Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

In 2009, Grotts applied for Social Security disability benefits, citing depression and low functional capacity. She had previously worked as a caretaker for a child with disabilities and he cared for her own child. Her case was remanded four times. Five times, an ALJ concluded that Grotts was not disabled. The final ALJ found that she could still perform light work with some restrictions and because a significant number of jobs fitting that description existed in the national economy.The district court agreed. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting arguments that the ALJ erred in its evaluation of Grotts’s subjective complaints about her symptoms, in its evaluation of the medical opinion evidence, and in its residual functional capacity determination. Substantial evidence supported the ALJ’s weighing of the medical opinion evidence and its RFC determination. The ALJ did not patently err in its evaluation of Grotts’s subjective complaints. View "Grotts v. Kijakazi" on Justia Law

In 2015, Talignani, a U.S. military veteran, consulted a VA neurosurgeon, who recommended that he undergo neck surgery. Because the VA could not perform a timely surgery, the surgeon suggested Talignani obtain evaluation and treatment at Saint Louis University Hospital. Talignani agreed and expressed a preference for the Hospital because he had previously undergone surgery there. A nurse obtained the VA’s approval to secure treatment for Talignani at a non-VA provider. The VA agreed to pay for “evaluation and treatment rendered pursuant to the non-VA provider’s plan of care.” The VA then sent a request for outpatient services to the Hospital. The Hospital agreed to treat Talignani and asked the VA to conduct several pre-operative tests. In January 2016, Dr. Mercier performed neck surgery on Talignani using the Hospital’s facility and staff. Talignani died shortly after being released.Talignani’s estate alleged he was prescribed excessive pain medication prior to his discharge, which proximately caused his death. An administrative complaint with the VA was denied. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the summary judgment rejection of a suit under the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. 1346(b). The Act waives sovereign immunity for certain torts committed by “employee[s] of the Government.” The estate’s claim does not involve a government employee. View "Talignani v. United States" on Justia Law

Mandrell, born in 198, pursued her education through one year in college. In 2005-2009, she served in the Coast Guard, which she left with an honorable discharge. While in service she was the victim of a rape by a fellow service member. She developed PTSD and anxiety afterward. The VA found her to be 100% disabled based on a service-related cause and awarded benefits but later revised her level of disability down to 70%. Mandrell’s 2017 application for Social Security disability benefits was denied and the Appeals Council denied her request for review. The district court affirmed.The Seventh Circuit reversed and remanded. The ALJ failed to connect the residual functional capacity he found with the evidence in the record, and he did not adequately account for her deficits in concentration, persistence, and pace. The ALJ apparently accepted that Mandrell suffered from PTSD as a result of the rape, but dismissed most of the symptoms that accompanied that condition. While the Social Security Administration is not bound by the VA’s assessment of Mandrell’s disability, the underlying medical evidence on which the VA relied is just as relevant to the social‐security determination as it was to the VA. View "Mandrell v. Kijakazi" on Justia Law

Bourke was exposed to fumes during his employment with the Veterans Administration. He received treatment at a VA hospital and contends that medical malpractice there caused him serious injuries. He sought compensation from the Department of Labor under the Federal Employees Compensation Act for on-the-job injuries and from the United States under the Federal Tort Claims Act for medical malpractice. The Department of Labor processed Bourke’s claim but found that he had not shown that his asserted injuries had been caused by exposure to fumes. The VA (handling the FTCA claim) concluded that, once Bourke applied to the Department of Labor, all other sources of relief were precluded. Bourke sued under the Tort Claims Act, conceding the Department of Labor’s conclusion that conditions at work did not cause the medical issues for which he was treated by the VA, and alleging medical malpractice.The district court rejected his complaint on the ground that the Federal Employees Compensation Act offers his sole avenue of relief.; once the Department of Labor adjudicates a claim, the applicant must accept the result because 5 U.S.C. 8116(c) forecloses other sources of relief and 5 U.S.C. 8128(b)(2) blocks judicial review of the Department’s decisions.The Seventh Circuit vacated. Bourke is not seeking judicial review of the Department of Labor’s decision. Someone who loses before the Department cannot contest that outcome in court but may pursue other remedies that are compatible with the Department’s views. View "Bourke v. United States" on Justia Law

Ruenger applied for Social Security Disability benefits in 2015, alleging that he had limited use of his left arm and mental impairments including anxiety and depression. At a hearing, the ALJ determined that Ruenger had not worked within the claim period, that his mental and physical impairments were severe but did not presumptively establish a disability, and that he had the capacity to perform light work with certain physical and social limitations. At the final step of the inquiry, the ALJ determined—based on a vocational expert’s testimony—that Ruenger could still perform jobs that exist nationwide in significant numbers and denied Ruenger’s application.The Seventh Circuit vacated and remanded. Substantial evidence does not support the ALJ’s decision. ALJs cannot afford complete discretion to vocational experts. When a claimant challenges a vocational expert’s job-number estimate, the ALJ must inquire whether the methodology used by the expert is reliable. In this case, the vocational expert enlisted by the agency to estimate the number of jobs suitable for Ruenger omitted crucial details about her methodology, such as the source of her job numbers and the reason she used the equal distribution method; the ALJ nevertheless relied on the expert’s testimony. View "Ruenger v. Kijakazi" on Justia Law

