Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

A federal district judge issued an injunction that blocks the State of Wisconsin from conducting a judicially supervised criminal investigation into whether certain persons have violated the state’s campaign-finance laws. The court acted despite 28 U.S.C. 2283, the Anti-Injunction Act, which provides: “A court of the United States may not grant an injunction to stay proceedings in a State court except as expressly authorized by Act of Congress, or where necessary in aid of its jurisdiction, or to protect or effectuate its judgments.” In 1972 the Supreme Court (Mitchum v. Foster) held that 42 U.S.C.1983 authorizes anti-suit injunctions if appropriate under principles of “equity, comity, and federalism.” The Seventh Circuit held that this case does not present a situation in which state proceedings may be displaced. The Anti-Injunction Act embodies a fundamental principle of federalism: state courts are free to conduct their own litigation, without ongoing supervision by federal judges, let alone threats by federal judges to hold state judges in contempt. The scope given to state litigation is especially great in the realm of criminal investigations and prosecutions. The court remanded the case with instructions to dismiss, leaving all further proceedings to the courts of Wisconsin.View "O'Keefe v. Chisholm" on Justia Law

Following the 2010 census, and pursuant to state law, Chicago sought to reapportion its 50 aldermanic wards, 65 ILCS 20/21-36. The City Council conducted hearings to solicit the views of citizens and, in 2012, approved the redistricting plan by a vote of 41 to eight. Chicago’s population was 2,695,598, which, if divided equally, would result in 53,912 people in each ward. The wards created by the new map deviate from the average population per ward by a maximum of 8.7 percent. Objectors alleged that the new map was implemented prematurely and deprived constituents of their right to equal protection; that the maximum deviation of 8.7 percent violated the Equal Protection Clause; that the map was arbitrary; that it politically discriminated against “independent” aldermen; and that it departed from traditional redistricting criteria. The district court dismissed, finding that the objectors had not alleged permanent disenfranchisement nor a change to election law and had failed to establish prima facie unconstitutionality because a maximum population deviation below 10 percent is considered minor. The complaint did not allege that the map targeted an objectively defined group. The map preserved the voting rights of minorities; disfavoring certain aldermen over others is an inherent part of the political process and an inevitable result of redistricting. The Seventh Circuit affirmed.View "League of Women Voters of Chicago v. City of Chicago" on Justia Law

Illinois law bars persons convicted of certain crimes from holding public office, 10 ILCS 5/29-1-5. Parker sought to run for a seat on the Peoria school board. The state’s attorney sought to bar Parker, who had been convicted of felony theft in the 1980s, from pursuing that office. After a brief hearing held on short notice, a state court ordered Parker’s name removed from the ballot and enjoined him from running. Parker sued in federal court, arguing violations of due process and equal protection by denying him a chance to defend himself and targeting him based on his race (African American), and challenging the constitutionality of the law on its face. The district court dismissed the suit as barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, immunity, and claim preclusion. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, finding that immunity, not Rooker-Feldman, bars the enforcement claims and that, even if claim preclusion did not preclude a facial attack on the statute, that challenge fails on the merits. View "Parker v. Lyons" on Justia Law

Beavers was a Chicago alderman from 1983-2006, when he began serving as a Cook County Commissioner. He was the chairman of each of his three campaign committees and the only authorized signor for each committee’s bank account. Beavers’ federal tax returns underreported his 2005 income, misstated expenditures in semi-annual disclosure reports (D-2s), did not disclose use of campaign funds to increase his pension annuity, misrepresented loans between the committees and Beavers, did not report monthly stipends that Beavers took as a Commissioner, and did not disclose that Beavers wrote himself checks totaling $226,300 from committee accounts to finance gambling trips, without documenting the purpose of the expenditures or any repayment. After federal agents approached Beavers in connection with a grand jury investigation, Beavers filed amended tax returns and attempted to repay the committees. Beavers was convicted of three counts of violating 26 U.S.C. 7206(1), which prohibits willfully making a material false statement on a tax return, and with one count of violating 26 U.S.C. 7212(a), which prohibits corruptly obstructing the IRS in its administration of the tax laws. Beavers was sentenced to six months’ imprisonment and was ordered to pay about $31,000 in restitution and a $10,000 fine. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. View "United States v. Beavers" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs challenged Wisconsin’s campaign-finance law in light of the Supreme Court decision, Citizens United (2010), alleging that laws concerning groups that spend money for political speech independently of candidates and parties are vague and overbroad and unjustifiably burden the free-speech rights of independent political speakers in violation of the First Amendment. The Seventh Circuit previously invalidated section 11.26(4), which capped at $10,000 the aggregate annual amount a donor could give to state and local candidates, political parties, and political committees. Remaining claims challenge a ban on political spending by corporations, interlocking definitions that determine “political committee” status, “noncoordination” oath and disclaimer requirements for independent political messages, among other provisions. The district court enjoined the ban on corporate political spending, partially enjoined a regulatory disclaimer rule, and denied an injunction on other challenges. The Seventh Circuit vacated with instructions to enter a new injunction to conform to the specificity requirements of FRCP Rule 65(d). On the merits, the court stated that the First Amendment requires a heightened degree of regulatory clarity and close fit between the government’s means and its end; some forms of regulation are categorically impermissible. Wisconsin Statutes Chapter 11 has not been updated to reflect new Supreme Court doctrine; administrative rules do not cohere with the statutes and the state elections agency has given conflicting signals about its intent to enforce some provisions. Certain provisions (the ban on corporate political spending and the cap on the amount a corporation may spend to raise money for an affiliated PAC) are obviously unconstitutional under Citizens. Others fail First Amendment standards as applied to independent political speakers. Some provisions are valid. View "WI Right to Life, Inc. v. Barland" on Justia Law

