed, requiring reapportionment. After public comment, the city approved its redrawn ward map and sought approval of that map. Appellants objected and sought leave to file their own map for implementation by the court. The court held that the Decree gave the city the exclusive right to reapportion the wards. The city’s map still contained seven wards, each with an individual population deviation of less than 10 percent. However, the overall deviation was 12.65%. The Seventh Circuit affirmed that the proposed map is constitutional. The city presented sufficient justification and made a good faith effort to reapportion the map with the smallest population deviations practicable, using legitimate and nondiscriminatory objectives, such as maintaining historical and natural boundary lines where possible, and easing voter confusion by redrawing unusual boundaries. View "McCoy v. Chicago Heights Election Commission" on Justia Law