Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

In 2010 Price was a full-time tenured Chicago Public Schools teacher who was working in a program to improve the class-room teaching skills of other teachers. In all of her evaluations, she was rated excellent or superior. In 2010, the Board of Education authorized the discharge of 1,289 teachers, some of whom were tenured. At the same time as the layoffs, Price alleges CPS was continuing to hire teachers to fill vacant positions, including new hires with no prior experience. Price alleges that she was not considered for any vacant positions, nor was she given any notice of existing vacant positions before her layoff and that the Board did not implement procedures to allow laid-off tenured teachers to show they were qualified to fill vacant positions. Price filed a 42 U.S.C. 1983 suit one year later on behalf of herself and a putative class of similarly situated teachers. The district court dismissed because Price did not identify any protected property interest that could give rise to a due process claim. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, based on an Illinois Supreme Court opinion that tenure did not create the claimed property rights. View "Price v. Bd. of Educ. of the City of Chicago" on Justia Law

Carmody worked for the University of Illinois for 25 years until he was fired for reasons involving a security breach of the university’s email system. The breach was connected to a state court lawsuit Carmody was pursuing against a university professor, alleging that the professor had assaulted him. Carmody says that he discovered several printed emails, contradicting affidavits filed in the case, in the newspaper box outside his home. Carmody gave the emails to his lawyer. After unsuccessfully appealing his discharge, Carmody filed, claiming violations of the Due Process Clause and an Illinois statute designed to protect whistle-blowers. The district court dismissed. The Seventh Circuit reversed in part, stating that Carmody has plausibly alleged that his pre-termination opportunity to be heard was meaningless because he could not answer the university’s crucial questions or respond to its accusations without violating a state court order that required him not to discuss the subject. The university fired Carmody on the same day the state court modified its order to allow him to respond to the charges. Carmody also alleged that he was actually fired based in part on a charge for which he had no prior notice and opportunity to be heard. View "Carmody v. Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of IL" on Justia Law

A.H.’s Greensburg, Indiana school has a policy: Hair Styles which create problems of health and sanitation, obstruct vision, or call undue attention to the athlete are not acceptable….. Each varsity head coach will be responsible for determining acceptable length of hair for a particular sport. The head varsity basketball coach has established an unwritten hair-length policy, providing that each player’s hair must be cut above the ears, eyebrows, and collar, to promote “team unity” and project a “clean cut” image. The boys’ baseball teams have a similar policy; the track and football teams do not. No girls’ team is subject to a hair-length policy. When A.H. refused to comply, he was removed from the team. The district court denied a preliminary injunction and rejected substantive due process claim, acknowledging that one’s choice of hairstyle is an element of liberty protected by the Fourteenth Amendment, but noting that public schools have authority to enact and enforce dress and grooming policies and may condition participation in interscholastic sports upon a greater degree of regulation than imposed on students generally. The Seventh Circuit reversed in part, reasoning that the policy treats boys and girls differently; there was no evidence of comparable grooming standards applied to girls playing basketball. The evidence supported the sex discrimination claims.View "Hayden v. Greensburg Cmty Sch. Corp." on Justia Law

Charlie has Type 1 diabetes, managed with an insulin pump, a personal diabetes manager, and a continuous glucose monitor. Before Charlie entered kindergarten, his parents worked with the school district to develop a “504 plan” to enable him to attend public school. Charlie’s plan incorporated doctor’s orders for how insulin doses and snacks would be administered at school; required his school to train three “Diabetes Personnel;” and that all staff members who would interact with Charlie be given general training about diabetes. The school hired a licensed nurse, to perform Charlie’s care and held one general training session and one session specific to Charlie’s equipment, attended by almost all staff who would interact with Charlie. In Charlie’s second year, the parents complained to the Department of Education that the school was violating the 504 plan by failing to have three Trained Diabetes Personnel and refusing to allow the nurse to adjust insulin doses on a case-by-case basis. A mediated agreement required the school to conduct training for three nurses and generally required the school to follow the 504 plan. The parents continued to be dissatisfied and moved Charlie to a private school with no medically trained staff and no formal plan for his diabetes care. The district court rejected their suit under the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. 794, and the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. 12132. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, finding neither intentional discrimination nor failure to reasonably accommodate Charlie’s diabetes.View "CTL v. Ashland Sch. Dist." on Justia Law

The Aurora School District fired Green from his position as a teacher. His union refused his requests to pursue a grievance under a collective bargaining agreement and to represent him in a suit under the Illinois Teacher Tenure Act. Green sued, won, and was reinstated, then sued, claiming that his union abandoned him because of his race, violating the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 2000e–2(c). Green, who is black, claims that the union has represented comparable white employees in grievance proceedings and litigation under the Tenure Act and that the union retaliated against him because he had opposed earlier discrimination. The district judge called Green’s evidence “conclusory;” concluded that the National Labor Relations Act does not apply to employees of state or local government, so the union did not have a duty of fair representation; and stated that Illinois law does not require teachers’ unions to represent teachers by filing grievances under a collective bargaining agreement or suits under the Tenure Act. The Seventh Circuit vacated and remanded, holding that neither 42 U.S.C. 2000e–2(c) nor 2000e–3(a) makes anything turn on the existence of a statutory or contractual duty violated by the act said to be discriminatory. View "Green v. AFT/IFT Local 604" on Justia Law

