Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The Seventh Circuit denied petitions for initial hearing en banc in appeals concerning Wisconsin’s law requiring voters to have qualifying photo identification. The court noted that Wisconsin will start printing absentee ballots this month and that it is unlikely that qualified electors will be unable to vote under Wisconsin’s current procedures. The state had assured the court that temporary credentials will be available to all qualified persons who seek them. Wisconsin has enacted a rule that requires the Division of Motor Vehicles to mail automatically a free photo ID to anyone who comes to DMV one time and initiates the free ID process. No one must present documents, that, for some, have proved challenging to acquire; no one must show a birth certificate, or proof of citizenship, so the urgency needed to justify an initial en banc hearing has not been shown. The state adequately informed the general public of the plan and the district court​ has the authority to monitor compliance. View "One Wis. Inst., Inc. v. Thomsen" on Justia Law

In 2011 Wisconsin enacted a statute requiring voters to present photographic identification. A federal district judge found violation of the Constitution and the Voting Rights Act and enjoined its application. The Seventh Circuit reversed. After the Supreme Court declined review, the state amended Act 23 to require acceptance of veterans’ IDs. The district court declined to address plaintiffs' remaining argument that some persons qualified to vote are entitled to relief because they face daunting obstacles to obtaining acceptable photo ID. The Seventh Circuit vacated in part; it did not previously hold that persons unable to get a photo ID with reasonable effort lack a serious grievance. The right to vote is personal and is not defeated by the fact that 99% of other people can secure the necessary credentials easily. Under Wisconsin’s law, people who do not have qualifying photo ID cannot vote, even if it is impossible for them to get such an ID. Plaintiffs want relief from that prohibition, not from the general application of Act 23. The district court should permit the parties to explore how the state’s system works today before considering plaintiffs’ remaining substantive contentions. View "Frank v. Walker" on Justia Law

Smith was appointed to the Illinois House of Representatives to complete an unfinished term. During his campaign to be elected in his own right, his assistant, “Pete,” alerted the FBI that Smith might be corrupt. Pete began recording conversations. At the FBI’s suggestion, Pete told Smith that a constituent would provide $7,000 if Smith wrote a letter supporting her state grant application. There was no such woman; the money would come from the FBI. Smith wrote the letter and received $7,000. Smith used some of the money to pay campaign staff; a search of his home turned up the rest. At Smith’s trial for violating 18 U.S.C. 666(a)(1)(B) and 1951, the prosecutor introduced the recorded conversations with Pete. Neither side called Pete as a witness: he may have been stealing from the FBI. Pete said that he would not testify, asserting his constitutional self-incrimination privilege. The prosecutor did not seek use immunity; defense counsel did not call Pete to see whether the judge would honor his privilege assertion. Questioning why Smith did not raise the hearsay doctrine, the Seventh Circuit affirmed the conviction, rejecting an argument under the Confrontation Clause. If the statements are not hearsay, they are not testimonial. Smith was not convicted on hearsay or of out-of-court testimonial statements. Smith’s own words and deeds convicted him. View "United States v. Smith" on Justia Law

Common Cause is a national organization that advocates for elimination of barriers to voting. ICommon Cause Indiana challenged the constitutionality of Indiana Code 33-33-49-13, which establishes the process for electing judges to the Marion Superior Court in Marion County. This system is unique in Indiana, as it is the only office where primary election voters do not vote for as many candidates as there are persons to be elected to that office in the general election. Common Cause contends that the procedure violates the First and Fourteenth Amendments. The district court and Seventh Circuit agreed.The statute burdens the right to cast a meaningful vote without sufficiently weighty interests to justify such a burden. In the context of partisan judicial elections, which the state has chosen to adopt as its preferred system for selecting judges for the Marion Superior Court, the asserted benefits and interests surrounding partisan balance do not justify the burden placed on the right to vote. View "Common Cause Ind. v. Individual Members of the Ind. Election Comm'n" on Justia Law

Before the 2008 presidential election, federal agents were investigating then-Governor Blagojevich and obtained warrants authorizing the interception of his phone calls. When Barack Obama, then a Senator from Illinois, won the election, Blagojevich was to appoint his replacement. Interceptions revealed that Blagojevich viewed the opportunity to appoint a new Senator as a bonanza. After two trials, Blagojevich was convicted of 18 crimes, including attempted extortion from campaign contributors, corrupt solicitation of funds, wire fraud, and lying to federal investigators. The district court sentenced Blagojevich to 168 months’ imprisonment. The Seventh Circuit vacated convictions on five counts, concerning Blagojevich’s proposal to appoint Valerie Jarrett to the Senate in exchange for an appointment to the Cabinet, and remanded. The court rejected a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, but concluded the instructions permitted the jury to convict even if it found that his only request of Obama was for a Cabinet position. A proposal to trade one public act for another, logrolling, is unlike the swap of an official act for a private payment. The instructions do not ensure that the jury found that Blagojevich offered to trade the appointment for a private salary. Because the court affirmed on most counts and concluded that the sentencing range lies above 168 months, Blagojevich is not entitled to release pending further proceedings. View "United States v. Blagojevich" on Justia Law