Two churches sued Illinois Governor Pritzker after he issued an executive order that limited to 10 the number of people who could attend a religious service during the COVID-19 pandemic. The district court declined to enjoin enforcement. By the time the appeal reached the Seventh Circuit, Pritzker had rescinded the order. The court held that the case was not moot but that the order did not violate the Free Exercise Clause. The churches nonetheless requested that the district court issue an injunction, citing recent Supreme Court decisions. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the request. The court noted that the Governor will likely consider recent legal developments in crafting any new order in response to the recent surge. The court further noted that Pritzker is entitled to qualified immunity and that an award of damages is not available. View "Elim Romanian Pentecostal Church v. Pritzker" on Justia Law

The Ludwig hiking group purchased vehicle passes from the ranger station in Oregon's Mount Hood Wilderness, federal land administered by the Forest Service, which provides parking areas and trail access. As the hikers crossed the Sandy River on a wooden seasonal bridge installed by the Service, a logjam ruptured, sending a wave of water and debris at the bridge. Ludwig was thrown into the river and drowned.The Seventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of the government in a wrongful death action under the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. 2671. Oregon statutes create immunity for a landowner from tort claims for any death that arises out of the use of the land for recreational purposes unless the owner charges for that recreational use; tort immunity applies if the owner charges only a “parking fee of $15 or less per day.” The Federal Lands Recreation Enhancement Act allows the Service to charge a standard amenity fee for an area that contains designated parking; a permanent toilet facility; a permanent trash receptacle; picnic tables; and security services. The Forest Service requires Ramona Falls visitors to purchase a $5 "National Forest Recreation Pass" to park; it tells users to “DISPLAY IN VEHICLE.” The Service does not require a pass or collect fees from hikers, bikers, and horseback riders who do not park a vehicle. It does not matter that the Service included other amenities; the charge was, ultimately, for parking. View "Ludwig v. United States" on Justia Law

Stevens, a Political Science professor at Northwestern University, researching the relations between the foreign campuses of American universities, the federal government, and private‐sector entities, submitted Freedom of Information Act requests to the State Department. She sought all materials from the Department’s headquarters and the Qatar U.S. consulate referring to Northwestern’s Qatar campus; policy and planning materials relating to the establishment of U.S. university campuses in Qatar, Abu Dhabi, South Korea, China, and Singapore; and documents sent to or from the U.S. Agency for International Development and documents produced, received, or maintained by the Middle East Partnership Initiative relating to U.S. Government funds transferred to the Independent Center of Journalists, Northwestern University and its components, and the Center of Journalism Excellence. After Stevens filed suit, the Department provided Stevens with 128 complete records and 350 partial records responsive to the Northwestern request, 29 complete records and two partial records responsive to the USAID/MEPI request, and no records responsive to the Campuses request. It withheld 24 records and submitted a 35‐page declaration describing its search processes and a Vaughn index describing each withheld document and the grounds for withholding it.The Seventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of the Department, rejecting arguments that summary judgment was improper because the Department’s searches were inadequate and because its withholdings were unwarranted. View "Stevens v. United States Department of State" on Justia Law

Belt Railway, the largest switching and terminal railroad in the U.S., has more than 250 miles of track in its main yard south of Chicago’s Midway Airport. Jointly owned by six railroads—BNSF, Canadian National, Canadian Pacific, CSX, Norfolk Southern, and Union Pacific—Belt dispatches more than 8,000 cars a day. Wisconsin Central (a Canadian National subsidiary) prefers to receive Soo Line (a Canadian Pacific subsidiary) traffic at Belt’s yard; Soo prefers the Spaulding yard, 25 miles to the west. The Surface Transportation Board ruled that Wisconsin Central cannot insist that Soo deliver to Belt because a carrier’s power to designate a place where it will receive traffic is limited to line that the designating carrier owns; Wisconsin Central does not wholly own Belt.The Seventh Circuit vacated. “A rail carrier ... shall provide reasonable, proper, and equal facilities that are within its power to provide for the interchange of traffic between … its respective line and a connecting line of another rail carrier, 49 U.S.C. 10742. The Board improperly read “that are within its power to provide” as “that it owns.” A rail carrier can have the “power to provide” facilities by ownership or under a contract. The Board also erred in assuming that the statute requires the two railroads have physically intersecting lines and in making an assumption about expenses. The word “reasonable” gives the Board interpretive leeway; the phrase “that are within its power to provide” does not. View "Wisconsin Central Ltd. v. Surface Transportation Board" on Justia Law

White, a white supremacist, is now in federal prison. His Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. 552, requests concern a conspiracy theory: that the racist movement he joined is really an elaborate government sting operation. Dissatisfied with the pace at which the FBI and Marshals Service released responsive records and their alleged failure to reveal other records, White filed suit.The court granted the agencies summary judgment and denied White’s subsequent motion seeking costs because the Marshals Service alone was delinquent in responding; the 1,500 pages held by that agency were an insubstantial piece of the litigation compared to 100,000 pages of FBI documents. The court stated that “the transparent purpose of White’s FOIA requests and lawsuit was to harass the government, not to obtain information useful to the public.” White then filed an unsuccessful motion to reconsider, arguing that the court should not render a final decision until the FBI had redacted, copied, and sent all the responsive records, which will take more than a decade. White next moved to hold the Marshals Service in contempt for telling the court in 2018 that it would soon start sending him records; by 2020 White had received nothing. The court admonished the agency but determined that no judicial order had been violated. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The district judge “carefully parsed White’s numerous and wide-ranging arguments and explained the result." View "White v. United States Department of Justice" on Justia Law