Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

In 2019 the Public Service Commission of Wisconsin issued a permit authorizing two transmission companies and an electric cooperative to build and operate a $500 million, 100-mile power line. Environmental groups filed lawsuits in both federal and state courts, alleging that two of the three commissioners had disqualifying conflicts of interest and should have recused themselves.The Seventh Circuit affirmed the denial of the commissioners’ motion to dismiss based on sovereign immunity. The commissioners were sued in their official capacities, so sovereign immunity blocks this suit in its entirety unless it falls within the Ex parte Young exception, which authorizes a federal suit against state officials for the purpose of obtaining prospective relief against an ongoing violation of federal law. The environmental groups seek an order enjoining the permit’s enforcement, prospective relief; they contend that the violation is ongoing as long as the permit remains in force and effect and the commissioners have the power to enforce, modify, or rescind it. Ex parte Young applies.The court, sua sponte, remanded with instructions to stay the case pending resolution of the state proceedings. Both cases raise materially identical due-process recusal claims. The case implicates serious state interests regarding the operation of Wisconsin administrative law and judicial review. Litigating the same questions in both court systems is duplicative and wasteful; comity and the sound administration of judicial resources warrant abstention. View "Driftless Area Land Conservancy v. Valcq" on Justia Law

Providers filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 and the Medicaid Act, alleging that the Department violated constitutional and statutory law in retroactively recalculating their Medicaid reimbursement rates for the three-month period of January through March 2016.The Seventh Circuit reversed the district court's dismissal of the Providers' procedural due process claim, concluding that, at this early stage in the litigation, the allegations are sufficient to allege a violation of procedural due process. First, the court explained that the Providers retain a legitimate entitlement to a rate determined according to that formula, and any action to alter the rate must be conducted with due process. In this case, according to the amended complaint, the auditors failed to provide any notice of the alleged deficiencies prior to the final decision, and the Providers had no opportunity to submit additional documentation or other evidence following that decision. The court stated that the burden on the Department in providing such notice is no impediment, given that the procedures are already in the Code. The court explained that the Department need only follow those procedures rather than routinely bypass them. Therefore, in the absence of that basic and fundamental protection against unfair or mistaken findings, the court concluded that the Providers have sufficiently alleged a violation of due process. Accordingly, the court remanded for further proceedings. View "Rock River Health Care, LLC v. Eagleson" on Justia Law

About 50 businesses that offer live adult entertainment (nude or nearly nude dancing) sought loans under the second round of the Paycheck Protection Program enacted to address the economic disruption caused by the Covid-19 pandemic. Congress excluded plaintiffs and other categories of businesses from the second round of the Program, 15 U.S.C. 636(a)(37)(A)(iv)(III)(aa), incorporating 13 C.F.R. 120.110. Plaintiffs asserted that their exclusion violated their rights under the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment.The district court issued a preliminary injunction, prohibiting the Small Business Administration (SBA) from denying the plaintiffs eligibility for the loan program based on the statutory exclusion. The Seventh Circuit granted the government’s stay of the preliminary injunction and expedited briefing on the merits of the appeal. The SBA satisfied the demanding standard for a stay of an injunction pending appeal, having shown a strong likelihood of success on the merits. Congress is not trying to regulate or suppress plaintiffs’ adult entertainment. It has simply chosen not to subsidize it. Such selective, categorical exclusions from a government subsidy do not offend the First Amendment. Plaintiffs were not singled out for this exclusion, even among businesses primarily engaged in activity protected by the First Amendment. Congress also excluded businesses “primarily engaged in political or lobbying activities.” View "Camelot Banquet Rooms, Inc. v. United States Small Business Administration" on Justia Law