Candidates for Chicago mayor, city treasurer, or city clerk must submit signatures from 12,500 “legal voters of the city” to have their name printed on the ballot, 65 ILCS 20/21-28(b). This number is just under 1% of the 1.3 million registered Chicago voters. As a proportion of active voters, the number is higher. Candidates are advised to allow some margin for error, in case of challenges. They have 90 days in which to gather signatures. Voters may not sign more than one nominating petition for the same office in a single election cycle. Chicago’s most recent general election took place in February 2011; 20 candidates submitted petitions to run for mayor, including four of the plaintiffs. Only Walls gathered enough signatures to appear on the ballot. The plaintiffs challenged the 12,500-signature requirement. The district court denied their motion for a preliminary injunction. While an interlocutory appeal was pending Rahm Emanuel was elected mayor. Walls came in sixth. The Seventh Circuit dismissed the appeal as moot. The plaintiffs amended their complaint to also challenge the 90-day limitation and the rule that a voter cannot sign more than one candidate’s petition in any election cycle. The district court concluded that their claims had been “soundly rejected by extensive Supreme Court and Seventh Circuit precedent” and dismissed. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. View "Stone v. Bd. of Election Comm'rs for the City of Chicago" on Justia Law

The major political parties in Marion County, Indiana followed a tradition of “slating” candidates that have the financial and organizational backing of party leadership in the primaries. Indiana enacted an “anti-slating” statute, prohibiting distribution of a list endorsing multiple political candidates during a primary election unless all such candidates have given written consent, Ind. Code 3-14-1-2(a). More than 10 years ago, that law was challenged as violating the First Amendment, resulting in a federal injunction against its future enforcement and a consent decree in which all parties stipulated and the court declared that the law was facially unconstitutional. The Marion County Election Board was a defendant, but nonetheless enforced the statute against a candidate running for state representative in the 2012 primary. That candidate sought an injunction. The district court dismissed the case under the “Younger” abstention doctrine, citing a still-ongoing Election Board investigation. The Seventh Circuit reversed. The Election Board’s investigation is too preliminary a proceeding to warrant Younger abstention, at least in light of the Supreme Court’s 2013 decision, Sprint Communications, Inc. v. Jacobs. Even if Younger abstention were theoretically available, the previous final federal judgment against the Election Board would amount to an extraordinary circumstance making Younger abstention inappropriate. View "Mulholland v. Marion Cnty. Election Bd." on Justia Law

Snyder was involved in a fistfight with another town council member. He was convicted of battery. The court imposed a sentence of six months suspended and six months of home detention, but later determined that Snyder had violated probation. Snyder served the remainder of his sentence at the county jail. While Snyder was incarcerated, the County Voter Registration Board informed him that his voter registration had been cancelled under Ind. Code 3-7-46. Snyder knew that Indiana law permits him to reregister to vote at any time following release from jail. Snyder refused to re-register. He was turned away from voting in a special election. He sued under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging violations of the National Voter Registration Act, 42 U.S.C. 1973gg; the Help America Vote Act, 42 U.S.C. 15301; the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. 1971; and the U.S. and Indiana Constitutions. On certification, the Indiana Supreme Court held that the Indiana Constitution authorized temporary disenfranchisement of any incarcerated convict. The district court dismissed the state defendants on sovereign immunity grounds; held that a county cannot be held liable under Section 1983 for acts done under state or federal law; and held that claims to enjoin de-registration or require reinstatement were not justiciable. Despite all parties arguing to the contrary, the Seventh Circuit found the case moot. Snyder waived any challenge to dismissal of the state defendants and failed to state a Monell claim against the county defendants. View "Snyder v. King" on Justia Law

Under Illinois law, a candidate for the state legislature seeking placement on the general election ballot without having participated in a primary (or having replaced a candidate who did) must submit a nominating petition signed by a certain number of eligible voters. In July 2012, the Chicago Board of Election Commissioners determined that five Republican candidates for the state legislature had not collected the requisite numbers of signatures and denied their petitions to be listed on the ballot in the 2012 general election. In September the candidates and supporters sought injunctive and declaratory relief, alleging that the statutory scheme violated their constitutional rights to free speech and association under the First and Fourteenth Amendments. The district court dismissed, holding that the doctrine of laches barred their claims. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, after holding that laches does not apply because the delay in filing suit did not impact the Board’’ ability to fashion prospective relief in future elections. The requirement that candidates seeking ballot access submit nominating petitions is reasonable and nondiscriminatory, and serves the important regulatory interests of protecting the integrity of elections from frivolous candidates and preventing voter confusion; it does not unconstitutionally burden the candidates’ and voters’ expressive and associational rights. View "Navarro v. Neal" on Justia Law

The Center broadcasts advertisements, maintains a website, publishes a weekly e-mail newsletter, produces a bi-weekly radio show, and engages in other forms of mass media communications. Its tax exempt status under section 501(c)(4) is incompatible with partisan political activity, so the Center cannot endorse candidates. During election seasons, the Center runs advertisements that refer to the positions of candidates or to ballot issues and call for actions such as contacting candidates. The Center claims that it feared that Illinois’s new campaign finance laws (10 ILCS 5/9) would require it to register as a “political committee” and to disclose election-related expenditures and significant contributors and that its donors require assurances that their identities will not be disclosed. The Center argued that the law was vague and overbroad. The district court dismissed. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, noting that the Illinois law is modeled on federal law. The Center did not establish that the statute “prohibits a substantial amount of protected speech,” or that its “deterrent effect on legitimate expression is ... real and substantial.”View "Ctr, for Individual Freedom v. Madigan" on Justia Law