Walczak, hired as a teacher in the Chicago Public School system in 1970, obtained tenure and taught continuously until her school’s new principal placed her in a performance remediation program during the 2007–2008 academic year. At the end of that year, she was facing discharge proceedings. Walczak filed a charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission alleging violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. 621. While the EEOC charge was pending, a hearing officer assigned to her discharge proceeding recommended that Walczak be reinstated as a tenured teacher. The Chicago Board of Education rejected the recommendation and terminated her employment. Illinois trial and appellate courts affirmed, applying state law. After the trial court decision, Walczak received a right-to-sue letter from the EEOC and filed suit in federal court The district court dismissed the ADEA suit on the basis of preclusion. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Walczak could have brought her ADEA claim in her state-court suit for judicial review of the Board’s decision. The Board did not acquiesce to claim-splitting. View "Walczak v. Chicago Bd. of Educ." on Justia Law

Medlock, an Indiana University sophomore, lived, by choice in a dormitory, where he was required to allow inspections of his room by graduate students employed by IU. Medlock was given a week’s notice by email and inspection of his floor was announced by intercom on the day of the inspection. On that day, a student inspector entered Medlock’s unoccupied room and saw a clear tube on the desk. Based on his training, he believed that it contained marijuana. Another inspector concurred and called University Police Officer King. They also noticed burned candles, an ashtray containing ashes, and a rolled‐up blanket at the bottom of the door. Smoking of any kind is forbidden in the dormitory, as are “open flame materials,” such as candles. Medlock’s closet was ajar. Officer King saw that it contained six‐foot‐high marijuana plant. He obtained a warrant; further search revealed marijuana paraphernalia, a grow light, and 89 grams of marijuana. Medlock was charged with felony possession of more than 30 grams of marijuana. For unexplained reasons, charges were dropped. The university suspended Medlock for one year. After a year obtained readmission to IU. The district court rejected his suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, in which he sought destruction of the record of his expulsion, and damages from the student inspectors and King. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, noting the ”in‐your-face” flagrancy of violations of university rules and of criminal law. The case is “near frivolous,” suing the student inspectors “offensive,” and “most surprising … is the exceptional lenity.” The court opined that the relation of students to universities is “essentially that of customer to seller.” View " Medlock v. Trs. of IN Univ." on Justia Law

Charleston began his fourth year at the College of Medicine in 2010, having finished his Obstetrics and Gynecology clinical rotation in June. In September, Charleston’s preceptors submitted a complaint, asking that Charleston be required to repeat the rotation, alleging that Charleston had committed errors in written work (including plagiarism), did not complete quizzes until after the rotation’s conclusion, did not have required signatures in his case log, spent four weeks without a preceptor, and he did not perform well enough to pass. The Student Progress Committee held a meeting; Charleston was not permitted to attend, but submitted a letter. The Committee recommended that Charleston be assigned a mentor in the future. Without notice to Charleston, the complaint and Charleston’s letter were forwarded to the Executive Committee with a new letter from Hall, Associate Dean for Student Affairs for the College of Medicine, alleging that in 2008, Charleston had acted “unprofessionally” while serving as a teaching assistant. Charleston had no opportunity to address Hall’s allegation, which, he claims, was false. The Executive Committee decided that Charleston should be dismissed. Internal appeals failed. His suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, claiming procedural due process, substantive due process, and equal protection violations, was dismissed for failure to plead sufficient facts to establish a protected property interest in his continued education, nor to demonstrate that the university singled him out for unfavorable treatment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed.View "Charleston v. Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of IL" on Justia Law

Diadenko began working at Schurz High School in 2009 and became aware of practices relating to Individualized Education Plans for the school’s special education department that, in her opinion, were problematic. After voicing her concerns to school administrators, Diadenko wrote Chicago Mayor Daley His office forwarded her letter to the Board of Education. A Chicago Public School investigator looked into Diadenko’s allegations, but in the interim Diadenko was suspended twice for violating school policies. Diadenko and three others filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging violations of their rights under the First and Fourteenth Amendments and under Illinois law by retaliation for speaking out and for refusing to engage in illegal activity occurring within the school. The court granted the defendants summary judgment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Diadenko failed to present evidence that the principal was aware of her letter to the Mayor before taking disciplinary action against her. View "Diadenko v. Folino" on Justia Law

Craig self-published a book of adult relationship advice, “It’s Her Fault,” in which he discussed sexually provocative themes and used sexually explicit terms. Craig’s employer, a school district, learned of the book and terminated his employment because of it. Craig sued under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging retaliation for engaging in speech protected by the First Amendment. The district court dismissed, reasoning that “It’s Her Fault” did not address a matter of public concern and was not entitled to First Amendment protection. The Seventh Circuit affirmed on an alternative basis. The book deals with adult relationship dynamics, an issue with which many members of the public are concerned, but the school district’s interest in ensuring the effective delivery of counseling services outweighed Craig’s speech interest. The district reasonably predicted that “It’s Her Fault” would disrupt the learning environment at Craig’s school because some students, learning of the book’s hypersexualized content would be reluctant to seek Craig’s advice. View "Craig v. Rich Twp. High Sch. Dist." on Justia Law