In 2016, Chicago and the Barack Obama Foundation selected Jackson Park as the location for the Obama Presidential Center, to consist of a museum, public library, and other spaces for cultural enrichment and education related to the life and presidency of Barack Obama. The Center will occupy about 20 acres of the park and require that Chicago close several nearby roadways. The National Park Service approved the plan on the condition that Chicago expand nearby spaces for public recreation. The Federal Highway Administration approved the construction of new roadways to make up for the roadways to be closed. Those agencies together performed an environmental assessment and concluded that their decisions would have an insignificant effect on the environment and were the least damaging alternatives available; they did not consider whether Chicago could have further reduced environmental harms by building the Center elsewhere.Objectors sought to enjoin the construction of the Center. The district court denied their request for a preliminary injunction. The Seventh Circuit declined to enjoin construction pending appeal, having previously affirmed summary judgment for the defendants on the constitutional claims. The opponents are unlikely to show that the agencies made a clear error in judgment when weighing the benefits of change against history; the agencies considered the full environmental impact of the Center’s construction. View "Protect Our Parks, Inc. v. Buttigieg" on Justia Law

Bless was employed by the Cook County Sheriff’s Office, 1996-2013. In 2004, Bless earned his law degree and began practicing law in addition to working as a police officer. The Sheriff’s Office requires its employees to request and receive authorization before engaging in secondary employment. In 2004-2008, Bless received the required approval. In 2008, Bless was involved in a collision while on duty. He sustained injuries, was placed on disability leave, and received temporary disability benefits. Shortly after the accident, Bless was elected as a Republican McHenry County Commissioner. Soon after his return to work as a police officer, Bless was transferred to a less desirable shift.Meanwhile, the County discovered that Bless was driving his car while on disability leave although he had a driving restriction. The Office of Professional Review found no records of secondary employment requests for Bless for 2009-2010. Bless claimed that he had submitted those requests. OPR brought filed a complaint with the Merit Board, which found that Bless had engaged in unauthorized secondary employment, violated driving restrictions, and lied to OPR investigators; it directed the Sheriff’s Office to fire Bless. After his termination, Bless filed suit, alleging political retaliation under 42 U.S.C. 1983 (the Sheriff is a Democrat) and race discrimination under section 1983 and Title VII, 42 U.S.C. 2000e. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the rejection of both claims on summary judgment. View "Bless v. Cook County Sheriff's Office" on Justia Law

Disabled children are entitled to benefits from the Social Security Administration, 42 U.S.C. 1382c(a)(3)(C). While benefits for an adult depend on a work history plus current inability to perform a job, administrative officials ask whether the child’s limitations meet one of the many listed categories of disability or are functionally equivalent to one of them. When determining whether a child’s impairment is functionally equivalent to a listing, the issue is whether it produces a marked limitation in at least two—or an extreme limitation in one—of six “domains of functioning,”McCavic argued that his son, N., is disabled by attention deficit hyperactivity disorder, intellectual limitations (an IQ near 70), oppositional defiant disorder, and nocturnal enuresis. He claimed that these conditions meet, or are functionally equivalent to certain listings. An ALJ found that N. did not meet any of the listings and has a marked limitation in only one functional category, “acquiring and using information.” A district judge affirmed. The ALJ was entitled to credit the views of a special-education teacher, who knew N well and had a good grasp of gradations among children with intellectual shortcomings. While N. may have met the standards of the old version of the regulations, but not the new one, the change applies “to claims that are pending on or after the effective date.” View "McCavitt v. Kijakazi" on Justia Law

Under the Indiana Video Service Franchises Act of 2006, anyone offering “video service” must enter into a franchise agreement with the Indiana Utility Regulatory Commission in exchange for use of a public right-of-way. For years, traditional cable and communications companies like Comcast and AT&T have signed the franchise agreements and paid the required fees to government “units,” including counties, municipalities, or townships within the provider’s service area. Recently, traditional cable television has been supplanted in many ways by on-demand streaming platforms like Netflix; some cities concluded that streaming platforms offer “video service” within the meaning of the Act. The streaming platforms have not done so and have avoided the Act’s fee obligations.In 2020, several cities filed a putative class action against Netflix, Disney, Hulu, DIRECTV, and DISH Network, seeking a declaration that the defendants are subject to the Act and must pay past and future franchise fees. The defendants removed the case to federal court under 28 U.S.C. 1441 and 1453. . Invoking the comity abstention doctrine articulated by the Supreme Court in Levin v. Commerce Energy (2010), the district court remanded. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Indiana courts are well-positioned to interpret (for the first time) the state’s Video Service Franchises Act and to resolve any federal defenses raised by the streaming platforms. View "City of Fishers, Indiana v. DIRECTTV" on Justia Law