In March 2013, Reeder received a letter from Phelon, the press secretary for Illinois Senate President Cullerton, informing Reeder that his request for Senate media credentials as a writer for the Illinois Policy Institute (IPI) was denied because IPI was registered as an Illinois lobbying entity. Phelon explained that Senate rules forbid credentials for anyone associated with a lobbying entity. Reeder tried again in January 2014 to obtain media credentials from the Illinois House of Representatives and Senate, arguing that IPI was no longer registered as a lobbyist. The Senate took the position that IPI was still required to register as a lobbyist given its retention of a lobbying firm that employed the same staff and office space as IPI itself. It again denied Reeder’s application. The Illinois House responded in kind. Reeder and IPI sued Illinois House Speaker Madigan and Cullerton, and their press secretaries under 42 U.S.C. 1983, claiming violation of his First Amendment right to freedom of the press, and his rights to due process and equal protection. The Seventh Circuit affirmed dismissal, concluding that the denial of credentials qualified as legislative activity and entitled the defendants to immunity. View "Reeder v. Madigan" on Justia Law

Since 2005 Indiana has required voters to present photographic identification at the polls. In 2008, the Supreme Court (Crawford decision) held that the statute is compatible with the Constitution. In 2011 Wisconsin enacted a similar statute, 2011 Wis. Act 23. A district court held that Act 23 is unconstitutional and enjoined its implementation. The Seventh Circuit stayed that injunction, but subsequently reversed, holding that the district court’s findings do not justify an outcome different from Crawford, in which the Justices concluded that prevention of voter impersonation on election day and preservation of public confidence in the integrity of elections justify a photo ID requirement, even though persons who do not already have government-issued photo IDs must spend time to acquire necessary documents (such as birth certificates) and stand in line at a public agency to get one. Wisconsin’s law differs from Indiana’s, but not in ways that matter under the analysis in Crawford. View "League of United Latin Am. Citizens of WI v. Deininger" on Justia Law

2011 Wis. Act 23 required a photo ID for voting, similar to an Indiana law, which the Supreme Court upheld in Crawford v. Marion County Election Board (2008). After the district court enjoined enforcement of the law, the Supreme Court of Wisconsin reversed two similar injunctions issued by state courts but ordered state officials to make it easier for registered voters to obtain documentation (such as birth certificates) that they may need to obtain photo IDs, or to waive the documentation requirement if obtaining birth certificates proves difficult or expensive. With the state injunctions lifted, the state requested a stay of the federal injunction so that it could use the photo ID requirement in this fall’s election. A divided Seventh Circuit granted a stay and denied reconsideration, noting Wisconsin’s “strong prospect of success on appeal’ and the public interest in using laws enacted through the democratic process, until the laws’ validity has been finally determined. The burden of getting a photo ID in Wisconsin is not materially different from the burden that Crawford deemed acceptable. View "Frank v. Walker" on Justia Law

A federal district judge issued an injunction that blocks the State of Wisconsin from conducting a judicially supervised criminal investigation into whether certain persons have violated the state’s campaign-finance laws. The court acted despite 28 U.S.C. 2283, the Anti-Injunction Act, which provides: “A court of the United States may not grant an injunction to stay proceedings in a State court except as expressly authorized by Act of Congress, or where necessary in aid of its jurisdiction, or to protect or effectuate its judgments.” In 1972 the Supreme Court (Mitchum v. Foster) held that 42 U.S.C.1983 authorizes anti-suit injunctions if appropriate under principles of “equity, comity, and federalism.” The Seventh Circuit held that this case does not present a situation in which state proceedings may be displaced. The Anti-Injunction Act embodies a fundamental principle of federalism: state courts are free to conduct their own litigation, without ongoing supervision by federal judges, let alone threats by federal judges to hold state judges in contempt. The scope given to state litigation is especially great in the realm of criminal investigations and prosecutions. The court remanded the case with instructions to dismiss, leaving all further proceedings to the courts of Wisconsin.View "O'Keefe v. Chisholm" on Justia Law

Following the 2010 census, and pursuant to state law, Chicago sought to reapportion its 50 aldermanic wards, 65 ILCS 20/21-36. The City Council conducted hearings to solicit the views of citizens and, in 2012, approved the redistricting plan by a vote of 41 to eight. Chicago’s population was 2,695,598, which, if divided equally, would result in 53,912 people in each ward. The wards created by the new map deviate from the average population per ward by a maximum of 8.7 percent. Objectors alleged that the new map was implemented prematurely and deprived constituents of their right to equal protection; that the maximum deviation of 8.7 percent violated the Equal Protection Clause; that the map was arbitrary; that it politically discriminated against “independent” aldermen; and that it departed from traditional redistricting criteria. The district court dismissed, finding that the objectors had not alleged permanent disenfranchisement nor a change to election law and had failed to establish prima facie unconstitutionality because a maximum population deviation below 10 percent is considered minor. The complaint did not allege that the map targeted an objectively defined group. The map preserved the voting rights of minorities; disfavoring certain aldermen over others is an inherent part of the political process and an inevitable result of redistricting. The Seventh Circuit affirmed.View "League of Women Voters of Chicago v. City of Chicago" on Justia Law