Indiana’s Act 442 allowed election officials to remove a voter from the state’s voter rolls automatically (without directly contacting the person) based on information acquired through a third-party database, “Crosscheck,” which provided the voter lists of multiple states. The Seventh Circuit concluded that Act 442 was preempted by the National Voter Registration Act (NVRA), 52 U.S.C. 20507(d), which requires hearing directly from that voter or providing notice to the voter that he would be removed from the rolls if he did not respond and failed to vote in the next two federal general elections.Indiana replaced Act 442 with Act 334, ending Indiana’s participation in Crosscheck in favor of the Indiana Data Enhancement Association, which is functionally identical to Crosscheck. The Act makes county officials responsible for deciding whether to remove a name, deleting Act 442’s requirement that county officials automatically remove the voter from the rolls. Act 334 instructs county officials to determine: whether a presumptive match in another state “is the same individual who is a registered voter of the county”; whether the registration in another state occurred after the presumptively matching Indiana registration; and whether the voter “authorized the cancellation of any previous registration” when the voter registered in the second state.The Seventh Circuit held that Act 334 is also preempted; it renders inapplicable the rule that a voter must personally authorize the cancellation of her registration before the county official may take that step. View "Common Cause Indiana v. Sullivan" on Justia Law

Kaplarevic filed for disability insurance benefits in 2012, alleging that he became disabled on August 1, 2012. His “date last insured” was December 31, 2014, meaning that if his disability arose any later than that, he would not be eligible for benefits.The Seventh Circuit affirmed the denial of benefits, rejecting Kaplarevic’s arguments that an ALJ improperly considered his own observations of Kaplarevic’s physical condition and ability to perform certain physical tasks at a 2018 hearing. Kaplarevic sought an open-ended period of disability so he needed to show that he became disabled before his date last insured and that he was still disabled. The court noted the ALJ’s 15-page opinion, which evaluated extensive medical and behavioral evidence. It was Kaplarevic’s burden to show disability, and if he wanted to do so, he should have accepted the ALJ’s invitation “to identify the portions of the medical records that he believed supported various of [his] allegations.” Vague references to the “totality of the evidence” are not helpful. The ALJ’s opinion did not rely on the failure to seek treatment as a factor demonstrating lack of disability; the record showed that Kaplarevic did not comply with prescribed therapy and that his pain complaints were not consistent with objective medical findings. View "Kaplarevic v. Saul" on Justia Law

In 1989, the Hamel Fire Protection District and Alhambra Fire Protection District formed a joint venture, “the Service” to provide ambulance service to residents of both districts. In 2012, a Service-operated ambulance collided with a semi-truck. The semi-truck drivers and ambulance passengers were seriously injured. The accident produced three lawsuits that eventually settled. Continental paid all attorney’s fees assessed for Hamel Fire’s defenses. Country Mutual had issued a multiperil commercial lines insurance policy to the Service.. Hamel Fire was the named insured on the Continental policy. Continental defended Hamel Fire in each lawsuit after first tendering them to Country Mutual, which ignored each tender. The ambulance was a covered auto under policies issued by both, which provided primary coverage for owned autos and excess coverage for non-owned autos.Continental sued Country Mutual. The district court granted Continental’s motion for summary judgment finding that the Service, and not Hamel Fire, owned the ambulance. Based on that finding, and both policies’ “Other Insurance” clauses, the court determined that Country Mutual owed primary coverage for the costs to defend Hamel Fire in the underlying lawsuits, while Continental only owed excess coverage. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, reasoning that the evidence strongly reflects the parties’ intent that Country Mutual’s insured owned the ambulance. The resulting award of attorney’s fees under Illinois law was reasonable. View "Continental Western Insurance Co. v. Country Mutual Insurance Co." on Justia Law